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 This thesis argues that William Langland’s Piers Plowman is an important 
contribution to the ways in which the late-medieval church discerned the development of 
doctrine. Langland’s poetry is embedded in a maze of political, philosophical, economic, 
theological and linguistic crosscurrents of fourteenth-century England. Over the course of 
at least thirty years and three distinct versions, Langland’s poem both engages and reacts 
to debates between John Wycliffe and Archbishop Arundel over English politics and the 
practice of vernacular theology. The poem itself becomes wrapped up in the rallying cries 
of John Ball and others during the Great Rising of 1381. It reflects keen attentiveness to 
the visceral exchanges between William of Ockham and Pope John XXIII over wealth, 
poverty and the church’s witness, as it also displays enmeshment within philosophical 
debates between realists and nominalists of the fourteenth century. Langland’s command 
of interconnected and shifting themes is matched only by the brilliance of his art. 
Specifically, a form of poetry that, as this thesis argues, is both distinctly capable of 
investigating the complex themes Piers Plowman examines and particularly fitting for the 
subject of its explorations.  
 Just as Piers Plowman proves capable of demonstrating the elasticity of language 
to stretch out towards the God who is ineffable, the poetry also portrays the consequences 
of that same language breaking, and folding back in upon itself. Langland presents 
practices, virtues, words, and characters whose meanings and identities are turned upside 
down and inside out to reweave the social fabric which makes up the body of Christ into 
a web of death-dealing machinations commanded by anti-Christ. Langland’s 
contributions to church discernment of the development of doctrine are not merely noetic. 
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Rather, Langland’s poetry offers a fierce argument in both form and content for how the 
church might learn to see itself, its Head, the space between, as well as the way to 
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 This thesis is born out of the generosity and expertise of many teachers and 
friends. As a young undergraduate at the University of Georgia, I was extremely 
fortunate to meet Frank Harrison. A Philosophy Professor and a ‘practicing 
Episcopalian’, he taught me to see Plato and Aristotle as invaluable conversation partners 
concerning some of my deepest questions about Christianity and life. His encouragement 
to further investigate my questions at Duke proved a gift for which I will ever be grateful. 
Duke was feast. Stanley Hauerwas embodied the kind of bridge between philosophy and 
Christian ethics Frank promised. And while teachers like Paul Griffiths and Reinhard 
Huetter introduced me to the rigor and depth of the Catholic tradition, David Aers 
simultaneously modeled a theological mind in relentless pursuit of a church semper 
reformanda. David introduced me to Piers Plowman and taught me to love Langland’s 
poetry. My efforts to analyze this great poem simply would not be possible without him. 
 Transforming interest into scholarship is no small task. I am deeply grateful that 
Carol Harrison and Giles Gasper took on such a work by taking me on as a PhD student. 
Giles, in particular, saw this thesis from its very inception through to the end with 
unfailing patience, encouragement and expertise. Giles worked harder, and with more 
hope in me completing this thesis, than any student could ever ask from their supervisor. 
Giles introduced me to Elizabeth Powell in the project’s final year. Her theological 
insights made the present work infinitely better. I continue to be grateful for all that I 
learned about theology and about teaching theology from Mark McIntosh and Lewis 
Ayers, whose presence in a classroom model their own commitment that, as Aquinas 
said, ex modo loquendi datur nobis doctrina. The entire department of Theology and 
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Religion was exceeding generous to me as I worked to bring this project to completion 
through the interruptions that came in the form of the births of our two sons as well as the 
coronavirus pandemic. To everyone at Abbey House, and St. John’s College, I offer my 
most sincere thanks.  
 One’s interest and scholarship must, I think, be oriented towards some telos 
beyond mere curiosity in order to be considered virtuous. Paul Murray and the Centre for 
Catholic studies (CCS) at the University of Durham embody such a commitment. I could 
not have taken on this work without the generous financial support of the CCS and the 
many ways in which the Centre creates an intellectual community blending the life of the 
mind and the life of the church. Joshua Furnal, Thomas Lynch, Charlie Shepherd, and Fr. 
Anthony Currer, all invited me into friendships that enriched and sustained me 
throughout this project, and for which I am deeply grateful.  
 I owe my sincere gratitude to the Institute of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 
(IMEMS), which not only fosters its own unique intellectual community at Durham, but 
also funded my convening two separate panels to present earlier versions of chapter 1 and 
chapter 2.2 at the International Congress on Medieval Studies at Kalamazoo.  
 I have been very fortunate to finish the final stages of writing while teaching 
Church History in the Divinity School at Duke University. The students, professors and 
fellow graduate students have offered constant resource and inspiration in a spirit 
exceeding collegiality. I owe a special thanks to Warren Smith, who met with me weekly 
in the last months to read through every chapter to sharpen my arguments. This work was 
further enriched by the people of Duke Memorial United Methodist church and Durham 
Congregations, Associations and Neighborhoods. The moments of intersection between 
 7 
faith and life that I witness in our shared work offers a constant reminder of Langland’s 
vision. 
I am grateful to my parents for having the kindness and selflessness to encourage 
me along such a winding journey. To my wife, Pamela, this is no place for a love letter. 
Then, of course, love is not best written in letters, but through a life. For the life that you 
have so beautifully shared with me, with all its love, joy and wonder I am grateful beyond 
words. I love you. Thank you. And to my two sons, Hayes and Jack, I pray that your lives 
may be enriched with a similar abundance of friendships, generosity and goodwill. It is to 
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Theories of Representation and the Craft of Theology 
 
 
nam uera religio, nisi credantur ea, quae quisque postea, si se bene gesserit dignus que 
fuerit, adsequatur atque percipiat, et omnino sine quodam graui auctoritatis imperio 
inire recte nullo pacto potest.1 
 
– Augustine of Hippo, De utilitate credendi 
 
Since, however, God has opened the way of eternal salvation solely to each person’s 
individual faith, and demands from us that whoever wants to be saved must have a 
personal faith of their own, I resolved to rely on the faith or judgment of no one else as to 
the things of God, but rather to take religious belief from a faith based exclusively on 
divine revelation; [I resolved], omitting nothing which was my own responsibility, but 
perusing and perpending the scripture of God itself with the utmost diligence, to have 
every single point investigated and understood for myself, by my very own care 
[cognitum].2 
 




This thesis examines specific scenes in which the poetic forms and dialectical 
processes constitutive of the theological vision(s) that develop through William 
Langland’s Piers Plowman are on display.3 It is worth noting at the outset what this focus 
                                                
1 Augustine, De utilitate credendi, ed. J. Zycha, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiarum Latinorum, 25 (Vienna: F. 
Tempsky, 1891), cap. 9, par. 21, linea 13, [There is no right way of entering into the true religion without 
believing things that all who live rightly and become worthy of it will understand and see for themselves 
later on, and without some submission to a certain weight of authority], English translation from Augustine, 
On Christian Belief trans. Ray Kearney, Boniface Ramesy, ed., The Works of Saint Augustine: A 
Translation for the 21st Century (New York, NY: New City Press, 2005), p. 133. 
2 John Milton, De Doctrina Christiana in The Complete Works of John Milton ed. John K. Hale and J. 
Donald Cullington vol. 8 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 5, lines 22-30. 
3 William Langland, Piers Plowman: A New Annotated Edition of the C-text ed. Derek Pearsall (Exeter: 
University of Exeter Press, 2008). All quotations of Piers Plowman unless otherwise stated are taken from 
Pearsall’s edition and cited by Passus and line number. I have constantly consulted Piers Plowman: The C 
Version; Will’s Vision of Piers Plowman, Do-Well, Do-Better, and Do-Best, ed. George Russell and George 
Kane (London: Athlone, 1997). Modern English translations are provided in the footnotes, and unless 
otherwise stated are taken from George Economou William Langland’s Piers Plowman: The C-version 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996). For the B-version of the poem I have referenced 
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does, and does not, include. The present study does not focus on anything like the 
‘theological vision of the historical figure William Langland’, but rather upon the 
multiple voices and theological visions that are expressed, pitted against each other, 
dialectically engaged, surpassed and returned to through Piers Plowman.  This is a 
theological engagement with the text of Piers Plowman that is informed by but not 
oriented towards making substantive conclusions concerning the historical identity and or 
dispositions of the author.4 The overarching argument concerns the ways in which 
Langland’s poem makes a contribution, in both form and content, to contemporary 
questions in late fourteenth-century England over the development of Christian doctrine, 
and pays particular attention to Langland’s vision of the role of the church in the 
Christian life. Langland’s poem provides a unique contribution to medieval debates 
concerned with negotiating rival claims to the unfolding of Christian identity and 
practice.  
Embarking on such a task, David Benson’s warning is apposite: ‘Treating 
Langland as a theologian risks undervaluing him as a poet, we should pay more (or at 
least equal) attention to the poetic form in which these opinions are expressed’.5 Benson 
is right. The theological genius of Piers Plowman’s art cannot be extracted from the 
minute details of its poetry. Thomas Aquinas insists a similar link between form and 
content in his commentary on the Pater Noster, ex modo loquendi datur nobis doctrina.6 
                                                                                                                                            
Piers Plowman: The B Version, rev. ed., ed. George Kane and E. Talbot Donaldson (London: Athlone, 
1988). 
4 For a contrasting recent study see Robert Adams, Langland and the Rokele Family: The Gentry 
Background to Piers Plowman (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2013). 
5 David Benson, ‘Salvation, Theology and Poetry in Piers Plowman’, English Language Notes, 44 (2006): 
103-107. 
6 Thomas Aquinas, In Orationem Dominicam Videlicet ‘Pater Noster’ Expositio, in Opuscula Theologica, 
ed. R.A. Verardo, R.M. Spiazzi, and M. Calcaterra, 2 vols. (Rome: Marietti, 1954) 2:228, [the teaching we 
receive comes from, or is bound up with, the mode in which we speak]. 
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Whether in poetry, theology or art, the teaching we receive is inextricably bound up with 
the mode in which it is composed.7 Piers Plowman’s theological visions are, as Elizabeth 
Salter suggested years ago, likewise indivisible from the forms of its composition, its 
multi-dimensional art of sermon, vision, alliterative poem and allegory.8 This thesis 
examines specific scenes in Langland’s poem in order to demonstrate the connection 
between form and meaning in Piers Plowman. It argues that the particular and unique 
form of Langland’s theological investigation offers its own substantive contributions to 
the development of Christian doctrine in late medieval England as well as the means of 
participating in such development when wayfarers find themselves caught between rival 
communities competing for the authority to claim ‘truth’. 
 
§ Langland’s Theological Poetics: Towards an Integrated Approach 
In the mid-twentieth century, historians and theologians popularized declension 
narratives of the ‘waning’ middle ages or the ‘breakdown of the medieval synthesis’.9 
More recent studies have focused on the diverse range of experiences in particular 
religious communities as well as literary witnesses that suggest a more complicated 
confluence of cultural decline, revolutionary energy, reformist zeal and even stability.10 
                                                
7 See David Aers, Beyond Reformation: an essay on William Langland’s Piers Plowman and the end of 
Constantinian Christianity (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015). 
8 Elizabeth Salter, Piers Plowman: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969). 
9 For instance, see Johan Huizinga The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life, Thought 
and Art in France and the Netherlands in the 14th & 15th Centuries trans. F. Hopman (New York, NY: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1949, repr. 1954) and David Knowles The Evolution of Medieval Thought 
(London: Longman, 1962, repr. 1988). 
10 For instance, Eamon Duffy The Stripping of the Alters: Traditional Religion in England 1400-1580 (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992, 2005) offers perhaps one of the most sweeping laments of cultural 
decline. Caroline Walker Bynum Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982) and John Van Engen Sisters and Brothers of the 
Common Life: The Devotio Moderna and the World of the Later Middle Ages (Philadelphia, PA: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2008) are examples of illuminating studies of particular reformist communities. 
James Simpson Reform and Cultural Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) analyzes a wide 
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Locating Langland’s poetry within such a complicated historical moment requires 
attention to the detail of the art as well as the context in which it was produced.  
In late medieval England, competing claims concerning the praxis and identity of 
the church emerge as certain Wycliffites and other vernacular writers challenge the 
consonance between the teachings of the ‘chirche’ and its ‘clerkis’, with the teachings of 
the Bible. Anne Hudson points out the way the Lanterne of Lizt expresses this tension, 
Here summe obiectun that the gospel is not of autorite but in a miche as the chirche 
hath autorised it and cannonisid it, the thei sein that no man knowith suche wordis to 
be the gospel, but as the chirche hath determyned in her determynacioun. This 
conclusion semeth to smak [smell of] heresie.11 
Resisting such a wedge between scripture and tradition, Thomas Netter and fellow 
clergymen were quick to point out, ‘3if thou spekist of the bible, thane seyen antecristis 
clerkis ‘How provest thou that it is holy wryt more thane annother writen book?’’12 For 
Netter, Scripture is a fruit of the church’s life, while for the author of the Lanterne of Lizt 
the church itself is a creature of the gospel.13 At the heart of this tension lies a question of 
interpretive authority. Specifically, the tension between those, on the one hand, who 
would argue that the church is a community vivified by the Holy Spirit, uniquely 
empowered to interpret the ethical and ideological implications of the Bible. And those, 
on the other hand, who insist that the Bible is itself somehow capable of standing over the 
interpretive authority of a web of traditions and institutions called ‘church’. If the latter, 
                                                                                                                                            
range of literary sources that display a rigorous debate over the possibilities and limitations of cultural and 
institutional change in the fourteenth through the mid-sixteenth centuries. 
11 The Lanterne of Lizt edited from MS Harl. 2324 by Lilian M. Swinburn, Early English Text Society, 151 
(1917), Chapter VI p. 30-1, cited in Hudson The Premature Reformation, p. 230. 
12 Quoted in Anne Hudson The Premature Reformation: Wycliffite Texts and Lollard History (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 231. 
13 The Lanterne of Lizt, Chapter VI, pp. 30-1. 
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who could claim such interpretive authority over and against such a historical community 
and who would be capable of determining the validity of rival claims to normative 
biblical interpretation that emerge either within or outside this one holy catholic church? 
The juxtaposition of the preceding epigraphs from Augustine and Milton, which will 
receive further comment below, crystalizes this tension. 
Disciplinary and periodic divisions within the modern university and scholarly 
norms often impede sustained academic focus upon the symbiotic relation between 
theology and poetry in a work like Piers Plowman. Contemporary ideologies and 
predispositions can also shape and obfuscate the poem’s reception by modern readers. 
These institutional and ideological hurdles present difficulties for approaching a text like 
Piers Plowman with the type of cross-disciplinary thinking that generated the text. As 
Cristina Cervone has recently noted in her own attempt to think along with the poem’s 
overlapping discursive modes, Piers Plowman was produced at a historical moment in 
which ‘disciplinary conventions had not yet split philosophy from theology, and literary 
studies as such did not exist’.14  
Benson’s warning taken on board, there is, however, no need to make of Langland 
either a theologian or a poet. Such a distinction is a distinction without difference that 
results in a false dichotomy. The present study aims to demonstrate how Langland’s 
modes of discursivity maximize the representational capacity of language through a 
dialectical poetic that is fascinated by the way human makings, linguistic, cultural and 
institutional, are transformed as they engage and are engaged by that mysterious contact 
point between the finite and the Infinite. This study pays particular attention to the 
                                                
14 Cristina Maria Cervone, Poetics of the Incarnation: Middle English Writing and the Leap of Love 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), pp. 17-18. 
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development of Christian doctrine – God’s act of self-revelation occurring through the 
linguistic processes of the Church learning to speak about God – as a key contact point 
between the finite and the Infinite in which Langland’s poem both participates and 
contributes.  
 A number of recent studies have paid attention to the profound relationship 
between poetic and theological form in Piers Plowman.15 Mary Carruthers argues that 
Piers Plowman participates in an Augustinian tradition ‘searching for a truly Christian 
rhetoric […] out of a sense that a rhetoric has failed and has led men away from Truth 
rather than toward him’.16 For Carruthers, the poem’s quest for a redeemed language is 
ultimately and intentionally unfulfilled as a gesture towards the partialness, the 
inadequacy, of theological language.17 Nicolette Zeeman advances what Carruthers 
describes as the necessary limit of theological language through the particular lens of 
Fruedian/Lacanian psycho-analysis suggesting that the poem reframes not only language, 
but also sin, seeing both as a location in which failure, or lack, generate new desires that 
propel both the poem and the pilgrim further along the search for truth.18 Cristina 
Cervone’s work, maintaining an equally sustained interest in the poem’s quest for a 
redeemed language, goes in a different direction than Zeeman by investigating the 
constructive representational capacity of Langland’s poetry. Cervone rightly situates 
                                                
15 The following studies are also worth noting for their contributions to this line of inquiry as it relates 
specifically to Piers Plowman and beyond: James Rhodes, Poetry Does Theology: Chaucer, Grosseteste, 
and the Pearl-Poet (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001); Malcolm Guite, Faith, Hope 
and Poetry: Theology and the Poetic Imagination (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2012); David C. Mahan, An 
Unexpected Light: Theology and Witness in the Poetry and Thought of Charles Williams, Micheal 
O’Siadhail, and Geoffrey Hill (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2009). 
16 Mary Carruthers, The Search for St. Truth: A Study of Meaning in Piers Plowman (Evanston, IN: 
Nothwestern University Press, 1973), p. 19. 
17 Carruthers, The Search for St. Truth, p. 173. For another contribution in this strand of interpretation, see 
also Pamela Raabe Imitating God (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1990). 
18 Nicolette Zeeman, Piers Plowman and the Medieval Discourse of Desire (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
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Piers Plowman within a tradition of late medieval vernacular texts that share a common 
interest in what she calls Incarnational poetics: 
An Incarnational poetic… epitomizes a way in which writers sought to understand the 
relationship of God to humanity by encoding the concept of the Incarnation within 
linguistic and rhetorical forms that point to Christian truths. […] Their strategies for 
puzzling over the Incarnation encourage readings based in rhetorical or poetic schemes 
but more often in tropes such as metaphor, reification, personification, and the near-
personification I will call linguistic dilation, which is a momentary stretching out 
(dialatio) of language such that words nearly take on agency as they fleetingly almost 
act within their localized context. Such imagining complements the activity, as these 
writers see it, of the Incarnation – the willed, kenotic leaping of love – so that if we 
hear only ‘static’ in ‘hypostatic,’ we have missed their point, theologically, 
linguistically, and even poetically, because the two-way pull of the Incarnational 
thought is expressed by means of form.19 
As the following analysis will demonstrate, Piers Plowman is brimming with poetic 
scenes that employ such ‘linguistic dialation’ to investigate some of the most complex 
theological puzzles in the Christian tradition. Cervone’s illuminating close readings of a 
range of texts demonstrate the ways in which Langland is not alone in experimenting 
with such a mode of theological discourse. Indeed, Cervone makes a strong case for a late 
medieval vernacular tradition interested in exploring the transformational capacity of the 
human word being met by and swept up into the Word made flesh.20  
                                                
19 Cervone, Poetics of the Incarnation, pp. 3, 6. 
20 Another recent study engaging the constructive possibilities of Piers Plowman’s rhetoric, but that extents 
past linguistic or representational transformation to include moral/tropological transformation through the 
act of interpretation, is Ryan McDermott’s Tropologies: ethics and invention in England, c. 1350-1600 
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 Another important strand of critical scholarship attending to the theological 
trajectory of Langland’s poem is evident in the work of Greta Hort. Arguing that ‘Piers 
Plowman is a theological poem’, Hort suggests the poem participates in an orthodox 
theological movement that involved ‘the awakening of the ‘lewed’ to intellectual 
pursuits, the filling up of the gap that separated priests from people, not by dragging 
priests down to the ignorance of the laity, but by raising the laity to the standard of the 
better among the priests’.21 Exactly which theological traditions the poem participates in 
and develops has generated a wide range of interpretations. Morton Bloomfield and 
Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, for example, have suggested that the theological visions of Piers 
Plowman participate in various strands of apocalyptic thought that strain towards social 
reform.22 In contrast, Edward Vasta argues that Langland’s goal is not social, but rather 
‘that of the mystic: the quest in this life for the real but supernatural union between the 
soul, with its powers of knowledge and love, and God’.23 Other significant studies, such 
as those of Wendy Scase and Edwin Craun, have examined the poem within the context 
of contemporary tensions in fourteenth-century England between clergy and laity, and the 
theological puzzles yoked with the theory and practice of fraternal correction.24  
                                                                                                                                            
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2016). A condensed and published version is to be 
found in his ‘“Beatus qui verba vertit in opera”: Langland’s Ethical Invention and the Tropological Sense’, 
Yearbook of Langland Studies, 24 (2010), pp. 169-204. 
21 Greta Hort, Piers Plowman and Contemporary Religious Thought (London: MacMillan, 1938), p. 158. 
22 Bloomfield locates Piers Plowman within an apocalyptic tradition of pre-twelfth century Carthusian 
discourse straining towards, and failing, to achieve social perfection. Kerby-Fulton builds on Bloomfield’s 
work, but then locates Langland within various traditions of ‘reformist apocalypticism’, especially the work 
of Joachim of Fiore. See Morton Bloomfield Piers Plowman as a Fourteenth Century Apocalypse (Rutgers, 
NY: Rutgers University Press, 1962) and Kathyrn Kerby-Fulton Reformist Apocalypticism and Piers 
Plowman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
23 Edward Vasta, The Spiritual Basis for Piers Plowman (The Hague: Mouten and Comp, 1965), pp. 20, 13.  
24 See Wendy Scase ‘Piers Plowman’ and the New Anti-clericalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) and Edwin Craun Ethics and Power in English Reformist Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
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The analysis performed in this thesis learns from these studies, while making its 
own argument about the way in which Langland is participating in and contributing to his 
inherited theological traditions. The argument includes and yet extends beyond the 
poem’s language and specifically attends to the cultures, institutional structures and 
linguistic communities through which language is both passed on and recreated over 
time.25 For it is not just language itself, but also the social and institutional bearers and 
producers of language that Langland’s work participates in and hopes to transform. David 
Aers’ scholarship is particularly pioneering and influential in this regard. Aers articulates 
the integrated perspective of his approach as  
emerg[ing] out of a fascination with the ways in which certain late medieval Christians 
and their Church addressed the immense resources of Christian tradition. They did so 
at a time when the common pursuit of salvation generated differences which came to 
seem, to some of the participants, uncontainable within the current ecclesiastical 
polity. So the fascination, for me, is with complex processes which are at once 
                                                
25 Many underlying tensions between, on the one hand, psycho-analytic readings that focus on the 
significance of the poem’s linguistic failure, and on the other hand, readings that attempt to draw out the 
constructive capacity of the poem’s discursive modes are in part a product of late-twentieth century 
developments in critical theory that either confuse or ignore the way Langland would have framed such 
tensions. The tensions surrounding the limitations of human language popularized by Saussure, Lacan, 
Derrida, Deleuze and others in the second half of the twentieth century were already being considered, 
albeit in different modes, in and preceding the fourteenth century through theological engagement with the 
dialectic between apophatic and cataphatic speech [See Denys Turner’s The Darkness of God: Negativity in 
Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)]. This is a linguistic and theologically 
significant discourse that Thomas Aquinas explored through his articulation of the distinctions between 
univocal, equivocal and analogical speech [see especially his Summa Contra Gentiles: Book One: God 
trans. by Anton C. Pegis F.R.S.C. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975) Chapters 32-
34]. Theological language is, by the very nature of the speaker and its object, partial. But that partiality is 
not static. Analogical speech generates and opens up creative space capable of holding tensions together, 
the very object of John Wyclif’s, not always appreciated, via media [see especially Michael Wilks ‘The 
Early Oxford Wyclif: Papalist or Nominalist?’ in Anne Hudson, ed. Wyclif: Political Ideas and Practice 
(Exeter: Oxbow Books, 2000) pp. 45-9]. Both psycho-analytic and constructive studies of Langland’s 
poetry are important avenues through which to appreciate the range of possibilities for the poem’s 
significance, as are the social and psychological contributions of Freudian, Marxist and Nietchzian 
readings. However, pitting pyscho-analytic and constructive readings of Piers Plowman against each other 
risks falling not only into a false, but also a potentially anachronistic, dichotomy, see Victor E. Taylor’s 
‘Wounding Theology and Literature’, English Language Notes, 44 (2006), pp. 13-18. 
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theological and institutional, doctrinal, and political. These are the processes of 
tradition formation, reformation, and preservation in changing cultural circumstances. 
And the fascination, for me, is especially with the contribution of certain texts to those 
processes.26  
 
Akin to Aers’ approach, this study of Piers Plowman is concerned not only with the way 
the poetry experiments with the representational capacity of language, but extends 
specifically to the transformational capacity of the poetry for the ecclesial structures, 
theological traditions and practices of worship the poet receives. As Aers puts it, 
Just as we inhabit traditions which enable us to carry out certain inquiries, and which 
preclude others, so Langland, […] composed inquiries and made choices (sometimes 
difficult, sometimes dangerous, sometimes with barely a thought) within the traditions 
[he] inhabited. And in [his] tradition-formed choices, in [his] inquiries and arguments, 
[he] contributed to continuation and change in the formation of these traditions, 
traditions of discourse which were also forms of life.27 
 
It is Piers Plowman’s contribution to ‘forms of life’, lives embodied with particular focus 
in the life of the church and which are informed by the ways the church grows in its 
understanding of and participation in God, that animate the current thesis. Specifically, 
how the poem’s inherited modes of discourse and debate shape the poem, and also how 
the poem attempts to develop and transform its received traditions through a vernacular 
poetry in the context of a Latinate ecclesiastical polity. Langland’s poem explores not 
                                                
26 David Aers, Sanctifying Signs: Making Christian Tradition in Late Medieval England (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), p. vii. See also his Chaucer Langland and the Creative 
Imagination (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980) and Salvation and Sin: Augustine, Langland, and 
Fourteenth-Century Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009). 
27 Aers, Sanctifying Signs, p. xi. 
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only the possibility of a redeemed rhetoric, as argued by Carruthers, but also the 
possibility for the transformation of institutions, and specifically the church, which are 
themselves locations in which modes of discourse are formed, reformed and passed on in 
the midst of changing corporate practices (for example, worship) and cultural 
circumstances. 
 These links between language, culture and institutional transformation were both 
unavoidable and controversial in late fourteenth-century England. The Great Schism of 
1378 left many wondering about the proper relation not only between Rome and the 
church in England, but also about the proper relation between the church and the English 
king.28 Questions concerning the proper bearer of theological authority were not separate 
from investigations concerning the proper office of earthly dominion, church and realm.  
As Nicholas Watson demonstrates, many of these debates spilled out of the Latin 
confines of the universities and royal courts and into English vernacular writing, a mode 
of discourse that became itself politically freighted in Langland’s context.29 For instance, 
Watson shows the tensions between a thinker like William Butler who, on the one hand, 
draws on the Pseudo-Dionysian tradition of the hierarchical order of religious knowledge 
and who warns against translations of the bible and the dangers of vernacular theology; 
and on the other hand, Richard Ullerston who defends the open availability of religious 
                                                
28 See Peter Heath Church and Realm 1272-1461: Conflict and Collaborations in an Age of Crisis 
(London: Fontana Press, 1988) and R.W. Southern Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages 
(London: Penguin Books, 1970). 
29 Nicholas Watson, ‘Censorship and Cultural Change in Late-Medieval England: Vernacular Theology, the 
Oxford Translation Debate, and Arundel’s Constitution of 1409’, Speculum, 70 (1995), pp. 822-64. See 
also The Vulgar Tongue: Medieval and Post Medieval Vernacularity ed. Fiona Somerset and Nicholas 
Watson (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003); and Jocelyn Wogan-
Browne, Nicholas Watson, Andrew Taylor, and Ruth Evans, ed., The Idea of the Vernacular: An Anthology 
of Middle English Literary Theory, 1280-1520 (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1999). 
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texts to all in the vernacular on grounds derived from the narrative of scripture itself. As 
Watson explains, 
Ullerston himself (prudently) submits to the will of the church and identifies that will 
with the decisions of prelates, but he is clear that both precedent and truth are on the 
side of vernacular theology as a legitimate instrument of lay instruction. […] Ullerston 
places an idealistic, but canonically correct, picture of Christian society as a 
harmonious, hierarchic community where knowledge is accessible to all without threat 
to truth, propriety, or social discipline […]. For Ullerston, the laity are not swine 
undeserving of the pearls of knowledge (fol. 204v) but the people of God to whom 
Christ preached in the mother tongue (fol. 207r) and who both need and are fit to 
receive God’s law translated into that tongue.30 
 
Watson makes clear that the tensions between Butler and Ullerston’s positions are not 
limited to linguistic norms as such, for instance whether the English language is capable 
of expressing the Word of God with the same degree of nuance and elasticity as Latin, 
but rather extend to tensions between social classes and the politics through which certain 
communities, and not others, are deemed worthy to engage the Word of God and interpret 
it for the times.31  
 
§ Authority and Interpretation: An Eschatological Orientation 
                                                
30 Watson, ‘Censorship and Cultural Change’, pp. 841, 846. 
31 Watson’s main concern is to elucidate the political implications bound up in performing vernacular 
theology. See also Alastair Minnis and A.B. Scott Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism, c. 1100-1375: 
The Commentary-Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), and Wogan-Browne, et al, eds, The 
Idea of the Vernacular. 
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 These tensions between authority and interpretation are gestured to in the 
quotations of the epigraph to this introduction. Augustine and Milton, writing on opposite 
sides of one of the most disruptive social and intellectual transformations in Western 
Civilization, understand the true religion of God’s self-revelation as mediated to 
humanity in very different ways.32 For Augustine, some level of trust in the received 
authority of the church is necessary in order for a person to enter into true religion, while 
for Milton, discerning truth is a burden each person must take on for themselves, trusting 
only the application of their own individual mind to discern God’s self-revelation through 
scripture. Milton’s anxiety about the corruptibility of inherited authority leads him, like 
many reformers past and present, to dislocate authority from the writings and institutions 
of a received tradition and to transfer it to the discernment of the individual. What Milton 
fails to appreciate is that Augustine’s willingness to trust on faith the teachings of the 
church does not preclude his active engagement with and, in some cases the 
transformation of, those received teachings. That is to say, as Alasdair MacIntyre’s work 
has argued, Augustine does not conceive of the tension as one between total submission 
to an unimpeachable magisterium on the one hand, or the freewheeling will of the 
individual on the other. Instead, Augustine sees the initial act of trust in received 
authority as a necessary first step for a person to enter into and engage a living tradition, a 
tradition that will transform the participant just as the participant will likewise join in the 
                                                
32 My reference to the disruptive social and intellectual transformation in western Europe is to the complex 
political, cultural and intellectual histories bound up in the Reformation. See in this connection Louis 
Dupre, Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1993); Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989) and A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2007), 
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 3rd Edition (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2007, 1981); and Thomas Pfau, Minding the Modern: Human Agency, Intellectual 
Traditions, and Responsible Knowledge (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013). 
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life of a community that will in turn both carry on and transform an inherited tradition.33 
Living traditions, so MacIntyre argues, are composed of historically contingent webs of 
texts, practices and communities that are themselves constantly in flux.34 The 
significance of this, for Augustine, is not merely to affirm or record complex and 
historically continent genealogies of divine pedagogy. Rather, it is grounded in the idea 
that these ornate tapestries of texts, practices and communities are some of the very 
means through which God reweaves broken human beings back together with one 
another and with God towards the end of the Christian journey itself: love. Augustine 
describes it thus:  
Then again charity itself, which binds people together with the knot of unity, would 
have no scope for pouring minds and hearts in together, as it were, and blending them 
with one another, if human beings were never to learn anything from each other.35 
 Piers Plowman is engaged in the complex processes involved in this reception of, 
participation in and development of tradition, while sharing Augustine’s view that such 
processes ultimately find their true end in charity.36 This thesis argues that the particular 
forms of writing in which the poem does so are indivisible from the linguistic, social and 
institutional transformations towards which Langland’s theological visions strain. That is 
to say, Piers Plowman resists theology’s proclivity for being ‘seduced by the prospect of 
                                                
33 Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p. 84. 
34 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice, Which Rationality (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988). 
35 Augustine, De doctrina christiana, prooem., linea 98, ‘deinde ipsa caritas, quae sibi homines inuicem 
nodo unitatis adstringit, non haberet aditum refundendorum et quasi miscendorum sibimet animorum, si 
homines per homines nihil discerent’, trans. Hill, Teaching Christianity, p. 103. 
36 David Aers suggests as much in his Chaucer, Langland, and the Creative Imagination, p. 61: 
‘[Langland] wished to criticize and reform society and church within the framework of the traditional 
ideology and authority he often affirmed; yet his poem’s intense imaginative and intellectual engagement 
with his world embodies a vision whose total movement and minute particulars negate and subvert this 
ideology’. 
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by-passing the question of how it learns its own language,’37 and is likewise just as 
critically aware of the difficulties of theological meaning-making in the vernacular as 
Geoffrey Chaucer is in his conclusion to Troilus and Criseyde, 
And for ther is so gret diversite /  
In Englissh and in writyng of oure tonge, /  
So prey I God that non myswrite the, /  
Ne the mysmetre for defaute of tonge; /  
And red wherso thow be, or elles songe, /  
That thow be understonde, God I biseche!38 
 
How to speak truthfully about God without being misunderstood? One of the primary 
aims of this thesis is to elucidate the distinct capacity of Langland’s vernacular poetry to 
participate in the complex processes of doctrinal development, specifically the way in 
which the church learns to speak truthfully about God through time, in late-fourteenth 
century England. 
Before considering Langland’s attentiveness to the complexities of meaning 
making in his chosen medium of vernacular poetry in particular, a few words on meaning 
making more generally from a philosophical perspective helpfully frames and illuminates 
his work further.39 Wittgenstein’s theory of the relation between language and ideas 
resonates in many ways with Langland’s.40 As Stanley Cavell explains, for Wittgenstein, 
                                                
37 Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), p. 132. 
38 Geoffrey Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde V.1793-8 in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. Benson 3rd 
edit. (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987). 
39 Minnis, Alastair J., and A.B. Scott (with the assistance of David Wallace) Medieval Literary Theory and 
Criticism: c. 1100 – c. 1375: The Commentary Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 
40 There are not only parallels between Wittgenstein’s language theory and Langland’s poetry. Wittgenstein 
also provides a helpful way to engage the philosophical nature of Langland’s linguistic investigations 
without getting bogged down in the (sometimes unhelpful) categories of ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ often used 
to describe medieval epistemology (see Étienne Gilson The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy trans. A.H.C. 
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We do not first know the object to which, by means of criteria, we assign value; on the 
contrary, criteria are the means by which we learn what our concepts are, and hence 
‘what kind of object anything is.’41 
 
Knowledge of things, so Wittgenstein insists, does not precede our language, but rather 
our knowledge comes into being through the processes of language. Furthermore, the 
linguistic process is not performed in private, but is thoroughly public and communal: 
The criteria Wittgenstein appeals to – those which are, for him, the data of philosophy 
– are always ‘ours’, the ‘group’ which forms his ‘authority’ is always, apparently, the 
human group as such, the human being generally. When I voice them, I do so, or take 
myself to do so, as a member of that group, a representative human.42 
 
Or, as Wittgenstein himself puts it, 
How could one describe the human way of behaving? Surely only by sketching the 
actions of a variety of human beings as they interweave. What determines our 
judgment, our concepts and reactions, is not what one man is doing now, an individual 
action, but the whole hurly-burly [das ganze Gewimmel] of human actions, the 
background against which we see any action.43  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Downes (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1936), pp. 229-47). That being said, Michael 
Wilks makes good use of what is at stake in the category ‘realist’ when he explains of John Wyclif ‘he 
came to believe that extreme Realism in philosophy was being used to underpin a perverted 
Augustinianism in theology which gave total universal power to the papacy at the expense of national 
communities, and therefore all branches of learning were in urgent need of reform’ [‘John Wyclif, 
Reformer, c. 1327—1384’ in Hudson, Wyclif: Political Ideas and Practice, p. 5]. 
41 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Trgedy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 16. 
42 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 18. 
43 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), pp. 567-9.   
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The ‘whole hurly-burly’ of human existence is, for Wittgenstein, the location in which 
human understanding is forged through historical developments of communal practice 
and language. As Fergus Kerr explains, ‘Nothing [for Wittgenstein] is more foundational 
to the whole human enterprise than the community that we create in our natural reactions 
to one another as they have been cultivated and elaborated in a very contingent historical 
tradition.’44  
As a result of this commitment to the communal processes of the creation of 
criteria which is fundamental to the processes of linguistic meaning making, Wittgenstein 
is willing to consider the possibility that, ‘One human being can be a complete enigma to 
another’ when a person fails to share the criteria which results from shared judgments and 
forms of life between radically distinct communities.45 Langland’s attentiveness to the 
possibility of this sort of linguistic dissonance is powerfully evident in Passus VI of the 
C-version of Piers Plowman. Here the character Repentance fails to share a common 
language with Covetousness, and declares, concomitantly, that Covetousness is an 
unkynde creature who cannot be forgiven.46 While this scene and unorthodox view haunt 
the poem, Langland’s explorations of linguistic processes do not abandon the hope of the 
real, yet mysterious, link between the human and the divine Word, the hope that God in 
Christ does share most intimately in kynde with humanity. Though certain scenes and 
exchanges explore theologically ‘unorthodox’ positions, Piers Plowman does so as it 
                                                
44 Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, 2nd Edition (Londond: SPCK Press: 1986), p. 76. 
45 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York, NY: 
Macmillan, 1953), p. 223. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 30. Herbert McCabe takes this notion up 
theologically, and in conversation with Wittgenstein in his Love, Law and Language (Continuum: New 
York, NY1968, 2003), pp. 63-103 at 84, ‘Meanings, then, are ways of entering into social life, ways of 
being with each other. The kind of meanings available in the language of a society – taking ‘language’ in 
its widest extent to include all conventionally determined signs and symbols – constitute the way in which 
people are with each other in that community. ‘To imagine a language,’ as Wittgenstein says, ‘is to imagine 
a form of life’. 
46 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.234-300. 
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strains to participate in the development of Christian doctrine, which is itself a 
participation in processes through which God the Word transforms finite human language 
through language, as that language is itself swept up into the Word. This is a 
transformation that is simultaneously a transformation of contemporary cultural and 
institutional forms that God enacts in order to resist the abandonment of both persons and 
the church to the linguistic and social chaos of Babel.  
This thesis will argue that while Piers Plowman strains towards cultural and 
institutional transformation, the poem leans eschatologically in a way aptly described by 
Herbert McCabe thus: 
The Christian moral outlook is essentially drawn from our contact with the future. It is 
based upon the virtue of hope. It transcends the present and is never wholly explicable 
in terms of the present and is never wholly explicable in terms of the present because 
it is revolutionary. For this reason, […], the Christian moral position will always in the 
end seem unreasonable to the contemporary world.47 
 
Langland’s theological visions strain towards a future hope by way of a form of writing 
that at times seems revolutionary and unreasonable; unreasonable at least to those who 
would prefer to maintain social institutions through reform. For Langland, however, 
reform and revolution are not the only options. This thesis aims to demonstrate the ways 
the poetic forms and dialectical processes constitutive of Piers Plowman’s theological 
vision(s) participate in the development of doctrine from the ground up, grammatically, 
with attention to a range of institutions and individual interlocutors, cultural practices and 
revelations that coordinate in an organic process of ongoing theological discovery. 
                                                
47 Herbert McCabe, Love, Law and Language (New York, NY: Continuum Press, 1968), pp. 154-5. 
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Langland’s model, I suggest, is distinct from a top down model of hierarchical reception 
of divine ideas, as if theological language were merely the mediated expression of pre-
existing concepts. While God’s divine ideas precede human knowing, Piers Plowman 
takes seriously the complex processes through which God mediates knowledge to human 
beings through the learning of language capable of expressing those divine ideas. For 
Langland, this is a process that requires a community, and a community that shares forms 
of life made possible by shared judgments which are themselves made possible through 
the sharing of language. The telos of this vision is not merely noetic, but as Augustine 
notes above, ultimately oriented towards charity: the love that is the reconciliation of God 
and humanity. For Langland, God’s mode of mediating God’s-self is not strictly 
‘natural’. That is to say, for Langland, God’s mediation of God’s-self to humanity is not 
limited to ‘natural’ processes of learning language in communities.48 For Langland, this 
process also includes interruptions, what Cervone refers to as ‘leaps of love’, that reflect 
the logic of the Incarnation.  
Therefore, this thesis will consider the way Piers Plowman inherits and performs 
theology in such a way that identifies the primary location for the development of 
doctrine linguistically, culturally and institutionally not in the magisterium, the royal 
court, the individual, or even the community understood in congregationalist terms. 
Instead, Langland’s theology emerges through the dialectical engagement between this 
entire cacophony of voices as they learn to sing around the table: the same table through 
which God’s presence and absence interrupts and transforms human speech about God 
into the embodiment of God’s love made manifest in Christ. For Langland, the Eucharist 
                                                
48 See especially Rebecca Davis’ recent study on kynde, Piers Plowman, Piers Plowman and the Books of 
Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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is a performative activity through which God’s creatures are invited to participate in their 
deification in and through the charity of God. This is not reducible to a notion of the 
deification of an individual, as argued by Vasta. Instead, this vision extends towards the 
sanctification of the entire creation through the particular mediation of the Christian 
polis, the church, as it enacts the social embodiment of caritas, the unifying and healing 
work of the Body of Christ in the world. At the altar, the present fuses with the past, a 
diverse and divided community is united with the One Lord Jesus Christ, and the Infinite 
enters into and takes on the finite: God works through this sacramentally reformed 
communion of sinners and saints to heal and accompany a wounded creation towards a 
future of promised, yet, unrealized glory. It is therefore through communion, in the fullest 
sense of the word, that Langland practices and performs his craft, his makings, or 
theological art. It is through modeling such a dense and layered concept of communion, 
beyond the sacrament itself and including the communion of discourse constituting the 
church’s whole life, that Langland offers his written work as a resource, an exemplum, for 
navigating rival claims to both Christian community and doctrine. Langland’s poetic 
communion attends to the ways God interrupts from the inside of these ever-shifting 
contexts of human life.  
Readers of Piers Plowman may justifiably question the argument that Langland’s 
poetry offers discursive communion as a means to participate in and discern doctrinal 
development in the midst of rival communities offering competing truth claims. After all, 
the poem ends without anyone actually receiving the Eucharist, and with one of the 
work’s primary figures, Conscience, abandoning the church, and the other, Will, 
downtrodden and wandering not knowing where to eat (an almost certain Eucharistic 
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pun) yet commanded by Kynde (God) to remain in ‘Vnity’ (the fourteenth-century church 
in England portrayed as besieged by Anti-christ and the seven deadly sins). The burden 
of this thesis is precisely to demonstrate the ways Langland’s discursive communion is at 
the heart of Langland’s theological vision(s) as a means through which to negotiate 
diverse, and often competing, ways of speaking about God and ways in which God 
extends grace through the church. The argument unfolds in three steps. 
Chapter one demonstrates the poem’s complex analysis of the self within the 
context of what Wittgenstein referred to as the whole hurly-burly [das ganze Gewimmel] 
of human actions and institutions. Through a close reading of Piers Plowman, Thomas 
Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae and Geoffrey Chaucer’s Pardoner’s Tale, the chapter 
argues that Piers Plowman’s representation of selfhood problematizes medieval catholic 
teaching on ecclesial authority. Langland and Chaucer’s respective thought experiments 
imagine the possibilities of errant clerks, who in turn form communities, wherein sin is 
literally built into the scaffolding of society. If the formation of such a sin-enclosed 
society is possible, and if the late medieval church has been so co-opted, as Langland and 
Chaucer’s poetry considers, might the church’s discernment of its own doctrine be 
impossible, a lost cause? 
Chapter two-one analyzes the figure of Conscience to demonstrate the way 
Langland represents Conscience as an incredibly malleable figure, susceptible to a 
myriad of influences at the king’s court. At stake here is if the church is susceptible to 
error (as Chaucer and Langland are shown to imagine in Chapter 1), and if Conscience is 
not trustworthy, then what authority might Christians turn towards to discern the church’s 
doctrine? Chapter two-two then examines Langland’s subtle depiction of sin. The 
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analysis demonstrates the degrees to which Langland’s poetry leaves open not only the 
possibility of errant clerks, or a sin-enclosed society, or a contorted Conscience, or a co-
opted and sin-sealed ‘church’, but also the horrifying possibility that people so 
malformed within such a sin-enclosed society/church might be made ‘unkynde’, 
unforgivable (as, for example, Covetousness in Passus VI), while not being able to 
recognize their own deformation. The chapter then considers Langland’s depiction of this 
horrifying possibility within a theological context by way of a comparative analysis 
including Saint Augustine, Boethius and Saint Anselm. As such, Chapter two-two 
demonstrates the remarkable tension Langland’s poetry applies to the question: Is the 
church, much less its ongoing practice of discerning the development of its doctrine, even 
possible? And further demonstrates the ways in which Langland’s poetry raises the 
stakes: Is human salvation possible at all? 
Chapter three begins with a survey of two of the most influential contemporary 
interpretations of Langland’s theological and ecclesial vision offered by James Simpson 
and David Aers. I then introduce Henri de Lubac’s account of the church as a ‘translucent 
medium’ as a hint towards an alternative reading of Langland’s ecclesiology. The chapter 
analyzes four key figures in the poem (Imaginatif, Liberum Arbitrium, the Samaritan and 
the Christ who harrows hell) and argues that through these four figures Langland’s poetry 
dialectically unfolds to represent his vision of the church. I argue that Langland’s 
ecclesiology, depicted through the dialectical unfolding of these four teachers, subverts 
Conscience’s reformation of the church (Vnity) at the poem’s end. Specifically, Piers 
Plowman’s dialectical process demonstrates the errors bound up in Conscience’s 
stewardship of the Eucharist within Vnity, while also critiquing his decision to depart 
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from Vnity at the poem’s end. I argue that Langland’s ecclesiology is not reducible to 
either reformism (Simpson) or congregationalism (Aers), but is rather represented 
through a more elusive mode. The church, for Langland, is present and discernable in the 
practice of (re)telling the narratives of Christ's Incarnation, passion, and resurrection 
coupled with images and sacraments that push human beings towards contemplation of 
the Trinity. Langland’s ecclesiology does offer a ruthless critique of the late medieval 
church, but in doing so, I argue, he also critiques those who might abandon the 
community which persists even in its brokenness to tell and enact the stories that draw 
human beings into the infinite mystery of the triune God revealed in Christ. Piers 
Plowman thus offers a pedagogy, an apprenticeship or training, in both the content and 
the form of speech that is, for the poet, most capable to aid Christian pilgrims along the 




























A Theology of Selfhood  
 
 
A complex account of a person, a ‘self’, emerges through the C-version of Piers 
Plowman.49 To examine this is to study in particular Langland’s nuanced account of 
human beings as creatures formed in and constituted by communities and institutions 
through which Christian identity is formed. As such, this chapter will pay particular 
attention to the institution of the late-medieval church and Langland’s ecclesiology. 
Following a detailed exposition of Langland’s nuanced account of a particular self, Will, 
the chapter then analyzes the ways in which the poem depicts the formation of Will’s 
identity as not only wrapped up in the formation one receives in the church, but also the 
church as an institution which is itself in complex relation with the coercive powers of 
                                                
49 Admittedly, the language of selfhood is historically conditioned. I find the language of ‘self’ helpful here 
only insofar as it serves as a reference to the sense of human identity Charles Taylor explores in his 
investigation of the intellectual history of selfhood, ‘One is a self only among other selves. A self can never 
be described without reference to those who surround it…A self exists only within what I call ‘webs of 
interlocution.’…The full definition of someone’s identity thus usually involves not only his stand on moral 
and spiritual matters but also some reference to a defining community’ in Sources of the Self: The Making 
of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 34-36. For Taylor’s account 
of the historically conditioned nature of the language of self see, pp. 111-210. Further studies exploring the 
‘self’ within the context of individual and communal identity in the middle ages include M.D. Chenu’s 
‘Monk, Canons, and Laymen in Search of Apostolic Life’ in Nature Man, and Society in the Twelfth 
Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West trans. Jerome Taylor and Lester K. 
Little (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), pp. 202-38; R.W. Southern’s ‘The Religious Orders’ in 
Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages (New York, NY: Penguin, 1990), pp. 214-99; Colin 
Morris The Discovery of the Individual: 1050-1200 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1987); Caroline 
Walker Bynum ‘Did the Twelfth Century Discover the Individual?’ in Jesus as Mother: Studies in the 
Spirituality of the High Middle Ages (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 82-109; John 
Van Engen Sisters and Brothers of the Common Life: The Devotio Moderna and the World of the Later 
Middle Ages (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); and for a study specifically 
focused upon such representations in Piers Plowman see David Aers Community, Gender, and Individual 
Identity: English Writing 1360-1430 (London: Routledge, 1988). 
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the emerging nation-state in late medieval England. As complex as this relation is, this 
chapter will argue that Langland’s investigation of a self extends beyond both 
introspection and church/state relations and focuses upon the particular cluster of 
questions constitutive of the relationship between a person’s coming to faith (fides qua) 
and the way the church negotiates its own authority in the process of faith’s unfolding 
across time (fides quae).  
To do so an additional and complementary analysis is required, namely of 
Thomas Aquinas’ theological account of the role of the pope in discerning the 
development of doctrine and as an example that significantly informs the late medieval 
church. To be clear, the distinctions Aquinas makes between fides qua and fides quae 
have a long history going back at least to Augustine’s De utilitate credenda, discussed 
below. However, in the time between Augustine and Aquinas, this distinction develops in 
ways that reflect the mutually informing relationship between the institutional forms the 
church takes on and the theology figures like Aquinas develop in order to describe those 
institutional developments. As such, the proceeding analysis of Aquinas’ theology of the 
development of doctrine does not aim to suggest that Aquinas necessarily represents a 
deviation from Augustine’s distinctions between fides qua and fides quae, but rather aims 
to examine Aquinas’ detailed account as representative of the ways in which the 
institution of the late medieval church theologically framed a long process through which 
the power to discern the development of the church’s doctine became increasingly 
centralized. For instance, the church’s doctrine concerning the selection of popes, which 
for Aquinas is correlative to who has the power to discern the unfolding of the church’s 
faith in time, develops in important ways from the Third Lateran Council (1179) to the 
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Second Council of Lyon (1274), ways which ultimately make Pope Boniface VIII’s 
claims for the plenitudo potestatis in his famous bull Unum sanctum (1302) intelligible.50 
These institutional developments, while not unimaginable to Augustine, centralize the 
power of discerning the development of the church’s docrine (fides quae) in ways that 
were outside of Augustine’s lived experience and analysis. Aquinas’ account offers a 
remarkably lucid and theologically compelling description of how the church justified the 
centralization of this power under the pope as necessary in order to defend the church 
against heresy. In Langland’s England, Archbishop Arundel’s Constitutions (1409) offer 
a contemporary English example of institutional and theological centralization of the 
church’s power to discern – or proscribe – normative doctrine in response to the 
emergence of perceived Wycliffite heresy. However distasteful modern readers might 
find Arundel’s Constitutions and the corresponding use of lethal state power to enforce it 
in early fifteenth century England51, much of the logic which underpins Arundel’s moves 
to centralize and protect the church’s doctrinal power are grounded in Aquinas’s own 
account. As such, Aquinas is examined at length in this chapter as an elucidating bridge 
between the preceding Augustinian account of fides que and fides quae and the 
institutionalization of those same principles that are used for a murderous defense of 
centralized ecclesial power in late medieval England under Archbishop Arundel. The 
proceeding argument examines Langland’s analysis of this theology as well as his 
                                                
50 See especially Walter Ullman’s A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen & 
Company, 1972) and Eamon Duffy’s Saints & Sinners: A History of the Popes (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2002). 
51 Watson, Nicholas “Censorship and Cultral Change in Late-Medieval England: Vernacular Theology, the 
Oxford Translation Debate, and Arundel’s Constitutions of 1409” Speculum (University of Chicago Press, 
1995), p. 822-864. 
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proposal for alternative frameworks the late medieval church might employ to discern the 
development of doctrine. 
For Langland, the doctrine pertaining to who has the power to discern the 
unfolding of the church’s doctrine is not merely about who has power in the church, but 
specifically concerns who has power to discern the unfolding of the church’s faith in 
time. Langland draws dazzling connections between the formation of individual and 
institutional identity by depicting both constructive and destructive developments of Will 
and the church. Langland’s analysis reflects a powerful theological mind grappling with 
the implications of both the church’s theology and lived experience which created the 
conditions for the Great Schism of 1378, when rival popes were elected and in turn 
excommunicated one another. The Great Schism raises critical questions not only to the 
church’s practice of right doctrine but also to tensions within the doctrine itself – tensions 
that Langland, and contemporaries like Chaucer, examine deeply.  
In this context it is important to note that Langland’s poetry is not merely critical 
of the practical failure of the late medieval church to embody its own doctrine of papal 
election during the Great Schism, but more piercingly that the church’s doctrine of papal 
authority emerges through what Langland’s poem will depict as a series of a theological 
and institutional missteps which have devastating effects upon the church. For Langland, 
these questions are not referential to an abstract institution nor are these questions best 
examined in the restricted confines of late medieval scholastic disputations. Rather, these 
questions are only intelligible when considered in conversation with the broader ‘field of 
folk’, amidst the very people whose lives are both formed by and participate in the 
formation of the church through which the contours of Christian identity take shape. As 
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such, Langland’s analysis of the church reveals a commitment to understanding the 
church and the self as deeply interconnected, though the poem’s fierce and fearless 
analysis will result in placing even this fundamental commitment in tension.  
 
 § Langland and the ‘self’ 
Langland’s poetry engages the puzzles around communal and institutional 
identity, selfhood and language in the first five lines of the Prologue, 
In a somur sesoun whan softe was the sonne 
Y shope me into shroudes as Y a shep were; 
In abite as an heremite vnholy of werkes 
Wente forth in the world wondres to here, 
And say many selles and selkouthe thynges.52  
 
As Ralph Hanna has recently pointed out, the identity of the dreamer, ‘Y’, in these lines 
is suspended between a range of possibilities.53 Is this ‘Y’ an innocent sheep, or a wolf 
clothed in order to deceive like the false prophet in Matthew 7:15?54 Is this figure the 
very embodiment of holy hermitic life, a life key voices in the poem explicitly respect 
later on, but a life that is also inchoately related to the one Holy Catholic and apostolic 
                                                
52 Langland, William Piers Plowman: A New Annotated Edition of the C-text ed. Derek Pearsall (University 
of Exeter Press, 2008), Prologue.1-5, [‘In a summer season when the sun shoe softly / I wrapped myself in 
woolens as if I were a sheep; / In a hermit’s habit, unholy in his works, / I went out into the world to hear 
wonders / And to see many strange and seldom-known things.], trans. George Economou William 
Langland’s Piers Plowman: The C-version (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), p. 3. 
53 Ralph Hanna, ‘William Langland’ in Larry Scanlon, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Medieval 
English Literature 1100-1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 128.   
54 An analogy Wycliffite writers were fond of making when reflecting on the ecclesiastical hierarchy. See 
‘The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy’ in Anne Hudson, ed., Selections From English Wycliffite Writings (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1997), pp. 75-83. 
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church in late medieval England?55 Or is the dreamer’s likeness a disguise, akin to that of 
Chaucer’s haunting figure of the Pardoner who, ‘stonde lyk a clerk in my pulpit’ 
preaching greedily in order to feed his own covetousness rather than to stir his hearers 
towards confession of and conversion from avarice?56 The space between the second and 
third line invite a positive association between the dreamer and a holy hermitic life, and 
yet the third line offers two irreconcilable possibilities. While the language ‘as an 
hermite’ invites associations of identity and likeness between the ‘Y’ and a true hermit, 
the structure of the third line simultaneously undermines how deep that likeness goes. 
Indeed, this teller subverts the validity of his own claim to authentic hermitic life as soon 
as he offers it. While he is like a hermit, he lacks a hermit’s ‘werkes’ and thus where he 
locates himself between authenticity and deception remains fluid. Unlike Chaucer’s 
Pardoner who audaciously confesses ‘For though myself be a ful vicious man, / A moral 
tale yet I yow telle kan,’ in Piers Plowman, the gap between the dreamer’s works and his 
identity interrupt him, and so the audience, from self-confidently plowing on in an 
authoritative interpretation of the dream.57 Here, the dreamer’s identity is held together 
                                                
55 That the poem holds out the possibility for a form of hermitic life that is truly admirable is evident in 
Prologue.30, and explicitly through Liberum Arbitrium’s high praise of ‘suche eremytes’ who lived 
according to the miraculous provision of God (XVII.6-36). However, serious reservations are expressed in 
Prologue.51-55 concerning the potential duplicitous nature of false hermits. For an excellent account of the 
precarious relation of late medieval English hermits to the institutional church see Nicholas Watson 
Richard Rolle and the Invention of Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
56 Geoffrey Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales in The Riverside Chaucer, 3rd edn, ed. Larry D. Benson 
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987), VI.391. All subsequent references to Chaucer’s works 
will be from this edition and cited by fragment and line number. Compare this line from Chaucer’s 
Pardoner’s Tale with a very similar line in Piers Plowman drawing attention to the danger of clerical 
semblances, ‘Ther prechede a pardoner as he a prest were’ (Prologue.66-67). The link between these two 
pardoners (Langland’s and Chaucer’s) will be made more explicit below. 
57 Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, VI.391. Preferring the term ‘audience’ over ‘reader’, ‘hearer’ or 
‘reader/hearer’ in part stylistic, and in part substantive. Not only is ‘audience’ a cleaner signification, but it 
also gestures towards the social-dialectic that exists between texts, authors and the societies/cultures in 
which texts are produced. On the later, see Paul Strohm ‘The Audience’ in his Social Chaucer (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), at p. 49, ‘The utterance, according to Voloshinov, is a ‘two-sided 
act…the product of a reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addresser and addressee.’ As 
such, it is to be regarded as the sole property neither of the speaker who frames it nor of the listener who 
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(or is it in the act of dissolving?) within a poetry that displays a communion of difference 
as constitutive of the dreamer’s own self-understanding.     
The dreamer’s uncertain self-knowledge concerns more than the defensibility of 
his individual moral character. His vision of ‘a fair feld of folk’ scans the cultural 
scaffolding of society in late medieval England, a purview including those ‘bidders’ who 
beg for money in exchange for offering prayers, false beggars, lying pilgrims, lazy 
hermits, greedy friars, and a whole host of pardoners, parsons, priests, bishops, bachelors, 
masters and doctors who all trade in cash rather than the care of souls.58 Yet, as the vision 
continues, it becomes clear that these identities are not equivalent to the simple 
dichotomies of true or false, ideal or hypocrite. Instead, the poetry demonstrates how the 
very meaning of the language necessary to define these various identities and practices 
becomes unstable.  
A sharp example of this instability occurs when the dreamer describes friars for 
whom ‘Here moneye and merchandise marchen togyderes’.59 The friars’ care of souls 
and the monetary compensation they receive in exchange for performing sacramental 
services do not exist in terms of either/or, true/false or ideal/hypocrite. Instead, these 
practices elide into an indivisibly composite, and transformed, process.60 The same hand 
that forgives also demands payment for services rendered, generating a practice and a 
                                                                                                                                            
receives it, but as their common property. This is because the utterance is formed and received within the 
larger social milieu that embraces both speaker and listener and the more particular social relationship that 
exists between them; the organizing center of the utterance thus lies in the social circumstances and 
purposes of the discourse.’ 
58 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.41-94. 
59 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.61, [Bind their love of money to their proper business.] 
60 Here, the poetry does more that James Simpson gives it credit when he suggests ‘The friars have made 
their confessional activity a function of their economic interests, in such a way as to extinguish charity 
altogether’, see James Simpson Piers Plowman: An Introduction to the B-Text Second, Revised Edition 
(Longman, 1990), p. 30. It is not simply that charity is extinguished, but that the language and practice of 
this culture have conjoined previously disparate grammars (that of gift and profit, sacrament and 
merchandise) and transformed them into something new, strange and dangerous (Prologue.62-65).  
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language that hollows out the very meaning of gift and reduces the sacrament of penance 
to just one more commodity being traded in the marketplace alongside the cacophonous 
shouts of ‘Hote pyes, hote! / Goodes gees and grys! Ga we dyne, ga we!’61 In this 
exchange the sacramentum of penance, that gift of contrition, confession and forgiveness, 
suffers a transformation of identity as it is absorbed by and conformed into the principles 
of the market.62 So too, the friars themselves experience a transformation of identity as 
subtle shifts in language and practice morph mendicancy into a sort of spiritual 
mercantilism.  
Here, the poetry provides an exploration into the complex processes involved as 
perversions of language and practice initiate cultural and ecclesial transformations.63 
What results is not so much a false friar who might be easily identified and avoided. 
Rather, what results is a figure whose identity as a guide in the practices of confession, 
forgiveness and restitution, stands subtly changed. The once familiar doctor in the care of 
souls now bears but a shadow of benevolence. A wolf in sheep’s clothing, the friar 
manipulates his art and his patient, indeed the very economy of salvation as understood in 
medieval Christianity, for cash. This friar whose ideal type begs for sustenance, receives 
all as gift, freely hears confession and bestows forgiveness in accordance with the 
sacramentum of penance, instead hawks his wares in a new competitive and 
commodified spiritual marketplace as if there were no other way.64 Or, it is as if a gene 
                                                
61 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.231-232, [‘Get your hot pies! / Good geese and pig meat! Come on 
up and eat!’]. 
62 See Thomas Tentler Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2015), and Peter Biller & A.J. Minnis, eds., Handling Sin: Confession in the Middle Ages 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2013).  
63 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.62-65. 
64 The historicity of this sort of spiritual marketplace, filled with rival communities, orders and forms of life 
competing to claim their own as the normative form of Christian practice is well described in Bynum Jesus 
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once integral to the cellular reproduction necessary to sustain the molecular processes of 
the body has now undergone the transformation of a cancer. A very building block of the 
body, and in this instance the Body of Christ, has become a subtle agent of destruction 
from within as it mutates otherwise life-giving processes. This is the space into which the 
poem opens, and into which the poem’s first representation of a self must negotiate its 
identity.65 The strangeness of this self in the midst of, and uncertain about, its relation to 
rival and shifting voices in a competitive religious marketplace displays a bleak initial 
glance into the institutions and communities through which Will’s identity will be 
formed. From this das ganze Gewimmel, Will meets a mysterious figure who 
paradoxically offers clearer counsel in this maze of the field. 
This figure, the first figure in the poem who identifies and names the dreamer, is 
Holy Church.66 She fills out the dreamer’s identity beyond his name, ‘Wille’, by locating 
him within a history of past relations and actions. Specifically, through the act of his 
baptism and relationships with godparents who pledged his life to the church,67 
thou oughtest me to knowe; 
Thow broughtest me borewes my biddyng to fulfille, 
To leue on me and loue me al thy lyf-tyme.68 
                                                                                                                                            
as Mother, pp. 82-109. The situation would only become further dizzying in England in the late fourteenth 
century with the added presence of the Lollards. 
65 James Simpson suggests ‘However much the opening of the poem might invite us to be wary about the 
voice of the narrator, who is ‘unholy of werkes’ (l. 3), the actual practice of the Prologue and Passus I 
seems to offer no space for the play of ironies that result from an untrustworthy voice’ in Piers Plowman: 
An Introduction, p. 24. To the contrary, the plays of irony that result from this untrustworthy 
narrator/dreamer, and also between rival religious orders, communities and indeed the papacy itself, are 
precisely the object of the poem’s attention in the opening lines. 
66 Langland, Piers Plowman, I.5-6. 
67 Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, 3rd ed. Spicilegium Bonaventurianum. 4 
(Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971), lib. 4, dist. 6, cap. 6, par. 1. 
68 Langland, Piers Plowman, I.72-5, [‘…you ought to know me; / I received you at first and made you free. 
/ God parents pledged you to fulfill my bidding, / To believe in me and love me all your life.’]. 
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The memory of this community and the sacramental practice of baptism, a practice that 
binds together the dreamer, God and a community, evokes an extraordinary reaction from 
Will, 
Thenne Y knelede on my knees and criede here of grace 
And preyede here pitously to preye for me to amende 
And also kenne me kyndly on Crist to bileue: 
‘Teche me to no tresor but telle me this ilke, 
How Y may saue my soule, that saynt art yholde.’69  
Humbly kneeling on both knees, Will cries out for forgiveness and renews his long-
forgotten journey towards an end which he does not yet understand, within a community 
which he cannot yet see, to believe in Christ and a salvation he cannot remember.  
 Will’s encounter with Holy Church, the memory of his baptism and the renewal 
of his life-long journey of faith resonate deeply with Saint Augustine’s own meditations. 
Amidst many possible sources across the Augustinian corpus, his De utilitate credendi  
and Confessionum are particularly apposite here. Augustine, writing to his Manichean 
friend Honoratus, recalls his habitation within a bewildering forest, that of 
Manicheanism, and his departure from that maze through piteous cries and the baptismal 
community of the church.70 While Augustine’s baptism is unlike Will’s insofar as 
Augustine’s baptism was delayed, the two figures share in their hearing of Holy Church’s 
                                                
69 Langland, Piers Plowman, I.76-80, [Then I fell to my knees and cried to her for grace / And begged her 
to take pity and pray I improve / And teach me plainly to believe in Christ: / ‘Teach me no more of 
treasure, but tell me this, / Sainted lady, how may I save my soul.’]. 
70 Augustine, De utilitate credendi, ed. J. Zycha, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiarum Latinorum, 25 (Vienna: 
F. Tempsky, 1891), cap. 8, par. 20, p. 25, linea 12: ‘restabat autem aliud nihil in tantis periculis, quam ut 
diuinam prouidentiam lacrimosis et miserabilibus uocibus, ut opem mihi ferret, deprecarer’ [In the midst of 
such great dangers there was nothing left for me except with tearful, piteous cries to implore divine 
providence to give me strength; and I did that earnestly] English translation from Augustine, On Christian 
Belief trans. Ray Kearney, Boniface Ramesy, ed., The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st 
Century (New York, NY: New City Press, 2005), p. 132. 
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voice, a shared determination to seek truth through accepting the teachings of this voice 
as well as the distinctive culture modeled by and passed on through a community of 
sponsoring godparents and friends.71 Like Will in his first encounter with Holy Church, 
Augustine describes his willingness to believe in a certain weight of authority as a 
necessary step for entering into true religion.72 To the consternation of Augustine’s 
Manichean epistoler, faith comes before understanding because, for Augustine, the mind 
must be transformed along the way of understanding.73 In addition to the puzzles around 
interpretive authority and uncertain identity, Augustine adds that a necessary disposition 
for the wayfarer journeying towards truth includes a willingness to depend upon the 
authority of a community that one does not yet know in order to advance towards a God 
who remains mysterious, all the while participating in and submitting to the 
transformation of one’s mind along the way towards the goal of love.74  
                                                
71 On Augustine’s delayed baptism see Augustine Confessionum libri XIII, ed. Martin Skutella and Luc 
Verheijen, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 27 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981) lib. 1, cap. 11, linea, 23. On 
Augustine’s decision to become a catechumen see Confessionum lib. 5, cap.14, linea 35, ‘statui ergo tandiu 
esse catechumenus in catholica ecclesia mihi a parentibus commendata, donec aliquid certi eluceret, quo 
cursum dirigerem’ [I therefore decided for the time being to be a catechumen in the Catholic Church, which 
the precedent of my parents recommended to me, until some clear light should come by which I could 
direct my course], trans. Henry Chadwick Confessions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 89. 
72 Augustine, De utilitate credendi, cap. 9, par. 21, p. 26, linea 13: ‘nam uera religio, nisi credantur ea, quae 
quisque postea, si se bene gesserit dignus que fuerit, adsequatur atque percipiat, et omnino sine quodam 
graui auctoritatis imperio inire recte nullo pacto potest’ [There is no right way of entering into the true 
religion without believing things that all who live rightly and become worthy of it will understand and see 
for themselves later on, and without some submission to a certain weight of authority] Augustine, On 
Christian Belief trans. Kearney, p. 133. 
73 Augustine, De utilitate credendi, cap. 16, par. 34, p. 43, linea 11: ‘uerum igitur uidere uelle, ut animum 
purges, cum ideo purgetur, ut uideas, peruersum certe atque praeposterum est’ [What defiles the mind, if I 
may explain it briefly, is love of anything at all other than the mind itself and God. The more one is 
cleansed of this defilement, the more easily one discerns the truth. Since, therefore, your mind is purified in 
order for you to see the truth, it is obviously perverse and absurd to want to see the truth in order to purify 
your mind] Augustine, On Christian Belief trans. Kearney, p. 145. 
74 Augustine, De utilitate credendi, cap. 17, par. 35, p. 46, linea 2: ‘et si unaquaeque disciplina, quamquam 
uilis et facilis, ut percipi possit, doctorem aut magistrum requirit, quid temerariae superbiae plenius, quam 
diuinorum sacramentorum libros et ab interpretibus suis nolle cognoscere et incognitos audere damnare?’ 
[To refuse to acknowledge her [the church’s] primacy is assuredly either the height of sacrilege or the 
height of headstrong arrogance. If souls have no secure path to wisdom and salvation unless faith prepares 
the ground for understanding, is it anything but ingratitude for God’s help and assistance if one chooses to 
resist such a strongly supported authority? If any subject, however lowly and easy to understand, requires a 
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Unlike Augustine, and despite Holy Church’s sermon exhorting Will to seek the 
triune God of love, Will does not remain focused upon Holy Church’s teaching, on Christ 
or on the hope of salvation that he so earnestly seeks.75 Instead, Passus II begins with 
Will kneeling on both knees crying for grace, but now with a very different object of 
attention. He begs Holy Church, in a narrative moment that echoes Adam and Eve’s shift 
of attention,  
‘Mercy, madame, for Mary loue of heuene 
That bar that blessid barn that bouhte vs on the rode, 
Kenne me by sum craft to knowe the false.’76 
Will’s desire for a skillful means to know ‘false’ directs him away from the baptismal 
community of godparents back to the chaotic field of folk, and particularly Lady Mede. 
This later figure, whose adornment and activity bear a mirror image of Holy Church, 
ravishes Will’s heart making the profit and power of court and realm the obsession of 
Will’s vision until he awakes at the beginning of Passus V.77 With his vision so cast, 
Holy Church commends Will to Christ, but then departs the poem, never to return. As if 
Will’s journey towards self-knowledge was not complicated enough, Will’s search is now 
                                                                                                                                            
teacher or tutor, could there be anything more proud and reckless than to refuse to learn about the books of 
the divine mysteries from their interpreters and then dare to condemn them without knowing anything 
about them?] Augustine, On Christian Belief trans. Kearney, pp. 146-7. 
75 Siegfried Wenzel, ‘Medieval Sermons’ in A Companion to Piers Plowman (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1988), pp. 155-72. 
76 Langland, Piers Plowman, II.2-4. Compare with Genesis 2:15-17, 3. It can be argued, and indeed it has 
been, that this early moment of directing attention away from God towards an ability to discern good from 
evil, initiates the fall. Augustine describes this directing of attention from God to the ability to discern good 
from evil as Adam and Eve’s desire to assert their own authority against obedience to God (see Augustine 
De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, ed. J. Zycha, CSEL, 28 (Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1894), lib. 8 and lib. 
11. 
77 The term ‘raueschede’ participates in a web of spiritual and ecclesial associations in this period. For 
instance, Richard Rolle uses the term ‘raueschede’ in his Meditations on the Passion to refer to his spiritual 
connection to Christ that emerges from focused devotion to Christ’s crucifixion. That Langland uses the 
term here as a referent to Will being enamored with Lady Mede carries, therefore, a spiritual significance; 
see Watson, Richard Rolle. 
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further complicated as his wandering is thrust into the material world of wealth, power 
and class that overlap and shape ecclesial, national and regional identities.  
 
§ Langland and the multiple contexts composing a ‘self’ 
 Passus V moves deeper into these themes of self, communal and institutional 
identity and language, but it does so with particular attention to the concrete historical 
realities that shape and form human identity in late-medieval England. Will awakens 
from his dreams of wealth and courtly power and finds himself roaming around Cornhill. 
He is soon met by Reason and Conscience who challenge his form of life because it does 
not seem to involve any meaningful work that might contribute to the good of the 
community.78 Anne Middleton persuasively argues that this scene is the latest addition to 
the poem and that the encounter between Will, Reason and Conscience is best understood 
not only as the poet’s apologia, but also that the scene is historically imbedded in the 
politics of the 1388 Vagrancy Statute.79 The historical particulars of late-medieval 
England are here seamlessly woven into the poetry’s study of the overlapping political 
and theological elements of selfhood. Three aspects of this scene are particularly 
illuminating and demonstrate Langland’s unceasing engagement with these questions all 
the way through this latest edition of the work: (1) statecraft and obedience, (2) the 
language of ‘lolleres’ and (3) the ongoing nature of the poem as a work that is indivisible 
from the perpetual development of a life. 
                                                
78 Langland, Piers Plowman, V.12-104. 
79 Anne Middleton, ‘Acts of Vagrancy: The C Version ‘Autobiography’ and the Statute of 1388’ in Steven 
Justice and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, eds., Written Work: Langland, Labor, and Authorship (Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), pp. 208-93. 
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 The Statute of 1388 marks a significant development, aspirational or real, in the 
power held by those in control of the emerging political formation of the English nation-
state. Middleton explains, 
Virtually all historians who have discussed the 1388 vagrancy measure have remarked 
on the breathtaking thoroughness with which it projects surveillance and control, and 
they have registered with expressions of dismay and distaste their sense that the 
measure is not merely unprecedented but premonitory – of a fundamentally different 
relation of the pragmatic to the normative in sociopolitical thought and imagination, 
and an early sign of the formation of an idea of the state as such, as an entity with 
intrinsic and supervening interests somehow in excess of those of the communities and 
individuals that constitute it.80 
Middleton further describes this development as involving a shift ‘toward the view that 
law and government have an active rather than a custodial role in identifying and solving 
perceived social problems – and that the state in which this power resides is personified 
in acts of parliament and decisions of justices rather than in the will or edicts of the 
monarch’.81 The date of the 1388 Statute is particularly relevant to its aims. In the wake 
of the Black Death, which wiped out almost forty percent of the English population in the 
mid-1300’s, many ordinances, and specifically the Ordinance of 1349, attempted to limit 
wages for labourers seeking to capitalize on the decrease in the labour supply.82 These 
ordinances aimed to stabilize, or restore, the prices of the pre-plague labour market. In 
contrast, the 1388 Statute followed not only the Black Death, but also events perhaps 
even more poignant in the English imagination. The Rising of 1381 involved a rebellion 
                                                
80 Middleton, ‘Acts of Vagrancy’, p. 219. 
81 Ibid, p. 226. 
82 R.B. Dobson, The Peasants Revolt of 1381, 2nd edit. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1983). 
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in which peasants and landed gentry coordinated an organized strike taking control over 
parts of London, invading the Tower of London and ritualistically beheading the Lord 
Chancellor Archbishop Simon Sudbury.83 The rising itself was infused with rhetoric from 
preachers like John Ball, whose theology and ability to organize caused many to fear that 
similar rebellions might be incited by the growing band of wandering Wycliffite 
preachers. The condemnation of certain Wycliffite theses at the Blackfriars Council of 
1382, mere months after the 1381 rising, punctuates the way theology and politics are 
intimately linked during this period.84 Given this context, Middleton explains that the 
aims of the 1388 Statute are directed not merely at curtailing the sorts of vagrancy that 
results from migrating labour populations, but specifically aims to curtail those 
wandering preachers whose ideas and rhetoric many feared would incite further rebellion.  
It is against this backdrop that the wandering Will meets and is interrogated by 
Reason and Conscience, and it is in this context that Will’s uncertainty about his 
communal and institutional identity, as displayed in the Prologue, comes uniquely into 
focus. Reason asks Will ‘Can thow seruen’, specifically through crafts related to bringing 
in the harvest, ‘or eny other kynes craft that to the comune nedeth.’85 Middleton points 
out that this is precisely the line of questioning one would expect from a local justice 
seeking to enforce the vagrancy Statute of 1388. If Will is found suspect, he is liable 
under the statute to be forced into labour in service to a ruling class claiming for itself the 
language of ‘comune nedeth.’86 The statute, however, makes exception for ‘people of 
                                                
83 Rodney Hilton, Bond Men Made Free: Medieval Peasant Movements and the English Rising of 1381 2nd 
edit. (London: Routledge, 2003). 
84 Andrew Cole, Literature and Heresy in the Age of Chaucer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
85 Langland, Piers Plowman, V.12, 20. 
86 Middleton, ‘Acts of Vagrancy’, pp. 216-8. 
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religion and hermits approved’ and Will scrambles to defend himself in these terms.87 
Will describes himself as an itinerant married clerk in minor orders, traveling between 
London and the country sustaining himself and his family by begging and praying for the 
souls of those who help him.88 This, however, is precisely the kind of person the 
vagrancy statute aimed to inhibit, as Middleton notes ‘no justice in England would have 
released Will on his own recognizance and estimate as the interlocutors have.’89  
What Middleton finds interesting is not necessarily why Conscience and Reason 
allow Will to go free, but the particular court of appeal to which Will, and so the poet, 
brings his defense: 
Of the two possible courts of appeal for fictively staging a defense of a legitimate, 
serious, and theologically adventurous vernacular poetics in the 1380s, Langland 
chose the secular venue in strategic preference to the ecclesiastical one, as by far the 
more promising for fantastic projection, and by far the more likely to concede its 
authority to a claim of scripturally informed vernacular conscience and calling – in 
short, more likely to accept, even if only by default, the verbal, citational, and sartorial 
trappings of clergie at face value.90 
 
Middleton suggests that Will here uses the Statute as a screen, choosing to defend himself 
in the secular sphere by arguing that his life of mendicant prayer is a legitimate form of 
labour under the terms of the statute, rather than risk his case being investigated in an 
ecclesial court and being declared ‘lollere’ for his adventurous and disruptive forays into 
                                                
87 Ibid, p. 217. 
88 Langland, Piers Plowman, V.43-52. See E.T. Donaldson Piers Plowman: The C-text and Its Poet (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1949). 
89 Middleton, ‘Acts of Vagrancy’, p. 262. 
90 Ibid, p. 279. 
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vernacular theology.91 That is to say, for Middleton, Will and so the poet chooses to veil 
the poem’s theological work, as well as the lives behind it, as a genuine form of ‘socially 
significant and spiritually valuable real work’ in order to avoid ecclesial censure. As 
such, this moment reveals the way in which Will’s identity and social location must find 
its way not only through the maze of ecclesial communities and personal anxiety, but also 
in relation to the increasingly defined operations of the state. More can be said about the 
theology and ecclesiology at play in this moment, but first it is worth considering what is 
at stake in Reason’s initial charge that Will’s is a ‘lollarne lyf.’92  
 Just what exactly it meant to be called a ‘lollare’, ‘lollere’ or to be charged with 
living a ‘lollerne life’ in the late 1300’s is complicated.93 It includes transformations of 
language and culture in late medieval England perhaps as unsettling as the 
transformations Langland describes around the language and practice of mendicancy and 
penance described above. As Middleton rightly argues, Reason’s charge that Will’s is a 
‘lollarne lyf’ certainly operates against the backdrop of the politics of the 1388 Statute as 
a charge that Will’s life is a wasteful avoidance of labour that might otherwise be 
directed towards the ‘common good.’ Thus, a portion of Will’s self-defense includes his 
argument that his life of mendicant prayer is legitimate work, and not a wasteful ‘lollarne 
lyf.’ However, after the 1382 Blackfriars Council, the term ‘lollere’ assumed a more 
particular referent as it became a form of pejorative slang directed with increasing 
frequency against Wycliffites. Thus, Reason’s charge against Will may not simply be a 
charge of laziness, but also include an heir of suspicion that Will might be a Wycliffite, 
                                                
91 Watson, ‘Censorship and Cultural Change’, pp. p. 276, 279-80. 
92 Langland, Piers Plowman, V.31. 
93 While Middleton’s work on the subject is certainly helpful, perhaps the most extensive treatment of the 
cultural and theological underpinnings of the term is to be found in Cole, Literature and Heresy. 
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perhaps one of those preachers like John Ball working to galvanize the peasants and 
incite a murderous uprising akin to the events of 1381.  
Will’s confession to these two figures does not, however, include a confession of 
errant theological positions or rebellious social activity, but rather the admission that, 
…Y beknowe 
That Y haue ytynt tyme and tyme myspened; 
Ac yut Y hope, as he that ofte hath ychaffared 
And ay loste and loste and at the laste hym happed 
A bouthe suche a bargain he was the bet euere 
And sette al his los at a leef at the laste ende, 
Suche a wynnyng hym warth thorw wyrdes of grace: 
    Simile est regnum celorum thesauro abscondito in argo. 
    Mulier que inuenit dragmam. 
So hope Y to haue of hym that is almighty 
A gobet of his grace and bigynne a tyme 
That alle tymes of my tyme to profit shal turne.94 
 
Will’s confession is for time wasted, and his hope is for a grace so abundant that it might 
sweep up all his time and turn it, transform it. Here, the poetry offers a sort of 
communion, a communion of biblical stories which offer parables depicting the excessive 
and inexhaustible nature of God’s grace. By bringing his life into communion with these 
                                                
94 Langland, William Piers Plowman, V.92-101, [‘…I must admit / That I have wasted time and time 
misspent; / But still, I hope, as he that has dealt often / And lost and lost, and at last happened / To buy such 
a bargain he was set up forever, / And counted his previous losses as not worth a leaf, / Such a winning 
came his way through words of grace. / The kingdom of heaven is like unto a treasure hidden in a field. The 
woman that found a silver coin, etc. / So I hope to have from him that is almighty / A mouthful of his grace, 
and begin a time, / That all times of my time shall turn to profit’]. 
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parables, Will’s hope is given a particular shape as he longs for a grace capable of 
overpowering misspent time through the eternal God who redeems all time. What is 
particularly fascinating, and where Middleton’s reading seems to stop short, is that Will 
does not await the fulfillment of this hope along the roadside where he has met Reason 
and Conscience. He does not wait for these justices to determine the legitimacy of his 
work. Instead, his act of confession spurs him to church,  
And to the kyrke Y gan go, god to honoure; 
Byfore the cross on my knees knokked Y my brest, 
Syhing for my synnes, seggyng my pater-noster, 
Wepyng and waylyng til Y was aslepe.95 
How interesting for Will to speed his way to church immediately after choosing to defend 
himself on secular grounds out of fear of ecclesial censure! Not to mention his previously 
expressed anxieties concerning the pervasive corruptions of the church in the Prologue. 
Given what has gone before, it seems strange for Will to run to church. To further 
complicate the scene, Will does not puzzle over the particular community, whether it is a 
local parish, a group of Wycliffites, a band of mendicants, or a particular monastic house, 
in which he should offer his confession. He simply goes to ‘the kyrke…god to honoure.’ 
Here, the binary alternatives for Will as a ‘lollere’ (orthodox or heretic, lazy vagrant or 
good working citizen) seem to fade. What matters is his sincere act of confession and the 
particular context, or community, in which confession is performed, the church. Is this 
move merely a retreat to a sort of conservatism or abstract idealic ecclesiology? At this 
point, it remains unclear. The details around the continuation of Will’s return to church, 
                                                
95 Langland, Piers Plowman, V.105-108, [And so to church I went to honor God, / Kneeling before the 
cross I beat my breast, / Sighing for my sins, saying my pater noster, / Weeping and wailing till I fell 
asleep]. 
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its practices and the potential renewal of his life-long journey of faith are again 
interrupted as Will falls asleep. Much can, and in later chapters will, be said about Will’s 
vision of the seven deadly sins; but for present purposes the focus remains on one final 
aspect of this scene. 
 As one of the final major editions to the poem, this section of Passus V in the 
poem’s last version is particularly revealing of the poet’s reflections about the nature and 
shape of his work. Middleton suggests that this addition inserted at this particular 
moment in the narrative sequence, 
Retrospectively asserts the poem’s immanent and intentional design, rather than its 
episodically fortuitous and merely additive character, as a long-term and large-scale 
literary enterprise. In the process this declaration also has the effect of rendering 
explicit and problematic the poem’s double social and cognitive ‘mode of existence’ 
in its historical world, as a fixed textual object (in fact a series of them), which may in 
theory be assimilated by the mind as a whole, and contemplated and reflectively 
elaborated as a single intent and narrative, yet produced and disseminated as a 
continuing and never-ending reiteration, a kind of liturgical performance, of an act 
from which the actor is, in the nature of the case, never fully free, a work of which the 
maker can never take his leave, as a book he can never close. … in other words, a 
continuous ‘work’ that has in effect become a ‘life’ rather than an assemblage of 
‘makings.’96 
Middleton’s assessment is helpful, even poetic. It also leaves certain questions hanging. 
Specifically, is Langland, like Will, intentionally testing the limits of orthodoxy through a 
daring and ongoing work of vernacular theology behind a veil of secular labour? If the 
                                                
96 Middleton, ‘Acts of Vagrancy’, p. 273. 
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resonances between this scene and the 1388 Statute are indeed a functional screen to 
ground Piers Plowman in the secular rather than the ecclesial realm of judgment, it might 
be wondered whether Piers Plowman is related to social or ecclesial revolution akin to 
the 1381 rising, or whether this is an instance of the poet back-peddling from the radical 
revolutionary potential of this making towards a more modest conservative reformism.97 
Amidst all of the dreamer’s anxieties about the corruption of the church, as well as his 
confusion regarding his social and ecclesial identity, what it means for Will to participate 
in such a work, and whether reform or revolution are the only two alternatives, are valid 
questions. So too the significance of Will’s continual return to the church, its community 
and practices: is this a retreat to an abstract ideal or a gesture towards an unwillingness to 
abandon the late medieval church? Will’s final waking moment offers a powerful 
location for the poet to bring together themes related to communal and institutional 
identity as they relate to theological and literary traditions of self-knowing and also the 
historical realities of late-medieval Christianity and culture. As such, Will’s wandering in 
the field of the world and his search for salvation are tangled up with a church that is 
itself mixed in with certain coercive powers of the state. This state, as has been shown, 
concerns itself with the content of theological work. How Langland portrays this church 
which Will runs to for prayer and confession is an important subject to address. 
 
§ Langland’s ecclesial vision: a first glance 
 In the final passus, Will awakes after an extraordinary sequence including 
allegorical visions of faith, hope and love; the life, death and resurrection of Christ; as 
                                                
97 A common suggestion, see G.R. Owst Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1933). 
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well as Pentecost, the formation of the church and the contradictions this new community 
endures on earth. In the wake of this powerful series of visions, the theological, social 
and self-reflexive puzzles of Will’s wanderings are powerfully expressed through the 
opening verse of this final passus, 
And as Y wente by the way, when Y was thus awaked, 
Heuy-chered Y yede and elyng in herte, 
For Y ne wiste where to ete ne at what place.98 
Will wakes here at the opening of the poem’s final passus after, in the penultimate 
passus, nodding off to sleep during the offertory at the moment prior to the consecration 
of the mass. Thus, his confusion about where to eat includes a Eucharistic pun, Will 
should have just received the sacramental body and blood of Christ. He should have just 
eaten, and specifically, he should have just eaten in church.  
But, in Passus XXII, Will is again wandering, accosted by yet another figure for 
being a ‘faytour’ and returns to all his uncertainties about his identity in relation to his 
social and ecclesial status. Will recapitulates his life of wandering, the abuse he endures 
at the hands of manipulative friars, his struggles in old age and the anxiety he experiences 
in the face of death. Looking into the void of death, Will cries out to Kynde, 
…‘Out of care me brynge! 
‘Lo! how Elde the hore hath me byseye; 
Awreke me, yif youre wille be, for Y wolde be hennes.’ 
    ‘Yf thow wolt be wreke, wende into Vnite 
And halde the there euere til Y sende for the. 
                                                
98 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXII.1-3, [And as I went on my way after I awoke, / Sad-faced I walked and 
aching at heart, / For I didn’t know where or at what place I could eat.]. 
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And loke thow conne som craft ar thow come thennes.’ 
    ‘Consaileth me, Kynde,’ quod Y, ‘what craft be beste to lere?’ 
    ‘Lerne to loue,’ quod Kynde, ‘and leef all othere.’ 
    ‘How shal Y come to catel so, to clothe me and to fede?’ 
    ‘And thow loue lelly, lacke shal the neuere 
Wede ne worldly mete while thy lif lasteth.’ 
And Y bi conseil of Kynde comsed to rome 
Thorw contricion and confessioun til Y cam to Vnite.99 
This Will, life-weary and uncertain about both his identity and the communities that 
might help him on his journey towards God, is commanded and submits to return to the 
very church he sees crumbling from within. If David Aers’ suggestion that Langland’s 
use of ‘rome’ includes both the sense of ‘to roam’ and the ‘Roman church’, then Will’s 
obedience includes a sort of double consciousness of suspicion and dependence as he 
returns to the liturgy, patterns and common life of late medieval Christianity.100 Such a 
split-minded return to the pattern and language of late medieval Christianity is gestured 
to by the very structure of the poem, which is itself shaped around the liturgy.101 While 
Will submits to end his days learning the craft of love within Holy Church, Vnity, the 
poem famously concludes with Conscience departing the church, perhaps punctuating 
                                                
99 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXII.201-13, […to bring me out of care: / ‘Look, how hoary Old Age has 
treated me; / Avenge me, if you will, I want out of here.’ / ‘If you want revenge, make your way into Unity 
/ And keep yourself there till I send for you, / And make sure you learn some craft before you come from 
there.’ / ‘Counsel me, Kind,’ I said, ‘what craft’s best to learn?’ / ‘Learn to love,’ said Kind, ‘and forget all 
the rest.’ / ‘How shall I earn a living, to clothe and feed myself?’ / ‘If you love loyally, you’ll never lack / 
Clothes or earthly food as long as you live.’ / And according to Kind’s advice I began to roam / Through 
Contrition and Confession till I came to Unity.]. 
100 David Aers, Sanctifying Signs: Making Christian Tradition in Late Medieval England (Notre Dame, IN: 
Notre Dame University Press, 2004), p. 155. 
101 See Robert Adams, ‘Langland and the Liturgy Revisited’ Studies in Philology, 73 (1976), pp. 266-84; 
Conor McKee, ‘Pedagogic and Dramatic Roles of the Liturgy in Piers Plowman’, The Cambridge 
Quarterly Review, 45 (2016), pp. 343-64. 
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those voices in the poem who represent Langland’s tempered sympathy for Wycliffites as 
representatives of a more authentic form of discipleship than their clerical, hermetic or 
Franciscan counterparts.102 Either way, at the poem’s close, the tensions between 
individual and communal identity are heightened, not resolved, and if Middleton is 
correct that the addition to Passus V in the C-version is one of the latest amendments to 
the work, then it is clear that Langland made no effort to resolve these tensions in his 
final redaction.  
 In response to these tensions, Walter W. Skeat long ago maintained, 
 
What other ending could there be? or rather, the end is not yet. We may be defeated, 
yet not cast down; we may be dying, and behold, we live. We are all still pilgrims 
upon earth. This is the truth which the author’s mighty genius would impress upon us 
in his parting words. Just as the poet awakes in ecstasy at the end of the poem of 
Dobet, where he dreams of that which has been already accomplished, so here he is 
awoke by the cry of Conscience for help, and is silent at the thought of how much 
remains to be done. So far from ending carelessly, he seems to me to have ceased 
speaking at the right moment, and to have managed a very difficult matter with 
consummate skill.103 
 
Skeat is here prosaic and not inaccurate. However, these tensions around individual and 
communal identity and the self that Langland holds throughout Piers Plowman involve a 
more particular theological concern than has often been credited to the poem. Langland’s 
work maintains certain tensions as necessary for the investigation of the following 
                                                
102 Cole, Literature and Heresy in the Age of Chaucer. 
103 Walter W. Skeat, The Vision of William Concerning Piers the Plowman together with Richard the 
Redeless, vol. 2 (of 2) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1886), pp. 285-6. 
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puzzle: how do pilgrims, faced with rival communities wielding competing and 
irreconcilable claims to the teaching authority of the church, negotiate rival claims and 
communities without spiraling into infinite spirals of individualistic regress? This 
question is not merely epistemological, but is inseparable from the communities, 
institutions and cultural practices that shape the architecture, control and dissemination of 
knowledge in late medieval English society.  
 
§ The ‘self’ and the church in the thought of Thomas Aquinas 
To further demonstrate the particular aptitude Piers Plowman offers to an 
investigation of selfhood, this analysis now considers the particular way Langland’s 
poetry engages and questions both the theological and institutional development of 
doctrine in the late-medieval church. Specifically, Langland’s poetry examines key 
elements of Thomas Aquinas’ theological account of the church’s teaching authority 
alongside critiques within Chaucer’s Pardoner’s Tale.  
The questions Langland raises, questions derived from the opacity of the subject 
and the possibility that such an unknowing self precludes the subject from carrying out a 
journey, are completely alien to the theological perspective of Langland’s near 
contemporary Thomas Aquinas.104 Aquinas is not troubled by questions of the unknown 
                                                
104 While comparing Chaucer and Langland’s representations of tensions concerning the church’s teaching 
authority need little justification, the relation between Langland and Thomas Aquinas requires more 
attention. Appreciation for Thomas’ theological insights in England and in the period immediately 
preceding and following the production of Piers Plowman is wide. The interpretive space concerning 
Thomas’ work between March 7, 1277 and his canonization by Pope John XXII in 1323 is further 
complicated in England by Robert Kilwardby’s, then Archbishop of Oxford, condemnations of 
Thomistically inspired theses on March 18, 1277 and his successor, John Pecham’s renewal of those 
condemnations a decade later. Not to mention William de la Mare’s Catalgue (Correctorium) of 118 
Thomistic theses deemed dangerous and attached to Thomas’ works in the schools. For a detailed history of 
this see Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P. Aquinas’s Summa: Background, Structure, & Reception, trans. Benedict 
M. Guevin, O.S.B. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), pp. 86-90; David 
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self in the way Langland depicts the problem in the opening lines of his poem. For 
Aquinas, the question of authority is bound up with trust, or faith. It is also a 
development of Augustine’s theological epistemology as described in his De utilitate 
credendi previously considered. 
 In the first question of the secunda secundae of his Summa Theologiae, Thomas 
explores faith and the relationship faith ultimately has to received authority and the 
carrying on of a tradition. For Thomas, questions related to authority, and specifically 
claims to the church’s teaching office, are bound up with the concept of faith and how 
faith is received by, and also forms, the soul. Thomas crafts a series of distinctions 
designed to demonstrate the justifiability, indeed the necessity, of assent to divine 
teaching offered through the mediation of the church’s authorities. The all-important 
theological shift Thomas brings to these questions around authority and the self is that 
Thomas does not ground assent to authority either in the trustworthiness of the subject or 
                                                                                                                                            
Piche, La Condamnation parisienne de 1277: translation, introduction et commentaire (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 
Edward Grant, ‘The effect of the Condemnation of 1277’ in Norman Kretzmann, ed., Cambridge History of 
Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 537-9; Étienne Gilson A 
History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward, 1953), p. 406. While it is 
certainly reasonable to suggest that acceptance of Thomas’ theology was neither universal nor widespread 
in England during the period of Langland’s education and writing, the flurry of interest around the angelic 
doctor during the mid-fourteenth century, and particularly in England, make it likely that Langland would 
have engaged either Thomas directly, or at least through figures working to refute Thomas’ positions. 
Indeed, Langland’s contemporary, regional neighbor and potential fellow Augustinian Canon Walter 
Hilton, in his Epistola de Utilitate, names Thomas Aquinas as a special authority on the religious life, see 
John P.H. Clark and Rosemary Dorward, ‘Introduction’ in Walter Hilton: The Scale of Perfection (New 
York, NY: Paulist Press, 1991), pp. 22-4, 32-3. Thomas’s theology around faith and the church’s teaching 
authority is examined at length here because it is uniquely articulate. The present chapter will demonstrate 
the ways many church authorities in England during Langland’s time will use (manipulate) some of 
Thomas’ conclusions to enforce and maintain their power. As such, it is remarkable that Piers Plowman not 
only challenges certain abuses to claims of ecclesial authority, but also goes further to question the very 
philosophical and theological scaffolding upon which these claims depend. Langland here resonates with 
certain Wycliffite writings, see Dialogue between a Clerk and a Knight in Four Wycliffite Dialogues ed. 
Fiona Somerset. The Early English Text Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Whether 
Langland is doing so as an intentional or direct engagement with Thomas is inconsequential to the 
chapter’s argument. What is important is the way Piers Plowman problematizes the propositions that make 
Aquinas’ teachings on ecclesial authority possible, and specifically the mode of reasoning and linguistic 
discourse he forms through his poetry as an alternative against contemporary theological and political 
abuses. 
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in appeal to human authority as such. Rather Thomas thinks through the relation between 
faith and authority in a way which presupposes that the very obiectum of faith itself is 
God.105 Furthermore, for Thomas, this same God choses to mediate God’s self to 
humanity through mystical unions of human and divine agency, specifically the 
Incarnation and also the Church. Thomas is interested in exploring the degree to which 
the concept of received authority itself is fitting only if the obiectum of faith, or trust, is 
the God who is the Creator, Sustainer and End of all things; the same God who choses to 
enter into the finitude of human existence through both the Incarnation and the church as 
the divinely elected means through which God mediates God’s self to God’s beloved.   
T.C. O’Brien helpfully clarifies the meaning behind Thomas’ language of 
obiectum, pointing out that, ‘The term [obiectum] ‘object’ stands for the reality, thing or 
person, that engages an act.’106 Going further, Rienhard Hutter notes that, ‘What needs to 
be highlighted is the verb ‘engage.’’107 For Thomas, the God who is the First Truth is the 
obiectum of faith in two ways.108 First, as the formal principle. As the formal principle of 
faith, God is the one who engages, God is the One who acts. As the formal principle, God 
makes it possible for the material objects to be known analogous to the way the formal 
principles of geometry are the means of demonstration that make the conclusions, that 
                                                
105 The critical edition for the Summae theolgiae used here is the Leonine edition, Corpus Thomisticum, 
Sancti Thomae de Aquino: Summa Theologiae, Leonine edition (Rome, 1888), 
https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth0000.html, which is cited following the usual conventions for 
Aquinas’s works, with the abbreviation ST, here, ST IIa-IIae q. 1. Modern English translations provided, 
unless otherwise stated, are taken from St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica 5 vols. trans. Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Ave Maria Press, 1948). 
106 T.C O’Brien, O.P. ‘Appendix 1: Objects and Virtues’, in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae. Vol. 
31 Faith (2a2ae 1-7), English translation, introduction, notes, appendices and glossary by T.C. O’Brien. 
Reprint of the 1974 original edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 178. 
107 Reinhard Hutter, ‘Theological Faith Enlightening Sacred Theology: Renewing Theology by Recovering 
Its Unity as Sacra Doctrina’, The Thomist (2010), p. 369-405. 
108 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q. 1.1. 
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which is known materially, knowable.109 To follow the contours of this analogy, God is 
both the primary target and the primary agent Who makes God’s self knowable. Thomas 
also insists that God is the obiectum of faith in a second way, and again he uses an 
analogy. Seemingly diverse and unconnected particulars like ‘Christ’s human nature, the 
sacraments of the church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith in so far as by 
them we are directed to God.’110 For Thomas, all creation comes into being ex nihilo 
through God and is ordered towards God, and thus even the diverse particulars of 
creation are contained under God Who is the obiectum of faith analogous to the way ‘the 
object of the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation to health.’111 
Faith, or trust, for Thomas is thus not the act of an independent deliberating subject 
assenting to an object that is extrinsic or uninvolved in the processes of its being known. 
Nor is faith the result of ad hoc or utterly disconnected elements randomly constructing a 
purely contingent way of discerning the relation between God and creation. God, for 
Thomas, is the obiectum of faith, the obiectum through which all creation comes into 
being and to which all creation is eventually ordered, in such a way that God is intimately 
bound up in the very act of the subject’s assent and knowing. 
This active, engaging, aspect of God Who is the obiectum of faith becomes more 
apparent as Thomas distinguishes how the human subject, particularly the intellect, 
assents. For Thomas, faith is to think with assent in a particular way, 
                                                
109 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q. 1.1. 
110 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q. 1.1.ad.1, [Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad humanitatem 
Christi et ad sacramenta Ecclesiae vel ad quascumque creaturas cadunt sub fide inquantum per haec 
ordinamur ad Deum. Et eis etiam assentimus propter divinam veritatem.]. 
111 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q. 1.1.co, […sicut etiam obiectum medicinae est sanitas, quia nihil medicina 
considerat nisi in ordine ad sanitatem.]. 
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To think is more strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect, which is 
accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which precedes the intellect’s arrival at the 
stage of perfection that comes with the certitude of sight.112 
Again, Thomas chooses to explicate this description by way of an analogy, this time 
through an analogy borrowed from Augustine, 
The Son of God is not called the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought 
realizes what we know and takes form therefrom, it becomes our word. Hence the 
Word of God must be understood without any thinking on the part of God, for there is 
nothing there that can take form, or be unformed.113  
Thus thinking is that inchoate activity which occurs prior to our utterance in word, or to 
use another analogy, that straining towards vision that occurs prior to sight. So, faith is a 
sort of thinking, in this inchoate mode, with assent, or ‘the movement of the mind while 
yet deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear sight of truth.’114 ‘If […] to think be 
understood in [this] second way, then this expresses completely the nature of the act of 
believing.’115 As such, the act of faith exists in the space between opinion and scientia.116 
It is a mode of knowing the unknown that is warranted, indeed fitting, precisely because 
the identity of the obiectum is God, and it is thus a mode of knowing the Infinite Creator 
                                                
112 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q. 2.1.co, [Alio modo dicitur cogitare magis proprie consideratio intellectus quae 
est cum quadam inquisitione, antequam perveniatur ad perfectionem intellectus per certitudinem visionis.]. 
113 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q. 2.1.co, [‘Cogitatio quippe nostra proveniens ad id quod scimus atque inde 
formata verbum nostrum verum est. Et ideo verbum Dei sine cogitatione debet intelligi, non aliquid habens 
formabile, quod possit esse informe.]. 
114 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q. 2.1.co, [‘Et secundum hoc cogitatio proprie dicitur motus animi deliberantis 
nondum perfecti per plenam visionem veritatis]. 
115 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q. 2.1.co., IIa-IIae q. 1.co, [‘Si igitur cogitare sumatur communiter, secundum 
primum modum, sic hoc quod dicitur cum assensione cogitare non dicit totam rationem eius quod est 
credere.]. 
116 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.4.1.co. 
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of all that is most appropriate in light of the limitations of the creature.117 Consequently, 
the subject is brought to belief by way of engagement by and with the obiectum of faith.  
It is a sort of ongoing interaction initiated by the God who is unseen118, Who also stirs the 
will towards the inchoate presentation of the obiectum offered by the intellect.119 Assent, 
therefore, is an activity that cannot be isolated to the internal or external action of the 
subject, but rather includes the very processes through which the subject is swept up into 
a life of participation in the One Who is believed. 
 Thomas further investigates the interrelation of the processes constitutive of the 
act of faith by clarifying how faith is best understood not simply as an act, but as a virtue. 
For Thomas, human virtue ‘denotes a certain perfection of a power’, a certain character 
formed and established within the soul which disposes a person to act in a certain way, a 
habitus.120 On the one hand, the virtues are distinguished regarding their ends; the moral 
virtues concern the formation of the will, while the intellectual virtues form the mind, 
both of which are united through the virtue of prudence. On the other hand, the virtues 
are also distinguished according to human capacity,  
Both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by nature, so far as we are adapted to 
them, but not in their perfection…both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by way 
                                                
117 Avery Dulles helpfully clarifies the significance and puzzle that God, and not merely things about God, 
is the obiectum of faith, ‘After explaining that faith is one and undivided in its content (since all truth is one 
in the divine mind), [Thomas Aquinas] points out that the human mind, unable to take in the entire content 
of faith in a single act, divides that content into articles. But the articles or propositions, he explains, are 
not, strictly speaking, the objects of faith ‘for the act of the believer does not terminate in the proposition 
(enuntiable) but in the reality [signified by the proposition]; for we do not form propositions except to have 
knowledge of things by means of them, whether in science or in faith (S. Th.,2-2.1.2, ad2).’ 
118 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.1.4.co. On the significance of apophatic theology in Thomas’ thought 
(specifically the unknowability of the divine essence this side of the eschaton) see Joseph Pieper The 
Silence of St. Thomas (St. Augustine Press, 1999). 
119 Aquinas, ST Ia-IIae q.9.1.co and IIa-IIae q.1.10.ad.4. Or as Thomas will later describe it, ‘Actus autem 
fidei est credere, qui, sicut supra dictum est, actus est intellectus determinati ad unum ex imperio 
voluntatis’ (Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.4.1.co). 
120 Aquinas, ST Ia-IIae q.55.1.co. 
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of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, – but not perfectly, since nature is determined to 
one, while the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of 
action, but on various modes, in respect of the various matters, which constitute the 
sphere of virtue’s action, and according to various circumstances.  
It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude 
and inchoation, but not according to perfection, except the theological virtues which 
are entirely from without.121 
Thus, for Thomas, there are certain virtues which are natural122 to human beings in an 
inchoative or imperfect mode, and these virtues develop in a person as that person 
acquires habits conducive to a virtue’s formation, or perfection, in the soul. The 
theological virtues are different. The theological virtues, of which faith is one, are infused 
‘entirely from without’ in a person by God. A person cannot even prepare her will for the 
infusion of faith, ‘To believe does indeed depend on the will of the believer: but [a 
person’s] will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in order that [she] may be raised 
to things which are above [her] nature.’123 Thus faith, for Thomas, is a theological virtue 
infused in a person by God, an act in response to the subject’s being engaged by the very 
                                                
121 Aquinas, ST Ia-IIae q.63.1.co, [Et his modis tam virtutes intellectuales quam morales, secundum 
quandam aptitudinis inchoationem, sunt in nobis a natura. Non autem consummatio earum. Quia natura 
determinatur ad unum, consummatio autem huiusmodi virtutum non est secundum unum modum actionis, 
sed diversimode, secundum diversas materias in quibus virtutes operantur, et secundum diversas 
circumstantias. Sic ergo patet quod virtutes in nobis sunt a natura secundum aptitudinem et inchoationem, 
non autem secundum perfectionem, praeter virtutes theologicas, quae sunt totaliter ab extrinseco]. See also 
Aquinas, ST Ia-IIae q.61. 
122 It is important to bear in mind that ‘natural’ in this context does not infer a mode of existence that is not 
the result of and sustained by the creative act of God. For Thomas, there is not such thing as a ‘natural’ 
mode of existence that is distinctively human in a way that is untouched and not indebted to God for its 
existence.  For an excellent account of this, see Henri de Lubac’s The Mystery of the Supernatural trans. 
Rosemary Sheed (New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2012). 
123 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.6.1.ad.3, [‘Ad tertium dicendum quod credere quidem in voluntate credentium 
consistit, sed oportet quod voluntas hominis praeparetur a Deo per gratiam ad hoc quod elevetur in ea quae 
sunt supra naturam, ut supra dictum est]. 
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obiectum of faith.124 For Thomas, that God is both the obiectum and the primary agent in 
the human act of faith is a critical commitment of Catholic teaching which is necessary to 
avoid the error of the Pelagian heresy, 
The Pelagians held that this cause [of faith] was nothing else than man’s free-will: and 
consequently they said that the beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to 
wit, it is in our power to be ready to assent to things which are of faith, but that the 
consummation of faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. 
But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his 
nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving him 
inwardly: and this is God. Therefore, faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act 
of faith, is from God moving man outwardly by grace.125 
To be clear, as an infused virtue, Thomas does not hold the act of faith to be a violent act 
of God upon a wholly passive human subject. Faith is entirely a gift, and yet a person 
grows in the gift of faith as they participate more and more in the God-given virtue 
through which they learn the truths of faith more explicitly.126 Thus, while faith is an 
                                                
124 That faith is a virtue, see Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.4.5.co, ‘Unde quicumque habitus est semper principium 
boni actus, potest dici virtus humana. Talis autem habitus est fides formata. Cum enim credere sit actus 
intellectus assentientis vero ex imperio voluntatis, ad hoc quod iste actus sit perfectus duo requiruntur. 
Quorum unum est ut infallibiliter intellectus tendat in suum bonum, quod est verum, aliud autem est ut 
infallibiliter ordinetur ad ultimum finem, propter quem voluntas assentit vero. Et utrumque invenitur in actu 
fidei formatae. Nam ex ratione ipsius fidei est quod intellectus semper feratur in verum, quia fidei non 
potest subesse falsum, ut supra habitum est, ex caritate autem, quae format fidem, habet anima quod 
infallibiliter voluntas ordinetur in bonum finem. Et ideo fides formata est virtus.’ That faith is a theological 
virtue, see ST Ia-IIae q.62. That faith is an infused virtue, see ST Ia-IIae q.6.1. 
125 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.6.1.co, [‘Hanc autem causam Pelagiani ponebant solum liberum arbitrium 
hominis, et propter hoc dicebant quod initium fidei est ex nobis, inquantum scilicet ex nobis est quod parati 
sumus ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei; sed consummatio fidei est a Deo, per quem nobis proponuntur 
ea quae credere debemus. Sed hoc est falsum. Quia cum homo, assentiendo his quae sunt fidei, elevetur 
supra naturam suam, oportet quod hoc insit ei ex supernaturali principio interius movente, quod est Deus. 
Et ideo fides quantum ad assensum, qui est principalis actus fidei, est a Deo interius movente per gratiam.]. 
Another excellent explication of the relation between divine and human agency in the processes and 
movements of human will can be found in Thomas’ account of the necessity of grace in ST Ia-IIae q.109. 
126 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.5.4.co. 
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infused virtue, it is infused in a way that is only intelligible for Thomas insofar as faith 
functions as a human act that is perfected through human participation in it as a gift from 
God. The theological virtues are not infused perfectly or completely in a person, but in 
form. Thus, faith, like hope and charity, requires the God-enabled participation of the 
recipient in order for the form of particular theological virtues to move a person towards 
perfection.127  
 Following his study of the obiectum of faith, Thomas turns his attention to how 
the tradition of faith in the unseen God passes on through time. That is to say, Thomas 
moves from considering how a person believes (fides qua), to an analysis of the how the 
church negotiates its own authority to teach and form the faithful across time (fides 
quae). He concludes that the best means for Christianity to be passed on is through an 
ecclesially mediated ‘collection of maxims of faith’ united under a ‘symbol.’128 One of 
the primary reasons Thomas deems this necessary is because, 
The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ, diffusely, under various modes of 
expression, and sometimes obscurely, so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from 
Holy Writ, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who 
require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no time for study, being busy 
with other affairs. And so it was necessary to gather together a clear summary from 
the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of all. This indeed was no 
addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it.129 
                                                
127 The participation of the human will in the God-initiated act/virtue of faith is also integral to the way in 
which Thomas holds the act of faith to be meritorious. See Joseph Wawykrow God’s Grace and Human 
Action: ‘Merit’ in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1995).  
128 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.1.9.co. 
129 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.1.9.ad.1, [‘Ad primum ergo dicendum quod veritas fidei in sacra Scriptura 
diffuse continetur et variis modis, et in quibusdam obscure; ita quod ad eliciendum fidei veritatem ex sacra 
Scriptura requiritur longum studium et exercitium, ad quod non possunt pervenire omnes illi quibus 
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What Thomas implies here by ‘symbols’ are, of course, the various creeds.  He affirms 
that multiple creeds are appropriate insofar as different creeds combat diverse errors 
brought by heretics over time.130 Here, two things become immediately apparent. First, 
that it is fitting and necessary for the complexity of Holy Writ and truths pertaining to 
God to be made sufficiently available to all members of the church given the diversity of 
functions each member of the body offers and the limitations such diverse stations place 
on the time different members have for study. The second aspect of the importance of 
symbols is the appropriateness of multiple symbols. Here, Thomas acknowledges that the 
faith of the church is not a static set of propositions, but a ‘living faith’131 and thus the 
church must constantly offer symbols of the faith to combat new errors that arise in 
changing historical circumstances. Yet, for Thomas, it is also the case that new symbols 
are not strictly born out of responses to error.  
The church develops new symbols as it discerns certain articles of the faith which, 
up until particular moments in history, are only believed implicitly, 
We must conclude that, as regards the substance of the articles of faith they have not 
received any increase as time went on: since whatever those who lived later have 
believed, was contained, albeit implicitly in the faith of those Fathers who preceded 
them. But there was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly which 
were not known explicitly by those who lived before them.132 
                                                                                                                                            
necessarium est cognoscere fidei veritatem, quorum plerique, aliis negotiis occupati, studio vacare non 
possunt. Et ideo fuit necessarium ut ex sententiis sacrae Scripturae aliquid manifestum summarie 
colligeretur quod proponeretur omnibus ad credendum. Quod quidem non est additum sacrae Scripturae, 
sed potius ex sacra Scriptura assumptum.]. 
130 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.1.9.ad.2. 
131 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.1.9.ad.3. 
132 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.1.7.co, [‘ Sic igitur dicendum est quod, quantum ad substantiam articulorum 
fidei, non est factum eorum augmentum per temporum successionem, quia quaecumque posteriores 
crediderunt continebantur in fide praecedentium patrum, licet implicite. Sed quantum ad explicationem, 
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Indeed, Thomas explains that the article of faith affirming that the transubstantiated 
substance of Christ’s body and blood are contained under the accidents of the material 
bread and wine in the Eucharist is an article of faith believed implicitly under the 
previously affirmed article of faith in God’s omniscience, and yet only believed explicitly 
later in the church’s history, determinatively at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.133  
The task of making more explicit the deposit of faith, or as John Henry Newman 
would call it centuries later ‘discerning the development of doctrine’, is an authority 
Thomas grants to, 
the universal Church [which] cannot err, since it is governed by the Holy Ghost, Who 
is the Spirit of truth: for such was our Lord’s promise to His disciples. … Now the 
symbol is published by the authority of the universal Church. Therefore it contains 
nothing defective.134 
 
And this responsibility, the right interpretation of the deposit of faith, is bestowed, for 
Thomas, upon the Supreme Pontiff, the Pope, 
Consequently it belongs to the sole authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to publish a new 
edition of the symbol, as do all other matters which concern the whole Church, such as 
to convoke a general council and so forth.135 
                                                                                                                                            
crevit numerus articulorum, quia quaedam explicite cognita sunt a posterioribus quae a prioribus non 
cognoscebantur explicite]. 
133 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.1.8.ad.6. For an excellent history of the development of church teaching around 
the Eucharistic see Henri de Lubac’s Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages 
trans. Gemma Simmonds CJ (London: SCM Press, 2006). 
134 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.1.9.sc, [‘Ecclesia universalis non potest errare, quia spiritu sancto gubernatur, qui 
est spiritus veritatis, hoc enim promisit dominus discipulis, Ioan. XVI, dicens, cum venerit ille spiritus 
veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem. Sed symbolum est auctoritate universalis Ecclesiae editum. Nihil 
ergo inconveniens in eo continetur’]. 
135 Aquinas, ST IIa.IIae q.1.10.co, [‘Et ideo ad solam auctoritatem summi pontificis pertinet nova editio 




Thomas further clarifies that this authority which the Supreme Pontiff bears is not 
equivalent to either individual judgment or novelty, but is rather bound up in a history of 
councils and creeds which all work together to proclaim ‘the same faith with greater 
explicitness’ rather than a new faith with each historically conditioned symbol.136 For 
Thomas, this trust in the authority of the church to mediate divine truths is itself an article 
of faith, 
If we say: “In” the holy Catholic Church, this must be taken as verified in so far as our 
faith is directed to the Holy Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: I 
believe in the Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church.137 
 
For Thomas, trusting the church to faithfully interpret and pass on the development of 
doctrine derived from revelation is bound up with believing that the Holy Spirit is active 
in the community of the faithful. Believing in the church’s authority is thus constitutive 
with believing in God the Holy Spirit. 
 Thomas’ commitment to the necessity of faith in the church’s teaching authority 
is as theological as it is political. Theologically, for Thomas, assent to the church’s 
teaching authority is necessary in order for members of Christ’s body to discipline 
themselves against the root of heresy, obstinate adherence to private judgment, or 
                                                
136 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.1.10.ad.1. 
137 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.1.9.ad.5, [‘si dicatur in sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam, est hoc intelligendum 
secundum quod fides nostra refertur ad spiritum sanctum, qui sanctificat Ecclesiam, ut sit sensus, credo in 
spiritum sanctum sanctificantem Ecclesiam]. 
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individual will, over and against the discernment of the church.138 The faith of the church, 
for Thomas, must be received wholly,  
Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic who disbelieves one article of 
faith…faith adheres to all the articles of faith by reason of one mean, […], according 
to the teaching of the Church who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever 
abandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith.139 
For Thomas, assenting to the whole, and not only certain parts, of the articles of faith 
determined by the church is the only way to avoid the infinitely regressive spirals of self-
referential individualism which lie at the root of heresy.140 This is because, for Thomas, 
pilgrims either assent to the church, established by Christ and led by the Holy Spirit, or 
their own individual will, 
                                                
138 From the Enlightenment through modernity, privileging private judgment over submission to received 
authority by faith, becomes a virtue. Charles Taylor argues that Rene Descartes stands as a seminal voice in 
this epistemological shift, in whose writing the individual, rather than mediated engagement with and by 
God, becomes determinative for human epistemology, ‘What has happened [in Cartesian epistemology] is 
rather that God’s existence has become a stage in my progress towards science through methodical ordering 
of evident insight. God’s existence is a theorem in my system of perfect science. The center of gravity has 
decisively shifted’ in Sources of the Self, p. 157. Taylor is not the first to incriminate Cartesian 
epistemology. Etienne Gilson makes this argument explicitly in his 1931-1932 Gifford Lectures published 
in 1936 as The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy trans. by A. H. C. Downes (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1936, 1991, 2007) especially chapters 11-13. Gilson’s student, Armand Maurer takes 
this way of contrasting medieval philosophy from modern philosophy in his thorough study Medieval 
Philosophy (New York NY: Random House Publishing, 1962) p. xiii, ‘Medieval philosophy came to an 
end when the conditions that had brought it about ceased to exist. Born of the confluence of the early 
Christian faith with the philosophical traditions of the Greeks, it was bound to die when Christians of a later 
day decided that philosophy should again be cultivated for its own sake, apart from theology and 
independent of revelation. Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes were primarily responsible for that epoch-
making decision, which is considered to make the birth of ‘modern philosophy’.’ 
139 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.5.3.co and ad.2, [‘Respondeo dicendum quod haereticus qui discredit unum 
articulum fidei non habet habitum fidei neque formatae neque informis… Sed omnibus articulis fidei 
inhaeret fides propter unum medium, scilicet propter veritatem primam propositam nobis in Scripturis 
secundum doctrinam Ecclesiae intellectis sane. Et ideo qui ab hoc medio decidit totaliter fide caret]. 
140 For an excellent attempt to narrate the history of how this ‘root of heresy’ becomes the foundation of 
‘modern epistemology’ see Louis Dupre, Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature 
and Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993). Dupre’s project ‘investigate[s] the origins, 
processes, and the effects of this double breakup: the one between the transcendent constituent and its 
cosmic-human counterpart, and the one between the person and cosmos (now understood in the narrower 
sense of physical nature). The two combined caused the ontotheological synthesis that had guided Western 
thought to break down’ (p. 3). 
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Now it is manifest that he who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an 
infallible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things 
taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to 
reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as an infallible rule, but to 
his own will. Hence it is evident that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article 
of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but if he is 
not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error. Therefore it is clear that such 
a heretic with regard to one article has no faith in other articles, but only a kind of 
opinion in accordance with his own will.141  
For Thomas, whole-sale adherence to the teaching authority of the Church which cannot 
err is absolutely necessary. And this complete acceptance, so Thomas argues, is in fact 
the only epistemological mitigation available to human beings whose sin and ignorance 
would otherwise tempt them towards the illusion that they can be gods unto themselves. 
Such errors stem from withholding assent in matters of faith and authority based upon the 
determination of their own private judgment, rather than the teaching of the community 
established by Christ actively sanctified through the Holy Spirit.142  
                                                
141 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.5.3.co, [‘Manifestum est autem quod ille qui inhaeret doctrinae Ecclesiae 
tanquam infallibili regulae, omnibus assentit quae Ecclesia docet. Alioquin, si de his quae Ecclesia docet 
quae vult tenet et quae vult non tenet, non iam inhaeret Ecclesiae doctrinae sicut infallibili regulae, sed 
propriae voluntati. Et sic manifestum est quod haereticus qui pertinaciter discredit unum articulum non est 
paratus sequi in omnibus doctrinam Ecclesiae (si enim non pertinaciter, iam non est haereticus, sed solum 
errans). Unde manifestum est quod talis haereticus circa unum articulum fidem non habet de aliis articulis, 
sed opinionem quandam secundum propriam voluntatem]. 
142 Rejecting the teaching of the church, so Aquinas argues, damns the obstinate to a maze insofar as the 
ultimate determination of all truth and action is no longer, in the manner of Thomas, grounded in the reality 
of God Who has created and ordered the universe to Himself. Instead, the ground of all good thought and 
action is located within individual selves, selves who insofar as human beings are finite cannot help but 
dissolve into chaotic cobbles of fragmentation and contradiction. Without the possibility of trusting in God 
as the obiectum of faith, human reasoning is trapped within an infinite series of self-contradicting selves 
unable to order their lives toward any sort of common good, much less common acceptance of authority. 
This is the argument, or story, Alasdair MacIntyre makes/tells in his seminal work After Virtue: A Study in 
Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). 
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Thomas envisions the passing on of the articles of faith through the development 
of symbols discerned through the church’s teaching authority by way of an ordered 
hierarchical series of relations mediating Divine revelation. 
Now Divine revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are over 
them, in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the angels, and to the lower 
angels through the higher, as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner, 
therefore, the unfolding of faith must needs reach men of lower degree through those 
of higher degree.143 
Indeed, Thomas is so committed to the hierarchical dissemination of Divine revelation 
that he is even willing to insist that it is sufficient for the salvation of the majority to have 
implicit faith and to be led by those of ‘higher degree’ whose faith in the various articles 
and symbols of faith is explicit.144 This view, Thomas acknowledges, appears to present a 
danger, 
If the simple are bound to have, not explicit but only implicit faith, their faith must 
need be implied in the faith of the learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible 
for the learned to err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also have explicit 
faith; so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have explicit faith.145 
 
To this objection, Thomas replies, 
                                                
143 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.2.6.co, [‘Revelatio autem divina ordine quodam ad inferiores pervenit per 
superiores, sicut ad homines per Angelos, et ad inferiores Angelos per superiores, ut patet per Dionysium, 
in Cael. Hier. Et ideo, pari ratione, explicatio fidei oportet quod perveniat ad inferiores homines per 
maiores]. 
144 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.2.6.arg.1—3, ad.1—3. 
145 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.2.6.arg.3, [‘si minores non tenentur habere fidem explicitam, sed solum 
implicitam, oportet quod habeant fidem implicitam in fide maiorum. Sed hoc videtur esse periculosum, 
quia posset contingere quod illi maiores errarent. Ergo videtur quod minores etiam debeant habere fidem 
explicitam. Sic ergo omnes aequaliter tenentur ad explicite credendum]. 
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The simple have no faith implied in that of the learned, except in so far as the latter 
adhere to the Divine teaching. […] Hence it is not human knowledge, but the Divine 
truth that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned stray from this rule, he does not 
harm the faith of the simple ones, who think that the learned believe aright.146 
 
The simple are thus protected, Thomas maintains, by nature of their simple faith in Christ 
from the mistakes of erroneous clerks.147 That is to say, those members of society whose 
station does not allow them the luxury of study and which thereby commits them to 
simple faith, are protected from irresponsible shepherds. Just as the body does not starve 
as a result of the agricultural mis-steps of a few plowmen, so the church need not crumble 
because of a few stuttering priests. 
Thomas’ account of the virtue of faith, of God as the obiectum of faith and of the 
means through which divine truth is mediated through the church seems to have led away 
from the questions raised earlier related to discerning and negotiating claims to the 
church’s teaching authority in the opening lines of Piers Plowman. Compared to Thomas, 
it seems that Langland is preoccupied with the deliberating subject in such a way that the 
poem’s puzzling over authority is doomed to infinite and regressive cycles of self-
reference, perhaps even Pelagian presuppositions related to the role of free will and 
discernment. Thomas aims to break the reader out of these habits of mind through a 
                                                
146 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.2.6.ad.3, [‘minores non habent fidem implicitam in fide maiorum nisi quatenus 
maiores adhaerent doctrinae divinae, … . Unde humana cognitio non fit regula fidei, sed veritas divina. A 
qua si aliqui maiorum deficiant, non praeiudicat fidei simplicium, qui eos rectam fidem habere credunt]. 
147 Thomas here carries forward a long tradition that goes back at least to Augustine’s early debates against 
the Donatists. The mediation of God’s grace is not precluded by the error or wickedness of the priest, 
otherwise, grace could not be mediated through human beings because all are imperfect. The power of 
God’s grace comes from God, and is sufficient to pass through even the most imperfect vessels. See Adam 
Ployd Augustine, the Trinity, and the Church: A Reading of the Anti-Donatist Sermons (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 56-99. 
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deeper understanding of what it means for God to be the obiectum of faith, and not 
merely the ‘object’ in the modern English sense.148  
It is now more apparent how three key aspects of Thomas’ investigation of the 
relation between faith and the church’s teaching authority are united. On the one hand, 
the act of faith, for Thomas, is a process through which the subject is engaged by the 
obiectum, God, and moved to offer assent to the One Who is believed. On the other hand, 
the specific articles related to who this God is who engages creatures and moves human 
beings towards assent are contained under symbols with greater explicitness across time 
which are themselves authoritatively mediated by the church as vivified by the Holy 
Spirit. As such, human beings are freed from the infinite spirals of regressive self-
reference which result from locating the primary agency of the act of faith in the subject 
by re-orienting the concept of faith from the subject to the obiectum: God. The 
consequence of this all-important, paradigm shifting, theological move is that each and 
every article of the faith issued through the church’s teaching authority must be accepted 
in order for a person to avoid temptation towards the sin which makes the private 
judgment of the individual the basis for determining right faith. The church can and must 
be trusted, and this is not equivalent to a sort of blind trust in a human authority because 
the church is itself established and vivified by God through the Holy Spirit. Trust in the 
church’s teachings can take an implicit form as one grows in faith towards the more 
explicit belief in the articles of faith. Faith develops in the mind of the believer and also 
                                                
148 Rienhard Hutter ‘Theological Faith Enlightening Sacred Theology’, ‘If you gain a distinct sense that by 
considering the full meaning of ‘obiectum’ you are leaving behind the epistemic presuppositions entailed in 
the Cartesian rupture between res cogitans and res extensa as well as those entailed in the Kantian rupture 
between the transcendental ego and the ‘thing in itself’ (das Ding an sich) – you are right. You are, as a 
matter of fact, being directed to the exit of the maze of modern subjectivity with its interminable succession 
of aporetic epistemologies. According to the realist epistemology of the philosophia perennis, there obtains 
a primordial causal, that is specifying, engagement of the apperceptive faculties by the ‘obiectum,’ which 
precedes and indeed enables the secondary epistemological reflection of this dynamic’ (378). 
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develops through the explication which comes through the church’s teaching authority as 
it adds to the articles of faith, thereby enjoying the fruit of the church’s ‘living faith’ or 
ongoing engagement with the obiectum of its faith in the One Who engages it. This 
process of doctrinal development, both in the believer and in the community of faith 
across time, can be trusted because the agent who makes the unfolding of faith possible is 
none other than the third Person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, working through the 
church. Finally, this development of doctrine is never to be confused with the mere 
accumulation of propositions, as if one day enough propositions or articles could be 
gathered so as to make possible either certitude or the vision of God. Rather, the act of 
assent through the faith of the believer and trust in the development of doctrine through 
the teaching authority of the church is, for Thomas, the proper activity of persons and the 
church in time as they respond to the engagement of God, and are swept up into 
participation in the divine life of the One Who is the obiectum and end of faith. 
Thomas’ teaching on the justifiability of the church’s teaching authority is heir to 
the tradition of fides quaerens intellectum on a political scale. Belief, as well as 
knowledge of God and knowledge of self, begins not in the individual’s capacity to judge 
the viability of the church’s teaching authority, but rather in the individual’s acceptance 
of the revealed truth being entrusted to and passed down through the historical church 
across time. Truth is a gift of grace. Truth, for Thomas, is also thoroughly mediated to 
finite creatures through complex processes of development within the teaching 
community of the church across time. Truth must be received, participated in and grow 
within a person and a community. This is because, for Thomas, the origin and esse of 
truth is God, not the rational judgment of the individual. As such, the journey of creatures 
 74 
towards truth must begin with the reception of a gift on the basis of trust, faith, rather 
than the apparently solid ground provided by an individual who deems either an extrinsic 
authority, or the intrinsic authority of their own rational faculty, trustworthy on the basis 
of their individual, and hopelessly finite, resources.  
There is an important distinction between what Thomas refers to as the heretical 
disposition to privilege private judgment, a mode of reasoning located in the agency of 
the individual rational powers of a depoliticized subject; and the way certain medieval 
authors, for the purposes of the present study, Chaucer and Langland, consider the 
relations between knowledge and authority, knowledge and power. Indeed, Chaucer and 
Langland press upon, and challenge, many of the tensions latent within Thomas’ account 
because both are aware of and concerned with a cluster of problems involved in the 
relation between knowledge and power. Their investigations include a deep awareness of 
institutional power and cultural formation. Neither Chaucer nor Langland focus 
exclusively upon the citadel of the human self nor an abstract sense of rationality 
accessible to individuals separated from the world in which they find themselves, the 
same world that teaches them how to speak. The exploration of the particular tensions 
involved in the relation between knowledge and power by Langland and Chaucer result 
from suspicion of both the logical construction produced in the second half of Thomas’ 
explication of faith and the political outworking of this theological vision in the 
fourteenth-century church. 
 The political upshot of Thomas’ thinking concerns the normative disposition the 
church should take towards those who dissent from one or more articles of faith as 
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determined by the church. To the question, ‘Whether Heretics Ought to be Tolerated,’ 
Thomas responds, 
On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the conversion of 
the wanderer, wherefore she [the Church] condemns not at once, but after the first and 
second admonition, as the Apostle directs: after that, if he [the heretic] is yet stubborn, 
the Church no longer hoping for his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by 
excommunicating him and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers 
him to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death.149 
Such a disposition towards those who dissent in one or more articles of the faith 
proclaimed by the church’s teaching authority did not remain buried in the pages of this 
Dominican teaching manual, but took material form in, among other places, England in 
the state policies endorsed in 1401 and 1409 by way of Arundel’s Constitutions which 
empowered bishops to arrest, imprison, examine and hand over to the secular authorities 
those who questioned the church’s teaching concerning transubstantiation and/or usurped 
the office of preaching. These are the same policies which resulted in actual public 
burnings of figures like William Sawtry (1401). 
 
§ How Chaucer and Langland problematize Thomas 
For reasons that are as theological as they are political, Chaucer’s Pardoner’s 
Tale participates with Langland’s Piers Plowman to critique Thomas’ account of the way 
                                                
149 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.11.3.co, [‘Ex parte autem Ecclesiae est misericordia, ad errantium conversionem. 
Et ideo non statim condemnat, sed post primam et secundam correctionem, ut apostolus docet. Postmodum 
vero, si adhuc pertinax inveniatur, Ecclesia, de eius conversione non sperans, aliorum saluti providet, eum 
ab Ecclesia separando per excommunicationis sententiam; et ulterius relinquit eum iudicio saeculari a 
mundo exterminandum per mortem]. 
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legitimate claims to the church’s teaching authority are to be received.150 These two 
poems open up tensions within Thomas’ scheme and challenge the degree to which the 
angelic doctor holds together the relation between authority and knowledge, between 
individual and communal identity, without collapsing the sign into the signified. 
Specifically, Langland and Chaucer expose the consequences of collapsing the signifier, 
the church, and the signified, the Body of Christ in the world, within Thomas’ account.  
 Chaucer’s Pardoner’s Tale and Langland’s Piers Plowman problematize Thomas’ 
theological and ecclesial/political account of a benevolent hierarchical pedagogy. They 
do this by imagining figures who are not simply isolated instances of vicious ecclesial 
straw men who can in turn be satirized.151 Instead, these two poems question (1) the 
theology of faith and authority at the heart of the tradition and politics of Thomas’ 
account and (2) the rationality undergirding Thomas’ specific theory of the development 
of doctrine by imagining ecclesial figures who form communities through 
institutionalizing practices of vice dressed in the linguistic, material and iconographic 
garb of Christianity. That is to say, Chaucer and Langland question the theology and 
politics bound up in Thomas’ account of faith and authority by thinking through the 
contradictions that arise when it becomes imaginatively possible to form communities of 
vice which claim and invert the teachings and practices of the church.  
                                                
150 Chaucer and Langland are neither alone, nor is there mode of writing the only bearer of such critique. 
Many medieval English drama’s, like the Shepherd Plays are particularly interested in the co-optability of 
language and the formation of wicked communities. See Sarah Beckwith ‘Drama’ in Larry Scanlon, ed., 
The Cambridge Companion to Medieval English Literature 1100-1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) and her Signifying God: Social Relation and Symbolic Act in The York Corpus Christi Plays 
(Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
151 For a nuanced study of the range of satire in this period see Jill Mann Chaucer and Medieval Estates 
Satire: The Literature of Social Classes and the General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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The weight of Langland and Chaucer’s critique lies in the serious problem which 
arises when rival claims to the Church’s teaching authority occur not between individuals 
dissenting against the established community of the one Holy Catholic Church, but when 
competing communities are created whose divergent cultural practices and 
epistemological habits are formed in such a way as to normalize, institutionalize and even 
sacramentalize vicious practices. The question Langland and Chaucer raise is not simply 
how might a person be brought out of such cultural habituation in the vices, but rather 
how might one so awakened adjudicate between rival communities claiming the church’s 
teaching authority and whose rationalities are grounded in practices and rituals 
legitimated by arguments, sacraments and iconography that are manipulated in ways that 
directly subvert the fundamental ordering principles of Christianity?152 Or, as expressed 
in the terms of Will’s Eucharistic anxiety at the opening of the poem’s final passus, 
And as Y wente by the way, when Y was thus awaked, 
Heuy-chered Y yede and elyng in herte, 
For Y ne wiste where to ete ne at what place.153 
                                                
152 This question is raised with exceptional force through the conclusion of Piers Plowman. The tradition 
Langland received through Augustine and Aquinas insists that sin effects the will, while leaving the 
intellect intact. For Augustine on the virtues see James Wetzel Augustine and The Limits of Virtue 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Aquinas makes this point explicit in his ST Ia-IIae q.85, 
though I will suggest that other moments in the ST show Aquinas to leave the door open for a more 
pervasive effect of sin on the intellect, a tradition he may well receive from Boethius. Later Reformers will 
insist that both the will and the intellect are obfuscated by sin. Langland is no ‘proto-protestant’. While 
‘Will’, representative of both the faculty and also the poem’s main character, is of primary interest in Piers 
Plowman, the poem offers no corollary figure to represent the intellect. What the poem does offer, 
however, is a thorough examination of both Will and Conscience, giving detailed attention to the various 
ways these characters/faculties develop and are influenced by different teachings as well as political powers 
and rival communities throughout the poem. Analysis of Langland’s conception of the effects of sin beyond 
the will going on to the intellect are difficult to substantiate because the faculty itself is not explicitly taken 
up in the poem. However, Langland is supremely interested in the formation of Conscience, which will be 
explored in the rest of this study.   
153 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXII.1-3, [And as I went on my way after I awoke, / Sad-faced I walked and 
aching at heart, / For I didn’t know where or at what place I could eat]. 
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 Chaucer’s Pardoner’s Tale succinctly raises the issue at hand and, comparatively, 
further illuminates Langland’s Piers Plowman. Chaucer concisely, yet profoundly, 
problematizes Thomas’ hierarchical theory of the church’s teaching authority and faith by 
demonstrating how Thomas’ commitment to an ordered, stable and sanctified teaching 
authority is not only vulnerable to manipulation and abuse, but also creates space for 
opportunistic ecclesiastics to form alternative communities claiming and competing for 
the authority of the Church.  
Along the road to Canterbury, the Host invites the Pardoner to tell a moral tale. 
Chaucer’s Pardoner prefaces his tale with a self-description of the single theme of all his 
preaching and of his ensuing speech, ‘Radix malorum est Cupiditas.’154 Not only is the 
Pardoner’s theme single, it is also static, unchanging, a memorized tale accompanied by a 
bit of Latin used to spice up his otherwise repetitive speech.155 His static sermonizing 
descends from the ecclesiastical teaching hierarchy in the proper order Thomas describes 
above. The Pardoner delivers his teaching to the people on authority and pronouncement 
of letters patent along with ‘Bulles of popes and of cardynales, / Of partiarkes and 
bishops.’156 These official documents serve the double purpose not only of establishing 
and legitimating the Pardoner in the hierarchy of ecclesiastical teaching authority, but 
also of protecting him, in both body and in work, from neighboring ecclesiastics with 
whom his activity competes, ‘[These documents] shewe I first, my body to warente, / 
                                                
154 Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, VI.332-5. 
155 Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, VI.332, ‘For I kan al by rote that I telle’. Perhaps anticipating the 
anxiety resulting from accounts of Christian teaching that are not open to the kind of doctrinal development 
theorized by Thomas, and can thereby by used, like the Pardoner’s rote sermonizing, for manipulation and 
extortion.  
156 Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, VI.342. 
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That no man be so boold, ne preest ne clerk, / Me to destourbe of Cristes hooly werk.’157 
This wandering Pardoner preaches in parishes that are not his own and thus undermines 
the sacramental and teaching authority of local priests to instruct the people of their 
parishes and hear confession. As the conclusion of the Pardoner’s Tale makes clear, this 
Pardoner not only competes for the spiritual, but also the economic, loyalty of the people 
as the money he wins is directed away from the local parish and parish priest and into his 
own pockets.158 
Two further aspects of this Pardoner are particularly relevant for the present 
investigation. First, it is significant that the Pardoner promises the people, both at the 
outset and conclusion of his tale, control over elements that will grant them material as 
well as spiritual security. His relics promise healing to livestock, cure of marital jealousy 
and an abundant harvest.159 The Pardoner’s ‘heigh power’ of absolution, which is 
guaranteed by and descended from the authority of the pope, is available as a ‘seuretee’ 
against the unpredictable whims of fortune to any pilgrim who willingly exchanges their 
material wealth for the Pardoner’s eternally effective absolution ‘Whan that the soule shal 
fro the body passe.’160  
Second, both the Pardoner and the people are well aware, by way of the 
Pardoner’s own public confession, of the duplicitous nature of his motivation, 
For myn entente is nat but for to wynne, 
                                                
157 Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, VI.338-41. These documents are also not unrelated to the 
documentation a wondering clerk would need in the wake of the Statute of 1388 discussed above. 
158 The relation between pardoner and priest is not necessarily competitive, indeed, Langland depicts the 
two figures working together to win money from the people of the parish, see Piers Plowman Prologue.79-
80. 
159 Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, VI.347-76. These promises are not outlandish for a Pardoner to make 
regarding the material efficacy of relics in this period. See Aers, ‘Alters of Power: Reflections on Eamon 
Duffy, The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England 1400-1580’, Literature and History, 3 
(1994), pp. 90-105. 
160 Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, VI.903-40. 
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And nothyng for correccioun of synne. 
I rekke nevere, whan that they been beryed, 
Though that hir soules goon a-blakeberyed! 
… 
But shortly myn entente I wol devyse: 
I preche of no thyng but for coveityse. 
… 
Thus kan I preche agayn that same vice 
Which that I use, and that is avarice. 
But though myself be gilty in that synne, 
Yet kan I maken oother folk to twynne 
From avarice and soore to repente. 
But that is nat my principal entente; 
I preche nothyng but for coveitivse. 
… 
For though myself be a ful vicious man, 
A moral tale yet I yow telle kan, 
Which I am wont to preche for to wynne.161 
It is important to appreciate the full weight of Chaucer’s creation. The Pardoner cannot 
be reduced to the hopeless anachronism of some sort of proto-protestant satire 
anticipating Martin Luther’s crusade against indulgences in far off lands some hundred 
                                                
161 Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, VI.403-6, 423-4, 427-33, 459-61. 
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and twenty years later.162 Here, the Pardoner stands as something much more deeply 
unsettling to late medieval Orthodoxy. The Pardoner poetically embodies an orthodox 
possibility, a possibility protected by Thomas’ account of the benevolent hierarchy of the 
church’s teaching authority. The Pardoner is the possibility not only of a wicked 
ecclesiastic manipulating the people as well as church doctrine and practice for his own 
greed, but also the possibility of the formation of a community that is shaped by and 
dependent upon the material and spiritual economy undergirding and perpetuating the 
Pardoner’s preaching. It is striking, though often unnoticed, that no one interrupts or 
seems offended by the Pardoner’s intent. The people are silent. Instead of rebuke, the 
people show no sign of countering the economy of transactional absolution the Pardoner 
proposes. They listen to his story, apparently expecting him to make good on his promise 
to offer a moral tale. Thus, what is perhaps more unsettling than the Pardoner’s vicious 
and public covetousness, is the people’s complicit participation, even formation, in his 
spiritual and material economy. The Pardoner, operating with a teaching authority 
institutionally protected by bulls and letters of the ecclesial hierarchy, creates a 
community that accepts, and even depends upon, the Pardoner’s transactional preaching 
and praxis of absolution. Like the friars in the Prologue of Piers Plowman ‘Here moneye 
and merchandise marchen togyderes.’163 
 Members of this community who assent to and are formed around the Pardoner 
can defend the reasonability of offering this figure their assent on the grounds of church 
teaching. These pilgrims might accept the teaching and practice of the Pardoner on faith 
                                                
162 Figures like John Tetzel, whose infamous 1517 sermon supported Archbishop of Mainz, Albert of 
Hohenzolleron’s Summary Instructions for Indulgence Preachers and which no doubt triggered Martin 
Luther’s 95 Thesis. See Hans J. Hillerbrand The Protestant Reformation Revised Edition (New York, NY: 
Harper Perennial, 2009), pp. 14-21. 
163 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.61. 
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precisely because his teachings are endorsed in the proper order of hierarchical ecclesial 
teaching. Indeed, for a pilgrim to dissent from the Pardoner would risk depending on 
one’s private judgment or individual will which, according to Thomas, would in turn 
commit these pilgrims to the very root of heresy.164 Yet, once assent is given to the 
Pardoner, the people become shaped, formed, even dependent upon the interconnected 
web of rationality and material and spiritual practices that constitute the Pardoner’s 
teaching.165 While the reader, and later the Host, may regard the Pardoner as a vicious 
farce, it is difficult to see what church endorsed resources the pilgrims have available that 
would allow them to dissent from the beliefs and ways of life the Pardoner teaches.166   
Just how unsettling this Pardoner is to the established order of late medieval 
society and orthodoxy is evident in the tale’s closing lines. As the Pardoner concludes his 
tale, he exhorts the people to participate in the monetary exchange that promises to make 
him rich and grant the people temporal gain and eternal security. He invites the Host to 
be the first to participate in his sacramental transaction. Famously, the Host lambasts the 
greasy-haired ecclesiastic, first with a joke and then with an, albeit colorful, threat of 
                                                
164 Thomas does allow for fraternal correction, even admitting that the obligation for Christians to correct 
one another is not limited to prelates, but extends to all Christians (ST IIa-IIae q.33.3.co). However, 
Thomas distinguishes two modes of correction. In the first, correction is a warning out of and as an act of 
charity performed ‘in a becoming manner, not with impudence and harshness’ especially when a subject 
corrects a prelate (ST IIa-IIae q.33.3—4). This mode of fraternal correction, Thomas maintains, is open to 
and indeed the obligation of all Christians, and it is the mode of correction, or warning, a reader might 
expect the pilgrims to extend to the Pardoner. In the second manner, however, Thomas distinguishes the 
former mode of correction to the second, which is concerned with justice, and specifically punishment, and 
this manner of fraternal correction is not available for subjects to execute upon prelates (ST IIa-IIae 
q.33.3.co). Thus, the question, at least for readers of Thomas and Chaucer, remains open. Not only, how 
would the people effectively correct a pardoner whose character is so firmly established in avarice; but the 
larger question as well, how could a people formed and habituated by the teaching and sacramental practice 
of this figure even become aware of the Pardoner’s error?  
165 There is a striking similarity here between Chaucer’s Pardoner and Langland’s Pardoner, see Piers 
Plowman, Prologue.66-81. 
166 Again, see Aquinas, ST IIaIIae q.33. For an interesting suggestion that Margary Kemp embodies the 
orthodox resources for fraternal correction in her debate with Archbishop Arundel see Edwin D. Craun 
‘‘3e, By Peter and by Poul!’: Lewte and the Practice of Fraternal Correction’ Yearbook of Langland 
Studies, 15 (2001), pp. 15-34. 
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violence against the Pardoner. In spite of the Pardoner’s bulles and letters patent, the Host 
responds, 
Nay, nay…thanne have I Cristes curs! 
Lat be…it shal nat be, so theech! 
Thou woldest make me kisse thyn olde breech, 
And swere it were a relyk of a seint, 
Though it were with thy fundement depeint! 
But, by the croys which that Seint Eleyne fond, 
I wolde I hadde thy coillons in myn hond. In stide of relikes or of seintuarie. 
Lat kutte hem of, I wol thee helpe hem carie; 
They shul be shryned in an hogges toord!167 
Here, the Host openly mocks both the Pardoner and the spiritual and material economy 
that this figure’s sacramental practice establishes for the community. The people all 
laugh.168 Yet, to consider the Host’s speech as a long awaited corrective against the 
satiric figure of the Pardoner would be to under-read this moment. This moment is far 
more urgent, an urgency that the knight perceives and rushes to reconcile. The Host’s 
joke and threat of violence risk subverting a sacramental practice that is not only 
necessary for the Pardoner’s livelihood, but also for the very economy and cultural 
scaffolding of late medieval society, the church.169 If the people, like the Host, begin to 
consider the validity of the sacrament of penance to depend upon the moral rectitude of 
the Pardoner, and thus possibly a laughing matter, the web of practices which organically 
                                                
167 Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, VI.946-55. 
168 Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, VI.961. 
169 See Christopher Dyer, Making a Living in the Middle Ages: The People of Britain 850-1520 (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003) and An Age of Transition: Economy and Society in England in the 
Later Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
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hold society together will collapse under the intractable and inevitable fragmentation 
brought on by individual judgments of clerical fitness.170 Furthermore, in terms of 
medieval orthodoxy, it remains unclear how the Host or the pilgrims could dissent from 
the Pardoner without handing themselves over to the forms of individual judgment that 
Thomas claims lie at the root of all heresy.  
This moment also bears the weight of a political possibility beyond the ecclesial 
or theological. Abandonment of the ecclesial structures signified by the Pardoner may 
also lead to revolt akin to the Rising of 1381. Thus, people’s laughter is not simply a 
response to the Host’s moralizing jest. The people’s laughter is a foretaste of the anarchy 
and cultural fragmentation that will ensue if the Pardoner and his economy are laughed 
out of the realm.  
This moment portrays a crack in the dam that is otherwise securing the cultural 
and social order of late medieval society. Immediately, the knight, the icon of chivalry 
and the protector of the established order, rushes in to force the Host and the Pardoner to 
make amends, to silence the people’s laughter, to maintain the social order and to keep 
the game going, 
But right anon the worthy Knyght bigan, 
Whan that he saugh that al the peple lough, 
‘Namoore of this, for it is right ynough! 
Sire Pardoner, be glad and myrie of cheere; 
And ye, sire Hoost, that been to me so deere, 
I prey yow that ye kisse the Pardoner. 
                                                
170 See Wim Vroom, Financing Cathedral Building in the Middle Ages: The Generosity of the Faithful 
trans. Elizabeth Manton (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010). 
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And Pardoner, I prey thee, drawe thee neer, 
And, as we diden, lat us laughe and pleye.’ 
Anon they kiste, and ryden forth hir weye.171 
It is worth pointing out that while the knight’s action in this moment interrupts ensuing 
anarchy, it also attempts to re-establish the epistemology of faith as it relates to the 
hierarchical pedagogy of the church. I say it attempts to do so because the knight neither 
endorses the Pardoner’s teaching nor validates the Host’s judgment of the Pardoner’s 
practices. The knight merely halts their argument in a way that leaves the question open. 
The disagreement is not resolved, and the reader is left wondering how a late medieval 
Christian might judge the teachings and practices of the Pardoner without (1) heretically 
depending on his or her own private judgment or (2) validating the covetousness that the 
Pardoner embodies and which in turn malforms the people through his manipulation of 
the language and sacraments of Christian discipleship. More simply put, what resources 
do medieval Christians have for resisting vicious epistemic and cultural formations 
grounded in communities without dissolving into the unending spirals of self-reference 
and private judgment constitutive of heresy?  
 Chaucer’s Pardoner’s Tale thus problematizes Thomas’ account of the 
relationship between fides quae and fides qua. He does so by creating a farcical and 
duplicitous figure whose corruption of the Church’s sacramental practice of penance not 
only has a vicious effect on the community, but whose very possibility as well as the 
community formed around him cannot be guarded against as a consequence of Thomas’ 
teaching concerning the ordo of the church’s benevolent hierarchical teaching authority. 
Thomas teaches, 
                                                
171 Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, VI.960-968. 
 86 
The simple have no faith implied in that of the learned, except in so far as the latter 
adhere to the Divine teaching. […] Hence it is not human knowledge, but the Divine 
truth that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned stray from this rule, he does not 
harm the faith of the simple ones, who think that the learned believe aright.172 
 
How then does one account for both the Pardoner and the community formed around 
him? The Pardoner stands not merely as a confused, or even greedy, clerk. Rather he 
stands as a possibility, a possibility protected by medieval orthodoxy, of a wayward 
ecclesiastic who can in turn manipulate the language, practices and sacraments of the 
church to form communities that cannot live without him. Furthermore, at the conclusion 
of the Pardoner’s Tale how would it be possible to judge between rival rationalities? On 
the one hand, a rationality asserting (1) that the community formed around the material 
and spiritual economy of the Pardoner, and safeguarded by the knight, is just as vicious 
as the Pardoner himself proclaims to be. And on the other, a rationality (2) so formed by 
the assumptions and institutions of medieval Christianity as to make a people unable to 
see themselves as swept up into anything other than the one organically formed through 
the tapestry of late medieval ecclesial practices? That is to say, how would it be possible 
for people and communities so formed by institutionalized patterns of vice to identify 
their own cultural habits as vicious? This is one of the focal questions that Chaucer and 
Langland raise to Thomas’ account.  
Langland shares Chaucer’s anxiety over the possibility of a community that 
claims both the church’s teaching authority and the normative forms of Christianity while 
                                                
172 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.2.6.ad.3, [‘minores non habent fidem implicitam in fide maiorum nisi quatenus 
maiores adhaerent doctrinae divinae, …. Unde humana cognitio non fit regula fidei, sed veritas divina. A 
qua si aliqui maiorum deficiant, non praeiudicat fidei simplicium, qui eos rectam fidem habere credunt]. 
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using these same claims to institutionalize and normalize sin, quite literally to cement sin 
into the very cultural fabric of a society through errant teachers and the commodification 
of the sacraments. It is an anxiety Piers Plowman expresses succinctly through the voice 
of Liberum Arbitrium, 
As holiness and honestee out of holy churche  
Spryngeth and spredeth and enspireth the peple  
Thorw parfit preesthoed and prelates of holy churche,  
Riht so oute of holy churche al euel spredeth  
There inparfit preestboed is, prechares and techares.173 
It is not simply that Langland and Chaucer share a similar anxiety over the 
potential corruptibility or cooption of a community claiming the name church. Rather, 
Piers Plowman goes a step farther to both model and also instruct its audience in certain 
habits of language and discourse for discerning and negotiating different voices 
competing for the power of the church. Piers Plowman’s model, this mode of instruction, 
is best understood as a thick description of communion. That is to say, it is a way of 
appreciating the discernment of truth as an ongoing process that seeks not simply to sort 
out competing voices but rather depends upon bringing about ideological and theological 
collisions in order to continue on the journey in a way that avoids reification and idolatry, 
Eucharistic, ecclesial, or otherwise. Put another way, Langland’s work models a form of 
poetic disputation that methodologically necessitates a communion through collisions of 
radically diverse voices. Unlike the knight of Chaucer’s Pardoner’s Tale, Langland seeks 
no premature or false reconciliation. Rather, the poetry models for the audience a poetic 
                                                
173 Langland, Piers Plowman, XVI.242-7, [As holiness and honesty out of Holy Church / Spring and spread 
and inspire the people / Through perfect priesthood and prelates of Holy Church, / Just so out of Holy 
Church all evil spreads / Where imperfect priesthood is, preachers and teachers]. 
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communion witnessed only by a complex series of substantive disagreements. The 
disjunctions, the ruptures, the interruptions and fragmentations of Piers Plowman are 
never resolved. Yet, through the practice, the holding together, of this poetic communion, 
the audience, like Will and Conscience, are changed. At the end, the audience, like Will 
and Conscience, is invited to return to the beginning and take up the journey once more. 
To continue along the mystical journey of self-knowing alluded to by Julian of Norwich 
in the fifty-sixth chapter of her Showings, a journey in which the beginning elides into the 
end as the destination becomes the via.174  
 The capacity of Langland’s poetry to train its audience in complex and subtle 
habits of language is evident in Conscience’s description of the church in the Prologue, 
immediately following the bleak description of the church and world considered earlier in 
this chapter. It is neither a coincidence, nor is it inconsequential that Conscience offers 
critical judgment against the corruption that Will can only behold.175 The Prologue begins 
with Will’s vision of the folk, a people wandering through the maze of the world. While 
Will certainly beholds many who commit themselves to work, prayers and penances in 
hope of ‘a good ende and heuenriche blisse’, he also sees ecclesial figures who fail in 
their charge to cultivate charity. Friars of all four orders bind their money-making with 
their trade in souls such that they preach for their own profit and contort the gospel 
                                                
174 Julian of Norwich Showings (Long text) in Julian of Norwich: Showings trans. Edmund Colledge, 
O.S.A. and James Walsh, S.J. (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1978), p. 288-90, ‘For our soul sits in God in 
true rest, and our soul stands in God in sure strength, and our soul is naturally rooted in God in endless 
love. And therefore if we want to have knowledge of our soul, and communion and discourse with it, we 
must seek in our Lord God in whom it is enclosed.’ 
175 That Conscience, and not Will, is capable of judging errant behavior in the Prologue is evident in so far 
as Will proves incapable of interpreting his own dream. Despite Will’s opening assertion immediately after 
awaking from the dream of the Prologue that, ‘What the montaigne bymeneth and the merke dale / And the 
feld ful of folk Y shal you fair shewe’, it is Holy Church, not Will, who explains the dream’s meaning (I.1-
2, 3–75).  
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towards covetous ends with glosses that contradict authorities.176 A Pardoner much like 
Chaucer’s preaches, ‘as he a prest were’, and blinds the people by striking them with ‘a 
bulle with bischopis selys’ only then to use the very same papal parchment to rake in the 
people’s goods.177 Unlike Chaucer’s Pardoner, however, Langland’s Pardoner is not in 
competition, but rather conspires with the parish priest and together they divide the 
people’s assets.178 Thus, all levels of local ecclesial leadership, parsons and parish priests, 
and not just pardoners, are equally bound up in this corruption of the church’s leadership 
as they collectively conspire to win the people’s goods.179 Meanwhile, higher up the 
ecclesial hierarchy, the bishops who are entrusted with the disciplinary authority 
necessary to correct errant clerks and thereby maintain shepherds fit to cultivate charity 
throughout the realm choose to live in London and serve the financial and administrative 
needs of the king’s court rather than the spiritual and communal needs of England’s 
parishes.180 As will become clear, it is significant that in this particular moment the 
figure/faculty of Conscience, not Will, nor the later figures/faculties of Holy Churche, 
Thought, Wit, Reason, or Imaginatif, much less Kynde, Abraham, Spes or the Samaritan, 
accuses these leaders of their failure in cultivating charity in their parishes and for their 
covetous desires to move to London.181  
 It is over this field that Conscience accuses an ecclesial leadership at both the 
local and hierarchical levels. Conscience claims these shepherds have not merely become 
                                                
176 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.56-61. 
177 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.66-73. 
178 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.79. 
179 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.81-4, These local priests, parsons and pardoners complain to the 
Bishops about the poverty resulting from the Black Death, and abandon their appointed flocks to move to 
London and work for the king’s court. 
180 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.85-94. 
181 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.95. 
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greedy, their covetousness enculturates ‘Ydolatrie.’182 For Conscience, the very relics and 
images that these ecclesiastics use to confiscate offerings are false.183 Thus, ‘prelates’, 
Conscience accuses, are not merely procuring an unjust portion of the common’s 
earnings, but rather church officials are quite literally placing idols before parishes as a 
means to generate additional income to feed their own covetousness. Errant authorities 
are thereby creating an idolatrous culture supported by the language and rituals of Holy 
Church, 
Ac for it profiteth yow into pursward ye prelates soffren 
That lewed men in mysbileue lyuen and dyen. 
I leue, by oure lord, for loue of youre coueytise 
That al the world be the wors, as holy writ telleth.184 
Conscience’s accusation is both temporal and eternal. The world and church ordered by 
these leaders is one dominated by greed, idolatry and manipulation of the commons. Yet, 
it is not merely the temporal manipulation of the commons which Conscience condemns, 
but also the eternal consequences brought on by prelates who allow, even thrust, 
unlearned folk into habits of idolatry and exchange which shape not only their living, but 
also their dying in misbelief. The unlearned formed by these prelates may well be 
damned, habituated in mind and practice into a culture of idolatry and exchange through 
which they abuse and are abused in this life and damned in the next. While Conscience’s 
accusation against such corrupt and corrupting ecclesial figures is echoed in 
contemporary works such as Dives and the Pauper as well as a range of Wycliffite texts, 
                                                
182 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.96. 
183 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.97-102.  
184 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.101-4, [But because it profits your purses you prelates allow / 
Unlearned men to live and die in misbelief. / Good lord! because you love to be covetous / I believe the 
world grows worse, as holy writ tells]. 
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it is the particular mode of Langland’s poetry that makes his form of writing and 
representation uniquely capable for theological investigation. 
 Conscience’s subtle representation of the systemic and widespread co-option of 
the church demonstrates the unique capacity of Langland’s poetry to train its audience in 
certain linguistic habits that form in the audience a disposition for poetic communion. In 
these first hundred lines of the Prologue, Langland has portrayed a bleak picture of the 
church and the world. The audience beholds a maze of misdirection made worse by 
corruptions contorting the church, the very institution that should produce trustworthy 
guides for the folk and help them see the way between the castle of truth and the deep 
dale of death.185 To this field of misguided pilgrims and errant ecclesiastics, ‘Consience 
cam and accused hem – and the / commune herd hit.’186 Conscience’s accusation is for 
‘Ydolarie.’ An idolatry that grows and becomes more insidious through the very 
economies of covetousness and greed in which ‘moneye and merchandise’ have been 
show to ‘marchen togyderes.’ He calls foul upon what he sees portrayed in the Prologue’s 
survey of the field of the church and world and then cites the biblical story of Ophni and 
Phinees as a sort of warning or prophecy for what comes when religious leaders disregard 
their calling and take advantage of God’s people.187 Then, Conscience turns his gaze 
upon the contemporary ecclesiastics. The specific form of Conscience’s critique offers an 
illustrative example of the powerful theological capacity of Langland’s poetry, 
‘Ac of the cardinales at court that caught han such a name   
And power presumen in hemself a pope to make,   
To haue the power that Peter hadde inpugne hem Y nelle,   
                                                
185 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.15-7. 
186 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.95. 
187 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.106-17. See also 1 Samuel 2:12-17. 
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For in loue and lettrure lith the grete eleccoun;   
Contreplede hit noght,’ quod Consience, ‘for holi kirke sake.’188 
Conscience’s identification of this ecclesial order, both in particular word choice, line 
order and in the structure of the poetry itself, allows for a mode of representation that 
runs in at least two directions at once. In terms of word choice, specifically ‘caught’ and 
‘presumen’, Conscience’s speech creates a subversive space regarding the validity of this 
ecclesial hierarchy’s cardinals to make a pope. Are these cardinals, in the double sense of 
both church officials and also the cardinal virtues, void of the character befitting their 
title, thus leading them to catch, or grab an office inconsistent with their character?189 If 
so, certainly the presumption that such unfit officials could make a pope is extremely 
dangerous and ought to be impugned. If the cardinals falsely claim their titles and rights 
for electing a pope, then the pope, and not just the cardinals, may be false.190 
Conscience’s accusation is ordered so as to pull the audience towards just this type of 
negative judgment. Such a negative judgment is only countered, and qualitatively so, at 
the very end of the third line.  
In three consecutive lines, Conscience piles up language and hints that push the 
audience towards a negative judgment of this ecclesial hierarchy’s efficacy. That this 
negative judgment is countered, but only at the end of a long sequence of subversion, 
                                                
188 Langland, Piers Plowman, Prologue.134-8, [‘But the cardinals at court that the name also claim / And 
its power presume in their choosing a pope, / That power from Peter I would never impugn, / For in love 
and learning lies the great election; / Don’t contradict it for Holy Church’s sake,’ said Conscience]. 
189 Langland will raise this question again later in the poem regarding the second sense of cardinal by 
portraying a church whose language of the virtues has been inverted. Here Langland is, perhaps, 
questioning the validity of certain ecclesial figures. But his anxiety extends beyond persons wrongfully 
catching titles and extends further to a culture capable of producing languages through which corrupted and 
co-opted grammars allow words themselves to betray their meaning. For a study of this in Piers Plowman 
see David Aers ‘Langland on the Church and the End of the Cardinal Virtues’, Journal of Medieval and 
Early Modern Studies, 42 (2012), pp. 59-81. 
190 See Norman Housley, The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades 1305-1378 (Oxford University Press 
1986) and Walter Ullmann A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages (Methuen & Co Ltd: London 
1972), pp. 279-305. 
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qualifies the weight an audience might attach to Conscience’s ‘nelle.’ Furthermore, this 
‘nelle’ is not established on grounds that would explain or excuse the series of questions 
opened up by the language and order of Conscience’s preliminary utterance. For, what 
immediately follows this ‘nelle’ is Conscience’s affirmation that the election of the pope 
is determined by love and learning rather than by rights or titles. Thus, this affirmation 
does not acquit the cardinals if they have merely ‘caught’ their authority through 
covetous desire, rather than earned it through love and learning. Conscience, however, 
refuses to question the validity of the processes through which cardinals appoint a pope 
according to love and learning. The validity of such a process is necessary ‘for holi kirke 
sake’ because trust in such processes, as Aquinas explained above, is necessary in order 
to affirm the possibility of the church as a community that carries on the living tradition 
and political witness of Christ’s presence on earth across time.191 However, the language, 
order and structure of Conscience’s speech are subtly ambiguous. It is open to forms of 
reading that invite subversion, question and impugn against those claiming the title of 
cardinal and pope. The criteria for such a critical view of contemporary clerics, so the 
poetry hints, is if their actions and character do not reflect the love and learning necessary 
for their facilitation of the processes constitutive of papal election, church governance 
and the embodied witness of the kingdom of God. 
 The poetry through which Conscience’s accusation is given voice allows for a 
unique representation of how one might identify the complex realities bound up in claims 
                                                
191 This is also affirmed by Hugh of Saint Victor. Although the concept of the church as a visible 
community is countered by Jon Huss and John Wycliffe who radicalize Augustine’s ecclesiology to argue 
for the invisibility of the ‘true’ church. See Ian Christopher Levy A Companion to John Wyclif (Leiden: 
Brill, 2006) and Matthew Spinka, John Hus’ Concept of the Church (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press, 1966). 
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to ecclesial authority. Conscience is not Wycliffe.192 He affirms the validity of the 
processes necessary for the election and organization of figures in the church so that the 
community can persevere as a political reality and temporal witness in the world, ‘To 
haue the power that Peter hadde inpugne hem Y nelle.’ Yet, what Conscience does not 
elaborate upon here, but what the poem will attend to through its unfolding, is that the 
power given to Peter is the power to forgive, to bind and loose, to care for the poor, the 
sick, the widow, children, the imprisoned and the hungry; a power not to be confused 
with dominion.193 For Conscience, as for Thomas and the tradition inherited by late 
medieval Christendom, Christianity is a living tradition carried on by the community 
engaged by and responsive to the obiectum of faith: God. However, Conscience’s 
particular speech act in this scene embodies a substantive affirmation of this tradition in a 
unique way. His speech draws these very tensions into a sort of communion that 
maintains, even deepens, the disjunction. Poetically, Conscience offers carefully chosen 
words formally structured in a way that pairs his substantive affirmation with a formal 
skepticism against whole-sale acceptance of potentially vicious authorities wrongfully 
claiming titles and duties unbefitting their character. That is to say, Conscience’s speech 
is a sort of poetic communion that not only holds but also heightens key ideological and 
theological tensions.  
This relation between form and substance, as well as that between obedience and 
skepticism, shift throughout Piers Plowman and will be discussed throughout the present 
study. Remaining in this moment, however, Conscience’s accusation here demonstrates 
                                                
192 David Aers, Faith, Ethics, and Church: writing in England, 1360-1409 (New York, NY: D.S. Brewer, 
2000). 
193 See, ‘whoever wishes to be first among you must be slave of all’ (Mark 10:44), ‘For whoever wishes to 
save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for my sake and the gospel’s will save it’ (Mark 8:35), 
Matthew 25:31-46 and Matthew 18. 
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just one example of the unique theological capacity of Langland’s poetry. It is a capacity 
to instruct an audience not just in how to say two things at once, but rather in how to 
affirm certain ideas substantively while also raising questions through the details of its 
form. As such, the poetry is capable of holding together and pressing the severity of 
certain implications between disparate positions. Langland’s poetic communion can both 
affirm and raise questions about complex topics in a way that inhabits certain tensions 
without resolving them. Furthermore, the poem provides a mode of discourse capable of 
substantively affirming orthodox positions while also naming the gap between the ideals 
of orthodoxy and the temporal/material reality of the church in the world, the gap 
between the sign and the signified. In reading this passage, specific attention has been 
given to the way particular words, line order and the structure of Conscience’s poetry are 
shaped in order to resist collapsing the sign and the signified as relates to orthodox 
ecclesiology. If the church really is the mystical body of Christ in the world, and not 
reducible to either an invisible community or an unimpeachable army of God, then such 
linguistic subtlety is not only necessary, but imperative in order for Christians to avoid 
the extremes of individualistic pietism on the one hand, and corporate communitarian or 
institutional idolatry on the other. If there is a theology of selfhood in Piers Plowman it is 
best understood as an understanding of self that is utterly fragmented and opaque, but in a 
constructive sense. The fragmentation and mystery of a self is an absolutely critical 
characteristic for pilgrims who aim to avoid reified or idolatrous self-conceptions. 
Conscience’s accusation exhibits only a few of the modes of complex 
representation Langland’s poetry employs. Line breaks, allegory, alliteration, shifting 
grammars, faculties and figures as well as narratively structured modes of dialectic work 
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together to produce other fecund and complex modes of representation throughout the 
work. These and other techniques are explored as the present analysis moves on to later 
moments in poem, and in so doing aims to further demonstrate the ways Langland’s 
unique forms of poetry attempt to offer an art capable of stretching language fit to 
signify, or point towards, the signified in a way that is simultaneously confident yet 
vulnerable.194  
Having demonstrated an instance of the poetry’s effectiveness in a few passages, 
this analysis now moves to consider the way in which the poetry functions on a broader 
scale. Specifically, chapter two explores the way Piers Plowman represents the processes 
through which the church, and Conscience in particular, are corrupted. One of the goals 
of the ensuing chapter is to demonstrate not only the robust theological potency of 
Langland’s art, but also the particular way in which the poem’s art proves capable of 
offering investigations around the relation between Conscience and Will, that spiral more 













                                                
194 A mode of speech particularly capable of both heights and limitations that Aquinas ascribes to 
analogical speech (in contradistinction to univocal and equivocal speech), Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra 
















 The poetry of both Chaucer’s Pardoner’s Tale and Langland’s Piers Plowman 
raise piercing questions to Thomas Aquinas’ account of ecclesial authority and the way 
Christian doctrine both develops and is passed on through the church across time. 
Chaucer’s depiction of the Pardoner and the community that forms around him raises the 
stakes of the Canterbury pilgrims’ game. Piers Plowman goes further to imagine a church 
whose leaders at every level, rather than Chaucer’s single errant clerk, as well as the 
church’s rituals and sacramental practices are so thoroughly inverted as to become an 
institution that forms people and communities in deadly vices under the guise of a 
commodified holiness. Langland’s depiction of Conscience’s critique of the church in the 
Prologue demonstrates the unique capacity of Langland’s poetry to cultivate certain 
linguistic habits in his audience, forming in them a disposition for what this thesis calls 
‘poetic communion.’ This refers to habits of speech that are instrumental for pilgrims 
seeking to discern truth between rival communities competing for souls in the maze of 
the world.  
Conscience’s critique of the church in the Prologue is not limited to an ideological 
or noetic tradition constituted and carried on through certain doctrines or abstract ideas. 
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Rather, his critique includes the community of persons whose corporate practices and 
forms of life are corrupted by their imperfect capacity to rightly participate in the very 
practices and sacraments necessary to know God in and through Christ’s body the church. 
That is not to suggest that Langland’s depiction of the church, however critical the 
depiction may be, is reducible to neat and tidy dichotomies of good and evil, true or false, 
ideal verses errant. Rather, Conscience displays subtle habits of seeing and naming good 
and evil even when they are veiled in the midst of the Prologue’s maze. Yet, as the poem 
unfolds, the audience will witness ways in which Conscience is portrayed as a figure or 
faculty quite capable of error and this presents a profound problem. The problem 
concerns pilgrims caught between rival communities claiming the title ‘church.’ 
Specifically, if Conscience is both a malleable human faculty and simultaneously 
understood to be instrumental in the discernment between good and evil, urgent questions 
concerning Conscience’s capacity as a guide emerge. The ways in which Langland’s 
poetry describes Conscience’s transformation from one capable of subtle discernment in 
the midst of the Prologue’s maze, to one led into confusion by Kynde Wit in the final 
passus require analysis. 
The nuanced way Piers Plowman explores Conscience’s malleability illuminates 
the processes of transformation the poem imagines for other figures as well. In particular, 
the transformation of those figures who go on to constitute the corrupt and corrupting 
community Conscience discerns to be parading under the name ‘church’ in the Prologue 
as well as the distinct community called ‘Vnity’ in the final passus. The processes, limits, 
consequences and possibilities of Conscience’s transformations underscore what 
Langland imagines to be possible in the embodied church ‘Vnity’ in the last passus. 
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Furthermore, it is only through close attention to Conscience’s transformation(s) across 
this long poem that Langland’s audience is equipped to interpret Conscience’s decision to 
depart from ‘Vnity’ at the poem’s end. 
The interactions and habituations leading to the corruption of the church in Piers 
Plowman are inseparable from the processes through which the poem represents the 
formation of Conscience. As such, detailed attention to Conscience’s formation can bring 
into focus one way Langland attempts to train his audience not only in subtle habits of 
speech, but also in the habits necessary for identifying one’s own participation in the 
processes that form and malform Conscience, a self and specifically a self formed in and 
through participation in the church.  
Sarah Wood’s recent study argues that interpretations of Conscience in Piers 
Plowman based upon scholastic faculty psychology tend to flatten the texture of the poem 
by assuming pre-existing medieval scholastic discourse determines Langland’s 
understanding of Conscience.195 For Wood, Langland’s depiction of Conscience does not 
merely illustrate ‘an already-extant proposition’ that he revises to bring more thoroughly 
into line with this prior scholastic formulation.196 Rather, Wood argues that Langland’s 
depiction of Conscience ‘re-presents’ Conscience in a variety of different ways across the 
poem within a series of different discourses, including legal, homiletic, and vernacular 
religious manuals.197 As such, Wood argues, ‘The poem’s argument develops, not the 
character [of Conscience].’198  
                                                
195 Sarah Wood, Conscience and the Composition of Piers Plowman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), p. 5. 
196 Wood, Conscience and the Composition, p. 5. 
197 Wood, Conscience and the Composition, p. 13, see also p. 4, 161-6. 
198 Wood, Conscience and the Composition, p. 12. 
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Specifically, Woods suggests that Langland’s depiction of Conscience in the final 
passus is ‘a specific instantiation of ‘conscience.’’ She continues, ‘He [Conscience] here 
becomes an example of a lordly conscience easily misled by friars.’199 For Woods, 
Conscience does not ‘develop’, but rather ‘Conscience remains fundamentally unchanged 
from his original appearance in the debate with Meed in the first vision.’200 Woods 
interprets Langland’s representation of Conscience as a figure who ‘remains true to a 
knightly type throughout.’ She argues, ‘All that changes is the mode within which 
Langland composes the figure.’201 In contrast, the present chapter will argue that 
Langland does not depict a particular kind of ‘conscience’, knightly or otherwise, but 
rather draws upon a wide range of theological and contemporary vernacular reflection 
concerning ‘Clergie’ and ‘Kynde Wit’ as key influences in the formation of Conscience. 
As the poem unfolds, and both Clergie and Kynde Wit influence Conscience in a variety 
of ways, Conscience emerges as a figure who is not static at all (contra Woods), but 
rather vulnerable and fragile.202 Specific attention will be given to Conscience’s 
formation and the extent to which the poem depicts the challenges that emerge when 
Conscience is understood to be a malleable human faculty simultaneously understood to 
be instrumental in the discernment between good and evil. Conscience is a figure in the 
poem whom Langland consistently deconstructs and rebuilds along a journey that never 
                                                
199 Wood, Conscience and the Composition, p. 88. 
200 Wood, Conscience and the Composition, p. 43. 
201 Wood, Conscience and the Composition, p. 43. 
202 See David Aers, Beyond Reformation: An Essay on William Langland’s Piers Plowman and the End of 
Constantinian Christianity (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015), p. 133, ‘If 
Conscience is ‘the site of truth,’ Langland is showing how vulnerable and fragile God’s precious gift may 
be when immersed in a cultural revolution involving de-Christianizing powers.’ See also his Beyond 
Reformation, p. 204, n. 290. 
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ends.203 While Conscience’s journey, like that of the poem, never ends, Conscience’s 
various routes are not meaningless. The ways in which Langland’s poem attempts to train 
its audience to become able to discern the directions and consequences of Conscience’s 
formation will be demonstrated in what follows. 
Wood’s warning against flattening Langland’s representation of Conscience as a 
mere illustration of pre-existing scholastic discourse is certainly correct.204 While Wood 
rightly notes that Langland’s personifications do not develop ‘like characters in a novel’, 
it remains the case that Langland does not depict Conscience as a faculty that is merely 
‘re-presented’ in different modes of discourse, but rather as a faculty that is formed and 
shaped, ‘turned’, through its interactions across the poem.205 Furthermore, Langland’s 
nuanced depiction of Conscience’s ‘turning’, and Clergie and Kynde Wit’s role therein, 
offers an example of Langland’s poetry testing the limits of theological orthodoxy and 
the potential his poetry has for participating in the development of church teaching 
concerning the role of ‘clerical’ authority in catechesis and the development of doctrine 
more broadly.206  
                                                
203 See A.C. Spearing ‘Piers Plowman: Allegory and Verbal Practice,’ in his Readings in Medieval Poetry 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1987). Spearing describes Langland’s poetry as perpetually in 
process ‘displacing and deconstructing itself as it is being produced’, p. 244. 
204 Wood, Conscience and the Composition, p. 161-166. So to, her keen and well-supported argument for 
the value of comparing the A, B and C versions as wholes in order to better discern the development of 
Langland’s argument and the reasons for his revisions between versions. 
205 Wood, Conscience and the Composition, p. 1-14: This is a move which readers who share Warner’s 
anxiety over summary accounts of a work that he perceives to be as fractile as Piers Plowman may well 
take issue. However, I cannot dismiss the consistent presence of particular narrative representations in the 
poem as meaningless. The links between figures and topics within the poem examined here reveal a great 
deal about the way Langland aims to represent the figure of Conscience as related to questions pertaining to 
ecclesial authority. See Lawrence Warner The Myth of Piers Plowman: Constructing a Medieval Literary 
Archive (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2014). 
206 As Anne Middleton, Wendy Scase and Fiona Somerset have shown, Langland’s reflection upon various 
forms of ‘clergy’ operates at multiple levels (for example clergy vs. lay, learning vs. ignorance) and within 
the context of developing forms of anti-clerical discourse in late fourteenth century England. Such 
distinctions will be considered in detail below. See Anne Middleton, ‘Acts of Vagrancy: The C Version 
‘Autobiography’ and the Statute of 1388’ in Steven Justice and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, eds. Written Work: 
Langland, Labor, and Authorship (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); Wendy Scase Piers Plowman 
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Langland himself hints towards this understanding of Conscience’s malleability in 
Passus III when Lady Mede’s defenders set out ‘Among knythes and clerkes Consience 
to turne.’207 If Conscience, a figure and faculty initially presented as capable of seeing 
and naming the corruptions of the church in the Prologue is capable of being ‘turned’ 
(perverted) to serve the interests of Lady Mede, this questions Conscience’s capacity to 
be trustworthy as a guide in the search for truth. This becomes increasingly urgent when 
pilgrims, like Will, are caught between rival communities claiming the identity of the 
very community in Langland’s medieval world which should lead pilgrims to truth, the 
church. Conscience himself names this anxiety precisely, ‘For clerkes and coueitise Mede 
hath knet togederes / That al the witt of the world is woxe into gyle.’208 If Lady Mede is 
successful, so Conscience warns, the very wisdom which clerks should offer to instruct 
pilgrims through the maze of the world on the journey towards truth will not merely be 
reduced to nonsense, but rather transformed into its opposite, ‘gyle.’ Clerks, Conscience 
warns, will then become the sowers, the evangelists, of a deceit that will lead 
communities to unravel and its people to death. As Piers Plowman unfolds, Langland 
critically analyzes how a pilgrim or a community might become capable of discerning the 
malformation of their own Conscience (both corporate and individual) if Conscience is 
itself perverted. Langland’s subtle depiction of Conscience’s malformation at court, and 
figures like Kynde Wit who instruct him therein, need to be analyzed, as do the figures 
Langland uses to critique Kynde Wit and his influence upon Conscience. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
and the New Anti-clericalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Fiona Somerset Clerical 
Discourse and Lay Audience in Late Medieval England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
207 Langland, Piers Plowman, III.49. 
208 Langland, Piers Plowman, III.210, [For Meed has so knit up clerks with covetousness / That all the 
world’s wisdom is turned into guile]. 
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§ Conscience at Court 
One of the most lasting influences Conscience perpetually recalls over the course 
of the poem is that of the king’s court.209 The extent of this influence is significant 
because Conscience eventually becomes the leader of ‘Vnity’, Langland’s imagined form 
of the embodied instantiation of Holy Church in late medieval England, in the poem’s 
penultimate passus.210 In this way, Conscience provides a complex representation of a 
figure shaped and influenced by the politics of both church and realm and leaves the 
audience to judge between formations, assumptions and practices constitutive of these 
distinct yet overlapping communities that orient Conscience’s leadership and contribute 
to the collapse of Unity later in the poem. Close attention to these influences are vital for 
any interpretation of Conscience’s decisions at the poem’s end.  
Like the church of the Prologue, Piers Plowman represents the king’s court as 
corrupt, a corruption brought on particularly through the machinations made possible 
through the presence of Lady Mede. Lady Mede is a personification of human reward 
offered prior to the completion of labour, and is given a range of scholarly interpretations 
inflected by gender as well as economic studies on feudalism and the development of 
capital in the late fourteenth century.211 In the poem itself, figures like Theology argue 
that Lady Mede is morally neutral, while Conscience argues that certain corruptions are 
introduced into society through the presence of Lady Mede.212 Whether this corruption 
comes through Lady Mede’s own active manipulative agency or as a result of her being 
                                                
209 Langland, Piers Plowman, II.200-III. 
210 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.256-356. 
211 T.A Yunck, The Lineage of Lady Meed: The Development of Medieval Veniality Satire (Notre Dame, 
IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1963). 
212 For Theology’s voice see Langland, Piers Plowman II.123. For Conscience’s perspective see III.155-
498. 
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abused by members of the court and wider society is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Instead, the present analysis focuses on Conscience’s capacity to recognize certain 
corruptions of both church and realm that result from the presence of Lady Mede and 
how that capacity for recognition slips away as the poem unfolds.  
Piers Plowman offers an account of the joint role of two central teachers who 
influence Conscience at court. Specifically, Langland portrays Kynde Wit and Clergie as 
central to Conscience’s early formation. In its representation of these two figures, 
Langland’s poetry draws the audience’s attention to the interactions between Conscience, 
Kynde Wit, and Clergie and the ways those interactions unfold across the poem to 
influence Conscience. The poem’s ongoing iterative representation of these figures and 
their mutual influence illuminates challenges and possibilities constitutive of a pilgrim’s 
journey to learn how and who to trust along the way to truth.  
The apparently clear-eyed Conscience whom the audience first meets at court 
critiques Lady Mede’s influence upon both court and society for seducing the realm to be 
dominated by a lust for reward,  
Trewe burgeys and bonde [s]he bryngeth to nauhte ofte 
And al the comune in care and in coueytise. 
Religioun [s]he al to-reueth and oute of reule to lybbe. 
Ther ne is cite vnder sonne ne noon so ryche reume 
Ther [s]he is allowed and ylet by that laste shal eny while 
Withouten werre other wo other wickede lawe 
And custumes of coueytise the comune to destroy.213  
                                                
213 Langland, Piers Plowman, III.201–7, [She often brings down true burgesses and bondsmen / And the 
commons into care and covetousness. / She deprives religion and gives it disorder. / There’s no city under 
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Conscience’s debate with and critique of Lady Mede before the king displays 
Conscience’s deep anxiety over the bi-directional corruption of church and realm she 
introduces. As Conscience sees it, not only are burgesses, bondsmen and the commons 
consequently conformed in greed, but religious orders are also coaxed to live contrary to 
their rule through their formation in this sin. Furthermore, these religious figures’ 
malformation leads them, like Chaucer’s Pardoner, to sacralize covetousness for the 
people. Conscience’s capacity to recognize, to identify, the dangers of these influences 
upon church and realm are unique to this moment in the poem. For as Piers Plowman 
draws to a close, Conscience will knowingly permit a member of a religious order 
corrupted by and who perpetuates covetousness to operate within the church, an 
operation that leads to both the collapse of ‘Vnity’ and Conscience’s departure.214 
Conscience’s decision is not the result of a momentary lapse of judgment, but rather 
traceable to processes of formation that are intentionally linked across the poem’s 
narrative. These long processes through which Piers Plowman portrays the formation of 
Conscience elucidate how the goal of Lady Mede’s first defenders is finally 
accomplished at the poem’s end, ‘Among knythes and clerkes Consience to turne.’215 It is 
this turning, it can be argued, that results in Friar Flattery’s permitted entrance. 
 While this early figure of Conscience proves capable of seeing and naming 
perceived corruptions Lady Mede introduces to society, Conscience’s life at court instills 
in him an expectation of a church whose political ordering maintains the class 
distinctions of the status quo, while holding out hope that such an ordering of church and 
                                                                                                                                            
the sun nor realm so rich / Where she’s praised and permitted that can last at all / Without wars or disaster 
or wicked laws / And covetous customs that destroy the commons]. This vision of a society that locks sin in 
is repeated later by Dame Study XI.1-90. 
214 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXII.323. 
215 Langland, Piers Plowman, III.49. 
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realm is tenable, indeed faithful, in light of the possibility of a good king who will one 
day rule an ordered society according to perfect justice. This is most evident in 
Conscience’s long speech in Passus III, ‘I, Consience, knowe this, for Kynde Wit me 
tauhte / That resoun shal regne and reumes gouerne / … And o cristene kyng kepe vs 
echone.’216 Conscience’s hope-filled theocratic vision, as indebted as it may or may not 
be to contemporary genres of millennial prophecy, expands to include a cosmic vision of 
peace drawing on the vision of Isaiah.217 Yet, the figure who instructs Conscience in the 
formation of this theocratic vision is specific: ‘Kynde Wit me tauhte.’ The poem’s 
representation of Kynde Wit will be analyzed in more detail below. In the interim, Derek 
Pearsall’s description of Kynde Wit as ‘natural practical reason, the inborn gift of 
intelligence, unillumined by divine revelation’ is a helpful shorthand for what Kynde Wit 
might represent as well as gesture towards his limitations.218 This able, yet limited, 
figure’s vision and interpretation of Isaiah are by no means uncontroversial in either 
Langland’s world or in the broader tradition Langland receives.219  
While a fourth-century figure like Eusebius of Caesarea lauded Constantine as a 
divinely ordained Christian king sent to establish peace and restore the church following 
various Roman persecutions, other contemporary patristic theologians like Gregory the 
Great and Augustine harbored far more reticence about any ordained partnership between 
church and empire.220 Neither Gregory nor Augustine harbour aspirations for a good 
                                                
216 Langland, Piers Plowman, III.436-57 [‘I, Conscience, know this, for Common Sense taught me / That 
reason shall reign and govern all realms / … And one Christian king look after us all’]. 
217 K. Kerby-Fulton, Reformist Apocalypticism and Piers Plowman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). 
218 Derek Pearsall, Piers Plowman: A New Annotated Edition of the C-text (Exeter: University of Exeter 
Press, 2008), p. 51 n. 141. 
219 See David Aers Beyond Reformation. 
220 Eusebius Caesariensis sec. transl. quam fecit Rufinus Historia ecclesiastica (CPL 0198 K (A)) lib. : 10, 
cap. : 1-2, p. 859ff (Turnhout: Brepols, 2020). 
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Christian king to rule the world in perfect justice. Such a hope was inconceivable for 
these two churchmen in the fallen world of the city of man.221 Rather, Augustine and 
Gregory maintained that the church, as well as Christians who find themselves in 
positions of power, have a responsibility to perpetually persuade those in power to use 
their power in accordance with caritas.222 That is to say, individual Christians and the 
wider community of the church were not permitted to wash their hands of politics, but 
this did not mean that the church carried with it either the responsibility nor the 
expectation that the world could be ruled in accordance with perfect justice this side of 
the eschaton.223 Augustine’s eschatological view of peace, and his consequent reticence 
that worldly empires could ever establish the peace of Christ in the fallen world, came 
under pressure in the early fourteenth century. Debates like those between Boniface VIII 
and Philip the Fair, those between John XXII and Marsilius of Padua, and the later views 
of John Wycliffe in England are representative of the shifting views concerning the 
possibility of a ‘Christian king.’224 In Piers Plowman, Conscience is represented at this 
early stage of the poem as a figure who has learned a sort of theocratic hope through 
Kynde Wit’s teaching. This hope is for a well-ordered society grounded in ‘o cristene 
kyng’ who will not simply rule the world with moderate justice, but a perfect justice of 
love and peace, 
And o cristene kyng kepe vs echone. 
Shal no Mede be maistre neueremore aftur, 
                                                
221 Robert Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
222 Philip Kates, The Two Swords: A Study in the Union of Church and State (Washington, D.C.: St. 
Anselm’s Priory, 1928). 
223 Peter Brown, The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity: A.D. 200-1000 (Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell, 1996). 
224 Kates, The Two Swords. 
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Ac loue and lownesse and lewete togyderes –  
Tho shal be maistres on molde, trewe men to helpe. 
…  
Batailes sholle neuere eft be ne man bere eg-toel 
And yf eny smyth smethen hit, smyte therwith to dethe.225 
This is a specific interpretation of Isaiah, a vision that Conscience is taught by 
none other than Kynde Wit. Kynde Wit’s legacy in the poem is significant because he is 
the same figure who partners with Conscience to first order the realm under the rule of 
the king of the Prologue, the same king who rules by power given to him through the 
aristocracy and the might endorsed by knights, a king who is not unlike the king who 
similarly rules by might, ‘bi his corone’, in the penultimate passus. Thus, from beginning 
to end, Conscience is influenced by the teaching of Kynde Wit, holding out hope in ‘o 
cristene kyng’ capable of ruling society, church and realm, in accordance with perfect 
justice. As Piers Plowman unfolds, Langland’s poetry teaches its audience how to 
evaluate Kynde Wit, his interpretation of Isaiah and his theocratic vision. 
 Langland offers at least two distinct figures who particularly challenge the extent 
to which the audience should trust the influence and teaching of Kynde Wit and the 
theocratic vision of ecclesiology and politics into which Kynde Wit catechizes 
Conscience. 
 
§ Imaginatif, Clergie and the Limitations of Kynde Wit 
                                                
225 Langland, Piers Plowman, III.443-4, 475-6, [And one Christian king look after us all. / Meed shall 
nevermore be the master, But Love, Meekness, and Loyalty together / Shall be masters of this world, to 
help all true men. / … / There shall be no more battles, nor men bear blades, / And the smith that forges one 
struck to death with it]. 
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 The first figure the poem presents to offer extensive teaching concerning the 
limitations of Kynde Wit is Ymaginatif.226 Ymaginatif does not deride the faculty of 
Kynde Wit as such, but rather insists that there are particular ends for which Kynde Wit 
proves incapable independent from the broader context of other necessary faculties or 
figures along a pilgrim’s journey. Two passages from Ymaginatif’s teaching are 
particularly relevant: 
So grace is a gifte of god and kynde wit a chaunce 
And clergie a connynge of kynde wittes techyng. 
And yut is clergie to comende for Cristes loue more 
Then eny connyng of kynde wit but clergi hit reule.227 
                                                
226 Recent criticism varies significantly in its interpretation of Ymaginatif. James Simpson argues that 
Ymaginatif’s analogies and imagistic arguments transcend apparent contradictions within Ymaginatif’s 
own teaching as the poem’s argument moves from scientia towards sapientia (‘Piers Plowman’: An 
Introduction to the B Text, (Longman, 1990), pp. 102-3, 136-9). See also his ‘From Reason to Affective 
Knowledge: Modes of Thought and Poetic Form in Piers Plowman’, Medium Aevum, 55 (1986): 1-23. 
Other assessments suggesting that Ymaginatif transcends apparent contradictions in his teaching include 
A.J. Fletcher’s ‘The Social Trinity of Piers Plowman’ Review of English Studies, 44:175 (1993): 343-61, 
and A.J. Minnis ‘Langland’s Ymaginatif and Late-Medieval Theories of Imagination’ Comparative 
Criticism, 3 (1981): 71-103. In contrast, Fiona Somerset rejects such positive assessments, arguing in 
Clerical Discourse, p. 44, ‘it cannot be claimed that the poem moves smoothly from scientia to sapientia, 
or that Ymaginatif stands at the point of transition. … The inconsistency between the content and the 
method of Ymaginatif’s defence seems to invite criticism rather than assent, and, instead of providing a 
medium between ‘lewed’ and ‘clergie’, to advertise the gap between them’. Somerset’s argument suggests 
that Ymaginatif’s own contradictions demonstrate a blindness to the tensions that I argued in chapter 1 lie 
within Aquinas’s view of the church’s hierarchical and benevolent teaching authority. For Somerset, the 
tension is evident in the paradox of a ‘lewed clergie’, the possibility of an ironically lay, or uneducated, or 
stupid clergy (a ‘stupid learning’). Somerset writes, at p. 47, ‘Ymaginatif is attempting to deal with the 
same difficulty with ‘lewed clergie that Will and Piers have posed. Whereas they suggest it is possible for 
the ‘lewed’ to have ‘clergie’ through grace, Ymaginatif claims clerics are instrumental in the conferral of 
grace upon the  ‘lewed’ by means of ‘clergie.’’ For Somerset, Ymaginatif fails to overcome the 
contradictions in his own ‘hopeful solution, that the diffusion of ‘clergie’ might bring everyone to cultivate 
their own personal reform’, because, for Somerset, Ymaginatif both names that not all clergy are without 
fault, and yet does not create a way for the ‘lewed’ to learn about the faults of the clergy and thereby 
recognize when the clergy (like Chaucer’s Pardoner) might be leading them astray. My analysis below is 
less concerned with arguing for the virtue or incoherence of Ymaginatif’s argument, and instead focuses on 
the way Langland’s poetry instructs its audience in a particular way of understanding what a virtuous 
clergy might be and how one might recognize it. 
227 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIV.33-6, 43, [So grace is a gift of God and common sense good luck / And 
learning an understanding of common sense’s teaching. / And yet learning is to be commended for Christ’s 
love more / Than any understanding of common sense unless learning rule it]. 
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This first passage makes it clear that, at least for Ymaginatif, Kynde Wit bears a 
particular relation to Clergie, a term itself with a complex history.228 At present, allow 
Clergie to stand as a placeholder for both learning, specifically, trained understanding 
and appreciation for the church’s interpretation of Scripture and tradition across time that 
is connected to a person’s salvation; and/or the ordained clergy, those who bear 
responsibility for sharing the church’s clergie throughout broader society.229 Kynde wit, 
so Ymaginatif teaches, is a chance, a matter of luck, while Clergie, or learning, is a 
particular form of knowing derived from Kynde Wit’s teaching. Paradoxically, this same 
Clergie, which is some how derived from Kynde Wit’s teaching, must also rule Kynde 
Wit in order for the two faculties to prove efficacious. This is evident at the end of this 
first passage when Ymagenatyf maintains that Clergie must be honored as a necessary 
component of properly formed Kynde Wit.  
The potentially circuitous, perhaps even incoherent, representation of the relation 
between these faculties crystalizes in the second passage: 
Forthy Y conseile vch a creature clergie to honoure. 
For clergy is Cristes vycary to conforte and to cure; 
Both lewede and lerede were lost yf clergie ne were. 
Kynde-wittede men han a clergie by hemsulue; 
                                                
228 Somerset, Fiona Clerical Discourse and Lay Audience in Late Medieval England (Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), p. 13.  See also Wendy Scase Piers Plowman and the New Anti-clericalism (Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
229 The Middle English Dictionary lists three broad definitions of ‘clergie’ including (1) The clergy (as 
distinguished from the laity); also, a particular group of clerics; the clergy of a country (as a political class); 
also, the prelates of the realm, the lords spiritual; the learned men of a country; the body of Christian people 
(2) clerical status or office; law benefit of clergy (3) knowledge, learning; doctrine; pure ~, higher learning, 
theology, divine inspiration; a branch of learning or study, a science; study; learned procedure, scholarly 
method; learned speech. Middle English Dictionary edited by Hans Kurath (University of Michigan Press: 
1952-2001) accessed via the Middle English Compendium of the University of Michigan Library System, 
14 February 2021: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/middle-english-dictionary/dictionary/MED7987.  
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Of cloudes and of costumes they contreuede mony thynges 
And marked hit in here manere and mused theron to knowe. 
And of the selcouthes that thei sye, here sones therof thei tauhten 
For they helden hit for an hey science here sotiltees to knowe. 
As thorw here science sothly was neuere soule ysaued 
Ne brouhte by here bokes to blisse ne to ioye. 
For al here kynde knowing cam bote of diuerse syhtes, 
Of briddes and of bestes, of blisse and of sorwe. 
Patriarkes and prophetus repreuede here science 
And saide here words ne here wysdomes was but a folye; 
As to the clergie of Crist thei counted hit but a trifle.230 
This passage admits the many extraordinary discoveries, identifications and patterns 
Kynde-wittede people are capable of deducing from the material world. Yet, Ymaginatif 
insists, Clergie is necessary beyond Kynde Wit because the science, words and wisdoms 
of these Kynde-wittede people are incapable of delivering humanity beyond temporal 
ends in the material world, ‘As thorw here science sothly was neuere soule ysaued / Ne 
brouhte by here bokes to blisse ne to ioye.’ That is to say, Kynde Wit proves incapable of 
delivering humanity beyond finite ends, and thus requires a form of Clergie capable of 
stretching Kynde Wit towards the supernatural end of eternal bliss.  
                                                
230 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIV.70-84, [Therefore I counsel every creature to honor learning, / For 
learning is Christ’s vicar to comfort and to cure; / both the unlettered and learned would be lost if it weren’t 
for learning. / Men of common sense have a learning by themselves; / Concerning clouds and customs they 
found out many things / And made notes in their manner and pondered them to understand. / And out of the 
strange things they saw they taught their sons about them / For they hold it high science their subtleties to 
know. / But surely through their science a soul was never saved / Nor brought by their books to bliss or to 
joy. / For all their natural knowing came only from diverse sightings / Of birds and beasts, of bliss and 
sorrow. / Patriarchs and prophets reproved their science / And said their words and wisdoms were mere 
folly; / Compared with Christ’s learning they counted it a trifle]. 
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The particular clergie, or learning, Ymaginatif advocates is not learning in the 
abstract, but specifically related to clerks and a form of learning that comes through the 
church. Ymaginatif illustrates this through a riddle about two strong men thrown into the 
Thames.231 When previously subsumed by Rechlessness, Will had denounced the value 
of human agency constitutive of both clergie and books and furthermore reduced grace to 
a random act of fortune.232 Ymaginatif here challenges Will for, ‘How thou contraridest 
Clergie with crabbed wordes, / That is, how lewede men and luyther lyhtloker were 
ysaued / Then connynge clerkes of kynde vnderstondynge.’233 Ymaginatif’s riddle 
subverts Will’s previous reduction of grace to a mere random act of fortune, by asking 
which of the two strong men thrown into the Thames, one who knows how to swim and 
the other who does not, has most to fear. The riddle problematizes Will’s previous 
assessment that the human agency involved in learning is irrelevant in the face of 
predestination. Will admits that the person who does not know how to swim has most to 
fear. Ymaginatif then compares this analogy with clerks who know both what sin is and 
how contrition heals as its remedy over and against those ‘lewede’ men who lack such 
learning. The later must wait, lying still, presumably at the bottom of the Thames, 
drowning, until Lent for confession when they are directed by clerks in the penitential 
practice necessary to receive absolution.234 The fate of such ‘lewede’ men who must wait 
for Lent to confess reveals a further aspect of Ymaginatif’s teaching, 
There the lewede lyth stille and loketh aftur lente 
                                                
231 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIV.104-30. 
232 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.281, ‘Sothly,’ saide Rechlessnesse, ‘ye se by many euydences / That wit 
ne witnesse wan neuere the maistrie / Withoute the gifte of god which is grace of fortune.’ 
233 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIV.100-2, [‘How you contradicted Clergy with cantankerous words, / That 
is, how unlearned and bad men were more readily saved / Than clever clerks of natural understanding’]. 
234 Thomas N. Tentler, Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation (Princeton University Press, 
1977). 
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And hath no contricion ar he come to shrift, and thenne can he lytel telle, 
But as his loresman hym lereth byleueth and troweth, 
And that is aftur his person other his parsche preest, and parauntur bothe lewede 
To lere lewede men, as Luk bereth witnesse: 
Dum cecus ducit cecum, &c.235 
  
While, Ymaginatif endorses clergie as ‘Cristes vycary to conforte and to cure’ he does 
not endorse clerks without a caution. It is possible, Ymaginatif imagines, that both one’s 
parson and parish priest are ‘bothe lewede’, nothing more than the blind leading the 
blind. In a mode reminiscent of Conscience’s previously qualified assessment of the 
cardinals who might lack cardinal virtues in the Prologue, Ymaginatif only endorses 
clerks who have learning while warning against clerks who lack it.236 As such, 
Ymaginatif here exhorts all people to clergie for the sake for their salvation to protect 
themselves from being hopelessly bound to ‘lewede’ parsons and parish priests. For 
Ymaginatif, pilgrims should not depend blindly on the work of clerks to deliver them to 
the knowledge necessary for salvation, but must instead take responsibility and learn the 
meaning of both sin and contrition lest they drown in the meantime between Easter and 
Lent. This figure, as it turns out, is, like Chaucer, seriously concerned with the objection 
Aquinas raised regarding the way people of lower degree might be protected against 
errant clerks through their simple faith. 
                                                
235 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIV.120-4, [Whereas the unlettered man lies still and waits for Lent / And 
has no contrition before he comes to confession, and then can tell little, / Believes and trusts only as his 
teacher directs him, / And that’s according to his parson or parish priest, and maybe both lack the learning / 
To teach unlearned men, as Luke testifies: / If the blind lead the blind, etc.]. 
236 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIV.120-5. 
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Ymaginatif is clearly concerned that both a parson and a parish priest might both 
be ‘lewed.’ Thus, Ymaginatif counsel’s all people to take some degree of responsibility 
for their own ‘clergie’, as is evidenced by the parable of the two swimmers in the 
Thames. However, it is by no means clear that Ymaginatif understands ‘clergie’ as a 
purely human act apart from grace. Indeed, that is how Kynde Wit is portrayed. While 
Somerset may question any clear positive proposal from Ymaginatif’s as to how people 
might acquire ‘clergie’ in the face of ‘lewed clergie’, this assumes that acquiring ‘clergie’ 
is a human act apart from grace.237 As such, Somerset’s critique asks Ymaginatif to 
provide the impossible, a way that human beings can save themselves apart from grace. 
The ‘clegrie’ Ymaginatif deems necessary for salvation is not reduceable to a perfect 
human teacher, priest, curriculum, or institution. Rather, the ‘clergy’ Ymaginatif deems 
necessary for salvation is the ‘clergie’ that is ‘Christ’s vycary to conforte and to cure.’238 
This is a mystical sapiential ‘clergie’ which pertains to the cure and salvation of souls 
through grace. Such is a ‘clergie’ that is beyond human prescription or control, and thus 
Ymaginatif offers something both appropriate and profound by refusing to resolve the 
puzzle of how and from whom the ‘lewed’ might gain the ‘clergie’ necessary for 
salvation if/when faced with a ‘lewed clergie.’ 
 Consequently, Ymaginatif problematizes Kynde Wit while simultaneously raising 
another difficult question. Ymaginatif teaches that Kynde Wit must be coupled with and 
shaped by clergie in order for the faculty to be edifying. In addition, clergie is to be 
sought not only through clerks, but also through a person’s own study and commitment to 
know both sin and contrition. How one might seek clergie in the face of the proposition 
                                                
237 Somerset, Fiona Clerical Discourse, p. 50. 
238 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIV.70. 
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that some clerks may lack it, and that clergie itself is a form of knowing that requires a 
guide, is not addressed at this point in the poem.239 Instead, like Conscience’s assessment 
in the Prologue, a problem is raised and the audience will have to continue on in order to 
discern how to negotiate this challenge. The raising of this particular problem at this 
moment in the poem’s narrative structure does, however, prepare the audience to make a 
judgment about Conscience’s decision to dismiss clergie, and to later appreciate the 
consequences this action has when Conscience is instructed by Kynde Wit, and unaided 
by clergie, in the ordering of Vnity.240 The capacity and limitations of Kynde Wit are, 
however, commented on by another voice in the poem, which deserves analysis. 
 
§ The Samaritan’s Warning 
 The Samaritan, a figure with even more authority than Ymaginatif, offers his own 
discrete teaching concerning unaided Kynde Wit. The narrative moment in which the 
Samaritan does so provides not only a substantive assessment of unaided Kynde Wit, but 
one which is heightened by the particular dialectic made possible by the narrative form of 
the moment.  
In Passus XIX, Will asks the Samaritan if all that Abraham and Spes taught him 
about the Trinity and love of enemies is true. The Samaritan answers plainly,  
‘A [Spes] saide soeth,’ quod the Samaritaen, ‘and so Y [Samaritan] rede the also. 
…  
                                                
239 See Wendy Scase ‘Pier Plowman’ and the New Anti-clericalsim (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge 1989), p. 41. Scase shows that this cluster of questions is not limited to the internal ruminations 
of Piers Plowman, but also occupied the minds of many near contemporaries from Aquinas to Jon Pecham 
Archbishop of Canterbury (1287) and the Dominican Friar Richard Helmsley (1380) who lamented that of 
the eighty curates in the diocese of Durham ‘not one could read from the gospel during mass without error.’ 
240 Langland, Piers Plowman, XV.176-84, XXI.361. 
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And yf Kynde Wit carpe here-ayen or eny kyne thouhtes  
Or eretikes with argumentis, thien hoend thow hem shewe.’241  
 
Here, the Samaritan affirms their teaching and offers Will two analogies: that of his own 
hand and that of a taper. These images the Samaratin offers are to combat Kynde Wit, or 
any heretics, who might teach him contrary to these two truths which are beyond the 
capacity of natural reason unaided by divine revelations, namely the Trinity and the 
moral imperative to love enemies. This Samaritan, who is an allegorical figure of Christ, 
stands as an inchoate answer to the question raised by Ymaginatif’s investigation of 
clergie.  This Christ figure stands as the teacher of the form of clergie that Will needs for 
the cure and salvation of his soul. I say that this figure stands as an inchoate answer to 
Ymaginatif’s investigation of clergie because Will here receives a teaching directly from 
an allegorical figuration of Christ. As such, the teaching is both direct, and yet mediated. 
Christ speaks directly to Will, but only as one simultaneously cloaked in the mystery and 
imaginative veil of allegory. This is a sort of direct, yet veiled, teaching reminiscent of 
the resurrected Christ’s teaching offered to Mary Magdalene in John’s Gospel, and 
Luke’s portrayal of the resurrected Christ’s encounter with the disciples along the road to 
Emmaus.242 Similarly, the teaching authority of Christ represented by the Samaritan in 
Passus XIX of Piers Plowman is paradoxically represented as both direct and also 
mediated. For the hasty reader who skips over this puzzle and rushes ahead to evidence in 
this figure Langland’s predisposition to regard the church’s teaching authority as a direct 
                                                
241 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.108-12, [‘He told the truth,’ said the Samaritan, ‘and I advise you so, 
too. / And if Common Sense or any kind of thoughts speak to the contrary / Or heretics with arguments, 
you just show them your hand]. 
242 See respectively John 20:11-8, Luke 24:13-35. 
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mediation of Christ rather than a complex series of mediations of clergie offered through 
clerks, parish priests or parsons, the following scene accommodates the impatient.  
 The Samaritan’s encounter with Semyuief challenges any attempt to reduce the 
clergie necessary for salvation to a person, curriculum, or institution. Langland portrays 
the familiar parable of the Good Samaritan and represents the Samaritan as an allegorical 
Christ figure. Along the road, Langland describes Semyuief who lies, 
…ybounde… 
For he ne myhte stepe ne stande ne stere foet ne hands 
Ne helpe hymsulue sothly fo semyuief he semede 
And as naked as an nedle and noen helpe abouten.243  
 
There is both consonance and dissonance between this figure and the two strong men of 
Ymaginatif’s riddle. Langland recalls the figures in Ymaginatif’s riddle by describing 
Semyuief in precisely the same way as the strongmen thrust into the Thames, ‘naked as an 
nedle.’244 The poetry here intentionally recalls the puzzles of Ymaginatif’s teaching 
concerning the role and means of human agency in the acquisition of the clergie 
necessary for salvation. Semyuief is like the figure in Ymaginatif’s riddle who does not 
know how to swim because Semyuief lies bound and completely unable to help himself. 
The puzzle takes on increasing urgency here in Passus XIX because Semyuief is in 
imminent mortal danger. The Samaritan ‘perseued by [Semyuief’s] poues he was in perel 
                                                
243 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.54-9, […bound / a man … / For he could neither step nor stand nor stir 
a foot or hands / Nor help himself in any way, for he seemed semyuief, / And as naked as a needle and no 
help about]. 
244 Compare XIX.57 ‘And as naked as an nedle and noen helpe abouten’ with XIV.105 ‘And bothe naked 
as a nedle...’ 
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to deye / And bote if he hadde recouerer the rather that ryse sholde he neuere.’245 
Ymaginatif entertains the possibility that the unfit swimmer could somehow survive lying 
underneath the waters of the Thames between annual Lenten instruction from a clerk 
regarding the meaning of sin and the habits of contrition providing the grace necessary to 
swim out of sin.246 In contrast, the Samaritan perceives Semyuief as not only incapable of 
helping himself, but also in urgent danger of death. Lying for a moment longer will lead 
to death. Rushing to his aid, the Samaritan soothes Semyuief’s wounds and leads him 
away from the market to a grange and leaves him with an inn-keeper to look after his 
wounds.247  
Though bandaged and in a safer place, the Samaritan explains to Will that 
Semyuief will not survive 
Withoute the bloed of that barn enbaumed and ybaptised. 
And thouh he stande and steppe, riht stronge worth he neuere 
Til he haue eten al that barn and his bloed drunken 
And yut be plasterud with pacience when fondynges hym priketh –  
… 
Andyut bote they leue lelly vpon that litel baby, 
That hi lycame shal lechen at the laste vs alle.248 
 
                                                
245 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.68-9. 
246 Presumably this bad swimmer can hold his/her breath for months? 
247 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.68-75. 
248 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.86-91, 94-5, [He’ll not be saved without the blood of a child, / A child 
that must be born of a maid, / And with the blood of that child anointed and baptized. / And though he 
stand up and take a step, he’ll never get strong / Till he has eaten all that child and drunk his blood, / And 
moreover be poulticed with patience when tempations excite him, / … / And further unless they believe 
loyally in that little child, / That his body will heal us all in the end.], trans. George Economou William 




Semyuief’s survival depends not only upon the initial, direct aid of the Samaritan, nor the 
care of the inn-keeper at the grange, but also Semyuief’s full Eucharistic participation in 
this child. The care of both Semyuief’s body and soul which is necessary for salvation 
includes complex and interconnected layers of mediation, a prescription that includes the 
church, its sacraments, and clerks, as well as the mystical presence of Christ in and 
through those mediations of grace. In this way, the Samaritan does not advocate an 
unmediated clergie at all. There is no perfect institution, person or syllabus of teaching 
capable of conferring the healing Semyuief so desperately needs. Instead, only a clergie 
understood in the mystical or sapiential sense of God’s saving grace extended and 
mediated through Christ and clerks sharing the sacraments, catechesis, and complimented 
by the fellowship of those at the grange is capable to save this one left for dead by the 
roadside. This is a thoroughly mediated and mystical rendering of clergie that also 
includes human agency to participate in the forms of healing Christ offers. Only a 
‘clergie’ that includes Christ’s mediated presence at every step of the way and Semyuief’s 
full participation at ever increasing degrees in the church and all its sacraments might this 
figure have life.   
 It is important here to note the creative expansion Langland’s poetry gives to 
typical fourteenth century usage of ‘clergie.’ As is true for theologians, including 
Augustine and Aquinas, so it is true for Langland that there exists a deep analogy 
between how human beings come to know God and how human beings are saved, healed 
and united to God. The journey towards knowing God includes something beyond human 
‘natural’ capacity because for the finite human being to acquire knowledge of the infinite 
God will require an expansion, or as Aquinas might say a ‘perfection’, of the natural 
 120 
human capacity through the gift of grace. Knowledge, for Aquinas and so for Langland, 
is perfected by the gift of the theological virtue of faith. Langland’s exploration of this 
mystical, sapiential form of ‘clergie’ gestures to Langland’s profound commitment to the 
ways in which knowledge of God is given both through the theological gift of faith that is 
beyond human nature and also the gift that includes mediation through the tradition, 
teachers and clerks of Christ’s body the Church. Here Langland expands the semantic 
register for ‘clergie’ beyond the ordained clergy, beyond clerical status or office, beyond 
knowledge acquired through learning, in order to re-present a vision of ‘clergie’that is 
already and necessarily infused with God’s grace wedded in Christological communion 
with the Church. Indeed, as will be argued explicitly in chapters 2.2 and 3, Langland’s 
robust vision of the Church as the body of Christ upon the altar and the body of Christ as 
the Church united under the mystery of the sacrament proves to be the ultimate mystical 
and sapiential ‘clergie’ necessary to draw God’s beloved into knowledge and union with 
God.  
Ymaginatif’s teaching insists that Kynde Wit is incapable without the aid of 
clergie, while the Samaritan goes a step further and warns that Kynde Wit may at times 
contradict the core teachings of the Christian faith regarding the Trinity and the love of 
enemies. Ymaginatif’s teaching raises a vexing question for Will, if clergie requires a 
guide and clerks cannot all be trusted, how might Will discover a trustworthy guide? The 
Samaritan’s treatment and diagnosis of Semyuief offer a possible answer, one which is 
repeated and affirmed later in the poem. Christ is both the trustworthy guide and the way 
who is alone capable of confirming and sustaining the pilgrim who receives the 
challenging teachings of the Christian faith which often contradict the impulses of Kynde 
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Wit. However, as the Samaritan teaches, Christ’s guidance is not unmediated, nor can 
human beings ever secure control over it. Rather, the clergie that leads to salvation is 
revealed in ever increasing degrees as pilgrims grow and learn to participate more fully in 
the Eucharistic life of Christ through the church and all its sacraments. Always hesitant to 
risk collapsing the sign and the signified, Piers Plowman opens the imaginative space for 
what this might look like only as an alternative to the ecclesiology Conscience will chose 
in the poem’s close.  
 
§ The Consequences of Conscience without Clergie 
 The model of clergie and the ecclesiology outlined through the teaching of 
Ymaginatif and the Samaritan are absent in the closing two passus of the poem. 
Conscience’s decision to dismiss Clergie in Passus XV freights the instruction 
Conscience receives from Kynde Wit in Passus XXI. This is because the guidance Kynde 
Wit offers Conscience in the penultimate passus leads these two figures to form a church 
that grates against not only Ymaginatif’s teaching regarding the necessity of clergie, but 
also the Samaritan’s teaching regarding the necessity of enemy love and full participation 
in the Eucharist.  
Kynde Wit again comes ‘to teche’ Conscience following a long sequence figuring 
Pentecost. The Holy Spirit has descended upon ‘many hundred’ crying ‘Helpe vs, Crist, 
of grace!’ in the face of anti-christ’s imminent attack.249 The peoples’ invocation brings 
Grace who leads Piers and Conscience, urging them to call forth the commons and 
receive instruction. Grace orders a society in which Conscience is crowned king and 
                                                
249 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.211-2. 
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Craft his steward.250 Grace makes Piers his ‘procuratour’ and ‘reue’ to keep and register 
redde quod debes.251 Grace equips Piers with the four Gospels along with the church 
fathers to till the earth, as well as seeds, the four cardinal virtues, to plant among the 
people. Before setting out into the world with Piers for their evangelistic mission, Grace 
builds a barn in which to store the ripened grain, the allegorical figuration of those 
persons well cultivated through baptism and discipleship planted and tilled by Grace and 
Piers. As this plan is being set, Pride redoubles his attack, warning Conscience, 
‘And Peres berne worth broke and thei that ben in Vnite 
Shal come oute, Consience, and youre two caples,  
Confession and Contricioun, and youre carte the bileue 
Shal be coloured so queyntly and keuered vnder oure sophistrie 
That Consience shal nat knowe ho is cristene or hethene  
Ne no manere marchaunt that with moneye deleth 
Where he wynne with riht, with wrong or with vsure!’252 
 
Pride here warns that he will succeed in veiling, concealing, members of the church in 
such a way that Conscience will not be able to discern the difference between Christians 
and heathens, between those who earn justly and those who practice usury.253 In 
response, Conscience calls the commons into Piers’ barn, ‘Vnity’, fearing that the people 
are incapable of defending themselves against Pride’s attack without Grace, who is, 
                                                
250 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.256. 
251 [repayment of what is owed]. 
252 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.344-350, [‘And Piers’ barn will be broken into, and those inside Unity / 
Will come out, and Conscience and your two horses / Confession and Contrition, and your cart the Faith / 
Will be colored co cunningly and covered with our sophistry / That Conscience will not know (by 
contrition or confession) who’s Christian or heathen, / Nor any manner of merchant who deals with money 
/ Whether he earns rightly, wrongly, or with usury’]. 
253 David Aers, ‘Piers Plowman and the End of the Cardinal Virtues’ Journal of Medieval and Early 
Modern Studies (2012) 42:1: 59-81. 
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perhaps confusingly, not in ‘Vnity’ but rather roaming the world with Piers cultivating 
truth.254 At this moment, ‘thenne cam Kynde Wit Consience to teche.’255 
 Kynde Wit’s teaching is concise but powerful as it recalls Conscience’s previous 
courtly catechesis and his theocratic hope for both church and realm, 
And thenne cam Kynde Wit Consience to teche 
And cryede and comaundede alle cristene peple 
To deluen a dich depe aboute Vnite 
That holi churches stoed in holinesse as hit were a pile.256 
 
With the church established as a peel-tower, or fortress, Conscience receives Grace’s 
kingly appointment in terms of courtly and temporal power. Conscience’s long-harboured 
theocratic hope, grounded in Kynde Wit’s initial interpretation of Isaiah in Passus III, 
here significantly influences the direction of his counsel. Conscience’s interpretation of 
what it will mean for him to be king is over-determined by his previous catechesis at 
court, now void of the instruction of clergie whom Conscience dismissed.257 Not only is 
his understanding of a good king militarized, but it also leads him to attempt to maintain 
the status quo order of society in hopes that his leadership will infuse the people with the 
grace necessary for them to be a Christian people. At no point does Conscience question 
the contradiction between the militarized fortress church he is forming and the 
Samaritan’s moral imperative of enemy love as a core component of Christian faith. In 
the fog and urgency of Pride’s attack, Conscience fails to remember the readily accessible 
                                                
254 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.355-9. 
255 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.360. 
256 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.360-3, [And then Common Sense came to teach Conscience / And cried 
and commanded all Christian people / To dig a deep ditch around Unity / So that Holy Church stood in 
holiness as if it were a fort.]. 
257 Langland, Piers Plowman, XV.175-84. 
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images of his own hand, or a taper, which the Samaritan provided as resources to recall 
the clergie of Christ necessary to challenge Kynde Wit.  
Conscience’s understanding of Grace’s language of kingship, however, is not the 
only available interpretation by this point in the poem’s narrative. At the opening of this 
same passus, the terms of self-sacrifice and mercy through which Christ’s Passion 
reorders language and thereby makes it possible for ‘knyht, kyng, conquerer may be o 
persone’ reconstitute Conscience’s own attempt to interpret what it means to refer to 
Christ as a king.258 However, this momentary glimpse of the grammatical implications of 
the Incarnation prove insufficient to counteract the prior influence of Conscience’s 
theocratic hope as taught by Kynde Wit. Void of ‘clergie’, Grace’s ordination of a 
missional evangelistic church, active and moving to till and sow throughout the world 
cultivating grain that might one day be worth storing in a vulnerable barn of martyrdom, 
is swept away by the theology and politics of Kynde Wit’s teaching of kingship, and the 
fortifications necessary to maintain it. In the face of the crisis that is anti-christ’s siege, 
Conscience, unable to remember the only clergie capable of reversing Kynde Wit’s 
influence, depends not on Grace and the witness of Christ, but upon the now old fantasy 
that society may be well ordered if led by ‘o cristene kyng.’ This king is now none other 
than Conscience himself. The image of ecclesial life as mobile, evangelistic and as 
vulnerable as a crop and as defenseless as a barn is replaced by the promised security of a 
fortress and the forms of violence necessary to defend it.  
Taking on this vision of kingship, politics and ecclesiology, Conscience orders the 
people to dig a moat around his fortress church to keep out ‘commune women’ as well as 
                                                
258 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.27, [a juror and summoner who always lied under oath]. 
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‘a sisour and a sompnour that weren forsworen ofte.’259 That this action of fortifying the 
church against these ‘sinners’ grates against the Samaritan’s moral imperative of enemy 
love is heightened by the shape of the poetry that follows, 
Ther ne was cristene creature that kynde wit hadde 
Saue shrews one swiche as Y spak of 
That he ne halpe a quantite holinesse to wexe.260 
 
The breaks between these lines are explosive. The first line stands awkwardly on its own. 
Is it the case, as George Economou’s translation renders it, that ‘There was no Christian 
creature who had common sense [Kynde Wit],’261 drawing dissonance between the 
members of this fortress church led by Kynde Wit, and those who might authentically 
claim the title ‘Christian’? The second line, left out in Economou’s translation, 
punctuates the question by extending the pause. Read together these two lines wax 
satirical, ‘There was no Christian creature who had common sense [Kynde Wit] / except 
wicked folk alone such as I speak of.’ Have the members of this fortress church guided 
by Kynde Wit become wicked? Are those who follow Kynde Wit as their teacher and yet 
who reside in ‘Vnity’ actually wicked? The third line brings the only resolution capable 
of settling the tension, ‘That he ne halpe a quantite holinesse to wexe.’ So it would seem 
that the wicked in question are in fact the ‘common women…a sisour and a sompnour’, 
not those Christians following Kynde Wit’s teaching who help holiness grow behind 
fortified walls. While the alliteration in the following lines tempt the audience by the 
                                                
259 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.367, 369, […a juror and summoner who always lied under oath]. 
260 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.372-4, [There was no Christian creature who had common sense / That 
didn’t help holiness grow to some degree]. 
261 George Economou, William Langland’s Piers Plowman: A verse translation (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996), p. 206. 
 126 
confirmation of these assumptions, Piers Plowman has previously trained its audience to 
pay close attention to lines which pile up questions while only offering an apparent 
resolution through a long delayed line.262 As with Conscience’s accusations of the church 
of the Prologue, the following lines matter, particularly insofar as they will either succeed 
or fail to bear the weight of this delayed, and perhaps only apparent, resolution. 
 The Christians who grow in holiness within fortress church do so through a series 
of practices, 
Somme thorw bedes-biddynge and somme bi pilgrimages 
Or other priue penaunses and somme thorw pans-delyng. 
And thenne walled watur for wikked werkes, 
Egrelich ernynge oute at menne yes. 
Clannesse of the comune and clerkes clene lyuynge 
Made Vnite holi churche in holinesse stande.263 
 
The independent efficacy of these very practices has previously been questioned in the 
poem, and in this moment Langland again comments on their insufficiency independent 
of Christ and the practices which mystically confer Christ to those wounded by sin.264 
Specifically, the same practices the Samaritan affirmed to be constitutive for Semyiuef’s 
survival, especially full participation in the Eucharist. The holiness made possible 
through prayers for the dead, pilgrimages, private penances, alms-giving, and clerics’ 
                                                
262 How can one possibly pay attention to the substantive claims of an utterance constituted of a cadence 
like, “Clannesse of the comune and clerkes clene lyuynge”? See Macklin Smith ‘Langland’s Alliterative 
Lines’ Yearbook of Langland Studies (2009) 23: 163-216. 
263 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.375-80, [Some through praying and pilgrimages / Or others by private 
penances and some through alms-giving. / And then water welled up for wicked deeds, / Stinging as it’s 
running out of men’s eyes. Purity of the common people and cleric’s clean living / Made Unity, Holy 
Church, stand in holiness]. 
264 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.220-4. 
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clean living is qualified, undermined, as it proves incapable on its own to shape a people 
desirous of Christ and participating fully in Christ through the Eucharist. This failure is 
demonstrated in the powerful and alarming reaction of the people to Conscience’s 
invitation to the altar.  
Overconfident in the holiness these practices have formed among the people 
behind the walls, Conscience calls the commons to share in the Eucharist,  
‘Cometh,’ quod Consience, ‘ye cristene, dyneth 
That haen labored lelly al this lenten tyme. 
Here is bred yblessed and godes body therunder. 
Grace thorw godes word gaf Peres the plouhman power,  
Myhte to make hit and men for to eten hit aftur 
In helpe of here hele ones in a monthe 
Or as ofte as they hadden nede, tho that hadden payed 
To Peres pardon the plouhman Redde quod debes.’265 
To this invitation into a Eucharistic form of life, a life that invites the people to forgive 
each other and make restitution in response to the One who forgives and settles all 
humanity’s debt, the same life the Samaritan himself previously confirmed to be 
absolutely crucial for Semyiuef’s survival, the people protest. It is not simply that they 
reject the stipulations of the meal Conscience offers, but more specifically that the terms 
in which they reject it reveal the insufficiency of the holiness, habits and assumptions 
underpinning the fortress church brought into being by way of a Kynde Wit and 
                                                
265 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.381-90, [‘Come,’ Conscience said, ‘you Christians, and eat, / Who have 
labored loyally all this Lenten time. / Here is a blessed bread and God’s body there-under. / Through God’s 
word Grace gave Piers plowman power, / Might to make it and men to partake of it / In help of their health 
once a month / Or as often as needed, those who had paid / To Piers the plowman’s pardon Redde quod 
debes.’]. 
 128 
Conscience unaided by Clergie. That is to say, the form of the people’s rejection of this 
meal cast the entire edifice of Conscience’s fortress church into question. To Conscience, 
the people shout, 
‘How?’ quod alle the comune, ‘thow conseylest vs to yelde 
Al that we owen eny wyhte or that we go to hosele?’ 
‘That is my conseil,’ quod Consience, ‘and cardinale virtues, 
Or vch man foryeue other, and that wol the pater-noster, 
Et dimitte nobis debita nostra, &c. 
And so to ben assoiled and sennes to be hoseled 
‘Ye? bawe!’ quod a breware, ‘Y wol nat be yruled, 
By Iesu! for al youre iangelyng, aftur Spiritus iusticie 
Ne aftur Consience, bi Crist, while Y can sulle 
Bothe dregges and draf and drawe at on hole 
Thikke ale and thynne ale; and that is my kynde 
And nat to hacky aftur holinesse – hold thy tonge, Consience! 
Of Spiritus iusticie thow spekest moche an ydel.’266  
 
The people’s response, so powerfully focused in that of the Brewer, reveals the 
insufficiency of the formation and catechesis affected behind the walls of Conscience’s 
fortress church. Langland makes this point by cascading irony and juxtaposition. The 
                                                
266 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.393-402, [‘Come again?’ said the common people, ‘you counsel us to 
give back / All that we owe anybody before going to communion?’ / ‘That’s my advice’, said Conscience, 
and the cardinal virtues’; / Or each man forgive the other, as the pater noster asks, / And forgive us our 
debts. / And so to be absolved and afterwards take communion.’ / ‘Oh, yeah?’ said a brewer, ‘I won’t be 
ruled, / By Jesus! despite all your fast-talk, according to Spiritus iusticie / Nor according to Conscience, by 
Christ, as long as I can sell / Both dregs and swill and draw at one hole / Thick ale or thin ale; that’s the 
kinf of guy I am / And not to poke around for holiness – so just shut up, Conscience! / Your Spiritus 
iusticie speech is a lot of hot air!’]. 
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people stand together, as Christians? as a church?, refusing to be ruled ‘By Iesu!’ The 
people refuse the Eucharistic life Christ offers back to the people as necessary for the 
salvation of their souls. Christ is rejected as the people’s king, as is His way of life, a 
Eucharistic life patterned by restitution, forgiveness and reconciliation. Instead, the 
people prefer lives of deceit in their small-scale trades. They prefer marginal profits won 
through manipulating their fellows over and against confession, forgiveness and 
corporate reconciliation. The people have become the embodiment of Dame Study’s 
scathing critique, a people who mock the Eucharistic meal with gluttony and heresy and 
for whom,  
‘Wysdom and wit now is nat worth a carse 
Bote hit be cardet with coueytise as clotheres kemben here wolle.’ 
… 
Forthy, Wit,’ quod she, ‘be waer holy writ to shewe 
Amonges hem that haen hawes at wille, 
The which is a lykyng and a luste, the loue of the world.’267 
 The final passus of Piers Plowman depicts the further dissolution of this fortress 
church as Conscience, finally calls out to a Clergie who never arrives.268 The vacuum 
created by Conscience’s need and the absence of clergie is filled by friars, figures who 
Conscience receives with reserved judgment.269 Without sufficient aide from clergie, this 
fortress church begins to crumble from within as ‘Ypocrisye at the yate harde gan fyhte / 
                                                
267 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.5-80, [Wisdom and wit now are not worth a cress / Unless carded with 
covetousness, as clothiers comb wool. … ‘Therefore Wit’, she said, ‘ be wary of showing holy writ / 
Among those that have husks to their fill, / Which is delight and desiring and love of this world.’]. 
268 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXII.228. 
269 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXII.230-308. 
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And wonded wel wykkedly many a wys techare.’270 Desperate for some relief for the 
people of Vnity that might revive their efforts against the siege, Conscience, on 
Contrition’s advice, goes against his previous judgment of the friars and allows Friar 
Flattery to be brought into Vnity. This moment is not a temporary lapse in judgment, but 
rather a demonstration of the consequences of Kynde Wit’s influence. Without clerige, 
Conscience is unable to sustain reasoned discourse. Conscience’s previous judgment of 
the friars makes his admission of Friar Flattery incomprehensible, and this is precisely the 
point. The narrative structure of Langland’s poetry demonstrates that Conscience, as 
informed by Kynde Wit without clergie is incapable of reasoned discourse, either with 
Contrition or with himself. The decision to admit Friar Flattery is non-sensical, and that is 
precisely the point.  
Once inside, Friar Flattery’s work is performed quickly and effectively. He 
intoxicates the people such that they forget what sin is, ‘The frere with his fisyk this folk 
hath enchaunted / And doth men drynke dwale, that they drat no synne.’271 The siege is 
complete, Conscience abandons the church in search of Grace and Piers, and 
commentators have spilled much ink wondering whether or not Langland thereby gives 
voice to some sort of proto-protestant sentiment.272 However, the argument can be made 
that the long processes of Piers Plowman, and the subtle poetic description of the 
influences Conscience receives over the course of the poem, invites the audience to ask a 
far more interesting series of questions. The poem invites the audience to consider just 
how this form of church is formed and how it might be identified. This chapter 
                                                
270 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXII.301-2, [Hypocrisy began to fight hard at the gate / And inflicted major 
wounds on many a wise teacher.]. 
271 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXII.378-9, [The Friar’s enchanted these people with his treatments / And 
gives them sleeping potions so they fear no sin.]. 
272 See James Simpson Reform and Cultural Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
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demonstrates some examples of the way in which Langland teaches his audience to 
discern the collapse of the church as a correlative of at least two errors on behalf of 
Conscience. The first involves an errant hope in the possibility ‘o cristen king’, whether 
that be one of the many king’s in the poem who assert their right to the crown, or 
Conscience’s own attempt to rule over the church. Piers Plowman teaches its audience 
how the aspiration for a figure who might rule church and realm according to perfect 
justice this side of the eschaton is a dangerous illusion. The second is bound up in the 
epistemological misstep Conscience makes by dismissing Clergie and attempting to rule 
according to the dictates of Kynde Wit. In this way, Piers Plowman offers Ymaginatif 
and the Samaritan as examples of a mystical sapiental form of ‘clergie’ that is both 
Christological and also mediated through the church, its sacraments and priests. Such 
‘clergie’, however, is not controlled or proscribed by any institution or practice, but rather 




























How far ‘turned’?: Langland and the limits of sin 
 
 
 Piers Plowman offers multiple moments which seem to endorse the possibility 
that human beings created in the imago dei can be so devastated by sin as to become 
irredeemable. This is the possibility that the link between God and humanity (Creator and 
creature, which is original and also taken up and redeemed through the Incarnation, life, 
death and resurrection of Christ) is itself capable of being completely severed. Such a 
break would not only reduce a human creature below the level of human but also beyond 
the reach of divine mercy. This unorthodox possibility haunts the poem not only in 
specific scenes, but also through the broader arch of the poem’s narrative and contributes 
to the dark tenor of the work’s final representation of the church. Indeed, Conscience’s 
final cry punctuates the coming to be of Librium Arbitrium’s anxiety. An anxiety not only 
that Conscience might be turned, but that the turning of Conscience might be one of 
many turnings which result in the turning of a whole society. For Librium Arbitrium, the 
sinister irony he fears is that these turnings might be achieved through the machinations 
of a corrupt church ruled by persons wholly consumed by sin to form the world in evil: 
As holiness and honestee out of holy churche 
Spryngeth and spredeth and enspireth the peple  
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Thorw parfit preesthoed and prelates of holy churche, 
Riht so oute of holy churche al euel spredeth 
There inparfit preestboed is, prechares and techares.273 
In this chapter, four specific figures are examined through whom Piers Plowman 
demonstrates the capacity of sin to corrupt the imago dei in a human person. Specifically, 
Gloutton, Couetyse, the Brewer, and finally Will. First, however, the Samaritan’s 
teaching on this topic serves as a sort of plumb line Langland uses to demonstrate the 
limits and possibilities of sin’s effects. Following an analysis of the Samaritan’s 
perspective on the corruptive potential of sin, Gloutton, Couetyse, the Brewer, and Will 
shall be examined in detail to demonstrate Langland’s representation of figures whose 
witness and experience of total conversion place pressure upon the Samaritan’s teaching. 
The tensions that emerge through reading the Samaritan’s teaching alongside these 
instances of the poem’s investigation of sin and its effects, prepare the poem’s audience 
for the context in which they must receive Langland’s advocacy for specific resources, 
practices and habits of mind which the poem deems to be constitutive of salvation. That 
is to say, analyzing the poem’s representation of sin and its effects as exhibited through 
these particular figures opens up a more complex mode of reading the poem’s view of sin 
and the way Langland imagines the church to participate in the mediation of grace. 
Furthermore, these representations of sin and grace contribute to the subtlety with which 
the poem teaches pilgrims to discern and negotiate rival claims to ecclesial authority. 
 
                                                
273 Langland, Piers Plowman, XVI.242-7, [As holiness and honesty out of Holy Church / Spring and spread 
and inspire the people / Through perfect priesthood and prelates of Holy Church, / Just so out of Holy 
Church all evil spreads / Where imperfect priesthood is, preachers and teachers], trans. George Economou 
William Langland’s Piers Plowman: A verse translation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1996), p. 148. 
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§ The Samaritan 
 As an allegorical figuration of Christ, the Samaritan’s teaching in Passus XIX 
stands as one of the most authoritative voices in the poem. The particular grammar of 
grace the Samaritan offers through the image of the torch, or taper, provides a sort of 
theological plumb line concerning the poem’s representation for the potential a person 
has to completely loose the imago dei. The Samaritan’s teaching develops the much more 
concise grammar of grace previously offered by Ymaginatif and provides a lens through 
which to read the poem’s representations of sin and its possible effects upon the imago 
dei in the human person. 
 The Samaritan’s teaching on grace does not explicitly name the imago dei, but 
instead focuses on the role of the Holy Spirit, the necessity of restitution and the 
consequences of ‘vnkyndenesse.’ The Samaritan’s development of these overlapping 
themes offers an important contribution or lens through which to read other moments in 
the poem that depict the possibility of ‘vnkynde creatures’, that is persons so conformed, 
or turned, by sin as to become void of the imago dei and thereby utterly separated from 
God.  
 The Samaritan begins by drawing an analogical comparison between the intwined 
interworking of a torch or taper whose, 
…wex and weke and warm fuyr togyderes 
Fostren forth a flaume and feyr lye 
That serueth this swynkares to see by a nyhtes, 
So doth the sire and the sone and the seynt spirit togyderes 
Fostren forth amonges folke fyn loue and bileue 
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That alle kyne cristene clanseth of synne.274 
Divine illumination and the warmth of love and belief are emanations of the Triune God 
working in and through people by the Holy Spirit. Yet, the Samaritan admits, at times 
‘The blase be yblowen out, yut brenneth the weke – / Withouten leye of lihte lith fuyr in 
the mache.’275 This image of an extinguished yet latent flame is the description the 
Samaritan uses to describe ‘vnkynde creatures’: 
So is the holi gost god and grace withouten mercy 
To alle vnkynde creatures that coueyten to destruye 
Leel lycame and lyf that oure lord shupte.276 
While the phrase ‘extinguished yet latent’ might seem incomprehensible in terms of 
deductive reasoning, it is conceivable by way of Langland’s poetic representation. That is 
to say, the image is conceptually feasible, albeit difficult if not impossible, to describe in 
terms of distinctions leading to clear categories.277 Through this inductive, poetic or 
fitting mode of representation, Langland’s poetry aims to open up the space for a sort of 
absence, yet an absence that is never as absolute as the much deeper and more real 
presence of grace. For, according to the Samaritan, it is the Holy Spirit which is the most 
kynde element within the human being, without which humans are completely incapable 
of the love and belief brought on through divine illumination and warmth.278 
                                                
274 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.175-80, […wax and wick and warm fire together / Foster forth a flame 
and fair glow / That serves these laborers to see by at night, / So do the Sire and the Son and the Holy Spirit 
together / Foster forth among the folk fine love and belief / That cleanses of sin all kinds of Christians]. 
275 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.181-2. 
276 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.184-6, [So is the Holy Ghost and grace without mercy / To all unnatural 
creatures who long to destroy / Loyal body and life that our Lord shaped]. 
277 For Langland, and the theological tradition in which he is writing, it is entirely possible for arguments to 
be sufficient on the grounds, not of syllogistic logic, but in terms of ‘fittingness’ as it might have been 
expressed by both Aquinas and Anselm. 
278 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.217.  
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Rebecca Davis has recently offered a different interpretation of kynde, one which my 
own interpretation – and my claim that, for Langland, the Holy Spirit is the most kynde 
element within the human being – appreciates, and yet from which I diverge. Davis 
argues that ‘Through its associations with kinship, kynde makes it possible to envision 
creation as an interconnected whole linked together by a universal bond of kinship with 
God, its origin.’279 For Davis, Langland’s poetry both evokes and violates contemporary 
scholastic distinctions whereby ‘God, the uncreated creator, is natura naturans, the active 
nature who “natures,” while creation is natura naturata, the passive nature that is 
“natured” by God.’280 The upshot for Davis is that Langland’s creative, poetic and 
category-bending deployment of kynde creates ‘a point of connection between divinity 
and humanity [whereby] kynde is an open conduit for movement in both directions, or, to 
put this in terms more suited to Langland’s dynamic allegory, kynde becomes the material 
ground of communion between the two ontologies of creator and creation.’281 This 
expansive and fluid conception of kynde, Davis argues, describes a ‘via positiva, an 
advisedly optimistic account of the natural capacity that persists alongside the poem’s 
darker expressions of doubt and deficiency in the natural realm.’282 This has implications, 
Davis argues, for both Langland’s exploration concerning the power of language and his 
own ‘makings’, and also Langland’s vision of human capcity for ethical action in the 
world. Davis describes Langland’s linguistic aims through his deployment of kynde thus, 
‘by depicting God as Kynde, that is under the guise of creation itself, Langland explores 
                                                
279 Davis, Rebecca, Piers Plowman and the Books of Nature (Oxford University Press: 2016), p. 4. 
280 Ibid, p. 8. 
281 Ibid, p. 8-9. 
282 Ibid, p. 9. 
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the capacity of nature and of language to bear the plenitude of the divine.’283 More 
specifically, Davis argues that ‘Kynde becomes a metapoetical figure, a vehicle for 
exploring how language and figures do capture something of the divine.’284 As such, 
Davis argues that Langland views his poetry and his poetic interpretation of nature as an 
ethical act that – gesturing to a Bonaventurean inheritance ascribed to the poem by 
Lawernce Clopper – fulfills nature’s potential by drawing out its spiritual meaning.285 For 
Davis, Langland’s poetic invention of his own symantic range for kynde  
…revalues the terrestrial and the contingent, not by demarcating the observable from 
the unknowable transcendant, but by bringing God himself to earth. Kynde makes the 
mundane matter by closing the gap between God and creation that the Natura tradition 
had opened.’286  
Thus, Davis argues that through his poetics of kynde Langland achieves ‘a daring vision 
of human partnership with God.’287 
While appreciating much of Davis’ remarkably learned and persuasively argued 
project, the current thesis argues that Langland’s representation of sin raises important 
questions about Davis’ optimistic interpretation of kynde. Davis herself notes that her 
interpretation of ‘natural capicity’ in Piers Plowman ‘differs sharply from David Aers’s 
interpretation.’288 While I am fascinated, and in many ways persuaded, by Davis’ 
argument that Langland deploys language in ways that ‘evoke and violate’ so many 
scholastic distinctions in order to display language’s capacity to ‘bear the plenitude of the 
                                                
283 Ibid, p. 2. 
284 Ibid, p. 17. 
285 Ibid, pp. 11, 24. 
286 Ibid, p. 31. 
287 Ibid, p. 34. 
288 Ibid, p. 30. 
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divine’, the current chapter of this thesis not only affirms Aers’s interpretation of sin in 
Piers Plowman, but goes further to demonstrate the ways in which Langland’s account of 
sin is even more terrifying than the terms Aers outlines in Salvation in Sin and 
furthermore that Langland’s robust theology of sin raises questions about the language 
and the mediators Langland imagines capable of ‘bearing the plenitude of the divine.’ As 
will become clear through the course of this chapter, and more explicitly so in chapter 
three, the present thesis argues that Langland’s poetry recovers a patristic and 
Augustinian tradition that binds together the church, the Eucharist and Jesus Christ under 
the mystical terms of what Augustine often refers to as totus christus. As a result of 
Langland’s respresentation of sin, his language of kynde proves provocative, creative and 
yet ultimately insufficient to bear the plenitude of the divine in Piers Plowman. Perhaps, 
surprisingly, chapter three will argue that it is Langland’s own unique retrieval and 
development of the patristic tradition of totus christus that draws his audience into a 
daring vision of human partnership with God. It is through Langland’s vision of the 
church, rather than nature, that invites his audience to envision creation as an 
interconnected whole linked together by a universal bond of kinship with God, its origin. 
But first, I return to Langland’s pneumatology and his robust account of sin. 
The Samaritan’s pneumatology described above echoes the previous account offered 
by Ymaginatif, 
Ac grace is a graes ther-fore to don hem efte growe; 
Ac grace ne groweth nat til gode-wil gyue reyne 
And woky thorw gode werkes wikkede hertes. 
Ac ar such a wil wexe worcheth god sulue 
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And sent forth the seynt espirit to do loue sprynge: 
Spiritus ubi vult spirat. 
So grace withouten grace of god and also gode werkes 
May nat be, be thow syker, thogh we bidde euere.289 
For both the Samaritan and Ymaginatif, humans entirely lack the capacity to act in 
accordance with grace without the initiative of the Creator and the aid of the Holy Spirit. 
The work of the Holy Spirit does not act coercively upon a wholly unwilling human 
agent, but rather invites persons to participate in a grace that will grow within, as ‘a 
graes’, just as the good will created in them by God participates more and more fully in 
the rhythms spurred on through the Holy Spirit. The Samaritan’s teaching will repeat this 
mode of imagistic representation throughout his teaching on grace. More must be said 
regarding Langland’s representations of the processes of mediated, participatory divine 
grace, but for the moment I focus on the possibility and consequences of refusing such 
grace. 
The Samaritan describes ‘vnkynde creatures’ as persons whose vicious desire 
extends above and beyond love for their fellow human beings to such an extent that 
‘vnkynde creatures’ are willing to kill others in order to acquire material goods. Yet, as 
the Samaritan’s examples make clear, it is not only a willingness to kill, but also a 
willingness to ignore, that makes a person ‘vnkynde.’ While an argument could be made 
that the Samaritan’s specific mention of ‘the fader’ in lines 204-213 intentionally recalls 
Anselm, most of the poem’s commentators rightly agree that the Samaritan primarily 
                                                
289 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIV.24-9, [But grace is a grassy herb that makes them grow again; / But 
grace won’t grow until goodwill gives rain / And through good works moistens wicked hearts. / But before 
such desire grew God himself went to work / And sent forth the Holy Spirit to make love spring up: / The 
spirit breatheth where he will. / So grace without God’s grace and good works as well / Cannot be, you can 
be sure, though we pray forever].  
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renders ‘vnkyndenesse’ as a disorder or failing between human-to-human relations.290 
This is evident in the examples the Samaritan employs. For the Samaritan’s more 
pressing pedagogical aim is to represent grace as the deepest reality which connects 
human beings to God and to one another through their participation in God the Father 
through Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit. 
 One example the Samaritan recalls is that of Diues, a rich man who won rightful 
wealth and yet was damned. The Samaritan explains, ‘Yut wan he nat with wrong ne with 
queynte slethes, / But rihtfulliche, as men rat, al his richesse cam hym’ and yet ‘That 
Diues deyede, dampned for his vnkyndesse.’291 The Samaritan attributes Diues’ 
vnkyndenesse to his willing ignorance of the needful poor,  
And for he was a nygard and a nythynge to the nedfol pore, 
For godes tretor he is told for al his trewe catel 
And dampned a dwelleth with the deuel in helle.292 
Through the example of Diues, the Samaritan affirms ‘vnkyndesse’ as a mode of 
ignorance, a failure of those, even whose riches are ‘rihtfulliche’, to care for figures such 
as Lazarus. 
 The Samaritan draws from another biblical narrative to describe another extreme 
of vnkyndesse. Specifically, the figure robbed, bound, mortally wounded and left 
semyiuef (half-dead, half-alive) by the roadside to die in Jesus’ parable of the Good 
Samaritan (Luke 10). Langland describes Semyiuef as having suffered at the hands of 
                                                
290 Derek Pearsall William Langland Piers Plowman: A New Annotated Edition of the C-text ed. Derek 
Pearsall (University of Exeter Press, 2008), p. 316 n. 185. 
291 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.236-7, 234. 
292 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.242-4, [And because he was a niggard and nothing-giver to the needful 
poor, / He’s reckoned God’s traitor despite his honest wealth / And is damned to dwell with the Devil in 
hell]. 
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…this corsede theues, 
Vnkynde cristene men, for coueytise and enuye 
Sleth a man for his mebles with mouthe or with handes.293 
Langland has the Samaritan describe ‘vnkyndesse’ as a sort of violence, performed by 
word or deed, either direct or indirect, with the intention to either maliciously acquire or 
ignorantly maintain wealth over and against the needs of others. Interestingly, the 
Samaritan identifies ‘vnkyndesse’ in conjunction with certain ecclesial practices used to 
sustain ‘vnkyndesse’, and deems these practices salvifically impotent, 
Be vnkynde to thyn emcristene and al that thow canst bidde, 
Dele and do penaunce day and nyhte euere 
And purchase al the pardoun of Pampilon and of Rome 
And indulgences ynowe, and be ingrate to thy kynde, 
The holy goest hereth the nat ne helpeth the, be thow certeyne.294 
These are the same practices Conscience will identify as integral to the growth of 
holiness within the fortress church ‘Vnity’ at the poem’s end. Yet, these practices are 
ineffective, so the Samaritan argues, because they fail to recognize the type of offense 
‘vnkyndesse’ entails. ‘Vnkyndesse’ is a failure to acknowledge one’s fellow human 
beings, as Piers does, as ‘blody bretherne’ united together into one ‘kynde’, one body, 
through God in Christ.295 Such failure of recognition is the same failure the people of 
‘Vnity’ embody in their rejection of the Eucharist and the rule of Christ, and thus, the 
                                                
293 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.257-9, […like those cursed thieves, / Unkind Christian men, for 
covetousness and envy / Kill a man for his property by mouth or with hands]. 
294 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.220-4, [Be unkind to your fellow Christians and all that you can pray 
for, / Deal alms and do penance day and night forever / And buy all the pardon out of Pamplona and Rome 
/ And indulgences enough, and be ingratis to your kind, / The Holy Ghost won’t hear you or help you, you 
can be sure]. 
295 Langland, Piers Plowman, VIII.216. 
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Samaritan’s teaching provides a resource for Langland’s audience to confirm a skeptical 
reading of the church Conscience will later form under the guidance of Kynde Wit.  
For the Samaritan, the opposite of these two modes of ‘vnkyndesse’ involves 
living in accordance with ‘kynde’, a recognition of mutual dependence and responsibility, 
and in the event of certain ‘vnkynde’ acts, participation in acts of amendment performed 
in order to return to the pattern and shared life of ‘kynde’ through restitution. The 
Samaritan maintains that an act, or at least a will, towards restitution is fundamentally 
necessary to counter the effects of ‘vnkyndesse’ which extinguish the yet latent flame of 
grace, 
Thus, is vnkyndesse the contrarie that quencheth, as hit were, 
The grace of the holy goest, godes owene kynde; 
For that kynde doth, vnkynde fordoth,…296 
Such undoing occurs by degree, of which the most extreme is a willingness to ‘sleth’ 
another human being ‘with mouthe or with handes’ for the sake of covetousness, as do 
the thieves who rob Semyiuef. The Samaritan’s account of this extreme form of 
‘vnkyndesse’ is worth citing in full because of the unique way that it displays the 
Samaritan’s understanding of the severity of both sin and grace, 
Vnkynde cristene men, for coueytise and enuye  
Sleth a man for his mebles with mouthe or with handes. 
For that the holy goest hath to kepe tho harlotes distruyeth, 
The which is lyf and loue, the leye of mannes body. 
For euery manere goed man may be likned to a torche 
                                                
296 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.255-7, [Thus unkindness is the contrary that quenches, as it were, / The 
grace of the Holy Ghost, God’s own kindness; / For what kindness does, unkindness undoes…]. 
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Or elles to a taper to reuerense with the trinite 
And ho-so morthereth a goed man, me thynketh bi myn inwit, 
A fordoth the lihte that oure lord loketh to haue worschipe of. 
And yut in mo maneres men offenden the holy gost; 
Ac this is the worste wyse that eny with myhte 
Synegen ayen the seynte spirit – assente to destruye, 
For coueytise of eny kyne thynge, that Crist dere bouhte. 
How myhte he aske mercy or eny mercy hym defende 
That wikkedliche and wilfulliche wolde mercy anyente? 
Innocence is next god and nyht and day hit crieth 
‘Veniaunce! veniaunce! foryeue be hit neuere 
That shent vs and shedde oure bloed, forshupte vs as hit semede: 
Vindica sanguinem iustorum!’  
Thus ‘veniaunce! veniaunce!’ verray charite asketh; 
And sethe charite, that holy churche is, chargeth this so sore 
Leue Y neuere that oure lord at the last ende 
Wol louye that lyf that loue and charite destruyeth.’297 
                                                
297 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.257-77, [Unkind Christian men, for covetousness and envy / Kill a man 
for his property by mouth or with hands. / For what the Holy Ghost has in keep these evil men destroy, / 
Which is life and love, the flame of man’s body. / For every manner of good man may be compared to a 
torch / Or else to a taper with which to revere the Trinity. / And whoever murders a good man, it seems to 
me in my conscience, / He puts out the light that our Lord looks to have worship of. / And in still more 
ways men offend the Holy Ghost; / But this is the worst way that any man might / Sin against the Holy 
Spirit – assent to destroy, / Out of covetousness for any kind of thing, what Christ dearly bought. / How 
might he ask mercy or any mercy defend him / Who wickedly and willfully would annihilate mercy? / 
Innocence is next to God and night and day cries / ‘Vengeance! Vengeance! let it never be forgiven / Of 
those who defiled us and shed our blood, as it seemed unraveled us: Avenge the blood of the just!’ / Thus 
‘vengeance! vengeance!’ true charity askes: / And since Charity, who is Holy Church, commands this so 
strongly, / I’ll never believe that our Lord at the last end / Will love that life that destroys love and 
charity’]. 
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To this, Will asks the Samaritan whether it is possible for him to be saved if he has 
sinned in the way described above, specifically that life that destroys life and charity by 
either word or deed. The Samaritan, perhaps surprisingly, says ‘Yus…so thow myhtest 
repente / That rihtwisnesse thorw repentaunce to reuthe myhte turne.’298 The Samaritan’s 
use of the word ‘turne’ is not surprising given its Greek and New Testament roots 
(meta;noia); but carries a particular weight of meaning within the wider semantic register 
of the poem given the work’s attention to the turning of Conscience considered in the 
previous chapter. It is also the case that Langland makes much use of the term ‘turne’ as a 
referent not only in regards to repentance, but also its opposite, a sort of hardening into 
sin which turns persons made in the imago dei into ‘vnkynde’ creatures. The Samaritan 
describes such turning as a sort of rejection of an eternally extended divine mercy, 
Thus hit fareth bi such folk that folewen here owene will,  
That euele lyuen and leten nat till if hem forsake; 
Drede of diseracion thenne dryueth awey grace 
That mercy in here mynde may nat thenne falle. 
For goed hope, that helpe thenne scholde, to wanhope ther turneth 
And nat of the nownpower of god, that he ne is ful of myhte 
To amende al that amys is, and his mercy grettore 
Thenne al oure wikkede werkes, as holy writ telleth: 
Misericordia eius super omnia opera eius.299 
                                                
298 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.283-4. 
299 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.291-7, [So it goes for such people who follow their own will, / Who live 
to do evil and don’t let up till life forsakes them; / The dread that comes out of despair then drives grace 
away / So that mercy may not then fall into their minds. / For good hope, that should help then, turns there 
into utter despair, / And not that God hasn’t the power or that he’s not full of might / To amend all that’s 
amiss, and his mercy greater / Than all our wicked works, as holy writ tells: / His mercies are over all his 
works]. 
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It is the process of turning, a formation into and addiction to sin, that cements 
‘vnkyndesse’ into the mind of persons who cannot but reject an ever-extended divine 
mercy. True, the Samaritan’s ‘Yus’ is never abandoned, but it is only uttered within a 
context that takes seriously the anthropological conviction that human beings are 
creatures formed through communities and habituating practices. God’s mercy is never 
withheld, so the Samaritan affirms, but the reception of such mercy requires a turning, a 
reformation from the habits and communities of sin, habits and communities that 
Langland represents as capable of turning a human being to ‘vnkyndesse’, 
Ac ar his rihtwisnesse to reuthe turne, restitucion hit maketh, 
As sorwe of herte is satisfaccioun for suche that may nat paye.300 
The Samaritan’s account of grace is utterly participatory, and specifically participatory in 
regards to the necessity of persons and communities participating in habits of restitution 
and reconciliation befitting a corporate and Eucharistic life, a conviction pictured so well 
through the Samaritan’s commitment that Semyiuef cannot survive without his full 
participation in the body and blood of the child. In order to consider more fully the 
resources Langland offers for an opening up of the imaginative space for what 
Eucharistic lives might look like, I now move to consider three of the poem’s 
representations of figures turned by sin.  
 
§ 
 Langland’s pedagogical order first demonstrates how sin operates and effects 
communities, and only later, retrospectively and dialectically, demonstrates the impact of 
                                                
300 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.298-9, [But before his righteousness turns to pity, restoration has to be 
made, / And sorrow of heart is satisfaction for such who can’t pay]. 
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sin both corporately and individually upon the imago dei in the human person and human 
societies.301 This ordering sets up a sort of dialectical and retrospective spiral in which 
the full effects of sin only begin to become clear once figures in the poem, and so the 
audience, have already suffered sins’ effects and are then empowered to reflect upon sin 
through the poem’s representations of Christ.302 Aers has made much of Langland’s 
account of sin as a dialectical and retrospective process. He does this by showing how 
Piers Plowman portrays sin as thoroughly social and yet discernable only 
Christologically by reading the Samaritan scene of the C-text as a corrective to the 
poem’s previous figurations of sin and its effects by the friars in Passus X.303 
Consideration of the ways in which the poem represents sin to operate specifically 
through the social, economic and soul-shattering processes constitutive of the poem’s 
representation of Couetyse in Passus VI of the C-text will develop this further.304  
                                                
301 Aers describes the way Piers Plowman works when he explains that Langland’s interests ‘are unfolded 
in a complex work whose processes are thoroughly dialectical. So our reading must recognize how the 
poem’s own processes are intrinsic to the poem’s theology. Many positions receive powerful advocacy but 
are later, often much later, subjected to further interrogation and superseded. Supersession is not, however, 
the same as forgetting’ (David Aers Salvation and Sin: Augustine, Langland, and Fourteenth-Century 
Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), p. 84). 
302 Aers argues persuasively that for Langland, as for Karl Barth and Augustine, the bondage of the human 
will to sin can only be understood Christologically (Aers Salvation and Sin, pp. 83-131). Aers’ helpfully 
engages and corrects many missteps in contemporary Langland studies that have unduly ascribed to 
Langland a ‘Pelagian’ or ‘semi-Pelagian’ account of God’s grace and human action. Aers argues 
convincingly against this strand of interpretation by demonstrating the way in which the interaction 
between Will, the Samaritan and Semyuief in Passus XIX corrects erroneous accounts of sin presented 
earlier in the poem. Key to Aers’ argument is that both Langland’s Christology and his understanding of sin 
are profoundly social (Aers Salvation and Sin, pp. 111-2). 
303 Aers, Salvation and Sin, pp. 83-131. Aers argues that Langland’s representation of the effects of sin 
through Semyuief in Passus XIX, as one utterly bound and on the brink of death, subverts the image of sin 
described by the friars in Passus X. For the friars, sin only affects a person as one falling within the safe 
confines of a boat. Summarizing the friars’ image of sin Aers writes, ‘The fallings are, however, without 
harm or consequence, for he [the sinner] just keeps falling into the boat’ (p. 102). The significance of this 
view of sin is a sharp contrast to the picture of Semyuief bound and dying. Aers goes on to demonstrate the 
way the figure of Semyuief in Passus XIX offers a corrective to the friars’ view of sin.  This latter image 
regards sin as utterly devastating to the human capacity for good apart from grace, and demonstrates, so 
Aers argues, the nuanced and thoroughly Augustinian account of grace that emerges from Piers Plowman 
over and against some contemporary scholars who read the poem as ‘Semi-Pelagian.’ 
304 As noted in Chapter 1 the effects of sin are evident in the very opening scene of the Prologue, a scene 
Will beholds, and a scene that Conscience critiques. The representation of sin in the Prologue, while both 
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First, this analysis will demonstrate ways in which Couetyse is presented as a 
development of sin’s effects upon Gloutton, and a foreshadowing of sin’s haunting 
effects upon the figure of the Brewer and the community that forms around the Brewer in 
the final passus. Second, this section will place Langland’s visions of sin in the context of 
three strands of theological discourse Langland’s poetry draws upon and develops. Third 
and finally, the section concludes by considering two later moments the poem offers as 
examples of Will’s identity becoming completely ‘turned.’ In so doing, this analysis 
demonstrates the ways in which the poem’s portrayal of Conscience’s turning as 
described in the previous chapter anticipate and inform the poem’s representation of other 
key figures’ transformations. Gloutton, Couetyse, the Brewer, and Will provide examples 
of the processes and possibilities involved in one’s formation in sin, as well as the effects 
such formation can have upon persons and communities. Langland depicts sin as not only 
more destructive than the position put forth by late-medieval orthodoxy, but also leaves 
the door open to envision sin as even more destructive than it is depicted through the 
figure of Semyuief and the teaching of the Samaritan in Passus XIX.305 Consequently, the 
impetus of this chapter’s argument is that a full presentation of the poem’s robust, 
terrifying and even unorthodox representation of the possibilities of sin is necessary in 
order to appreciate the way Langland invites his audience to consider the ways both sin, 
and later its cure, depend upon a thoroughly social, ecclesial and sacramental 
                                                                                                                                            
social and economic, is a representation of a situation, and not the processes bound up in forming of 
society. Langland’s detailed study of sin in Passus VI-VII (of the C-text, Passus V of the B-text) more fully 
illuminates the social and economic processes of the kinds of sin Will beholds in his initial visions of 
society. While Langland’s detailed study of the sins’ confessions clarifies key elements of the making of 
society into a fractured and degrading economy of relations, even this detailed study of the sins’ 
confessions fails to illuminate the full extent of sin’s economy; a revelation only possibly in the light of 
Christ, Charity and the Samaritan in Passus XIX (C-text, XVII B-text).     
305 See Nicolette Zeeman Piers Plowman and the Medieval Discourse of Desire (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
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Christology. That salvation is rendered in such a social, ecclesial and sacramental order 
makes the question of discerning and negotiating rival claims to ecclesial authority all the 
more pressing. 
 
§ Couetyse, Glotoun and the Brewer 
Langland’s depiction of Couetyse and Glotoun appear side by side in Passus VI. 
The passus itself offers a range of encounters between Repentance and six of the seven 
deadly sins. Reading Glotoun and Couetyse together highlights their differences, and 
furthermore, the specific language Langland uses for each reappears in his representation 
of Semyuief and the Brewer later in the poem. These linguistic links, it can be argued, 
illuminate key elements of the poem’s theology of sin and its effects. 
The material economy of Couetyse described in Passus VI illumines the 
frighteningly destructive powers that sin has upon the imago dei in humankind. Couetyse 
portrays sin as that which is formed in a person through processes of habituation so as to 
invert a person’s nature, making one ‘an vnkynde creature.’306 To achieve this 
(mal)formation Couetyse literally becomes a ‘prentis’, or apprentice, to ‘Symme at the 
style’ in the craft of false trading and usury.307 Figuring Couetyse as a learned craft, or 
trade, is a repeated trope in various contemporary vernacular works.308 What is unique 
about Langland’s portrayal of Couetyse is the way he describes Couetyse’s formation 
into and perpetuation of sin as requiring participation in an interconnected web of 
                                                
306 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.294, [an unnatural creature]. 
307 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.208. 
308 See especially, Speculum Vitae: A Reading Edition ed. Ralph Hanna 2 vols. Early English Text Society 
no. 331 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), lines 6143-6150: ‘Auaryce may be tolde bi skille / 
Bigynnynge and rote of alle ille; / that es a craft that the fende leres / To them that wil be his skolers. / 
Auaryce men may bi skille calle / A tre that growes and spredes ouer alle, / Of whilk springes braunches 
ten / that spredes amange all maner of men. / Ane es Oker [usury] first to bygynne; ...’. 
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relationships.309 Not only does Couetyse train under Symme, he goes on to describe the 
way his formation gives him the capacity for innovative, corruptive and re-productive sin 
beyond that which he learns from his teacher. Couetyse explains how he left Symme to 
join cloth-makers whom he taught ingenious methods for deceitful trading.310 Advancing 
beyond this particular professional guild, Couetyse then slithers into the domestic sphere, 
marries, and he and his wife collude together in spinning out deceitfully thin wool and 
watered-down ale: all for their profit at the expense of others.311 Couetyse even 
perpetuates the life cycle of sin by training his own apprentice whom he sends to collect 
his loan profits from far off lands.312 The processes of Couetyse are thoroughly social. 
This form of sin operates like a sort of virus that multiplies, regenerates and grows 
stronger, more vicious, as it degrades the health of its host.313 Throughout Couetyse’s 
life, he depends upon and participates in communities for the formation, practice and 
perpetuation of his existence. His influence extends into both professional guilds as well 
                                                
309 Couetyse is here the very antithesis of Rebecca Davis’ more optimistic view of Langland’s 
representation of kynde ‘as both a product and a craft, a process of ongoing cultivation that requires the 
participation of all those who by definition claim a share in its meaning’ (18). Couetyse exemplifies how 
Davis is absolutely right about Langland’s representation of the participatory, ongoing link between the 
human and the divine by way of a poetic imagination that binds the material and the spiritual, the human 
and the divine together. And yet, Couetyse also demonstrates the way in which Langland’s unrelenting 
exploration of the destructive capacity of sin reveals deep reservations with any attempt to imagine 
salvation as ‘natural’ apart from God’s grace. That is to say, for Langland, humanity and God are deeply 
linked, and yet sin reveals, that this link is the link of grace rather than nature. Humanity’s healing, for 
Langland, is always brought about by participation in the prior, sustaining and ultimate act of God’s grace. 
310 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.215-20. 
311 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.206-33. 
312 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.279-85. 
313 Another popular medieval image depicting a usurer is that of a spider. Jacques Le Goff offers an 
excellent example, ‘This is how Jacques de Vitry describes the funeral of a usurer spider: I heard tell of a 
knight, that he met a group of monks who were on their way to bury the corpse of a usurer. He said to 
them, ‘I will let you have the corpse of my spider and let the Devil have his soul.  But I will have the 
spider’s web, that is to say, all its money.’ It is quite right to compare usurers to spiders, who eviscerate 
themselves in order to trap flies, and who sacrifice to the devil not only themselves but also their sons, 
dragging them into the fire of greed...this process is perpetuated with their heirs. In fact, some of them, 
even before the birth of their sons, assign them money so they will multiply by usury and thus their sons are 
born hairy like Esau and extremely rich. On their death they leave their money to their sons, who then 
begin to wage a new war on God.’’ in Jacques Le Goff Money and the Middle Ages: An Essay in Historical 
Anthropology, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 66. 
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as his family. Couetyse grasps the social and habituated nature of sin in all its terrifying 
fullness.   
Langland’s figuration of sin through Couetyse portrays a frightening habituation 
not only because of the infectious mode of Couetyse’s cultivation, but also because of 
sin’s effects on Couetyse himself. Couetyse literally inverts human nature, and this is 
depicted vividly through the exchange between Couetyse and Repentence. 
Following Couetyse’s recollections of his formation in sin, Repentance asks, 
‘Repentedestow neuere?... ne / restitucioun madest?’314 Couetyse’s response 
demonstrates not simply that he lacks an understanding of the term ‘restitucioun’, but 
instead that he has become so malformed as to give the term a different meaning all 
together. Couetyse takes ‘restitucioun’ as the French ‘riflynge’ and goes on to describe 
that he has indeed performed this act, once rifling through and stealing from the bags of 
sleeping tradesmen at an inn.315 Couetyse’s association with the signifier ‘restitucioun’ is 
a mirror image, a complete inversion, of the sin Repentance intends to name.316 Perhaps 
believing this to be a genuine misunderstanding, Repentance asks Couetyse another 
question, ‘Vsedestow euere vsurye in al thy lyf-tyme?’317 To this, Couetyse claims he is 
innocent. In a different sort of linguistic fumble, Couetyse associates ‘vsurye’ with 
lechery and denies his guilt ‘saue in my youthe.’318 At this, the reader is tempted to 
imagine Couetyse giving Repentance a smirk, perhaps a wink. Because Couetyse then 
                                                
314 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.233-4, [‘And you never repented?... or made / restitution?’].   
315 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.235-7. 
316 See Mary Carruthers The Search for St. Truth: A Study of Meaning in Piers Plowman (Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 3-5. Carruther’s discusses the processes involved in the 
inversion of meaning in Piers Plowman in terms of pleonasm (pp. 41-3). Another recent study of this 
inversion of meaning can be found in David Aers ‘Langland on the Church and the End of the Cardinal 
Virtues’ Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 4 (2012): 67-9. Here, Aers explores these 
inversions of meaning as paradiastole. 
317 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.239: [‘During your lifetime did you ever practice usury?’]. 
318 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.240: [‘except in my youth.’].  
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goes on, with dark irony, to describe in detail a lifetime of usurious practices that he 
learned and perfected while training under various Lombard bankers.319 Couetyse makes 
no connection between ‘vsurye’ and his life of usury. Now alarmed, Repentance warns 
Couetyse that not even the pope and all his confessors have the power to absolve him of 
his sin unless Couetyse makes restitution, the same counsel we might expect the 
Samaritan to give this figure.320 Repentance’s warning is, of course, ineffectual because 
Couetyse has given new meaning to restitution. 
The tensions haunting this exchange between Repentence and Couetyse are not 
isolated to Langland’s imagination. Indeed, they are manifest in the daily tensions of life 
in the late middle ages. Le Goff explains,  
For most of the thirteenth century, the only way in which the usurer could avoid going 
to Hell was to restore what he had gained through taking interest, that is, usury.  The 
best restitution was that performed by the usurer before his death, but he could also 
save himself after death by including the restitution in his will.321  
Thomas Aquinas further underscores the intimate relationship between restitution and 
salvation, 
Restitution as stated above (A. 1) is an act of commutative justice, and this demands a 
certain equality. Wherefore restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken; 
since it is by giving it back that equality is re-established. If, however, it be taken 
away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no need for restitution, for 
justice consists in equality. Since therefore the safegaurding of justice is necessary for 
                                                
319 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.241-7. 
320 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.253-7. 
321 Le Goff, Money and the Middle Ages, p. 64. 
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salvation, it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken 
unjustly.322 
A similar idea of restitution extends beyond the university and into ecclesial law, as is 
explicitly evident in the thirty-ninth constitution of the Fourth Lateran Council, 
It often happens, when a person has been unjustly robbed and the object has been 
transferred by the robber to a third party, that he is not helped by an action of 
restitution against the new possessor because he has lost the advantage of possession, 
and he loses in effect the right ownership on account of the difficulty of proving his 
case.  We therefore decree, notwithstanding the force of civil law, that is anyone 
henceforth knowingly receives such a thing, then the one robbed shall be favoured by 
his being awarded restitution against the one in possession. For the latter as it were 
succeeds the robber in his vice, inasmuch as there is not much difference, especially as 
regards danger to the soul, between unjustly hanging on to another’s property and 
seizing it.323 
Following Repentance’s warning, Couetyse exhibits the extent of his formation 
beyond linguistic examples, and shows the way his formation in sin has not only inverted 
his language, but also his nature. Ignoring, or failing to understand Repentance’s 
warning, Couetyse explains his obsession over his profits, an obsession that is riddled 
                                                
322 The critical edition for the Summae theolgiae used here is the Leonine edition, Corpus Thomisticum, 
Sancti Thomae de Aquino: Summa Theologiae, Leonine edition (Rome, 1888), 
https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth0000.html 
which is cited following the usual conventions for Aquinas’s works, with the abbreviation ST, here, 
Aquinas ST IIa-IIae q.62.2.co, [Respondeo dicendum quod restitutio, sicut dictum est, est actus iustitiae 
commutativae, quae in quadam aequalitate consistit. Et ideo restituere importat redditionem illius rei quae 
iniuste ablata est, sic enim per iteratam eius exhibitionem aequalitas reparatur. Si vero iuste ablatum sit, 
inaequalitas erit ut ei restituatur, quia iustitia in aequalitate consistit. Cum igitur servare iustitiam sit de 
necessitate salutis, consequens est quod restituere id quod iniuste ablatum est alicui, sit de necessitate 
salutis], trans. The Fathers of the English Dominican Province in St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica 
(Notre Dame, IN: Ave Maria Press, 1948), p. 1450. 
323 Norman Tanner Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils (Georgetown University Press, 1990) vol. 1 of 2, p. 
252. 
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with anxiety, and an anxiety that is unrelieved by the church’s witness and the ecclesial 
practices which should stand to remind him of his true treasure, the grace of God and His 
great might, 
Myhte neuere me comforte in the mene tyme 
Nother matynes ne masse ne no maner sythes; 
Ne neuere penaunce parformede ne pater-noster sayde 
That my muynde ne was more on my godes in a doute 
Then in the grace of god and in his grete myhte;324 
At this, Repentance issues an unsettling judgment, ‘Thou art an vnkynde creature; / Y can 
the nat assoile / Til thow haue ymad by thy myhte to alle men restitucioun.’325 In the C-
text, this judgment is immediately followed by two figurations of Couetyse who have not 
totally lost their capacity to understand Repentance’s sense of ‘restitucioun’, and 
Repentance affirms, in accordance with Aquinas and the Fourth Lateran Council, that 
there is indeed still hope for those who have won wrongful gain, confess and are yet 
unable to fulfill the material demands of making restitution to all whom they have 
wronged.326  
 A demonstration of the range of Langland’s thinking about the effects of sin 
comes through comparing the figures of Glotoun and Couetyse. Immediately following 
Langland’s depiction of Couetyse, and Repentance’s haunting declaration that Couetyse 
is ‘unkynde’ and unforgiveable, we meet Glotoun walking to church for confession.327 
                                                
324 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.282-5, [‘Nothing might comfort me in the meantime, / Neither matins nor 
mass nor any other sight; / Nor performed penance ever or said pater noster / That my mind was not more 
on my goods in my anxiety / Than on the grace of God and his great might’]. 
325 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.294-5, [‘You’re an unnatural creature; I can’t absolve you / Till you’ve 
made to the best of your ability restitution to all men’]. 
326 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.309-49. 
327 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.350ff. 
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Yet, passing Betty the Brewer’s brew house, Glotoun proves incapable of resisting the 
temptation of good ale, hot spices and the fellowship of the tavern. Glotoun is soon swept 
up into tavern games and a drunkenness that keeps him from church and confession. 
Langland’s poetry portrays Glotoun’s drunkenness as a slow drifting, drink by drink, as 
the church and the means of grace Glotoun so desperately needs reappear and fade, 
reappear and fade until his eyes grow dark and he passes out. Glotoun’s friends greet him 
‘with a galoun of ale’ and with much laughing they all shout ‘lat go the coppe!’ [please 
pass the cup!], in an almost certain Eucharistic pun.328 Overfull of food and drink, 
Langland graphically portrays Glotoun’s stomach grumbling and then ‘A pissede a potel 
in a pater-noster whyle.’329 Here are hints of prayer and the Eucharist, hints of grace that 
then fade away. Langland’s depiction of sin’s effects upon Glotoun are specifically 
blinding and incapacitating, ‘He [Glotoun] myhte nother steppe ne stande til he a staf 
hadde, / ... And when he drow to the dore thenne dymmede hi yes; / A thromblede at the 
thresfold and threw to the erthe.’330 This blinding and incapacitating effect of sin appears 
in a different form in Passus XIX. In Passus XIX, the reader finds Semyuief, a figure 
whose incapacitation is far more dire than Glotoun’s. Semyuief’s incapacitation is 
described in terms of bondage and a mortal wounding with language that explicitly 
recalls the prior description of Glotoun.  Semyuief is so bound that, ‘For he ne myhte 
stepe ne stande ne stere foet ne handes / Ne helpe hymsulue sothly for semyuief he 
semede / And as naked as an nedle and noen helpe abouten.’331 With Glotoun, the 
                                                
328 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.393-4. 
329 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.398-9, [He pissed half a gallon in the time of a pater noster]. 
330 Langland, Piers Plowman, VI.403, 406-7, [‘He could neither step nor stand unless he held a staff, / ... 
And when he reached the door, then his eyes dimmed, / And he stumbled on the threshold and fell to the 
ground’]. 
331 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.56-8, [‘For he could neither step nor stand nor stir a foot or hands / Nor 
help himself in any way, for he seemed semyuief, / And as naked as a needle and no help about’]. 
 155 
immediate consequences of sin is drunkenness and a hangover, a condition he can still 
manage with a staff and time to sleep it off.  
With the figure of Semyuief, on the other hand, sins’ effects are life threatening 
beyond Semyuief’s ability to save himself. Semyuief’s apparently mortal condition is 
punctuated when the Samaritan quickly discovers that Semyuief ‘was in perel to deye.’332 
Unlike Glotoun, Semyuief cannot stumble to his room and sleep off the effects of his sin. 
Semyuief portrays sin as fatal and requiring immediate aide. Only through the help and 
medicine of the Samaritan, the care of the innkeeper at the grange and Semyuief’s full 
participation in the body and blood of the child does the Samaritan hold out hope for the 
survival and recovery of this half-dead, half-living man.333 These two scenes, of Glotoun 
and Semyuief, work together to present, correct and demonstrate the devastating and life-
threatening effects of sin. The question might be posed what this means for Couetyse, a 
sin shown not only to bind, blind and incapacitate, but to actually invert human nature so 
as to make a person ‘an vnkynde creature’, apparently un-absolvable – utterly separated 
from God. Through the figure of Couetyse, Langland leaves open the possibility of a sin, 
made possible through a community, that is so deforming to human beings that it not only 
fractures, but completely destroys the imago dei in a person. 
That there is a sort of analogous relationship between Semyuief’s figuration of 
salvation and sin linguistically recalling the figure of Glotoun, and the demonstration of 
sin in the much more frightening way through the figure of Couetyse and later, the 
Brewer of Passus XXI, can be put forward. The powerful effects of Langland’s poetry in 
relation to the question at hand are worth considering again here. The folk reject 
                                                
332 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.67, [‘was in danger of dying.’]. 
333 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.64-105. 
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Conscience’s offer of the Eucharist and his invitation that they make restitution, forgive 
each other and reconcile as they come to altar, 
‘How?’ quod alle the comune, ‘thow conseylest vs to yelde 
Al that we owen eny wyhte or that we go to hosele?’334 
The Brewer, who is so consumed and formed by the maze of the world and his own 
practices of covetousness wholly rejects the Eucharist as well as the Lord who offers it. 
The Brewer shouts back at the giver, 
‘Ye? Bawe!’ quod a breware, ‘Y wol nat be yruled, 
By Iesu! For al youre iangelyng, after Spiritus iusticie 
Ne aftur Consience, bu Crist, while Y can sulle  
Bothe dregges and draf and drawe at on hole 
Thikke ale and thynne ale; and that is my kynde 
And nat to hacky aftur holinesse – hold thy tonge, Consience! 
Of Spiritus iusticie thow spekest moche an ydel.’335 
In this figure of the Brewer, Langland offers perhaps the most haunting image in the 
poem, the embodiment of the sin of covetousness whereby a person’s desire, indeed their 
nature, is so twisted by sin and the lust for more that a person determines to alienate 
themselves from the body of Christ. In this way, the Brewer figures the embodiment, and 
thereby the possibility, of a person and a society so formed through Couetyse and greed 
for profit as to become ‘vnkynde.’ Specifically, the Brewer ridicules Conscience and 
                                                
334 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.391-2, [‘Come again?’ said the common people, ‘you counsel us to give 
back / All that we owe anybody before coming to communion?’]. 
335 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.396-403, [‘Oh, yeah?’ said a brewer, ‘I won’t be ruled / By Jesus! 
Despite all your fast-talk, according to Spiritus iusticie / Nor according to Conscience, by Christ, as long as 
I can sell / Both dregs and swill and draw at one hole / Thick ale or thin ale; that’s the kind of guy I am / 
And not to poke around for holiness – so just shut up Conscience! / Your Spiritus iusticie speech is a lot of 
hot air!’]. 
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confesses that he is of a different ‘kynde’ and cannot recognize Spiritus iusticie but only 
covetous gain, ‘while Y can sulle / Bothe dregges and draf and drawe at on hole / Thikke 
ale and thynne ale; and that is my kynde.’ The Brewer, like Couetyse, has developed a 
different nature, a different ‘kynde’ and is now incapable of recognizing the virtue of a 
life lived out through the bonds of a mutual self-giving community between God and 
others. Analogous to the resonance between Glotoun and Semyiuef, Langland’s use of the 
Brewer in this scene recalls Couetyse’s infiltration into the domestic sphere of 
brewmaking in Passus VI. The figures are not only linked linguistically and thematically 
but even through a common trade.  
Furthermore, this later figuration of the Brewer recalls Couetyse of Passus VI 
insofar as this later Brewer is a person who refuses to make restitution with both his 
fellow human beings and also with God by rejecting the Eucharist, and thus becoming 
unforgivable.336 That Langland portrays this unsettling possibility through the figure of a 
Brewer, and not a banker, merchant, or noble, underlies the poem’s anxiety that the 
corruptive forces of covetousness upon society and individual desire are capable of 
penetrating all levels of society, not just a privileged minority. And furthermore, by re-
casting Couetyse in the figure of a Brewer, a person who is legally and morally 
responsible for a community as paterfamilas under London Ordinance, Langland 
punctuates the social implications of sin’s destructive economy.337 Indeed, the Brewer’s 
rejection of the Eucharist initiates a communal mimicry whereby the people follow the 
Brewer’s act of rejection. The Brewer in this scene not only depicts his own rejection of 
                                                
336 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.396-408. 
337 Barbara Hanawalt ‘The Host, the Law, and the Ambiguous Space of Medieval London Taverns’ in her 
Of Good and Ill Repute: Gender and Social Control in Medieval England (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), pp. 104-23. 
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God in the Eucharist, but also the way in which a whole community becomes so formed 
through the desire for more as to conspire together in its rejection of God and God’s gift. 
Thus, the question the Brewer raises goes beyond the more abstract wonder of whether 
sin can so unravel a human soul so as to make a person less than human. The Brewer asks 
whether or not specific practices born out of covetousness and which perpetuate the sin of 
covetousness might not only transform a person but also a community in such a way that 
a person and a community might become antithetical to God, to grace and to the practices 
of the church. 
 
§ 
 Langland’s anxiety over covetousness, usury and restitution have immediate roots 
in ecclesiastical debates concerning money and its use in the medieval period. Take, for 
instance, the way the twenty-fifth canon of the Third Lateran Council of 1179 anticipates 
some of Langland’s anxiety about covetousness, the practices of usury and the effects of 
the cultivation of the desire for more within society, 
Nearly everywhere the crime of usury has become so firmly rooted that many, 
omitting other business, practice usury as if it were permitted, and in no way observe 
how it is forbidden in both Old and New Testament. We therefore declare that 
notorious usurers should not be admitted to communion of the alter or receive 
christian burial if they die in this sin. Whoever receives them or gives them christian 
burial should be compelled to give back (reddere) what he has received, and let him 
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remain suspended from the performance of his office until he has made satisfaction 
according to the judgment of his own bishop.338 
Until the thirteenth century, monastic institutions served as the main money-lenders in 
Latin Christendom.339 This fiscal activity was, however, governed by the church’s 
conviction, as expressed in the canon above, that lending at interest between Christians 
directly contradicted the command of the Scriptures.340 The church in turn forbade the 
practice of lending at interest, while Christians simultaneously depended on this practice 
as performed, not without derision, by Jews.341 In this way, Langland’s investigation of 
sin through Couetyse is hardly arbitrary.  Rather, its investigation of the utterly 
devastating possibilities of sin through the figure of Couetyse is the product of a period in 
which money begins to function in a radically new way in society.342 
 
§ Augustine 
                                                
338 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. Tanner:, vol. 1 p. 223. 
339 Le Goff Money and the Middle Ages, pp. 61-2. 
340 Ibid., p. 62. 
341 For an excellent recent account of the history of the Jews in the middle ages see Robin R. Mundill The 
King’s Jews: Money, Massacre and Exodus in Medieval England (London: Continuum, 2010). Thomas 
Aquinas provides a more nuanced account of usury, as well as the possibility of licit usury, in ST II.II.78. 
However, the number of medieval treatises on money, usury, just price, and covetousness are both 
abundant and diverse, and part of the growing literature on pastoral care, pre and post Lateran IV, for 
example Robert of Flamborough, Liber poenitentialis, ed. J. J. Francis Firth (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1971) and Robert Grosseteste, Templum Dei, ed. Joseph Goering and F.A.C. Mantello 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984); M. E. Bloomfield et al, Incipits of Latin Works 
on the Virtues and Vices 1100-1500 A.D. (Cambridge. Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979). Also Julie L. 
Mell, The Myth of the Jewish Money-Lender, 2 vols (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).   
342 A full explication of the context and debates around usury and covetousness in the middle ages is 
beyond the scope of this essay. See especially Alexander Murray Reason and Society in the Middle Ages 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, England 1978); Michel Mollat The Poor in the Middle Ages: an essay in social 
history trans. by Arthur Goldhammer (Newhaven: Yale University Press, 1986); Christopher Dyer 
Standards of Living in the Later Middle Ages: Social Change in England c. 1200-1520 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989) and An Age of Transition?: Economy and Society in England in the 
Latter Middle Ages (Oxford University Press, 2007); Odd Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools 
(Leiden: Brill, 1992); Giles E.M. Gasper and Svein H. Gullbekk, eds., Money and the Church in Medieval 
Europe, 1000-1200: Practice, Morality and Thought (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015). 
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As well as contemporary socio-economic mores, Langland’s account of the range 
of sin’s possible effects should also be considered within the theological traditions he 
received. Augustine’s writing on the topic of sin is far more nuanced than many of his 
alleged medieval, and modern, disciples suggest. Augustine understands sin in at least 
two overlapping ways: one, in terms of original sin as inherited from Adam and Eve, and 
another, as a chain of learned habit, a sort of socially instilled custom, that so corrupts 
human desire that sin becomes itself a necessity. A few examples will help to make 
Augustine’s complex account of sin more clear, and from these examples the relation 
between Langland and Augustine becomes evident especially in the latter’s Confessions. 
 Augustine is aware of sin from the very opening pages of the work, recalling the 
presence of sin in his own life from the outset, ‘I ask you, my God, I ask, Lord, where 
and when your servant was innocent?’343 Sin, so Augustine reflects, is present in him 
even as an infant.344 Elsewhere in Augustine’s corpus, he reflects on the origin of original 
sin and determines that it is the result of Adam’s misuse of his free will.345 The 
                                                
343 Augustine Confessionum libri XIII, ed. Martin Skutella and Luc Verheijen, Corpus Christianorum Series 
Latina, 27 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), lib. 1, cap. 7, linea 42, [quod si et in iniquitate conceptus sum et in 
peccatis mater mea me in utero aluit, ubi, oro te, deus meus, ubi, domine, ego, seruus tuus, ubi aut quando 
innocens fui?], trans. by Henry Chadwick Saint Augustine Confessions (Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 
10. 
344 Ibid., lib. 1, cap. 7, linea 3, ‘quis me commemorat peccatum infantiae meae, quoniam nemo mundus a 
peccato coram te, nec infans, cuius est unius diei uita super terram [‘Who reminds me of the sin of my 
infancy? for ‘none is pure from sin before you, not even an infant of one day upon the earth’ (Job 14:4-5 
LXX).’]?’, trans. Chadwick Confessions, p. 9. 
345 Augustine De natura et gratia, ed. C. F.Urba and J. Zycha, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latina, 
60 (Vienna: F. Tempsky,1913), cap. 3, par. 3, linea 8, ‘natura quippe hominis primitus inculpata et sine ullo 
uitio creata est; natura uero ista hominis, qua unusquisque ex adam nascitur, iam medico indiget, quia sana 
non est. omnia quidem bona, quae habet in formatione, uita, sensibus, mente, a summo deo habet creatore 
et artifice suo. uitium uero, quod ista naturalia bona contenebrat et infirmat, ut inluminatione et curatione 
opus habeat, non ab inculpabili artifice contractum est, sed ex originali peccato, quod commissum est libero 
arbitrio.’, [Human nature was in the beginning created blameless and without any defect.  But that human 
nature, in which each of us is born in Adam, now needs a physician, because it is not in good health.  All 
the goods which it has it has in its constitution: life, the senses, and the mind, it has from the sovereign 
God, its creator and maker.  But the defect which darkens and weakens those natural goods so that there is 
need for enlightenment and healing did not come from its blameless maker.  It came from the original sin 
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consequence of Adam’s error is in turn inherited by, and passed on to, the entirety of the 
human race.346 The effect of this inherited sin upon Adam’s descendants is, so Augustine 
maintains, itself the punishment for Adam’s original sin.347 That is to say, the degradation 
that sin brings on begets further degradation, and this devastating process is itself a 
punishment for sin.   
This notion of sin as a punishment leads directly to the second way Augustine 
understands sin. This second lens sees sin as a chain of learned habit, or socially instilled 
custom, that so corrupts human desire that sin becomes itself a necessity. Looking 
beyond his infancy, Augustine recalls, not only his inheritance of sin, but also his 
initiation into and formation within a culture through which sin begets further sin.348 
Reflecting on his early experiences at school Augustine writes, 
I was disobedient not because I had chosen higher things, but from love of sport. In 
competitive games I loved the pride of winning. I liked to tickle my ears with false 
stories which further titillated my desires (2 Tim. 4: 3-4). The same curiosity 
mountingly increased my appetite for public shows. Public shows are the games of 
adults. Those who give them are persons held in such high dignity that almost 
everyone wishes to be their children. But they happily allow them to be flogged if 
                                                                                                                                            
which was committed by free choice.], trans. Roland J. Teske, SJ in Answer to the Pelagians I (Hyde Park, 
NY: New City Press, 1998), p. 226. 
346 See William E. Mann ‘Augustine on Evil and Original Sin’ in Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, 
eds., The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 40-8. 
While I think Mann is correct to say that sin, for Augustine, is ‘inherited, infecting every descendant of 
Adam and Eve’ (47), Mann is wrong to assert that sin, for Augustine, is ‘not acquired ... transmitted by 
propagation, not imitation’ (47). In what follows, I will make it quite clear sin, for Augustine, is both 
inherited and also in some way acquired. 
347 Augustine, De natura et gratia, cap. 22, par. 24, linea 21, ‘utique ista obscuratio uindicta et poena iam 
fuit; et tamen per hanc poenam, id est per cordis caecitatem, quae fit deserente luce sapientiae, in plura et 
grauia peccata conlapsi sunt; dicentes enim esse se sapientes stulti facti sunt.’ 
348 See Robert McMahon Augustine’s Prayerful Ascent: An Essay on the Literary Form of the Confessions 
(Atlanta: University of Georgia Press, 1989). 
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such shows hinder the study which will bring them, they hope, to the position of 
giving such shows!349 
Augustine here recalls his initiation into ‘the stormy society of human life’ at Rome that 
teaches him to weep over the death of Dido, and yet makes him totally incapable of 
weeping over his sins.350 A culture that teaches him to long for more and more stories 
that ultimately corrupt his soul.351 A culture that inflames Augustine’s curiosity and lust 
for the public shows, while ignoring desire and love of God. The result of this ‘flood of 
human custom’ is the formation of a heavy and lacerating chain of habit that is itself a 
punishment through which Augustine unravels and tears himself into pieces, as he 
pursues an array of sinful pleasures hopelessly incapable of bringing him happiness.352 
The inherited and yet culturally formed, or cultivated, sin Augustine describes shapes him 
in such a way that sin itself becomes a necessity, 
The consequence of a distorted will is passion. By servitude to passion, habit is 
formed, and habit to which there is no resistance becomes necessity. By these links, as 
                                                
349 Augustine, Confessionum, lib. 1, cap. 10, linea 5, [non enim meliora eligens inoboediens eram, sed 
amore ludendi, amans in certaminibus superbas uictorias et scalpi aures meas falsis fabellis, quo prurirent 
ardentius, eadem curiositate magis magis que per oculos emicante in spectacula, ludos maiorum; quos 
tamen qui edunt, ea dignitate praediti excellunt, ut hoc paene omnes optent paruulis suis, quos tamen caedi 
libenter patiuntur, si spectaculis talibus impediantur ab studio, quo eos ad talia edenda cupiunt peruenire], 
trans. Chadwick Confessions, pp. 12-3. 
350 Ibid., lib. 1, cap. 13, linea 22, ‘et haec non flebam et flebam didonem extinctam ferro que extrema 
secutam, sequens ipse extrema condita tua relicto te et terra iens in terram: et si prohiberer ea legere, 
dolerem, quia non legerem quod dolerem.’ 
351 Ibid, lib. 1, cap. 16, linea 14, ‘et tamen, o flumen tartareum, iactantur in te fili hominum cum 
mercedibus, ut haec discant, et magna res agitur, cum hoc agitur publice in foro, in conspectu legum supra 
mercedem salaria decernentium, et saxa tua percutis et sonas dicens: ‘hinc uerba discuntur, hinc adquiritur 
eloquentia rebus persuadendis sententiis que explicandis maxime necessaria.’’ 
352 Ibid, lib. 2, cap. 1, linea 3, ‘amore amoris tui facio istuc, recolens uias meas nequissimas in amaritudine 
recogitationis meae, ut tu dulcescas mihi, dulcedo non fallax, dulcedo felix et secura, et conligens me a 
dispersione, in qua frustatim discissus sum, dum ab uno te auersus in multa euanui.’ 
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it were, connected one to another (hence my term a chain), a harsh bondage held me 
under restraint.353 
This account immediately raises a cluster of questions. Does the cultivation of inherited 
sin through fallen human culture create a sinful will, or a sinful nature, in Augustine? 
Does sin change human nature or will? The same nature or will that was, for Augustine 
‘in the beginning created blameless and without any defect’?354 
 To this question, Augustine’s answer is an, albeit rather nuanced, ‘no.’ 
Augustine’s negation, however, is not immediately clear. In terms of the will, Augustine 
does indeed recount how,  
A new will had begun to emerge in me, the will to worship you disinterestedly and 
enjoy you, O God, our only sure felicity; but it was not yet capable of surmounting 
that earlier will strengthened by inveterate custom. And so the two wills fought it out – 
the old and the new, the one carnal, the other spiritual – and in their struggle tore my 
soul apart.355 
Augustine explains the character of these two wills with an important degree of 
specificity. He explains his new will, the will to worship God, as a will in which he, 
Augustine, shares a degree of agency. The other will, in contrast, is one in which 
Augustine is not really the agent. While Augustine exhibited agency in the acquisition 
                                                
353 Ibid, lib. 8, cap. 5, linea 10, [quippe ex uoluntate peruersa facta est libido, et dum seruitur libidini, facta 
est consuetudo, et dum consuetudini non resistitur, facta est necessitas. quibus quasi ansulis sibimet 
innexis - unde catenam appellaui - tenebat me obstrictum dura seruitus], trans. Chadwick Confessions, p. 
140. 
354 See Elizabeth A. Clark ‘Vitiated Seeds and Holy Vessels: Augustine’s Manichean Past’ in Karen L. 
King, ed., Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), pp. 367-401. 
355 Augustine, Confessionum, lib. 8, cap. 5, linea 10, [sic intellegebam me ipso experimento id quod 
legeram, quomodo caro concupisceret aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem, ego quidem in 
utroque, sed magis ego in eo, quod in me approbabam, quam in eo, quod in me improbabam], The 
Confessions trans. Maria Boulding, O.S.B (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), pp. 153-4. Preferring 
Boulding’s translation ‘…and in their struggle tore my soul apart’ over Chadwick’s ‘…and their discord 
robbed my soul of all concentration.’ 
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and formation in certain destructive habits, those habits have now stripped him of his 
agency. These sinful habits of his own making enslave him in the act of his own self-
destruction. Augustine explains, 
I was aligned with both [wills], but more with the desires I approved in myself [those 
directed to worship of God] than with those I frowned upon, for in these latter I was 
not really the agent, since for the most part I was enduring them against my will rather 
than acting freely. All the same, the force of habit that fought against me had grown 
fiercer by my own doing, because I had come willingly to this point where I now 
wished not to be. And who has any right to object, when just punishment catches up 
with a sinner?356 
Augustine further explicates this condition with the image of sleep, 
I was thus weighed down by the pleasant burden of the world in the way one 
commonly is thought to be asleep, and the thoughts with which I attempted to meditate 
upon you were like the efforts of people who are trying to wake up, but are 
overpowered and immersed once more in slumberous deeps.357 
As such, sin does not function in Augustine as an alternative active competing will, but 
rather as the ‘brute force of habit whereby the mind is dragged along and held fast against 
its will, and deservedly so because it slipped into the habit willingly.’358 
                                                
356 Ibid., lib. 8, cap. 5, linea 20, [sic intellegebam me ipso experimento id quod legeram, quomodo caro 
concupisceret aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem, ego quidem in utroque, sed magis ego in eo, 
quod in me approbabam, quam in eo, quod in me improbabam. ibi enim magis iam non ego, quia ex magna 
parte id patiebar inuitus quam faciebam uolens. sed tamen consuetudo aduersus me pugnacior ex me facta 
erat, quoniam uolens quo nollem perueneram], The Confessions, trans. Boulding, p. 154. 
357 Ibid., lib. 8, cap. 5, linea 33, [ita sarcina saeculi, uelut somno assolet, dulciter premebar, et cogitationes, 
quibus meditabar in te, similes erant conatibus expergisci uolentium, qui tamen superati soporis altitudine 
remerguntur], The Confessions, trans. Boulding, pp. 153-4. 
358 Ibid., lib. 8, cap. 5, linea 50, [ex enim peccati est uiolentia consuetudinis, qua trahitur et tenetur etiam 
inuitus animus eo merito, quo in eam uolens inlabitur], The Confessions, trans. Boulding, pp. 155. 
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 Turning from the will to the question of two natures, Augustine is more straight 
forward,  
Let them perish from your presence’ (Ps. 67:3) O God, as do ‘empty talkers and 
seducers’ of the mind (Titus 1:10) who from the dividing of the will into two in the 
process of deliberation, deduce that there are two minds with two distinct natures, one 
good, the other bad. They really are evil themselves when they entertain these evil 
doctrines.359  
Unlike the Manichess who declare that there are two natures in a person that account for 
two competing wills, Augustine is adamant that,  
In my own case, … , the self which willed to serve was identical with the self which 
was unwilling. It was I. I was neither wholly willing nor wholly unwilling. So I was in 
conflict with myself and was dissociated from myself. The dissociation came about 
against my will. Yet this was not a manifestation of the nature of an alien mind but the 
punishment suffered in my own mind. And so it was ‘not I’ that brought this about 
‘but sin which dwelt in me’ (Rom. 7: 17,20), sin resulting from the punishment of a 
more freely chosen sin, because I was a son of Adam.360   
Precisely these two competing desires within the one person of Augustine is what he 
describes as ‘renting apart’ [dissipabar], or ‘fragmenting’, his soul.361 
                                                
359 Ibid., lib. 8, cap. 10, linea 22, [si deliberet quisquam, utrum ad conuenticulum eorum pergat an ad 
theatrum, clamant isti: ‘ecce duae naturae, una bona hac ducit, altera mala illac reducit. nam unde ista 
cunctatio sibimet aduersantium uoluntatum?’ ego autem dico ambas malas, et quae ad illos ducit et quae ad 
theatrum reducit], trans. Chadwick Confessions, p. 148. 
360 Ibid., lib. 8, cap. 10, linea 16, [ideo me cum contendebam et dissipabar a me ipso, et ipsa dissipatio me 
inuito quidem fiebat, nec tamen ostendebat naturam mentis alienae, sed poenam meae. et ideo non iam ego 
operabar illam, sed quod habitabat in me peccatum de supplicio liberioris peccati, quia eram filius adam], 
trans. Chadwick, Confessions, pp. 148-9. 
361 Ibid., lib. 8, cap. 10, linea 16. 
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  These multiple passages from Augustine’s writings illuminate three key aspects 
of his deeply nuanced account of sin. First, for Augustine, sin is not merely inherited 
guilt. Sin is also a punishment for sin that is brought about through habituation in the 
earthly city. Second, the formation in sin that a person willingly takes on in the earthly 
city does not create an alternative competing active will. Rather, sin functions against the 
will to love God as a force of engrained, or acquired, habit. Third, sin, for Augustine, is 
not a second nature competing against the nature that God originally created in human 
beings. Rather, human beings are of one nature, and sin corrupts that nature by literally 
tearing it apart as a person enslaves themselves to the vacuous and hopelessly empty 
pursuit of pleasures in the earthly city. 
 It is worth pointing out here, if only briefly, echoes and differences in the way 
Augustine and Langland describe sin. First, Langland’s depiction of Glotoun and his 
addiction to the community-instilled habits of the tavern deeply resonates with 
Augustine’s view of sin as a flood of human custom. On the other hand, Langland’s 
image of Coueytse, recast through the Brewer, is both similar to and notably different 
from that of Augustine. Couetyse and the Brewer figure an image of social formation in 
sin that is so vicious as to completely transform human nature into something less than 
human, something ‘vnkynde’ and ultimately unforgivable. While Augustine’s account of 
sin is attentive to the vicious capacity of social formation in sin that Couetyse and the 
Brewer represent, the Bishop does not present a human person or community as capable 
of being so twisted by sin as to transform their human nature into something that is less 
than human.  
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Augustine would perhaps have more sympathy for the poem’s later depiction of 
sin’s effects as voiced by the Samaritan, ever conscious of the devastating possibility, but 
always holding out hope that the deepest reality in the human person is grace. That 
Langland departs from Augustine and the Samaritan in his figuration of Couetyse and the 
Brewer by allowing their imaginative possibility to exist does not, however, mean that 
Langland rejects his inherited tradition. Rather it gestures towards the rich abundance of 
Langland’s inherited traditions regarding sin, and demonstrates one way in which the 
poem receives and recasts multiple strands within catholic thought with notable 
creativity. 
 
§ Boethius  
 Augustine is, of course, not the only resource Langland has to draw upon for 
theories related to sin. Geoffrey Chaucer’s translation of Boethius’ The Consolation of 
Philosophy marks another influential voice in medieval discourse. One important way 
that Boethius’s thinking about the vicious effects of sin differs from that of Augustine 
provides a possible resource, or alternate strand, of influence upon Langland’s particular 
depiction of sin through Couetyse and the Brewer. 
   In the context of some warning words about the dangers of wealth, Boethius 
insists that,  
Indeed, the condition of human nature is just this; man towers above the rest of 
creation so long as he recognizes his own nature, and when he forgets it, he sinks 
lower than beasts.362  
                                                
362 Boethius Philosophiae consolatio, ed. L. Bieler Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 94 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1984), liber: 2, prosa: 5, par. 29, linea: 75, [Humanae quippe naturae ista condicio est ut tum 
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Here, Boethius entertains the possibility that the effects of sin are more destructive than 
Augustine displays above. Indeed, for Boethius, sin is capable of so forming a person as 
to make them less than human. Interestingly, just as Langland depicts Coueytse as the 
only one of the seven deadly sins who might be unforgiveable, Boethius’ reflection on 
the potential for a human person to descend ‘lower than the beasts’ immediately proceeds 
his warnings about the negative influence of wealth. Boethius and Langland share a 
mutual anxiety over the corruptive potential of wealth, or covetousness, and the capacity 
of such sin to, in Boethius’ terms, degrade human nature below that of beasts, or in 
Langland’s, to twist human nature until a person becomes ‘vnkynde’, unforgiveable.  
The conceptual framework of Boethius’s particular mode of thinking is worth 
attending to in further detail in order to demonstrate more precisely how he understands 
the potential effects of sin. Such a framework is evident in a lengthy, but apposite, section 
of Book IV, 
A short while ago you learned that all that exists is in a state of unity and that 
goodness itself is unity; from which it follows that we must see everything that exists 
as good. This means that anything which turns away from goodness ceases to exist, 
and thus that the wicked cease to be what they once were. That they used to be human 
is shown by the human appearance of their body which still remains. So it was by 
falling into wickedness that they also lost their human nature. Now, since only 
goodness can raise a man above the level of human kind, it follows that it is proper 
that wickedness thrusts down to a level below mankind those whom it has dethroned 
                                                                                                                                            
tantum ceteris rebus cum se cognoscit excellat, eadem tamen infra bestias redigatur si se nosse desierit; 
nam ceteris animantibus sese ignorare naturae est, hominibus uitio uenit], English translation from Boethius 
The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. Victor Watts (London: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 36. 
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from the condition of being human. The result is that you cannot think of anyone as 
human whom you see transformed by wickedness.363  
For Boethius, humanity’s turning away from goodness or God, an act Augustine 
explicitly calls sin, can actually lead to the loss of human nature.364 Humans transformed 
by wickedness are quite literally ‘dethroned from the condition of being human’ such that 
they remain only human in the ‘appearance of their body.’365 In his figuration of 
Couetyse, Langland cannot help but describe the appearance of one who is human merely 
in bodily appearance, if only just, 
Thenne cam Couetyse ... 
He was bitelbrowed and baburlippid, with two blered eyes, 
And as a letherne pors lollede his chekes, 
Wel syddore then his chyn, ycheueled for elde, 
                                                
363 Ibid., liber: 4, prosa: 3, par.: 14, linea: 38, [Hoc igitur modo quicquid a bono deficit esse desistit. Quo fit 
ut mali desinant esse quod fuerant. Sed fuisse homines adhuc ipsa humani corporis reliqua species ostentat; 
quare uersi in malitiam humanam quoque amisere naturam. Sed cum ultra homines quemque prouehere 
sola probitas possit, necesse est ut quos ab humana condicione deiecit infra homines merito detrudat 
improbitas; euenit igitur ut quem transformatum uitiis uideas hominem aestimare non possis], trans.Watts 
Consolation, p. 94. 
364 Ibid., liber: 4, prosa: 2, par.: 33, linea: 89, ‘Quod quidem cuipiam mirum forte uideatur, ut malos, qui 
plures hominum sunt, eosdem non esse dicamus; sed ita sese res habet. Nam qui mali sunt eos malos esse 
non abnuo; sed eosdem esse pure atque simpliciter nego. Nam uti cadauer hominem mortuum dixeris, 
simpliciter uero hominem appellare non possis, ita uitiosos malos quidem esse concesserim, sed esse 
absolute nequeam confiteri. Est enim quod ordinem retinet seruat que naturam; quod uero ab hac deficit 
esse etiam, quod in sua natura situm est, derelinquit. [‘Some may perhaps think it strange that we say that 
wicked men, who form the majority of men, do not exist; but that is how it is. I am not trying to deny the 
wickedness of the wicked; what I do deny is that their existence is absolute and complete existence.  Just as 
you might call a corpse a dead man, but couldn’t simply call it a man, so I would agree that the wicked are 
wicked, but could not agree that they have unqualified existence. A thing exists when it keeps its proper 
place and preserves its own nature.  Anything which departs from this ceases to exist, because its existence 
depends on the preservation of its nature.’], trans. Watts Consolation, p. 91. This view, that human beings 
can be so degraded by sin, is evident pictorially in many medieval mappa mundi’s. See for example, the 
Hereford map (which still hangs in Hereford Cathedral not far from the Malvern Hills where Piers 
Plowman begins) which depicts part-human part-beast figures wandering about in regions perceived 
barbaric by the map’s makers. 
365 See also Rik Van Nieuwenhove An Introduction to Medieval Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), p. 31. 
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And as a bondemannes bacoun his berd was yshaue...366 
This horrific possibility of sin’s effects is not only evident in Boethius, but is also evident 
in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. A brief excursus will further situate this Boethian 
trajectory of Langland’s imagination.  
While on the whole Thomas Aquinas closes down this Boethian potential of sin’s 
effects, at least in one particular moment of his Summa Theologiae Thomas offers a 
rather Boethian account of sin. Thomas asks the question ‘Whether it is lawful to kill 
sinners?’367 Thomas responds ‘yes’, with an affirmation that echoes his position on the 
justification of killing heretics.368  Thomas is quite clear: 
I answer that, As stated above (A.1), it is lawful to kill dumb animals, in so far as they 
are naturally directed to man’s use, as the imperfect is directed to the perfect.  Now 
every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is 
naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the 
whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or 
infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have 
it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part 
to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on 
account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to 
safeguard the common good, since a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump (1 Cor. V. 
6).369 
                                                
366 Langland, Piers Plowman, C-Version VI.196-201, [Then came Covetousness ... / He was beetle-browed 
and blubber-lipped, with two bleary eyes, / And his cheeks hung on his face like a leather purse, / 
Quivering with age well below his chin; / Like a bondsman’s bristly bacon his beard was shaved...]. 
367 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.64.2. 
368 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.11.3-4. 
369 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.64.2.co, [Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, licitum est occidere 
animalia bruta inquantum ordinantur naturaliter ad hominum usum, sicut imperfectum ordinatur ad 
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What is interesting about Thomas’ reflections on this question, ‘Whether it is lawful to 
kill sinners?’, is the particular way he describes the nature of the sinner who must be 
killed.  Indeed, his description leaves open the possibility of the total degradation, or even 
eradication, of the imago dei in a human being similar to Langland’s depiction of 
Couetyse, as well as that of Boethius.  Thomas writes, 
By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from 
the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and 
he falls into the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is 
useful to others. ... Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he 
preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to 
kill a beast.  For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is more harmful, as the 
Philosopher states (Polit. i. 1 and Ethic. vii. 6).370 
Thus Thomas, like Langland and Boethius, seems to leave open the possibility 
that sin can so degrade a human’s dignity as to reduce them not only below the order of 
the human, but below the order of beast, and thereby justify their being put to death. In 
such a thought-world, the putting to death of a sinner would not be murder because that 
                                                                                                                                            
perfectum. Omnis autem pars ordinatur ad totum ut imperfectum ad perfectum. Et ideo omnis pars 
naturaliter est propter totum. Et propter hoc videmus quod si saluti totius corporis humani expediat 
praecisio alicuius membri, puta cum est putridum et corruptivum aliorum, laudabiliter et salubriter 
abscinditur. Quaelibet autem persona singularis comparatur ad totam communitatem sicut pars ad totum. Et 
ideo si aliquis homo sit periculosus communitati et corruptivus ipsius propter aliquod peccatum, 
laudabiliter et salubriter occiditur, ut bonum commune conservetur, modicum enim fermentum totam 
massam corrumpit, ut dicitur I ad Cor. V], trans. by The Fathers of the English Dominican Province in St. 
Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica (Notre Dame, IN: Ave Maria Press, 1948), p. 1461. 
370 Aquinas, ST IIa-IIae q.64.2.ad.3, [‘Ad tertium dicendum quod homo peccando ab ordine rationis recedit, 
et ideo decidit a dignitate humana, prout scilicet homo est naturaliter liber et propter seipsum existens, et 
incidit quodammodo in servitutem bestiarum, ut scilicet de ipso ordinetur secundum quod est utile aliis; 
secundum illud Psalm., homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et 
similis factus est illis; et Prov. XI dicitur, qui stultus est serviet sapienti. Et ideo quamvis hominem in sua 
dignitate manentem occidere sit secundum se malum, tamen hominem peccatorem occidere potest esse 
bonum, sicut occidere bestiam, peior enim est malus homo bestia, et plus nocet, ut philosophus dicit, in I 
Polit. et in VII Ethic]. 
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which is being killed is less that human, indeed, less than beast.  This is a terrifying 
possibility. And one, admittedly, that Thomas closes down in other places in the Summa 
Theologiae, specifically his account of the effects of sin in ST Ia-IIae q.85.1.co and most 
explicitly in ST Ia-IIae q.85.2, ‘Whether the entire good of human nature can be 
destroyed by sin.’ In ST Ia-IIae q.85.1.co the ‘good of human nature’ is presented as 
threefold.  Only humans’ original justice is destroyed by sin, the other two aspects are 
either unaffected or merely diminished.  His explication is further nuanced in the 
following article, ST Ia-IIae q.85.2. That Thomas closes down this possibility is further 
evident in Ia-IIae q.63.1.co, ‘That which is in human beings by nature is common to all 
human beings and not taken away by sin because even in demons the natural goods 
persist (bona naturalia manet).’  Or more explicitly in Ia q.48.4.co ‘The readiness of the 
soul for grace is always diminished [by sins]...yet it is never completely 
removed...because it follows from the soul’s nature.’371 Fergus Kerr captures Thomas’s 
sense of the limitations of sin’s effects well, drawing upon Bernard Quelquejeu, Kerr 
writes,  
Quelquejeu rephrases the axiom, as follows: ‘sin presupposes nature, doesn’t remove 
or destroy it but diminishes its capacity’.  That is to say, sin cannot destroy the 
ontological structure of human nature, or change the created subject’s species-specific 
nature – but it certainly restricts, wounds, and disorders the human creature.372  
This account of sin’s effects makes it difficult to see how Thomas can come to the 
conclusions he does in ST IIa-IIae q.64.2.reply 3. Nonetheless, the door stands open in 
ST IIa-IIae q.64.2.ad.3, as it does for both Langland and Boethius, with haunting 
                                                
371 Aquinas, ST Ia q.48.4.co, [semper magis et magis minitur habilitas animae ad gratiam...neque tamen 
tollitur totaliter ab anima...praedicta habilitas quia consequitur naturam ipsius]. 
372 Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), p. 145. 
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implications. These tensions within the Summa Theologiae gesture to what Henri de 
Lubac refers to as the instability of Thomas’ synthesis.373 
Boethius’s account of the potential effects of sin, a vision also evident in the 
thought of Aquinas, and Boethius’ anxiety over the corruptive power of wealth provide a 
fruitful and resonant potential influence upon Langland’s figure of Couetyse as well as 
the Brewer. Augustine’s nuanced account of the way sin is cultivated through floods of 
human custom stands as another source that resonates deeply with Langland’s depiction, 
not only of the potential effects of sin, but also of the processes through which sin is 
cultivated and developed through fallen human communities and social practices. It is a 
significant achievement that Langland is able to couple both Boethius and Augustine’s 
theories of sin so vividly in the figure of Couetyse and the Brewer, and perhaps not 
surprising that Langland’s imagination includes some of the tensions that Aquinas’ own 
reflections upon sin fail to resolve completely. One further theological resource Langland 
draws upon for his incredibly complex account of sin remains to be considered. 
 
§ Anselm 
 Anselm of Canterbury’s dissemination through the later-middle ages, especially 
through vernacular writers, is far from a fragmentary or piece-meal inheritance.374 This 
section aims to demonstrate the extent to which Langland inherits a particular and 
nuanced strand of Anselm’s understanding of sin and restitution, and in so doing show 
                                                
373 See Henri de Lubac Surnaturel: Etudes historiques (Paris: Aubier, 1946) pp. 435-436. 
374 Margaret Healy-Varley, ‘Ansem’s Afterlife and the Middle English De Custodia Interioris Hominis’ in 
Saint Anselm of Canterbury and His Legacy edited by Giles E. M. Gasper & Ian Logan (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2012) 1-3.  Indeed, Healy-Varley maintains, ‘The pastoral Anselm was no 
less ‘Anselmian’ for having been adapted to lay use or translated into vernacular languages, but rather more 
so.’ 
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that Piers Plowman stands as one among many examples of the range and pervasiveness 
of Anselm’s influence upon late-medieval theological discourse. As will become more 
evident through the following analysis, Langland’s vision of the church bears a 
significant debt to Anslem’s theology of the atonement. 
 Jaroslav Pelikan helpfully situates Anselm’s theory of sin and salvation in the 
context of Anselm’s rejection of the popular medieval theory pertaining to the rights of 
the devil.375 This intellectual history is of critical importance when approaching the 
Archbishop’s account of sin. Piers Plowman participates in Anselm’s rejection of the 
rights of the devil theory, but my concern in this section is to explore the particular way 
in which Langland receives and develops not only Anselm’s account of sin, but also the 
specific role that Anselm ascribes to restitution.376 I will argue that Piers Plowman 
receives and develops Anselm’s understanding of sin and restitution by taking it beyond 
the scope of the relationship between God and humanity in order to conceive of the 
practice of restitution as one between both God and humans, and also between humans 
and humans, as, for Langland at least, a necessary means of entering into the salvation 
offered by Christ. 
Anselm’s preferred image for thinking about sin is inflected slightly differently 
than that of Augustine or Boethius. In his influential work Cur deus homo, Anselm 
locates the problem of sin in the disruption of the beautiful order that God intends for 
                                                
375 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: a History of the Development of Doctrine vol. 3, The Growth 
of Medieval Theology (600-1300) (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1978), pp. 135-57. This is, of 
course, evident in Anselm himself, see Cur Deus homo, ed. F. S. Schmitt, Opera omnia, 6 vols (Edinburgh: 
Nelson, 1946-61), vol. 2, Book I, Chapter 7: ‘Quod nullam diabolus habebat iustitiam adversus hominem; 
et quare videatur habuisse cur deus hoc modo hominem liberaret’ [‘That the devil had no jurisdiction over 
man.  Why he might seem to have it, causing God, as a result, to set us free in his way’]. See also Giles E. 
M. Gasper, Anselm of Canterbury and his Theological Inheritance (Aldershot: Ashgate 2004), pp. 164-73.    
376 See especially the discourse between Christ and hell’s minion in Langland, Piers Plowman, Passus 
XX.269-469. 
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creation. Creation, for Anselm, has a divinely ordained purpose, ‘the rational creation 
was created righteous, and was so created for the purpose of being happy in the fact of 
God’s delighted approval.’377 Human beings participate in this purpose, for Anselm, in 
the following way, 
When such a being [creature] desires what is right, he is honoring God, not because he 
is bestowing anything upon God, but because he is voluntarily subordinating himself 
to his will and governance, maintaining his own proper station in life within the 
natural universe, and, to the best of his ability, maintaining the beauty of the universe 
itself.378 
God’s beautiful and well-ordered creation is disrupted ‘when a rational being does not 
wish for what is right.’ Indeed, Anselm explains, such a misguided wishing ‘dishonours 
God, with regard to himself [the creature], since he [the creature] is not willingly 
subordinating himself to God’s governance, and is disturbing, as far as he is able, the 
order and beauty of the universe.’379 This disordering that comes from not rendering to 
God what is due to him (redde quod debes) is precisely how Anselm defines sin, 
                                                
377 Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus homo, ed. Schmitt Vol. 2, lib. 1, cap. 9, linea, 29, [Rationalem 
creaturam iustam factam esse et ad hoc, ut deo fruendo beata esset, non negas], English translation from 
Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works ed. Brian Davies and G.R. Evans (Oxford University Press, 
1998), p. 277. 
378 Ibid., lib. 1, cap. 15, linea 3, [Quae cum vult quod debet, deum honorat; non quia illi aliquid confert, sed 
quia sponte se eius voluntati et dispositioni subdit, et in rerum universitate ordinem suum et eiusdem 
universitatis pulchritudinem, quantum in ipsa est, servat], Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, p. 288. 
379 Ibid., lib. 1, cap. 15, linea 6, [Cum vero non vult quod debet, deum, quantum ad illam pertinet, 
inhonorat, quoniam non se sponte subdit illius dispositioni, et universitatis ordinem et pulchritudinem, 
quantum in se est, perturbat], Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, p. 288. 
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Someone who does not render to God this honour due to him (redde quod debes) [that 
is, the act of the creature subjecting its will to God] is taking away from God what is 
his, and dishonouring God, and this is what it is to sin.380  
Importantly, Anselm qualifies this by maintaining that the disruption of the created order 
by the creature ‘does not harm or besmirch the honour of God in the slightest extent.’381  
Rather,  
As long as [the creature who has sinned] does not repay what he has taken away [that 
is, not taken away from God, but rather the disruption of God’s beautiful and well-
ordered creation by the creature], [then the creature] remains in a state of guilt. And it 
is not sufficient merely to repay what has been taken away; rather, [the creature] ought 
to pay back more than he took, in proportion to the insult which he has inflicted... 
restitution.382 
Sin, for Anselm, is described as the creature’s disruption of the divine ordering of 
creation. This disruption does not harm or besmirch the honor of God, but rather renders 
the creature guilty for disrupting God’s good creation. 
                                                
380 Ibid., lib. 1, cap. 11, linea 19, [Hunc honorem debitum qui deo non reddit, aufert deo quod suum est, et 
deum exhonorat; et hoc est peccare. Quamdiu autem non solvit quod rapuit, manet in culpa. Hunc honorem 
debitum qui deo non reddit, aufert deo quod suum est, et deum exhonorat; et hoc est peccare. Quamdiu 
autem non solvit quod rapuit, manet in culpa], Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, p. 283. Anselm 
provides another, overlapping, image of sin that gestures towards his inheritance of a particularly 
Augustinian strand discussed above, describing sin as punishment for sin. This is evident in Anselm’s use 
of the image of the pit. See Cur Deus homo, lib. 1, cap. 24. An image that differs drastically from the pit 
imagery that Julian of Norwich uses to describe humanity’s fallen condition of sin in her Showings, pp. 51-
4.   
381 Ibid., lib. 1, cap. 15, linea 6,  [licet potestatem aut dignitatem dei nullatenus laedat aut decoloret], 
Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, p. 288. 
382 Ibid., lib. 1, cap. 11, linea 21, [Nec sufficit solummodo reddere quod ablatum est, sed pro contumelia 
illata plus debet reddere quam abstulit. Sicut enim qui laedit salutem alterius, non sufficit si salutem 
restituit, nisi pro illata doloris iniuria recompenset aliquid: ita qui honorem alicuius violat non sufficit 
honorem reddere, si non secundum exhonorationis factam molestiam aliquid, quod placeat illi quem 
exhonoravit, restituit], Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, p. 283. 
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 The specific character of this guilt, needs to be further explicated. For Anselm, 
this guilt can be resolved in one of two ways. Sin must either be paid for through the 
satisfaction of restitution or through punishment.383 These two possibilities are direct 
correlates of Anselm’s position that human sin cannot harm or besmirch God’s honour, 
It is impossible for God to lose his honour. For either a sinner of his own accord 
repays what he owes or God takes it from him against his – the sinner’s – will. This is 
because either a man of his own free will demonstrates the submission which he owes 
to God by not sinning, or alternatively by paying recompense for his sin, or else God 
brings him into submission to himself against his will, by subjecting him to torment, 
and in this way he shows that he is Lord, something which the man himself refuses to 
admit voluntarily.384   
Satisfaction of restitution and punishment are the only two possibly ways in which God 
deals with sin, and this is, again, because of the particular way Anselm perceives of 
order. The creature owes to God the submission of its will, and this can only be restored 
by satisfying restitution, a repayment above and beyond what was not rightly rendered, or 
else submission will be imposed upon the creature by God through punishment. That 
these are the only two options is because, for Anselm, God’s mercy cannot be self-
contradictory.385   
                                                
383 Ibid., lib. 1, cap. 12, linea 11, Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, p. 284. 
384 Ibid., lib. 1, cap. 14, linea 8, [Deum impossibile est honorem suum perdere. Aut enim peccator sponte 
solvit quod debet, aut deus ab invito accipit. Nam aut homo debitam subiectionem deo sive non peccando 
sive quod peccat solvendo, voluntate spontanea exhibet, aut deus eum invitum sibi torquendo subicit et sic 
se dominum eius esse ostendit, quod ipse homo voluntate fateri recusat], Anselm of Canterbury: The Major 
Works, p. 287. 
385 Ibid., lib. 1, cap. 24, linea 13, ‘At si dimittit quod invito erat ablaturus, propter impotentiam reddendi 
quod sponte reddere debet: relaxat deus poenam et facit beatum hominem propter peccatum, quia habet 
quod debet non habere. Nam ipsam impotentiam debet non habere, et idcirco, quamdiu illam habet sine 
satisfactione, peccatum est illi. Verum huiusmodi misericordia dei nimis est contraria iustitiae illius, quae 
 178 
 The problem, for Anselm, is that ‘no one can pay except God, and no one ought to 
pay except man’.386 This situation provides Anselm with the logical ground upon which 
he articulates the necessity of the Incarnation, ‘it is necessary that a God-Man should pay 
[the debt owed to God] for human sin.’387 Anselm’s logic is neither intended to force 
God’s action by a necessity outside God’s-self, nor is it intended to provide the ground 
for later developments such as substitutionary atonement. In fact, Anselm explicitly 
closes this latter door off, ‘God the Father did not treat that man [Christ] as you 
apparently understand him to have done; nor did he hand over an innocent man to be 
killed in place of the guilty party.’388 Rather, the force driving Anselm’s logic is, again, 
that of God’s beautiful created order, and this gestures to the former. Anselm does not 
suggest that the Incarnation is a necessity external to God’s-self. Instead, Anselm 
understands God in such a way that God will not allow the beauty of his well-ordered 
creation to be disrupted by sinful humanity. Through the Incarnation, God does not 
merely restore the original order and beauty of creation, but rather the Incarnation makes 
a sort aesthetic restitution. That is, the Incarnation restores and adds more beauty to 
God’s well-ordered creation. As such, the Incarnation is necessary only insofar as it is 
consistent with the outpouring and manifestation of God’s goodness.  
 To return to Langland, we may now see how the exchange between the people, 
the Brewer and Conscience that occurs during Conscience’s offer of the Eucharist in 
                                                                                                                                            
non nisi poenam permittit reddi propter peccatum. Quapropter quemadmodum deum sibi esse contrarium, 
ita hoc modo illum esse misericordem impossibile est.’ 
386 Ibid., lib. 2, cap. 6, linea 16, [nec hoc esse valet, nisi fiat praedicta satisfactio, quam nec potest facere 
nisi deus nec debet nisi homo: necesse est ut eam faciat deus-homo], Anselm of Canterbury: The Major 
Works, p. 320. 
387 Ibid., lib. 2, cap. 7, linea 14, [Ut ergo hoc faciat deus-homo, necesse est eundem ipsum esse perfectum 
deum et perfectum hominem, qui hanc satisfactionem facturus est; quoniam eam facere nec potest nisi 
verus deus, nec debet nisi verus homo ‘], Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, p. 320. 
388 Ibid., lib. 1, cap. 8, linea 11, [Deus pater non, quemadmodum videris intelligere, hominem illum 
tractavit aut innocentem pro nocente morti tradidit], Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, p. 275. 
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Passus XXI shows Langland’s participation in the Anselmian theme of restitution, redde 
quod debes, or rendering what is due. That is to say, Piers Plowman participates in the 
idea that restitution is necessary to restore the disruption of God’s beautiful creation that 
comes about through human sin. However, where Anselm stops short of certain ecclesial 
or practical implications, Langland refuses to imagine the theme of redde quod debes 
without them.389 For Langland, rendering what is due is not an activity that occurs simply 
through the mystery of the Incarnation. Rather, rendering what is due is an ongoing 
practice that the church is ordered to embody and witness. The church, for Langland, 
because of its mystical identity as the body of Christ, is wrapped up in the processes not 
only of offering what is due to God through worship, but also of forming a community 
that offers back to itself and the world the love and honour appropriately due to fellow 
human beings. As such, it is not only the Incarnation that offers a sort of aesthetic 
restitution, but also the ongoing witness of the self-giving church. Langland’s vision here 
stresses the reality of sin while simultaneously imagining the possibilities created by the 
mystery of Christ’s body the church in a fallen world. Put another way, for Langland, 
God’s grace is mediated through the church; rather than kynde as mediated through 
nature, a la Davis. Here, for Langland, it is God’s grace manifest through the mystical 
union of Christ’s body the church and its praxis of receiving, sharing in and being 
transformed into Christ’s body through the Eucharist that Langland’s Christological 
vision of the church becomes the bearer and mediator sweeping creation up into the 
divine. As will become more explicit in chapter three, language, poetry and specifically 
Langland’s form of poetry are vital for the representation of this mystery. 
 
                                                
389 Gasper, Anselm of Canterbury, p. 149. See also chapters four and six. 
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§ Will’s turnings 
 Before exploring the poem’s representation of sin’s cure, it is important first to 
briefly consider two additional instances in which a figure’s identity is completely 
‘turned’, subsumed by a rival identity, because both moments work to prepare the poem’s 
audience to imagine not only sin but also its cure as thoroughly social, ecclesial, 
Christocentric and sacramental. Couetyse and the Brewer are not the only two figures 
whose turning Langland depicts. Will, the dreamer, who is both a figuration of the poet 
and also a personification of the willing faculty is turned no less than twice in the poem. 
This next section recalls these two moments of turning and considers both their causes 
and effects. These instances of turning not only offer further depth into the poem’s 
complex and layered representation of sin, but also provides hints, by way of the diverse 
modes through which the poem represents the dreamer’s being restored from his turning, 
into the way the poem aims to train its audience to think through the communities, 
practices and habits of mind necessary for a person to be reformed after being turned 
through sin.  
The first instance of Will’s turning occurs between Passus XI and XII through his 
encounter with Rechelesnesse. This scene demonstrates the way the dreamer’s turning is 
the specific result of Will’s seduction into a mode of thought that rejects clergie and then 
confuses a theological concept of destiny with an arbitrary notion of fate. Up until this 
point in poem, Will has wandered his way into the company of Wit, Dame Study, 
Scripture and finally Clergie and received a range of teaching concerning the meaning of 
dowell.390 His instruction stops short when he is scolded by Scripture, falls into a dream 
                                                
390 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.1-159. 
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within a dream, is ‘rauysched’ and fetched by Fortune ‘into the lond of longyng.’391 
Fortune and his two attendants Concupiscencia carnis and Coueytise-of-yes collude to 
lead Will into a lifetime of pleasure, with the promise that ‘The man that [Fortune] liketh 
to helpe myhte nat myshappe.’392 Such a promise, of course, rings both false and ironic to 
readers familiar with Book II of Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy and the pervasive 
medieval image of Lady Fortune and her wheel. To remind Will of this, Elde appears 
foreshadowing the poem’s conclusion to warn him that in the end, Fortune will forsake 
the pilgrim and ‘to moche perel the brynge.’393  
It is in this moment that Will meets the figure of Rechelesnesse. Rechelesnesse 
tells young Will not to worry about a far off Elde, but more substantively, Rechelesnesse 
argues, 
Were hit al soth that ye seyn, thow Scripture and thow Clergie, 
Y leue neuere that lord ne lady that lyueth her on erthe 
Sholde sitte in goddis sihte ne se god in his blisse.394 
Rechelesnesse’s argument is grounded on a particular understanding of predestination 
derived from certain unnamed preachers,  
Predestinaet thei prechen, prechours that this sheweth, 
Or prescit inparfit, pult out of grace, 
Vnwriten for som wikkednesse, as holy writ sheweth.395 
                                                
391 The term ‘rauysched’ is the same term Will uses to refer to his first sight of Holy Church, but also Lady 
Mede. It is a word often used in vernacular mystical texts, particularly Richard Rolle, to refer to the way 
the spiritual journey toward God involves the soul being ‘rauysched’ by increasing degree though its 
beholding of God, see Nicholas Watson Richard Rolle and the Invention of Authority (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). Will is fetched by fortune in at XI.160-70. 
392 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.180-5, [‘The man whom I like will never suffer mishaps’]. 
393 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.192, [‘…put you in great danger.’]. 
394 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.199-201, [‘Were everything you say true, you Scripture and you Clergy, / 
I believe that never lord or lady that lives here on earth / Will sit in God’s sight or see God in bliss’]. 
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On this account, human beings are quite literally predetermined towards heavenly bliss or 
hell regardless of their virtue or wickedness in life. Rechelesnesse confirms this by 
pointing out that Solomon and Aristotle were both committed to lives of virtue, and yet 
‘holi churche, as Y here, haldeth bothe in helle!’396 Rechelesnesse provides further 
examples of Mary, David and Paul whose lechery, adultery and murder did not prevent 
them from becoming saints.397 On the authority of these witnesses, Rechelesnesse 
determines that ‘the gifte of god which is grace of fortune’ and thereby ‘Ac me were 
leuere, by oure lord, a lyppe of goddes grace / Thenne al the kynde wyt that ye can bothe 
and kunnyng of youre bokes.’398 Grace is a free, but also arbitrary, gift of God given to 
some and yet not others. Clergie itself is, on this account, incapable of equipping human 
beings in the way Ymaginatif and the Samaritan will later describe. And Rechelesnesse, 
again, cites Scriptural witness for his position. He recalls and paraphrases the words of 
Christ, 
‘Thogh ye come bifore kynges and clerkes of the lawe 
Beth nat aferd of that folk for Y shal yeue yow tonge 
And connyng and clergie to conclude he alle.’399 
In a mode that completely contradicts the teaching of Ymagintif and the Samaritan as 
outlined in chapter 2.1, Rechlessness maintains that clergie is a gift of God given directly, 
as a wholly unmediated deposit, requiring no agency, training or formation on the part of 
the recipient. This particular mode of clergie’s transference is further witnessed, so 
                                                                                                                                            
395 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.205-7, [‘They preach men are predestinate, preachers who declare this, / 
Or beforehand known to be imperfect, thrust out of grace, / Not written down because of some wickedness, 
as holy writ shows.’]. 
396 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.218. 
397 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.261-9. 
398 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.224-5. 
399 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.276-8, [‘Though you come before kings and clerks of the law / Do not be 
afraid of these people for I shall give you tongue / And cunning and learning to refute all such.’]. 
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Rechelesnesse argues, by the fate of the many workers who helped build Noah’s ark and 
yet were destroyed by the flood.400 Such workers relate allegorically to those workers 
who now build up the ark of the church, and yet will not themselves be saved. Thus, 
Rechelesnesse presents Will with a particular reading of Scripture that makes God’s 
grace indistinguishable from an arbitrary gift of fate. 
 Will is swept away by this teaching, ‘Of Dowel ne of Dobet no deynte me ne 
thouhte, / Ne Clergie ne his conseile – Y counted hit ful litel!’401 Will is not only 
persuaded by Rechelesnesse, but transformed. Indeed, his identity becomes wholly 
subsumed by and indistinguishable from this figure. His transformation is described by 
Elde and Holynesse who use the particular language of turning, ‘Allas, eye!’ quod Elde 
and Holynesse bothe, / ‘That wit shal turne to wrechednesse for Wil hath al his wille!’402 
So Will’s very capacity to think has been turned, inverted, not unlike Conscience’s 
turning which results from his dismissal of Clergie, and this has disturbing consequences 
for Will, 
Couetyse-of-yes conforted me aftur and saide,  
‘Rechelesnesse, reche the neuere; by so thow riche were, 
Haue no consience how thou come to good – confesse the to som frere; 
He shal asoile the thus sone how so euere thow wynne hit. 
For while Fortune is thy frende freres wol the louye 
And frestene the in ther fraternite and for the byseche 
To here priour prouincial his pardoun to haue 
                                                
400 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.236-251. 
401 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.311-2, [‘Do-well and Do-better seemed to me worthless, / And to Clergy 
and his counsel – I gave next to no credit!’]. 
402 Langland, Piers Plowman, XII.1-2 [‘Aw, too bad!’ said Old Age and Holiness together, / ‘That wit will 
turn to wretchedness because Will has it all his way!’]. 
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And preye for the pol by pol yf thow be peccuniosus.’403 
As evident from the grammar of the poetry, Will has now become the figure of 
Rechelesnesse. Furthermore, this figure whose wit is turned to wretchedness is further 
instructed to ‘Haue no consience.’ All his cognitive faculties, both of intellect and that 
middle term conscience, have been overcome, and Will/Rechelesnesse is encouraged to 
submit his eternal fate to friars who will pardon him in exchange for payment.  
 This scene thus provides a detailed account of a particular hermeneutic capable of 
constructing a theology of predestination necessary to underpin the transactional 
economy of salvation depicted by Chaucer’s Pardoner, a process that establishes and 
leads to the dissolution of Vnity at the end of Piers Plowman. In point of fact, the 
particular theology Rechelesnesse constructs cannot even offer justification for 
participation in the friars’ economy of pardon and exchange. If grace is equivalent to fate, 
then payment in this life can surely not effect salvation. However, Rechelesnesse’s effect 
on Will/Rechelesness has co-opted his intellectual faculties of both wit and conscience 
leaving him utterly incapable of resisting the manipulations and contradictions of this 
theology of sin and salvation. Will/Rechelesnesse attempts to comfort himself with 
Rechelesnesse’s promise,  
‘Aren noen rather yraueschid fro the rihte bileue 
Comuneliche then clerkes most knowyng in konnyg 
Ne none sanere ysaued ne none saddere in bileue 
                                                
403 Langland, Piers Plowman, XII.3-9, [‘Covetousness-of-eyes then comforted me, / And said, 
‘Recklessness, never you mind as long as you’re rich, / Have no conscience about how you came into 
wealth – confess yourself to some friar; / He will absolve you as soon no matter how you won it. / For as 
long as Fortune’s your friend friars will love you / And join you to their fraternity and intercede in your 
behalf / To their prior provincial for his pardon for you / And pray for you, by the head, if you’re 
peccuniosus’]. 
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Then ploughmen and pastours and pore comune peple.’404 
However, as the witness of Vnity, Ymagenatyf and the Samaritan argue, such a promise 
is not as sure as Rechelesnesse perceives. 
The forces of Fortune and the debate with Elde return again in the poem’s closing 
passus with familiar effects upon the dreamer in a second scene depicting another turning 
in Will’s journey. Will, having met Nede, falls into another dream. A dream in which 
anti-christ and Pride wage war on Conscience, who has in turn called the commons into 
Vnity to make their stand. Kynde rains a range of natural disasters upon the people, until 
Conscience begs for respite. And it is at this point that the figure of Fortune returns to 
join the company of forces attacking a reeling and ailing community behind the walls of 
fortress church, Vnity. Fortune quickly pairs up with Lyf, as a mistress, making the 
dreamer the familiar promise of ‘long lyf.’405 Fortune and Lyf do not merely aim to 
distract Will from the fear of death and Elde, but tempt him ‘so foryete sorwe and yeue 
nat of synne.’406 That is to say, Fortune and Lyf tempt Will to forget and ignore sin 
through the promise of a long and healthy life secure from the whims and contingencies 
of creaturely existence. At this, Conscience calls upon Elde who fights off Wanhope, the 
wife of Fortune and Lyf’s bastard son Sleuthe. Elde pursues Lyf, who retreats to Fisyk, 
killing him and thereby reminding the audience, in a way that is as true in the twenty-first 
century as it is in the fourteenth, that advances of modern medicine can never get a 
person out of life alive.407 Fleeing from Fisyk, Lyf carries on to Reuel to forstall anxiety 
                                                
404 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.289-92, [‘None are more readily ravished from the right belief / Generally 
than clerks most steeped in knowledge, / Nor any sooner saved or more steadfast in belief / Than plowmen 
and pastors and poor common people’]. 
405 Compare XXII.111 and XI.177-8. 
406 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXII.154-5. 
407 Langland punctuates this irony and false promise with a brilliant image in the B-version, wherein Fisyk 
gives Will a glass helmet for protection. 
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over Elde with worldly pleasure. Will’s catechesis at the hands of Rechelesnesse has 
lingering effects in the thought processes of the dreamer, because as the following lines 
demonstrate, the reunion with Fortune, despite Fortune’s apparent series of failures, 
succeeds in distracting the dreamer from Elde long enough to again subsume his identity, 
this time into the figure of Lyf, 
And in hope of [Lyf’s] hele goed herte he hente 
And roed so to Reuel, a ryche place and a murye –  
The compeny of Comfort men clepede hit som tyme – 
And Elde aftur hym, and ouer myn heuede yede 
And made me balled bifore and baer on the crowne 
So harde he yede ouer myn heued hit wol be sene euere!408 
Elde attacks the dreamer/Lyf knocking out his teeth, his hearing, his virility and infecting 
him with gout. It is this beaten down figure to whom Deth draws near. And in this state, 
the dreamer/Lyf, now in a condition as dire as that of Semyiuef three passus earlier, cries 
out to Kynde.  
 
§ 
 Complex visions of sin and its processes emerge through Piers Plowman and the 
poem engages distinctively with a range of theories of sin developed in medieval 
discourse in important, and currently underappreciated, ways.409 Langland’s poetry, and 
                                                
408 Langland, Piers Plowman XXII.180-5, [‘And in hope of his health he took good heart / And rode off to 
Revel, a rich, fun place, / (The Good Times Company, men once called it), / And Old Age was right behind 
him, and ran over my head / And erased my hair line and put a shine on my crown; / So roughly he rode 
over my head it will always show.’]. 
409 Nicolette Zeeman, Medieval Discourse of Desire, considers the representation of sin and the Fall in 
Piers Plowman through the Tree of Charity sequence (Passus XVI B version). She argues that a ‘governing 
proposition of Piers Plowman’ is that ‘sin brings its own rewards’ (1). Ibid., pp. 6-7 sums up Langland’s 
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the particular way in which he uses personification, allows him to depict sin not as a 
monolithic vice, but rather through a series of overlapping figures. This habit of 
employing overlapping images to depict the complexity of sin is a technique I showed 
both Augustine and Anselm to employ. While Augustine and Anselm make good use of 
this practice, Langland’s poetry allows him to do so in a unique way. Specifically, 
Langland’s poetic mode allows for a casting of sin in a range of ways that can drastically 
differ, and possibly even lead to contradiction, without inviting judgments upon the 
discourse as either contradictory or incoherent.  
 The figures of Glotoun and Couetyse collude to present sin as a series of 
community forming, and community perpetuating, practices. Glotoun is seduced not 
merely by Betty’s invitation, but by his addiction to the community of the tavern: its 
games, its drink and its fellowship. Couetyse, on the other hand, demonstrates the 
particular way in which sin is learned, or acquired, by means of apprenticeship. Couetyse 
represents sin as an acquired craft that develops and adapts as it is introduced to new 
communities. Such adaptation in turn allows sin to reproduce itself in new and more 
vicious ways. While the paired figurations of sin through Glotoun and Semyuief as well 
                                                                                                                                            
figuration of sin and the Fall as represented in the Tree of Charity sequence as follows: ‘In this episode 
Langland regards the Fall from a number of angels, each of which is written into the structure of the 
narrative itself. First, he sees this sin as somehow inevitable, determined by a force other than human 
intentionality; second, the broad tendency of Langland’s perspective remains highly psychological; third, 
he sees sin and its consequences in terms of multiple forms of loss and suffering; fourth, he suggests that 
this loss and its suffering engender desire – not just as they elicit the renewing gifts of redemption and 
grace, but also as they effect psychological renewals of desire in the soul itself...  The Fall enabled human 
beings to knowe and to feele the condition of human beings within the world, and, by doing so, to knowe, 
feele and desire the wele that God offers’. While Zeeman’s thesis is both intriguing and suggestive, her 
emphasis on the psychological runs the risk of ignoring the political implications of sin, and thereby 
threatens to sideline the Christological and ecclesial nature of grace which are constitutive of Langland’s 
hope in the salvation of humanity from the effects of sin and the Fall. Zeeman, of course, is interested in the 
fascinating thesis that Langland, thinking within the tradition associated with felix culpa, is open to sin 
itself being a sort of remedy for sin; that loss, failure and rebuke can renew, create and inspire new forms of 
desire (Ibid., pp. 18-9, 21, 43-5, 47, 51). For a similar assessment of Zeeman’s account of sin in the Piers 
Plowman see Kate Crassons The Claims of Poverty: Literature, Culture, and Ideology in Late Medieval 
England (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), p. 305 n. 16. 
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as Couetyse and the Brewer suggest distinct possibilities and limits for sin’s effects, both 
pairs depict sin as devastating the spiritual economy of humanity through the very 
material economies of tavern, guild and monetary exchange. That is to say, Piers 
Plowman’s figurations of sin present sin in a way that is ever mindful of the material and 
communal practices through which sin not only manifests itself, but also grows, 
transforms and weaves itself into the fabric of particular societies. My own interpretation 
of Langland’s depiction of sin emphasizes Rebecca Davis’ keen observation that 
Langland’s poetics ‘revalues the terrestrial and the contingent, not by demarcating the 
observable world from the unknowable transcendant, but by bringing God himself [and I 
would add, sin] to earth.’ I have argued that it is paradoxically both sin and the grace 
manifest through the church – rather than kynde – that make the mundane matter by 
revealing the void between Creator and creature while simultaneously anticipating the 
closing of that void through the mystery of the church, the Eucharist and the body of 
Christ. The present thesis interprets Langland’s poetic attention to be speaking not only to 
the way in which his ‘makings’, his poetry, are a moral act, but emphasizes the way his 
poetry, his ‘making’, is designed to teach its audience that ecclesiology and participation 
in the mystery and fullness of the sacrament – that is participating in forms of life ordered 
by and through the community that receives, shares and becomes Christ’s body through 
the Eucharist – is vital for human beings to be swept up into the mystery of God’s healing 
and the restoration of God’s beloved creation. This is precesiley the argument that will be 
unpacked further in chapter three. 
Langland’s particular mode of representation is able to do a number of things. 
First, through Couetyse and the Brewer, the poetry is able to hold open the imaginative 
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possibility not only of a person, but also of a whole community, that becomes so formed 
by sin as to reject God and become incapable of contrition: the gift of the Holy Spirit that 
is necessary for forgiveness.410 This mode of representation inherits the Augustinian 
notion of sin as a flood of human custom that in turn cultivates a chain of habit that 
becomes itself a necessity, and takes this Augustinian account to a frightening Boethian 
conclusion. Through the sin of Couetyse, the figure of the Brewer and those who mimic 
the Brewer, Langland imagines sin as capable of eradicating the imago dei in a human 
person and even a society. This raises a question Langland asks of both contemporary 
England and its church.  Is society so deformed and habituated by an engrained flood of 
human custom that it has become irredeemable? That is to say, is there no longer a way 
out of this flood of human custom except for a rather Noah-like flood of eradication? 
How apocalyptic is Langland’s imagination? 
Another key aspect of Langland’s account of sin presents itself as a different sort 
question. By figuring sin as bound up in social practices and habit formation, and by 
doing so in such close relation to the material economies that manifest and cultivate sin, 
Piers Plowman is able to keep the imaginative possibility open that if this ‘field of folk’ 
are to be saved, then their salvation will include their reformation in a way that involves 
material practices and habits that relate directly to material economies. Here, Langland is 
receiving an Anselmian tradition of restitution, and developing it in a way that imagines 
restitution not only as logically requiring the God-man, but also sees the church as 
mystically and materially swept up into the processes of restitution. On this, a distinctive 
view of Piers Plowman, Christ makes restitution for human sin, and insofar as the church 
is mystically Christ’s body, the church recalls and enacts this once and for all act of 
                                                
410 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXII.368-73. 
 190 
restitution as it participates in forms of corporate Eucharistic life. The Eucharist is also 
the church’s ongoing embodiment, or witness, of Christ’s restitution for human sin. That 
is to say, the church does not merely recall, or remember, the restitution achieved through 
Christ, but also participates in figuring that restitution to the world as the manifestation of 
the body of Christ in the world. This heightens the significance of the moment when the 
turned dreamer/Lyf of passus XXI cries out to Kynde and receives instruction to remain 
in the church in order to learn how to love. The church renders what is due not only to 
God through its worship, but renders what is due to God through its material acts of 
reconciling and making restitution with human others, a distinctively Eucharistic activity 
which Conscience invites the folk to, but which the people reject in the penultimate 
passus. The extraordinary theological and social capacity of this image of Eucharistic 
practice is one of the most significant gifts of Langland’s art, and this image is the focus 
of the next chapter. 
Piers Plowman represents sin as a disordered desire for more that is cultivated 
and reproduced through material processes that manifest themselves in ways that stretch 
beyond the human imagination’s capacity for description. This inverted-transcendent 
quality of sin, its existence only as non-existence, is precisely the reason that Langland’s 
open, imaginative and agile poetic mode is a most adept form of discourse for theological 
investigations into sin. That being said, the processes of sin in Piers Plowman are not 
beyond human intelligibility. Rather they are always grounded in material economies. Sin 
is not merely a moral but also a social issue through and through. Thus, the healing from 
sin will only come about through corporate participation in practices of restitution that 
are as divine as they are social, as material as they are spiritual. Langland’s unique ability 
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to resource his inherited traditions through a poetic investigation of sin demonstrates one 















































‘Brethrene of o bloed’: Christ and the corpus mysticum in Piers Plowman 
 
 
 The preceding chapters have demonstrated how Langland’s distinctive form of 
poetry is particularly capable not only of dazzling theological arguments, but more 
specifically that Langland’s art offers an invaluable and too often overlooked 
contribution to ways in which the church might discern the development of doctrine. This 
chapter turns explicitly to demonstrate how Langland’s poetry offers a significant 
contribution to the church’s practice discerning the development of doctrine, namely the 
doctrine of the church. The argument of this chapter rests on two general premises which 
have been implicitly demonstrated through the preceding analysis. The first is that 
Langland’s poetry makes judgments. Sometimes those judgments are subtle, as in the 
myriad distinctions Langland draws in his nuanced depiction of sin. Sometimes the 
judgments are scathing, as in the poet’s visceral lament of Covetousness and the figure’s 
capacity to deform not only an individual, but indeed a whole society. Whether subtle or 
direct, Langland’s poetry is not merely abstract. Piers Plowman makes clear judgments 
as it unfolds.411 The second premise is that Langland’s poetry employs the elasticity of 
                                                
411 Theologians as far back as Irenaeus warned against those who invented heresies by piling one ambiguity 
upon another and claiming the resulting confusion as the truth veiled in mystery. Irenée de Lyon: Contre 
les heresies [Adversus haereses], Livre 2, Source chrétiennes 293, 294 (Paris: Cerf, 1982); lib. 2, cap. 10, 
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‘an open line.’ Specifically, Langland’s lines often invite the audience in multiple 
directions at the same time. While the poetry does in many cases guide the audience in 
one direction or another, the openness, the multiplicity of possible directions, Langland 
opens by way of his form of poetry creates space for multiple possibilities to linger. Thus, 
even when Langland’s poetry makes a judgment, even when it takes the audience in a 
specific direction, it carries other (abandoned? unexplored? dangerous?) possibilities 
along. This openness of Langland’s lines discourage the audience from forgetting wrong 
paths, errant teachers, and unrealized hopes. That Langland’s poetry offers a contribution 
to the church’s practice of discerning the development of doctrine is grounded in his art’s 
capacity to make judgments while also guiding his audience with an open line that 
cultivates the virtue of a long full memory. 
 These paired aspects of Langland’s art, a capacity for judgments and openness, 
are uniquely fitting for examining the church and the praxis the church employs to 
discern the development of doctrine concerning the church itself. As such, it is necessary 
to return again to Langland’s depiction of the church in order to better appreciate the 
significance of his poetry as a contribution to the church’s capacity to discern its own 
development. This is because the church’s identity is itself not only subtle and complex, 
                                                                                                                                            
par. 1, linea 15, ‘Omnis autem quaestio non per aliud quod quaeritur habebit resolutionem, neque 
ambiguitas per aliam ambiguitatem soluetur apud eos qui sensum habent, aut aenigmata per aliud maius 
aenigma; sed ea quae sunt talia ex manifestis et consonantibus et claris accipiunt absolutiones.’ [No 
question is resolved by another question. Intelligent people do not resolve one ambiguity through another, 
nor an enigma through a greater one. Such matters find resolutions out of what is evident, consistent, and 
clear], trans. R. Grant Irenaeus of Lyons (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 108. Part of my argument 
concerning the judgments that Langland’s poetry makes is to demonstrate the ways in which Langland’s 
poetry employs a mode of dialectic that seeks the truth, in this instance the development of the church’s 
doctrine, through steps (passus) that build upon one another in ways that Irenaeus would appreciate. That 
certain truth claims of the church are regarded to be paradoxes and/or mysteries (for example, the trinity, 
the incarnation, the resurrection, etc.) is distinct from the lazy and ultimately vapid form of theology 
Irenaeus warns against. This is because, such mysteries, for both Langland and Irenaeus, are only 
discovered through reasoned discourse concerning that which is evident, consistent, and clear. Specifically, 
a reasoned discourse that follows human language to the limits inherent to creatures’ efforts to describe the 
rationality and truth that is the triune God revealed through Christ. 
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but also, and especially in the fourteenth century, profoundly contested. Langland’s 
ecclesial vision is not produced under conditions akin to the serenity of a cloistered 
monastery or a medieval university. Rather, Langland produced, re-imagined, rewrote, 
and revised his ecclesiology repeatedly over a whole life. Langland’s life was one lived 
under intense intellectual, institutional and social pressures resulting from the Black 
Death, the Great Schism, the Great Rising of 1381, and the Blackfriars Council of 1382 
to name only a few.412 Piers Plowman’s vision of a church collapsing under siege was no 
whimsical wonder, but rather emerges out of the material conditions under which the poet 
created his art. As such, Piers Plowman offers an ecclesial vision that is no mere luxury, 
but rather a vision the poet perceived to be most effective to teach and inspire a 
generation to see both the bleak realities of human life and also the real possibilities of 
hope God offers through the body of Christ. Consequently, understanding what the 
church is, or at least what Piers Plowman represents the church to be, is fundamental to 
appreciating the ways Langland’s poem contributes to the church discerning the 
development of its doctrine, a doctrine that includes the church’s own self-understanding, 
and a doctrine which was itself under intense scrutiny in the late fourteenth century. 
 Tracing Langland’s ecclesial vision with attention to the form through which it is 
imagined requires detailed analysis of four of the most authoritative voices in the poem: 
Imaginatif, Liberum Arbitrium, the Samaritan, and the Christ who harrows hell. The 
                                                
412 For a recent analysis of the social and economic impacts of the Black Death in England in the fourteenth 
century see Alan Kissane, Civic Community in Late Medieval Lincoln: Urban Society and Economy in the 
Age of the Black Death, 1289-1409 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2017); on the Great Schism see Norman 
Housley, The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades 1305-1378 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) and 
Walter Ullmann’s A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972), 
pp. 279-305; on the Great Rising of 1381 see the classic study, Rodney Hilton, Bond Men Made Free: 
Medieval Peasant Movements and the English Rising of 1381 (London: Methuen, 1973) and Steven 
Justice’s Writing and Rebellion: England in 1381 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994); 
and on the Blackfriars Council of 1382 see Andrew Cole’s Literature and Heresy in the Age of Chaucer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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subtle dialectic Langland crafts through these figures interactions, corrections and 
supersessions outline the content of his ecclesial vision and equip the audience with the 
resources they need to evaluate Conscience’s departure from Vnity at the poem’s end. 
However, before attending to these four figures and the way Langland uses them to 
depict his ecclesial vision, I offer a brief summary of two of the most influential 
interpretations of the poem’s ecclesiology.  
 
§ Interpretations of Langland’s ecclesiology 
Two contemporary interpreters, James Simpson and David Aers, have offered 
perhaps the most influential and detailed analyses of the poem’s representation of the 
church. In his study Reform and Cultural Revolution, James Simpson locates Piers 
Plowman within the context of a range of vernacular texts to situate Langland’s 
ecclesiology in a spectrum that ranges from revisionists histories of fourteenth century 
English Catholicism exemplified by Eamon Duffy’s Stripping of the Alters, to what 
Simpson calls the ‘evangelical theology of Henrician England’ and then expands to 
include the ‘revolutionary spirituality of the sixteenth century.’413 For Simpson, 
Langland’s poem cannot be neatly categorized within any of these respective points. 
Rather, Simpson argues,  
Piers Plowman was prophetic, looking forward as it did to Reformation theology. 
Even as it prophesied such a spirituality, however, it also recoiled from it: Piers 
Plowman both foresaw and forestalled the Reformation, by offering a reformation of 
its own in which grace is distributed in a wholly decentralized way.414  
                                                
413 James Simpson, Reform and Cultural Revolution (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 327-9. 
414 Simpson, Reform and Cultural Revolution, p. 329. 
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As such, and in these terms, Simpson argues that Langland’s ecclesiology is best 
described as ‘reformist.’ 
 Simpson’s interpretation of Langland’s ‘reformist’ ecclesiology is grounded in his 
interpretation of Langland’s ‘theology’, from whence Simpson argues Langland’s 
‘ecclesiology, economics, and politics’ all flow.415 In short, Simpson argues that 
Langland’s theology affirms that salvation is entirely a matter of the individual’s 
unmediated dependence upon God’s gift, independent from ecclesiastical mediation, and 
yet also recoils from this revolutionary view. Specifically, Simpson argues that 
Langland’s theology decentralizes grace from any view suggesting grace to be a 
mechanistic distributive power channeled through the institutional church to the 
faithful.416 Yet, Simpson also demonstrates ways in which the poem rejects a theology of 
‘grace alone’, as if the institution of the church played no causal role at all in the journey 
of salvation. For Simpson, Langland offers a reformist spirituality in which grace is not 
constrained to the semi-pelagian debates of the fourteenth century, but is instead best 
understood as a sort of psychoanalytic drama. The church has a role to play, but not as an 
institution that either controls the distribution of grace through the sacraments, nor as an 
institution that rewards good works with God’s grace. As Simpson explains, ‘Instead, the 
Church is given a psychological, volitional location. … In Langland’s poem, … Christ’s 
                                                
415 Simpson, Reform and Cultural Revolution, pp. 344-5. 
416 Such arguments were present among various late-medieval figures, particular in the critiques John Duns 
Scotus and William of Ockham raised against what they perceived to be an overly mechanistic view of 
grace depicted by Thomas Aquinas in his sacramental theology. For an overview of this debate, see Henri 
de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages trans. Gemma Simmonds 
CJ with Richard Price (London: SCM Press, 2006). 
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best act is to allow individuals to merit salvation through penance.’417 Simpson 
summarizes Langland’s theology of grace and salvation this way: 
Salvation is ultimately dependent upon Christ’s freely given act of Atonement, but 
immediately dependent on the choice of individual Christians. … The sacraments, and 
especially the sacrament of penance, are not merely signs of prior decisions in this 
institution; on the contrary, they are functional practices of negotiating with God. … 
For the individual Christian, history remains open to individual effort, and is not 
wholly subject to the inscrutable movements of grace.418 
 
This theology, Simpson argues, is best described as a reformist spirituality that results in 
a reformist ecclesiology. The church is not to be utterly abandoned under the banner of 
certain (later) protestant renderings of salvation ‘by grace alone’ which eventually 
undermine the role of the church in the Christian life. The church, as Simpson interprets 
Langland’s vision, plays an indispensible role in God’s decentralized distribution of grace 
in the pilgrim’s psychoanalytic journey of understanding how a Christian might merit 
salvation in the light of Christ’s atonement by participating in the ongoing sacrament of 
penance. For Simpson, Langland’s poem offers a significant theological reform of 
contemporary semi-pelagian debates of grace. Grace is neither earned through works, nor 
conferred inscrutably regardless of human action. Rather God’s grace is conferred in a 
thoroughly decentralized mode and realized through pilgrims’ ongoing participation in 
the sacrament of penance. From this theological center, Simpson argues that Langland 
envisions a reformist spirituality that will in turn reform the church. The church will 
                                                
417 Simpson, Reform and Cultural Revolution, p. 361. 
418 Simpson, Reform and Cultural Revolution, p. 362. 
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remain a critical element of the Christian life without wielding dominion as the gate-
keeper of God’s gift of grace.  
Certain tensions and questions arise in Simpson’s analysis. Specifically, one 
might ask, is Simpson’s portrayal of Langland’s theology of grace coherent and is it 
consistent with that offered by the poem? In terms of coherence, does Simpson’s 
suggestion that Langland’s view of salvation ‘is ultimately dependent upon Christ’s 
freely given act of Atonement, but immediately dependent on the choice of individual 
Christians’ risk contradiction? Is salvation contingent upon God’s saving act in Christ, or 
the volitional act of individual pilgrims? Here, Simpson’s portrayal of Langland’s 
theology of grace does not reform the semi-pelagian debates of the fourteenth century, 
but rather reproduces it in a different mode.419 The extent to which Simpson’s 
interpretation of Langland’s view of grace is consistent with grace’s representation in 
Piers Plowman will be taken up in detail below.  
Prior to this analysis, however, David Aers’ rigorous career-long investigation of 
Piers Plowman must be considered not least because he offers a substantive alternative to 
Simpson’s interpretation. In his recent essay, Beyond Reformation, Aers pays particular 
attention to fourteenth century ecclesial forms and doctrinal developments around the 
papacy, as well as figures like William of Ockham who opposed such developments, to 
                                                
419 See Rega Wood, ‘Introduction’ in her Ockham on the Virtues (West Lafayette, Ind.: Perdue University 
Press, 1997), pp. 3-59. For an example of a particular voice in late medieval semi-Pelagian debates see 
Gabriel Biel, Canonis missae expositio, ed. H.A. Oberman and W.J. Courtenay (Mainz, 1965), Lect. LIX P, 
2: 443 and especially Beil’s ‘The Circumcision of the Lord’ wherein Biel frames human and divine agency 
in a way that became abundantly popular among the via moderna. Beil argues that grace strengthens human 
power. He offers the image of a bird that has a stone tied to it so that it cannot fly and notes that if the 
bird’s wings were strengthened, then one would say that the impediment to flight had been lessened, 
although the weight of the stone had not been lessened. Beil’s framing of grace as strengthening human 
power, as the strengthening of the bird’s wings, frames grace as an extrinsic power that is added to the pre-
existing power of human agency. Langland, I will show, turns this on its head, making grace more 
instrinsic to humanity than humanity’s own agency. See especially the analysis of Liberum Arbitrium’s 
image of the Tree of Charity below. 
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demonstrate ways in which Langland imagines the historical community of the church to 
be capable of such inversion that the church itself can become an engine for what John 
Paul II calls de-Christianization.420 Aers describes such de-Christianization, quoting John 
Paul II,  
…a decline or obscuring of the moral sense. This comes about both as a result of a 
loss of awareness of the originality of Gospel morality and as a result of an eclipse of 
fundamental principles and ethical values themselves.421  
 
For Aers, this is precisely the fear voiced by Liberium Arbitruim, so vividly depicted by 
figures like Covetousness, the Brewer and the break down of Vnity at the poem’s end.422 
Aers’ analysis highlights the judgments Langland’s poetry makes through its depiction of 
the gap between the brief glimpse of a visionary Church in the figure of Lady Church in 
Passus I, and the historical community that fails to live up to its own visionary identity at 
the poem’s end.423 Aers emphatically insists that, ‘Nowhere does Langland make explicit 
how he understands the relationship between the visionary Church descending from 
heaven to teach him and the historical Church which fills the poem.’424 Aers’ analysis 
does not reduce Langland to any sort of Wycliffite or proto-Reformer, nor does Aers 
locate Langland within the company of those sixteenth century revolutionaries Simpson 
describes.425 For Aers, like Simpson, Langland is not anti-institutional, nor does 
Langland uphold any commitment to grace being utterly unmediated. Rather, Aers’ 
                                                
420 Simpson, Reform and Cultural Revolution, p. 84. 
421 Ibid. 
422 Langland, Piers Plowman, XVI.242-7, As holiness and honestee out of holy churche / Spryngeth and 
spredeth and enspireth the peple / Thorw parfit preesthoed and prelates of holy churche, / Riht so oute of 
holy churche al euel spredeth / There inparfit preestboed is, prechares and techares. 
423 See Aers ‘What Is Charity? William Langland’s Answers with Some Diachronic Questions’, Religions, 
31 (2019), pp. 1-12, at p. 2. 
424 Ibid. 
425 David Aers, Faith, Ethics, and church: writing in England, 1360-1409 (New York: D.S. Brewer, 2000). 
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research argues that Langland depicts grace as a gift composed of a sort of double agency 
that includes both God and humanity.426 This has specific implications for Langland’s 
ecclesiology.  
For Aers, Piers Plowman does not offer a reformist view of penance as a 
psychoanalytic practice to understand or accept God’s gift of grace, but rather offers a 
poetry that gestures towards the mysterious elisions and overlaps of God’s grace and 
human agency whereby a person is called by God from within to return to the very God 
their soul calls to in prayer.427 Aers couples this distinct interpretation of Langland’s 
theology of grace with a robust attention to the poem’s representation of human beings as 
powerfully susceptible to the practices and institutions that conform them into both 
virtues and vices.428 The habituation of the will is always embedded in webs of 
institutions, language, practices, and communities. And yet Aers’ attention to Langland’s 
representation of the corruptibility of the church, performed in dialogue with fourteenth 
century theologians like William of Ockham and the historical realities of the Great 
Schism, leads Aers to an interpretation of Langland’s ecclesiology he describes as 
congregationalist.429  
For Aers, Langland’s poetry affirms the role of the church in the Christian life as 
inextricably wrapped up in God’s mysterious gifting of grace. Aers delicately traces the 
                                                
426 David Aers, ‘Augustinian Prelude: Conversion and Agency’ in Salvation and Sin: Augustine, Langland, 
and Fourteenth Century Theology (Notre Dame, Ind: Notre Dame Press, 2009), pp. 1-24.  
427 Ibid. 
428 For Aers’ study of the virtues and vices in Piers Plowman see his ‘Langland on the Church and the End 
of the Cardinal Virtues’, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 42 (2012), pp. 59-81. For Aers’ 
analysis of the practices, sacraments and institutions that conform figures in Piers Plowman, and more 
broadly in fourteenth-century English writing, see his Sanctifying Signs: Making Christian Tradition in 
Late Medieval England (Notre Dame, Ind: Notre Dame Press, 2004). 
429 Aers argues in both ‘Langland on the Church and the End of the Cardinal Virtues’ and Beyond 
Reformation: An Essay on William Langland’s Piers Plowman and the End of Constantinian Christianity 
(Notre Dame, Ind: Notre Dame University Press, 2014) that Langland’s ecclesiology is best described as 
congregationalist.  
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ways in which Langland portrays Will’s formation as being wrapped up in the influences, 
teaching, language, and institutions as wide and complex as the ‘maze of the world.’ Will 
is dependent on and determined by the context, communities and histories within which 
he finds himself inescapably embedded. And yet, on Aers’ interpretation of the poem, the 
susceptibility of all human wills to lusts for power and dominion leave open the 
possibility that historical institutions bearing the name church might turn out to be its 
opposite. As such, Aers reads Langland’s poem as both a guide and an exhortation for 
pilgrims to discern, discover and participate in communities of fools (‘foles’) who might 
rightly form them in charity whilst wandering through the maze of a world and a late-
medieval Catholic Church, besieged and seduced by the false church of anti-christ.430  
 While Aers’ interpretation certainly incorporates multiple elements of Langland’s 
indebtedness to a variety of strands in Catholic thought, both Aers and Simpson ascribe 
distinct protestant sensibilities to Piers Plowman. Each in their own way argue that 
Langland depicts the church as important, but not itself a sacrament, not itself a cause of 
grace.431 For Simpson, Langland decentralizes grace, rejects a theology of grace alone, 
and yet affirms penance as well as the institution through which penance is practiced as 
necessary along a psychoanalytic process of acceptance. As suggested above, Simpson’s 
account of Langland’s theology of grace reproduces rather than reforms fourteenth 
century semi-pelagian debates, and situates itself within a contradiction regarding the 
relationship between human and divine agency that will plague protestant renderings of 
grace for centuries. Specifically, circumscribing the depiction of grace within the 
                                                
430 Aers has particular examples in mind including Hawisia Moon (Beyond Reformation), Walter Brut 
(Sanctifying Signs), Margary Kemp (Beyond Reformation). 
431 In contrast, Thomas Aquinas depicts the Eucharist, and thus the Church who distributes the Eucharist, as 
a cause of grace. See especially, Aquinas, ST IIIa q.74-81, especially IIIa q.79. See also his Summa Contra 
Gentiles Book IV.61. 
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assumption that human and divine agency are necessarily competitive and thereby 
displace one another such that salvation must ultimately hinge upon either the will of 
God or the will of a person. Under such assumptions, the church is either irrelevant or 
perhaps a compliment to the Christian life, but certainly does not play a necessary or 
causal role in salvation. While Simpson works to suggest otherwise, one can almost feel 
the necessity of the church in the Christian life slipping through Simpson’s hands, as it is 
ultimately reduced to a role that is important, but not fundamental; complimentary but not 
instrumental.  
For Aers, the necessity of the church is questioned in another way. The church is 
necessary, but nowhere to be found. The search for the church as a recognizable historical 
and hierarchical institution capable of forming the will in charity does not exist as such in 
the poem, as Aers aruges, ‘Nowhere does Langland make explicit how he understands the 
relationship between the visionary Church descending from heaven to teach him and the 
historical Church which fills the poem.’432 For Aers, Piers Plowman offers a sustained 
lament and indictment of the contemporary church as pervaded by Mede in such a way 
that the modern church is revealed to be a parodic simulacrum of the celestial figure of 
Lady Church from Passus I.433 Aers argues that Langland’s ecclesiology does not reject 
the church or the church’s role in the Christian life, but rather that Langland’s poetry 
critiques those forms of ecclesiology that collapse the mystery of the church into a 
historical, hierarchical and landed institution. Instead, for Aers, Langland’s ecclesiology 
                                                
432 Aers, ‘What Is Charity?’, p. 2. 
433 Aers, Beyond Reformation, p. 168, and especially at 171, ‘The latter [the church as depicted in Passus 
XXI.335 through XXII.379] represents the contemporary Roman Church as a demonic simulacrum of the 
Pentacostal church of the Holy Spirit and Piers. It obstructs the visions of the risen Christ and the Holy 
Spirit. It dissolves the memory of doctrine taught so carefully by Christ the Samaritan and Christ the 
emancipatory orator in hell. It infuses Christians living in the Roman Church and obeying its mandatory 
sacrament of penance with an overwhelming opiate.’  
 203 
is congregationalist, pointing towards those individuals and communities of fools 
(‘foles’) called forth at Pentecost and led by the Holy Spirit across time. Simply put, 
‘Langland leaves us with the church of a few fools.’434 Aers’ own description is 
instructive and worth citing at length: 
In fact, disciples of Christ are found in all sorts of places and vocations. Agricultural 
laborers like Piers the Plowman (Prol. 22-24; VII.182-282); anchorites and hermits 
‘that holdeth hem in here [their] selles’ (Prol. 27-32); people scattered among poor and 
rich, even once, in a distant past, a friar and, once upon a time, kings and cardinals, 
according to Liberum Arbitrium (XVI.340-74a). These all foreshadow the fools of the 
poem’s ending, and all seem to practice discipleship in a manner independent of any 
ecclesiastical hierarchy directing their spiritual life, let alone any identifiable 
magisterium deploying a legitimate coercive jurisdiction replete with worldly power. 
While Langland discerns Christian discipleship in such individuals and groups, he 
also implies that individual spiritual disciplines, active and contemplative, guided by 
the Holy Spirit, may lead to the making of a church in the Christian’s heart.435 
  
Aers then interprets the poem’s depiction of Conscience’s departure from the crumbling 
Roman Church Vnity in the final two passus as Conscience ‘abandoning the modern 
church led by pope (or popes, in the present Schism) and cardinals, searching for the 
absent Piers, and crying out to the Holy Spirit’ to join the church of ‘foles [fools].’436  
Yet, as a Catholic Christian shaped by the medieval assumption that extra 
Ecclesiam nulla salus popularized by Pope Boniface VIII’s Unam sanctam (1302), how 
                                                
434 Aers, Beyond Reformation, p. 171. 
435 Aers, Beyond Reformation, p. 169. 
436 Aers, Beyond Reformation, p. 171. 
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would Langland imagine the absence of the very institution perceived to be necessary for 
his salvation? Furthermore, given Langland’s sustained attention to the malleability of 
both Conscience and Will, what judgments may lie latent within Langland’s unique 
poetic form concerning Conscience’s departure from the church in the closing lines? 
After all, Augustine’s view that there can never be a valid reason for separating one’s-self 
from the church was certainly not unknown to Langland.437 Recalling Aquinas’ powerful 
argument outlined in Chapter 1, how is Conscience’s willingness to abandon the church 
in favor of his own private judgment not equivalent to the root of heresy, the pride that 
chooses one’s own discernment over and against the discernment of the community God 
has promised to guide through the Holy Spirit until Christ comes again? Lastly, given the 
fragility and fractile nature of both Conscience and Will’s own self-knowing depicted 
time and again throughout the poem, how could Langland envision an individual pilgrim 
(like Conscience) being capable of trusting their own judgment in the journey outside of 
the church? How might Conscience, as an individual pilgrim, be capable of discerning 
between the guidance of the Holy Spirit to whom he calls, and himself? How might 
Conscience be able to trust his own discernment between those virtuous fools Aers 
celebrates, and actual fools (like Recklessness) who would lead him into disaster? 
 In his analysis of Langland’s theology of both the Eucharist and the church, Aers 
argues powerfully that Langland’s poetry resists the temptation to collapse a sign into the 
signifier.438 Yet, given Aers’ subtle attention to Langland’s ability to depict grace as 
bound up in the elisions and overlaps of human and divine agency, might Langland’s 
                                                
437 Augustine, Contra epistulam Parmeniani, PL 43, 105-105, bk 3, chapter 5, no 28. 
438 See especially his ‘The Sacrament of the Alter in Piers Plowman’ in Sanctifying Signs: Making 
Christian Tradition in Late Medieval England (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2004) and 
Beyond Reformation. 
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poetry also render the Eucharist and the church in forms that reflect similar analogous 
elisions of God’s mystical presence through material forms? If so, might Langland’s 
poetic representation of the church include similar elisions and overlaps of human and 
divine agency within the historical and material institution of the late-medieval church in 
England? And if so, might Langland’s representation offer an example of how the church 
might engage in the processes of its own discernment while simultaneously taking into 
account the church’s failures? These are the questions this chapter aims to explore. But 
first, I want to clarify, or at least offer more specific content to, this sense that the church 
could be depicted as a historical and material institution that includes and in fact requires 
descriptive attention to the elisions and overlaps of human and divine agency particular to 
the church itself. 
 
§ Stretching the ecclesial imagination 
 Henri de Lubac’s classic study Corpus Mysticum traces key shifts in Catholic 
ecclesiology and Eucharistic theology from the patristic era through the middle ages. His 
The Splendor of the Church – written almost a decade later, and less for an academic 
audience and more for fellow priests – draws on de Lubac’s extensive learning to cast an 
ecclesial vision soaked in the wisdom of the church. Read together, these two works offer 
an important lens into the tradition(s), theological developments and ecclesial vision(s) 
that echo deeply throughout Langland’s poetry. I would like to suggest that de Lubac’s 
work in these two texts offers a third lens through which to consider Langland’s own 
ecclesial vision beyond those proposed by Simpson and Aers.  
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Corpus Mysticum traces what de Lubac describes as a process through which ‘the 
word true supplanted the word mystical as a description for the sacramental body [of the 
Eucharist]’ in the period between the patristic era and the Late Middle ages.439 De Lubac 
begins by excavating a widespread patristic vision of the Church, the Eucharist and 
Christ’s body as mystically united. For figures like Augustine, this overlapping and 
interconnecting vision was often refered to in various forms of shorthand, including 
Augustine’s frequent reference, totus christus. As will be demonstrated in further detail 
below, totus Christus, for Augustine, stands as a sort of shorthand pointing symbolically 
towards the mystery whereby Christ, Christ’s body the Church and Christ’s body upon 
the altar are united as all creation’s ultimate end, even as they are simultaneously 
effecting the transformation of God’s beloved, the bread and the wine and indeed all 
creation into Christ’s body.  
De Lubac demonstrates the ways in which ‘mystery’ and ‘sacrament’ were used 
as virtual synonyms by patristic thinkers, and that thinkers like Augustine consistently 
linked the Church, the Eucharist and Christ in such a way that all were understood to be 
interconnected – often overlapping – insofar as grace itself includes the work of God to 
bind together the Church and all creation into Christ’s body through the mystery of the 
sacrament. One of a myriad of examples includes de Lubac quoting Augustine’s 
Confessions, ‘You will not change me into you, as you do with the food of your body. 
Instead you will be changed into me.’440 For de Lubac, this mystical vision of unity 
emerges from the overlapping and interconnected grace at work through the sacrament of 
                                                
439 Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages trans. Gemma 
Simmonds (SCM Press, 2006), p. 248. 
440 Ibid, p. 178. 
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the Eucharist, the Church that receives it, and Christ’s body. This vision is developed 
further by later figures like Gerhoh of Reichersberg,  
The entire Christ is eaten in the mystery of the altar. The eater does not change 
him into himself, that is, into food for his flesh; but he himself will be changed 
into him, so as to become a member of his body which is the one Church, 
redeemed and fed by the one body of Christ.441 
Thus, de Lubac illustrates a patristic and Augustinian tradition that readily links past, 
present and future together in and through a multi-fold understanding of the sacrament of 
Christ’s body the Church, the body of Jesus Christ of Nazareth and the sacrament of 
Christ’s body present upon the altar. For de Lubac, this vision of the mystical includes a 
vision of time, body, Christ, the elements, and the Church bound together through a 
sacramental imagination replete with overlaps and unions which transcend clear 
distinction. De Lubac writes, 
Fundamentally, they [the distinction between the Church and the Eucharist in 
patristic usage] are not so much used to describe two successive objects as two 
simultaneous things that make one whole. For the body of Christ that is the 
Church is in no other than the body and the blood of the mystery. … Through the 
Eucharist each person is truly placed within the one body. It unites all the 
members of it among themselves, as it unites them to their one head. … In this 
way, little by little, the ‘whole Christ’ comes into being, who is always in our 
minds as the ultimate end of the mystery. So much so that, in this perspective of 
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totality and of unity, there is virtually no need to search for formulations or 
expressions to distinguish one ‘body’ from another.442   
For de Lubac, this patristic and Augustinian vision demonstrates little interest in parsing 
out the location of Christ’s ‘true’ body, and was instead seriously and playfully 
committed to seeing the Christian life as a journey of God’s beloved being swept up into 
the mystery of grace through the church and the sacrament of the Eucharist towards the 
ultimate end whereby all bodies are made one body in Christ and Christ is ‘all in all.’443  
De Lubac then shifts his attention to narrate the way in which this patristic and 
Augustinian vision of the mystical body of Christ is gradually abandoned in the wake of 
the Berengar controversy and consequent developments in theological method in the late 
Middle Ages.444  
De Lubac describes Berengar as a representative of a ‘new mentality that was 
spreading, a new order of problem that was emerging and catching people’s interest, a 
new way of thinking, the formulation of new categories.’445 For de Lubac, these 
categories were drawn from and influenced by the recovery of Aristotle in figures like 
Thomas Aquinas, and this new way of thinking was the emergence of a dialectical 
theology fueled by the rise of medieval schools and a renewed furvor to draw theological 
distinctions in order to avoid the confusion of categories which would lead to theological 
error. Yet, for de Lubac, the dialectitions’ passion for distinction deeply wounded the 
symbolism in which the faith of Augustine and other patristics imagined the mystical 
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interconnection between Christ’s body the Church, Jesus Christ of Nazareth and Christ’s 
body upon the alter. De Lubac narrates the long process through which ‘mystical’ 
language traditionally used to speak the mystery of this sacramental unity between the 
sacrament of Christ, the Eucharist and the Church, was supplanted in exchange for the 
language of ‘true.’ For de Lubac, the dialectictians’ innitial effort to theologically unpack 
the doctrine of transubstantiation became the altar upon which the mystical sacramental 
vision of Augustine was sacrificed in order to defend against Berengar’s heresey.446 
In short, de Lubac argues that in its fervor to affirm the doctrine of 
transubstantiation and defend against heresy the late medieval church depended upon a 
form of dialectical theology that gutted the patristic vision that held Christ, the Eucharist 
and the Church together under the mystery of the sacrament. Preferring instead the 
language of Christ’s ‘true’ presence in the bread and the wine, the late medieval church 
drifted away from the mystical affirmation that the sacrament includes the grace through 
which God unites the Church, the Eucharist and the recipient into the one body of Christ 
in a way that transcends both time and space. As de Lubac laments, 
At the hands of Berengar, the sacramental synthesis disintegrated, as once the 
Trinitatian and Christological synthesis had done at the hands of the Arians and 
their successors. … If others were tempted to an excessive confusion of Christ 
with his Church, the Head with the members of the Body, for his part Berengar, 
entirely on the other side, no longer had any sense at all of their mutual 
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immanence. His dialectic prevented him from understanding Augustine’s ‘one 
Christ, full Christ, total Christ [totus christus], whole Christ.’447 
The abandonment of this sacramental synthesis in favor of dialectical specificity not only 
led to the abandonment to the mystical sense of the patristic vision. It also created a 
distinction between the church itself and the Eucharist. Where previously the two were 
mystically bound together in the sacrament of Christ’s body, now through the distinctions 
popularized by medieval dialectictions, Christ is ‘truly’ present in the bread and the wine, 
but not ‘truly’ present in the church in the same way. Augustine imagined Christ’s body 
on the altar as mystically united with the people of the church who were themselves 
being swept up into Christ’s very body through their reception of Christ’s body in the 
sacrament. For de Lubac, the wedge introducted by late medieval dialectical theology 
creates a world in which Christ’s ‘true’ body is limited to the bread and the wine, and the 
faithful are no longer invited to imagine, to recognize, the ways in which grace is God’s 
activity of binding God’s beloved together in unity with Christ’s body through the 
sacrament of the Church and the Eucharist.448  
 Piers Plowman engages the theological shifts from mystical to diaclectical 
theology de Lubac narrates. Furthermore, Langland’s unique poetic form of theological 
discourse offers an alternative in both form and content to contemporary late medieval 
ecclesiology that intentionally or unintentionally drove a wedge between Christ’s body 
on the altar and Christ’s body the church. As I will argue further below, Langland’s 
poetic mode of theological inquiry offers a unique form of discourse that creates space 
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for both rigorous distinction and also the holding together of those distinctions in ways 
that reflects the patristic tradition’s commitment to the mystery of the sacrament and the 
church. First, however, I turn to de Lubac’s later, more pastoral and constructive ecclesial 
vision as offered through The Splendor of the Church. This vision, drawing deeply on the 
tradition de Lubac works to recover in Corpus Mysticum is, I will argue, a helpful lens 
through which to read Langland’s own ecclesiology. 
De Lubac’s Splendor of the Church is pertinent to this study of Langland’s 
ecclesiology insofar as de Lubac draws his ecclesial vision from a myriad of patristic and 
medieval sources, sources that would have inspired Langland’s own imagination. Key 
elements of de Lubac’s vision demonstrate ways in which ancient and medieval thinkers 
open up vistas to imagine the church in ways that not only resonate deeply with the vision 
of Piers Plowman, but also offer important nuance pertaining to how de Lubac – and 
Langland – recover a patristic sacramental synthesis of totus christus.  
De Lubac writes, 
The Church is a mystery; that is to say that she is also a sacrament….She is ‘the total 
locus of the Christian sacraments’, and she is herself the greatest sacrament that 
contains and vitalizes all the others. In this world she is the sacrament of Christ, as 
Christ himself, in his humanity, is for us the sacrament of God.449 
 
For de Lubac, that which is sacramental is the sensible bond between two worlds and has 
a twofold characteristic. On the one hand, the church is a sign of something else and thus 
is not to be confused as an end in itself. On the other, as a sacramental reality it can never 
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be discarded as merely a sign. For de Lubac the church is a necessary yet ‘translucent 
medium’, 
We never come to the end of passing through this translucent medium, which we 
must, nevertheless, always pass through and that completely. It is always through it 
that we reach what it signifies; it can never be superseded, and its bonds cannot be 
broken.450 
 
What does the sign and sacrament of the church signify? For de Lubac, 
Her whole end is to show us Christ, lead us to him, and communicate his grace to us; 
to put it in a nutshell, she exists solely to put us into relation with him. She alone can 
do that, and it is a task she never completes; there will never come a moment, either in 
the life of the individual or in the life of the race, in which her role ought to come to an 
end or even could come to an end. If the world lost the Church, it would lose the 
Redemption too.451 
 
The church is not an end in itself, according to de Lubac, but a sign pointing beyond itself 
to Christ. Yet, the church is also a sacramental sign which can never be discarded, a 
sacramental sign which never completes the work of presenting Christ and 
communicating grace. De Lubac then goes a step farther suggesting that, ‘The Church is 
the sacrament of Christ. This means, to put it another way, that there is between her and 
him a certain relation of mystical unity.’452 A mystical unity such that, ‘Practically 
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speaking, for each one of us Christ is thus his Church.’453 It is here that de Lubac’s 
description of the church as a sacrament gestures towards certain overlaps and elisions 
between God and the material form of the institutional church through which God 
communicates God’s-self to creation. ‘Christ is thus his Church.’ Christ cannot be 
separated from the historic and material community of those who worship him.  
Is de Lubac here collapsing the sign into the signifier in ways that Aers argues 
Piers Plowman resists? De Lubac is not entirely dismissive of the imperfections of the 
church along her earthly pilgrimage and is indeed sensitive to the ways Christians err 
when the church is perceived to be an end in itself.454 However, de Lubac insists that too 
much attention to the church itself runs the risk of letting ‘our vision of the Church stop 
short at the Church’ rather than moving through that translucent medium into mystical 
union with God in Christ.455 Here, de Lubac’s ecclesiology is not reducible to pietism, 
but is instead grounded in the ways that living in and through the church are constitutive 
of a person’s participation in and union with Christ.456 Put another way, his ecclesial 
vision offered in The Splendor of the Church is an attempt to recover the patristic 
mystical vision of the church as a sacrament that is always already bound up with 
Christ’s body even as it shares in God’s grace which is actively sweeping God’s beloved 
into Christ’s body through the church and the Eucharist. Furthermore, de Lubac 
suggestion that the church is a sort of ‘translucent medium’ offers an important hedge, or 
nuance, for interpretors who might otherswise be tempted to read totus christus literally 
                                                
453 Ibid., p. 210. See his Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages trans. Gemma 
Simmonds CJ with Richard Price (London: SCM Press, 2006). 
454 De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, pp. 218-9. 
455 Ibid., p. 224. 
456 Ibid., p. 228, ‘The Gospel is not announced by word only. It is announced – and to an even greater 
extent – by living.’ 
 214 
rather than symbolically. That is to say, de Lubac’s description of the church (which also 
applys more broadly sacramentally) is that neither the sacrament of the Church or the 
Eucharist are ends in themselves; but rather these are means of grace God offers through 
which God actively sweeps God’s beloved into Christ’s very body. And this because de 
Lubac is committed to a faith that believes, 
Men may be lacking in the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit will never be lacking to the 
Church. In virtue of her witness and sovereign powers, she will always be the 
Sacrament of Christ and make him really and truly present to us.457 
 
This particular commitment to the presence of the Holy Spirit in the church, and de 
Lubac’s representation of the church as a ‘translucent medium’ – a mystery and a 
sacrament through which God is reweaving God’s beloved into union with one another 
and God through a multi-fold vision of the body of Christ (on the altar and as the church) 
– may at first glance seem foreign to the representations Langland offers of the church’s 
unraveling and Conscience’s ultimate departure from it in Piers Plowman. However, 
while Conscience leaves the Church at the poem’s end, another figure remains within it. 
Commanded by Kynde, Will is told to remain in Holy Church, even as it crumbles from 
within, because it is only within the Church that Kynde tells Will he can learn to love.458 
What do the poem’s interpreters make of this juxtaposition? How might closer attention 
to the structure of Langland’s poetry, and the way it leads to this specific moment, offer 
an alternative representation of the church to the models described by Aers and Simpson 
above? It is to these questions, and to Langland’s poem, that I now turn. 
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§ The blood of Christ as the church’s foundation 
‘Ayeynes thy graynes,’ quod Grace, ‘bigynneth for to ripe,   
 Ordeyne the an hous, Peres, to herborwe in thy cornes.’   
 ‘By god! Grace,’ quod Peres, ‘ye moet gyue tymber  
 And ordeyne that hous ar ye hennes wende.’  
  And Grace gaf hym the cros with croune of thornes   
 That Crist vpon Caluary for mankynde on peyned;  
 And of his bapteme and bloed that he bledde on rode   
 He made a manere morter and mercy hit hihte.  
 And therwith Grace bigan to make a goode foundement   
And wateled hit and walled hit with his paynes and his passioun  
And of all holy writ he made a roef after 
And calde that hous Vnite, Holy Chirche an Englisch.459 
 
This remarkable exchange between Grace and Piers, Grace who is the Holy Spirit the 
third person of the Trinity, depicts in vivid imaginative detail the founding of the church 
God establishes through Pentecost. This is Langland’s account of the church’s beginning. 
It is a church not only established by God’s own self, the Holy Spirit, but also founded 
upon Christ’s passion. The very baptism and blood of Christ poured out on the cross 
becomes the mortar with which Grace lays the foundation, while Christ’s blood also 
becomes the very material with which the walls are wattled. This vivid depiction of the 
                                                
459 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.320-329, [‘When it’s time your grains,’ said Grace, ‘begin to ripen, / 
Ordain yourself a house, Piers, to store your harvest in.’ / ‘By God! Grace,’ said Piers, ‘you must give 
timber / And ordain that house before you go away. – And Grace gave him the cross with the crown of 
thorns / That Christ suffered on for mankind on Calvary; / And of his baptism and blood that he bled on 
cross / He made a kind of mortar, and called it mercy. / And with that Grace began to lay a good foundation 
/ And wattled it and walled it with his pain and his passion / And of all Holy Writ he made a roof after / 
And called that house Unity, Holy Church in English]. 
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Church built upon and held together by Christ’s blood is not a repetition of those forms of 
late-medieval piety that offer particular reverence to Christ’s physical suffering, nor is the 
reference to Christ’s ‘blood’ empty religiosity.460 Langland’s depiction of Christ’s 
passion being the literal foundation of the Church participates in a long process of 
discernment that the poem has been engaged in concerning election, the boundaries of 
Christ’s atonement and the nature of the church. The importance that the Church be 
founded upon Christ’s ‘blood’ and how Christ’s passion and blood are related to the 
poem’s depiction of the atonement, are critical features. So too are the implications of the 
poem’s representation of Christ’s atonement and consequent establishment of the 
Church’s foundation upon Christ’s blood for the constitution and identity of the Church. 
Another element of this scene invites consideration in a distinct, though related, 
direction. The church Grace establishes in Christ’s blood is not, perhaps surprisingly, the 
pristine church of Acts or antiquity which inspires some elements of Liberum Arbitruim’s 
ecclesial vision.461 Rather, Grace establishes the very church founded in Christ’s passion 
and then connects it immediately to the historic community of the church in England, 
                                                
460 See, for example, David Aers ‘The Humanity of Christ: Reflections on Orthodox Late Medieval 
Representations’ in David Aers and Lynn Staley, Powers of the Holy: Religion, Politics, and Gender in 
Late Medieval English Culture (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996) pp. 15-42. See 
also Miri Rubin Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) and Caroline Walker Bynum Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance 
of Food to Medieval Women (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1987).  
461 I am here referring to that strand of Wycliffite ecclesiology (later popularized through the Reformation) 
that imagined the church in its first three hundred years prior to Constantine’s donation to be a more pure 
and holy embodiment than the forms the church takes following Constantine’s donation. Liberum 
Arbitrium signals this view specifically calling Constantine’s donation ‘venym [venom] / And tho that haen 
Petres power aren apoysened [poisoned] alle’ (XVII.220), and further calls upon kings to forcibly take the 
lands and endowment which Constantine gave to the church, described as venom/poison (XVII.227-232): 
Taketh here londes, ye lords, and lat hem lyue by dymes / Yf the kynges coueyte in Cristes pees to lyuene. / 
For if possession be poysen and inparfit hem make, / The heuedes of holy churche and tho that ben vnder 
hem, / Hit were charite to deschargen hem for holy churche sake / And purge hem of the olde poysen ar 
more perel falle. [Take their lands, you lords, and let them live by tithes / If the kings desire to live in 
Christ’s peace. / For if possession is poison and makes them imperfect, / The heads and their subordinates 
of Holy Church, / It would be charity to relieve them for Holy Church’s sake / And purge them of the old 
poison before the peril grows]. 
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‘Vnite, Holy Chirche an Englisch.’ Here, Langland connects the miraculous Pentecostal 
founding of Christ’s church through the Holy Spirit not with any imagined pristine 
Jerusalem community a millennia earlier. Rather, Langland jumps chronologically from 
the founding of the church in Acts, to invite a direct connection between that miraculous 
joining of the Holy Spirit and the early church to the historically identifiable fourteenth 
century church in England. At first glance, this moment appears to undermine Aers’ 
conviction that, ‘Nowhere does Langland make explicit how he understands the 
relationship between the visionary Church descending from heaven to teach him and the 
historical Church which fills the poem.’462 For, in this exchange between Grace and Piers, 
Langland seems to be drawing an explicit connection between the church in England and 
the church Grace establishes through the blood of Christ’s passion. Whether this is or is 
not the case, however, requires a careful deliberate tracing of the poem’s structure which 
led to this moment, a structure which reveals the implications of this scene and its vivid 
depiction of the church as founded on Christ’s blood. To do so requires attention to the 
specific teachers and instruction Will receives leading up this moment. It is through those 
various teachers and the dialectical unfolding of their distinct positions that Langland 
prepares the audience to understand the significance of the particular foundation Grace 
lays the church upon, and how the atonement won through the blood of Christ stands as 
the very foundation of the church.  
 Several key moments shape Will’s pilgrimage and, in turn, Langland’s argument. 
Langland’s vision of the Church cannot be expressed without the memory and eventual 
correction of Recklessness’ teaching in Passus XI-XII. This correction requires multiple 
teachers in the poem. First, however, a brief recollection of some of the key moments of 
                                                
462 Aers, ‘What Is Charity?’, p. 2. 
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Will’s journey, and then more detailed analysis of Recklessness’ representation of grace, 
election and the implications they have for Recklessness’ ecclesiology will make those 
teachers and visions which ultimately supersede Recklessness’ view more apparent. 
 
§ Following Will to, and from, church 
In many ways, Will’s journey begins with his initial call to Lady Church in Passus 
I, a plea that she might, ‘Teche me to no tresor but telle me this ilke, / How Y may sauve 
my soule, that saynt art yholde.’463 Yet, Will’s desires are subsequently ravished not by 
the beatific vision as the hope of salvation, but instead by the gilded Lady Mede and the 
politics of courtly life. As Will follows various figures angling for power at court, he 
awakens and finds himself wandering about until he falls back into another dream where 
he beholds the confessions of the seven deadly sins before Repentance.464 This sequence 
appears as an imagined confession by all those vices of lust, covetousness, pride, envy, 
sloth, gluttony and wrath that Will witnesses in the maze of the world and which he 
beholds corrupting the king’s court. Will is subsequently swept up into this confession 
alongside the seven deadly sins as, ‘A thousend of men tho throngen togyderes, / Criede 
vpward to Crist and to his clene moder  / To haue grace to go to Treuthe – god leue that 
they mote!’465 Will and the folk then set out leaderless for Truth, ‘Ac ther ne was wye 
non so wys that the way thider couthe / But blostrede forth as bestes ouer baches and 
hulles …’466 As they blunder, the folk encounter Piers the Plowman who claims to know 
                                                
463 Langland, Piers Plowman, I.79-80, [‘Teach me no more of treasure, but tell me this, / Sainted lady, how 
may I save my soul’]. 
464 Langland, Piers Plowman, V-VII. 
465 Langland, Piers Plowman, VII.155-7, [A thousand men then thronged together, / Cried upward to Christ 
and to his clean mother / To have grace to go to truth – God grant that they might!]. 
466 Langland, Piers Plowman, VII.158-159, [But there was no one so wise that he knew the way there, / But 
blundered forth like beasts over valleys and hills…]. 
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the way to Truth, and yet first invites the people to work together in an attempt to 
establish an agrarian utopia.467 The attempt fails. While some folk work earnestly 
together, other ‘wasters’ chew up that which is honestly won. This eventually leads to the 
granting of Truth’s pardon to Piers on behalf of the people.468 However, the pardon is but 
two lines from the Athanasian Creed, ‘Qui bona egerunt ibunt in vitam eteram; / Qui vero 
mala in ignem eternum’ which a priest interprets and declares,  
Y kan no pardon fynde 
Bote Dowel and haue wel and god shal haue thy soule 
And do yuele and haue euele and hope thow non othere 
Bote he that euele lyueth euele shal ende.469  
 
The beginning of Passus X finds Will ‘for to seke Dowel [in search of Dowell].’ 
That is to say, Will’s journey is now a pilgrimage to discover how he might ‘do well’ and 
thereby merit salvation. It is worth noting that Will’s first exchange with Lady Church in 
Passus I, and Will’s beginning again in Passus X, are both attempts made by Will to save 
himself, either through a ‘kynde’ knowing (I.78) or by ‘dowel’ (X.2ff.). This is worth 
noting because the first half of the poem represents Will’s search for salvation as centered 
in his own agency, as he says, ‘How Y may sauve my soule.’470 Will assumes that he can 
save himself through right knowledge or right action, and his search for Dowell is merely 
a maturation or development of his assumptions regarding the capacity of human agency 
to merit salvation.  
                                                
467 Langland, Piers Plowman, VII.183 – IX. 
468 Langland, Piers Plowman, VIII-IX. 
469 Langland, Piers Plowman, IX.290-2, [I can find no pardon, / But only ‘Do well and have well and God 
shall have your soul / And do evil and have evil and expect nothing other / But he that lives evilly shall 
have an evil end]. 
470 Langland, Piers Plowman, I.80. 
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In the opening lines of Passus X Will meets a figure, a friar, who self-confidently 
claims that Dowell ‘soiourneth with vs freres / And euere hath, as Y hope, and euere wol 
hereafter.’471 Here, it seems, Will has found a figure, and an order, through which he can 
do well and save his soul. However, Will immediately rejects the friar’s claim with a 
scholastic ‘Contra’, and then appeals to Proverbs 24:16 to argue that no human is without 
sin and thus rejects the friar’s claim that Dowell perpetually dwells with friars. That Will, 
a figure who could not recognize Holy Church in Passus I, might have enough clergie and 
knowledge of Scripture to engage in scholastic debate with a Franciscan friar is itself a 
joke which the poem will shortly return to in the figure of Scripture. Following a brief 
debate, Will rather courteously departs from the friar going ‘forth wyde-whare, walkynge 
myn one / By a wide wildernesse and by a wode-syde.’472  
Wandering alone, Will meets Thought who guides him to Wit. Wit leads Will to 
his wife Dame Study, a figure whom Derek Pearsall notes ‘is the first of the personified 
figures who represent external bodies of knowledge rather than innate faculties.’473 In a 
move that recalls and then suggests judgment regarding Will’s use of Scripture to reject 
the friar, Dame Study warns that a little learning can be dangerous and directs Will not 
towards further introspection (for example, Thought or Wit) but to Clergy and Scripture. 
As Pearsall notes, this gestures towards Dame Study’s argument that ‘True learning can 
be sought only within the strict clerical regime of the school and university and with 
particular reference to the study of theology and biblical studies.’474 Will is then ‘fayn as 
                                                
471 Langland, Piers Plowman, X.18-9, [resides with us friars, / And always has, as I hope, and will forever 
hereafter]. 
472 Langland, Piers Plowman, X.60-1, [forth far and wide, walking alone / Beside a savage wilderness and a 
woodland]. 
473 Derek Pearsall, Piers Plowman: A New Annotated Version of the C-text (Exeter: University of Exeter 
Press 2008), note 1 p. 201. 
474 Pearsall, Piers Plowman: A New Annotated Version, notes 78-80, p. 204. 
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foul of faire morwen, / Gladdere then gleman that gold hath to yefte’ to hear of Clergy 
and Scripture.475 Upon meeting, Clergy teaches Will that if Will desires Dowell he should 
keep the ten commandments, keep away from sin and ‘byleef lely how goddess loue 
alythe / On the maide Marie for mankynde sake / And bycam a man of that maide 
withoute mankynde.’476 Clergy then gestures towards the mysteries of the faith, 
particularly the trinity, and those ‘Patriarchs, and prophets, apostles and angels’ who have 
reflected upon and taught those mysteries over centuries.477 But Clergy’s instruction is 
interrupted as Scripture ‘scorned me [Will] and mony skiles shewed / And continaunce 
made on Clergie to congeie me, hit semede.’478 Will weeps, falls off to sleep and is 
fetched by Fortune who appears briefly before being superseded by Recklessness.  
It is not insignificant that Will’s encounter with Scripture interrupts his journey 
and drives him towards the figures of Fortune and Recklessness, figures who reduce 
God’s grace to fate. Indeed, Piers Plowman will represent Scripture at least twice in this 
sequence as a catalyst that drives Will to consider forms of fatalism clothed in Christian 
language.479 Specific language in Scripture taken in isolation from Scripture’s broader 
narratives lead Will into forms of thinking that, the poem will argue, are ultimately at 
                                                
475 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.103-4, [happy as a bird on a beautiful morning, / Gladder than a minstrel 
who just got a gift of gold]. 
476 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.141-3, XI.139-44, [believe loyally how God’s son alighted / In the 
maiden Mary for mankind’s sake / And became a man of that maid without the intervention of human 
agency]. 
477 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.149-63. 
478 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.160-2, [scorned me and made many arguments / And flashed a look to 
Clergy to get rid of me, it seemed]. 
479 The first being the instance just mentioned at XI.163, the second being Scripture’s sermon in XII.37-51 
in which Will latches onto the tension between her language of multi and pauci, puzzles over his election, 
his reception by Holy Church at the font of baptism and the extension of Christ’s call to all people, ‘For 
Crist clepede vs alle, come yf we wolde, / Sarrasynes and sismatikes, and so a ded the Iewes, / And bad 
hem souke for synne saue at his breste / And drynke bote for bale, brouke hit ho-so myhte: [For Christ 
called us all, come if we would, / Saracens and schismatics and the Jews as well, / And bade them suck for 
their sins salvation at his breast / And drink health for harm, enjoy it who may:].In this sequence Will 
resists the reduction of grace to the fatalism Recklessness has taught precisely by appealing to the narrative 
Christ and Will’s own participation in the church through baptism. 
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odds with Christ’s atoning work depicted through the narratives of Scripture. Langland 
represents those forms of thinking that rely on isolated Scriptural language to define 
grace as fate through the figure of Recklessness. As such, Recklessness’ teaching merits 
more detailed analysis because it is a position which Langland’s later ecclesial vision will 
reject precisely because of its misunderstanding of grace, election, the atonement and the 
implications each have for the church. 
Recklessness argues that, 
Clergie saith that he seyh in the seynt euauneglie / 
That Y man ymaed was and my name y-entred /  
In the legende of lyf longe ar Y were. / 
Predestinaet thei prechen, prechours that this sheweth, /  
Or prescit inparfit, pult out of grace, / 
Vnwriten for som wikkednesse, as holy writ sheweth.480  
 
Here, Recklessness appeals to Clergy and Scripture to justify his view that God’s grace is 
fortune, an inscrutable determination made by God wholly irrespective of human agency. 
Specifically, Recklessness appeals to the abstract language of predestination and election 
scattered across the New Testament and also preached by some clerks, ‘Predestinaet thei 
prechen, prechours that this sheweth, / Or prescit inparfit.’ ‘Or prescit inparfit’ is, in this 
instance, a technical theological term referring to those whom God foreknows to be 
imperfect. The conclusion Recklessness draws from this abstracted phrase is 
encapsulated in the brilliant lines, ‘Sothly…ye se by many euydences / That wit ne 
                                                
480 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.205-10, [Clergy says he saw in the holy gospel / That I was made man 
and my name entered / In the book of life long before I was. / They preach men are predestinate, preachers 
who declare this, / Or beforehand known to be imperfect, thrust out of grace, / Not written down because of 
some wickedness, as holy writ show]. 
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witness wan neuere the maistrie / Withoute the gifte of god which is grace of fortune.481 
The ‘gifte of god which is grace of fortune.’  
Recklessness’ view and mode of argument are important for at least two reasons. 
On the one hand, because Recklessness is here removing human agency entirely from the 
journey of salvation and arguing, by way of employing abstract language from Scripture 
and its deployment by some members of the clergy, that salvation is inscrutably 
determined by God regardless of human action. On the other hand, Recklessness justifies 
equating grace with fate by appealing to Scriptural language and abstract terms of 
scholastic theology that have been removed from the broader narrative of God’s atoning 
work in Christ. This dislocation of both human agency from the gift of God’s grace and 
of the dislocation of the language of election from the narratives of God’s atoning work 
in Christ will become more apparent below when analyzing the mode through which 
Langland’s poetry rejects Recklessness’ view precisely through Langland’s commitment 
to the narrative of salvation history. But first, the ecclesial implications of Recklessness’ 
view of grace must be analyzed. 
 Not surprisingly, the Church is utterly irrelevant for Recklessness. He argues, 
‘…fonde Y neuere in faith, for to telle treuthe, / That clergie of Cristes mouthe comended 
was euere.’482 Here, ‘clergie’ is representative of something like ‘book learning’ and thus 
participates in Recklessness’ broader argument that human agency, specifically through 
learning acquired through the church, is utterly irrelevant to salvation. Recklessness goes 
                                                
481 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.281-3, [Truly…you see by many kinds of evidence / That neither wit nor 
quickness ever won the victory / Without God’s gift, which is grace of fortune]. 
482 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.276-7, […I never ever found, to tell you the truth, / That learning was 
ever commended by Christ’s mouth]. 
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on to argue that even Saint Augustine thought that wise men often end up in hell while 
the ignorant often enjoy heavenly bliss. Recklessness goes further to assert that, 
…lewede laborers of litel vnderstondyng  
Selde falleth so foule and so depe in synne  
As clerkes of holy kirke that kepe sholde and saue  
Lewede men in good bileue and lene hem at here nede.483 
The passus closes with Will persuaded to dismiss Clergy and Clergy’s counsel, counting 
it worthless in the face of the ‘grace of fortune.’ Thus, not only does Recklessness deem 
useless the learning and formation one is shaped by through participation in the ‘clergie’ 
of the church, Recklessness also deems the clerks who serve the church as untrustworthy 
and useless. Thus, both the praxis and the teachers of the church are rendered 
unnecessary to the Christian journey on Recklessness’ account. Passus XII then opens 
with Will having his identity absorbed into that of Recklessness. Recklessness’ argument 
has thus not only made the church irrelevant and erased any meaningful identity it might 
have, but Recklessness’ argument has also erased Will’s own identity, the baptismal 
identity he was beginning to remember and grow into through Clergy and Scripture’s 
guidance before falling asleep into the dream of Recklessness.  
 The last ten passus of Piers Plowman offers a subtle process that rejects the 
content of Recklessness’ teaching on grace and the church. Through its unfolding, the 
poem reimagines grace, the atonement and the church by re-presenting salvation through 
an entirely different register. This re-presentation is most manifest through four pivotal 
                                                
483 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.299-302, […illiterate laborers of little understanding / Seldom fall as 
foully and deeply into sin / As do clerks of Holy Church who should keep and save / Ignorant men in good 
belief and give them in their need]. 
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figures whose teachings and modes of instruction Langland uses to correct and recast an 
alternative theological vision.  
Imaginatif, Liberum Arbitrium, the Samaritan, and the Christ who harrows hell 
offer a tapestry of teaching that is grounded not in language dislocated from biblical 
narratives or abstracted in formulas produced through late-medieval scholastic discourse, 
but is instead grounded in some of the fundamental mysteries of the faith (especially the 
trinity and the imago dei) coupled with the narratives which culminate in Christ’s passion 
and resurrection. Throughout the proceeding analysis of these four figures, detailed 
attention will be paid to the distinct capacity of Langland’s poetry to re-present (1) 
multiple diverse images depicting subtle instances of non-competitive double agency that 
Langland presents as constitutive of grace, (2) a creative and expansive vision of Christ’s 
atonement, which leads to (3) a vision of the church founded in Christ’s blood that not 
only corrects Recklessness’ errors but also the errors of late-medieval Christians whose 
vision of the Church collapse the historical manifestation of the church into an end in 
itself. The fourth (4) and critical element demonstrates how the teachings of these four 
figures gives the audience the resources needed to judge the terms under which 
Conscience offers the Eucharist within Vnity. Specifically, Conscience’s Eucharist is 
seen as a mistake because the conditionality with which he frames the Eucharist departs 
from the church’s foundation in Christ’s blood and instead locates the sacrament’s 
foundation in human ethical action. In addition, the teaching and mode of discourse 
offered through the four figures analyzed here further train the audience to identify 
Conscience’s infamous decision to abandon the Church in the poem’s closing lines as a 
critical error; especially when read in contrast to Will’s obedience to Kynde and his 
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willingness to remain in Vnity, even as it crumbles around him. Piers Plowman’s 
ecclesial vision emerges out of a subtle poetic processes of these four figures interactions.  
 Will, who has been temporarily subsumed into Recklessness (XII-XIII), only 
begins to return to himself as Kynde turns Will/Recklessness’ gaze towards the mirror of 
middle earth ‘To knowe by vch a creature Kynde to louye.’484 Through Kynde’s 
intervention and guiding Will to behold the ways through which reason appears in the 
natural order of creation, Will awakes from his dream within a dream and meets the 
figure of Imaginatif. Will remains puzzled and in search of Dowell. 
 
§ Remembering Imaginatif 
 Imaginatif’s teaching on Dowell is as beautiful as it is concise. It takes up specific 
elements of Recklessness’ argument and supersedes them. First, Imaginatif explains, 
Y haue folewed the, in fayth, mo then fourty wynter  
And wissed the fol ofte what Dowel was to mene  
And conseyled the for Cristes sake no creature to bygile,  
… 
Lowe the and leue forth in the lawe of holy chirche,  
And thenne dost thow wel, withoute drede, ho can do bet, no force!  
Clerkes that conne al, Y hope they can do bettere,  
Ac hit soffiseth to be saued to be such as Y tauhte.  
Ac for to louye and to lene and lyue wel and byleue  
Is ycalde Caritas, Kynde Loue an Engelysche,  
And that is Dobet, yf eny suche be, a blessed man that helpeth  
                                                
484 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIII.132, [To learn through each creature how to love Kind]. 
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That pees be and pacience and pore withoute defaute:485 
 
Contrary to Recklessness, Imaginatif argues that salvation is not reducible to the 
inscrutable determination of God alone; but rather a person’s salvation is bound up with 
their willingness to ‘Lowe the and leue forth in the lawe of holy chirche.’ Such obedience 
is, for Imaginatif, all that salvation requires. Though, there is a way beyond, the way of 
caritas. Both Dowell and Dobest require human agency, humility, obedience and love. 
For Will, who was utterly immersed in Recklessness’ logic in the preceding passus, 
Imaginatif’s recovery of human agency in the process of salvation is striking; as is 
Imaginatif’s concise yet brilliant description of the grace that makes human agency 
possible. Here, Langland offers a brilliant thread of the larger tapestry of images that his 
poetry will weave together to depict human and divine agency as non-competitive. 
Imaginatif explains, 
Ac grace is a graes ther-fore to don hem efte growe; /  
Ac grace ne groweth nat til gode-wil gyue reyne / 
And woky thorw gode werkes wikkede hertes. / 
Ac ar such a wil wexe worcheth god sulue /  
And sent forth the seynt espirit to do loue sprynge: / 
 Spiritus ubi vult spirat. / 
So grace withouten grace of god and also gode werkes / 
May nat be, be thow syker, thogh we bidde euere.486 
                                                
485 Langland, Piers Plowman XIV.3-5, 9-16, [I have faithfully followed you more than forty winters / And 
instructed you often on what Do-well means / And counseled you for Christ’s sake not to deceive any 
creature, / … /To humble yourself and to live henceforth in the law of Holy Church / And then you do well, 
without a doubt, it doesn’t matter who can do better, / But Do-well and to be such as I taught suffice for 
salvation. / But to love and to give and live well and believe / Is called Caritas, Natural Love in English, / 




Grace makes human’s able to Dowell and to Dobest, but grace will not grow, Imaginatif 
teaches, unless “gode-wil” gives rain. This brilliant word play embeds God’s will (gode-
wil) at the heart of human goodwill (gode-wil), and as the rain necessary for grace to 
grow within a human being and thereby make a person capable of Dowell and Dobest. A 
person’s good will and good works moistens even wicked hearts, suggesting that even the 
wicked might be saved. Yet a person’s good will and good works are never theirs’ alone. 
For Imaginatif, human good will and good works are only possible because of the gift of 
the Holy Spirit breathed into the heart. The Spirit stirs a desire for good will and good 
works, and a person’s movement in, through and towards that God-inspired good will 
moistens even wicked hearts. A person’s good will and good work are bound up with 
God’s own will. Human and agency melts before the warmth of divine love and is made 
free to act through the act of God’s Spirit.  
Human and divine agency are not collapsed into one another here, nor does one 
predetermine or coerce the other. Instead, the poetry offers a picture of God’s grace and 
human agency eliding, overlapping, in a mode that is non-competitive, free. The 
reference to John 3:8 is a lection Recklessness might have readily used to justify his view 
of election as being independent of human agency and determined by the whimsy of God 
whose Holy Spirit blows wherever it wills inscrutably and arbitrarily. Yet, Imaginatif 
appeals to this passage to gesture towards the width of God’s grace even to the wicked, 
and also the need for human participation in the gift for it to become meritorious. Thus 
                                                                                                                                            
486 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIV.23-29, [But grace is a grassy herb that makes [Do-well and Do-best] 
grow again; / But grace won’t grow until goodwill gives rain / And through good works moistens wicked 
hearts. / But before such desire grew God himself went to work / And sent forth the Holy Spirit to make 
love spring up: / The spirit breatheth where he will. / So grace without God’s grace and good works as well 
/ Cannot be, you can be sure, though we pray forever]. 
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the brilliant line, ‘grace withouten grace of god and also gode werkes / May nat be, be 
thow syker, thogh we bidde euere.’ Contrary to Recklessness, grace, for Imaginatif is not 
reducible to a gift of fortune. Rather grace is the gift of ‘gode-wil’ blown into the human 
heart through the Holy Spirit which blows even upon the wicked, to stir up desire for 
good works which in turn warms hearts to become capable of the love that is salvation. 
This subtle depiction of grace is the first of several which Langland offers to begin to re-
present an alternative view of grace as well as alternative boundaries for Christ’s 
atonement to those posed by Recklessness. 
 The implications of Imaginatif’s view of grace upon his vision of the atonement 
becomes manifest as Imaginatif takes up one of the very biblical characters Recklessness 
used to support his fatalistic view of grace as a ‘gift of fortune.’ Recklessness taught 
Will, 
A Gode Friday, Y fynde, a feloun was ysaued  
That vnlawefulliche hadde ylyued al his lyf-tyme,  
… 
A robbere was yraunsomed rather then thei alle --   
Withoute penaunce other passioun other eny other peyne  
Passed forth paciently to perpetuel blisse.487 
 
For Recklessness, the thief who dies next to Christ is saved without any penance, 
suffering or pain; and is thus an example of the random nature of God’s saving grace 
which is gifted without any human agency at all. Interpreting the same character, 
                                                
487 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.252-3, 257-60, [On Good Friday, I find, a felon was saved / Who had 
lived his whole lifetime as an outlaw, / … A robber was ransomed sooner than them all [John the Baptist, 
Adam, Isaiah or any of the prophets]; / Without penance or suffering or any other pain / He passed forth 
patiently into perpetual bliss]. 
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however, Imaginatif directs Will’s attention to the part of the story Recklessness glosses 
over. Recklessness himself had noted of the thief, ‘And for he biknewe on the cross and 
to Crist shrof hym / He was sunnere ysaued then seynt John the Baptiste, and yet skipped 
over any significance the man’s faith or confession may have played in his salvation.488 
Imaginatif returns to this same scene, this same figure, 
The thef that hadde grace of gode a Gode Fryday, as thow toldest, 
Was for a yeld hym creaunt to Crist and his grace askede. 
And god is ay gracious to alle that gredeth to hym  
And wol no wikkede man be lost bote if he wol hymsulue: 
 Nolo mortem peccatoris, &c.489 
 
The thief was not saved without himself. Rather, he was saved in part because he 
surrendered his belief up to Christ and called out for grace. Here, this figure becomes an 
exemplar for Imaginatif’s view that God’s gift of grace is extended even to the wicked, 
and that God’s grace can stir up the will of a wicked heart to call out to God. Damnation 
is not, Imaginatif teaches, the will of God but only the result of a person rejecting the 
grace poured into their heart by the Holy Spirit. And so the thief becomes an example of 
a person whose desire to call out to God is stirred up through God’s gift of grace and then 
joined by the person to thereby merit their salvation.  
Yet, how far does Imaginatif extend the gift of God’s healing grace? Will 
anticipates this question and attempts to determine grace’s limits by appealing to clerks 
                                                
488 Langland, Piers Plowman, XI.252-3, […because he confessed faith on the cross and made confession to 
Christ / He was saved…]. 
489 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIV.131-4, [The thief had grace of God on Good Friday, as you said, / 
Because he surrendered his belief up to Christ and asked for his grace. / And God is always gracious to all 
who cry out to him / And will let no wicked man be lost, unless he wants it himself. / I desire not the death 
of the wicked]. 
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who teach that neither Saracens nor Jews can be saved without baptism.490 Repeating the 
often quoted understanding that Extra ecclesiam nulla salus, Will suggests the sacrament 
of baptism as a sort of marker that determines those who are saved. Imaginatif meets 
Will’s proposal with a ‘contra’ and a frown of disproval.491 Imaginatif attests to three 
different forms of baptism; by water, by bloodshed (martyrdom) and by fire (the 
illumination of the Holy Spirit). He then points to Trajan as an example of one who was 
outside the church and yet saved through one of these alternative forms of baptism.492 
Here, it seems, Imaginatif has expanded the reach of grace and Christ’s atonement to 
potentially include all, even those outside the church and the sacrament of baptism, 
unless a person wills their own damnation and rejects the gift of grace. Imaginatif’s 
teaching, while challenging Recklessness’ view of grace and the limits he places on 
Christ’s atonement, runs the risk of doing so only by offering a mirror image of 
Recklessness’ view. If grace is extended to all as a gift of the Holy Spirit poured out into 
the hearts of even the wicked, and if salvation requires participation in the gift of grace, 
then Imaginatif’s teaching risks grounding human salvation not in the will of God but 
rather in the human will to participate in the gift of grace. Furthermore, Imaginatif’s 
teaching that salvation extends to those outside the church through the diversity of 
baptismal forms, risks compromising the specific role of the church and its sacraments, if 
not making both ultimately irrelevant. On the one hand, Recklessness’ portrayal of 
election proscribes, albeit inscrutable, limits to Christ’s atonement to the predestined 
whom God foreknows thereby nullifying the efficacy of both human agency and the 
Church. On the other hand, Imaginative’s expansion of Christ’s atonement to include all 
                                                
490 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIV.197-9. 
491 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIV.202. 
492 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIV.205-10. 
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people, even those outside the Church so long as they live according to their law, could 
also nullify the efficacy of the Church in the other direction. Imaginatif’s view makes 
salvation available to all, but also contingent upon human will. All these tensions gather 
force in the moment immediately preceding Imaginatif vanishing from the poem. And 
yet, Imaginatif’s teaching seeds in Will’s own imagination poetry that points towards a 
view of human and divine agency that is non-competitive. The development and 
reinforcement of this teaching by those Will meets next, coupled with more detailed 
reflection upon the nature of the church, work together to guide the audience to a more 
robust understanding of grace, the atonement and the church. These seeds will grow 
significantly in the particular teachings of Liberum Arbitruim. 
 
§ Liberum Arbitrium, caritas and the church 
 Prior to meeting Liberum Arbitrium, Will awakes from his dream, and from 
Imaginatif who led him, only to fall asleep again. This time, Will is led by Conscience 
and Clergy for a meal to dine with a ‘master.’493 Conscience eventually dismisses Clergy 
from the meal in a not so subtle nod to Recklessness who also dismissed Clergy of all 
kinds. Conscience then chooses to sojourn with Patience who proceeds to teach Will and 
Conscience on the virtues of poverty. Patience’s teaching on poverty modifies and 
reproduces that of Recklessness.494 While the dinner scene of Passus XV and Patience’s 
extended teaching on poverty are worthy of analysis, and much insightful commentary 
has indeed been offered, I will pass over these scenes to instead consider a portion of the 
teaching Will receives from the figure he meets following Patience’s teaching on poverty, 
                                                
493 Langland, Piers Plowman, XV. 
494 See especially Kate Crasson The Claims of Poverty: Literature, Culture, and Ideology in Late Medieval 
England (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). 
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Liberum Arbitrium. There are hints of a chiastic structure between the contrasting 
arguments of Recklessness and Imaginatif on the one hand, and the contrasting 
arguments between Patience and Liberum Arbitrium on the other. I pass over the details 
of the dinner scene and Patience’s teaching on poverty to focus upon Imaginatif and 
Liberum Arbitrium’s teachings side by side so as to demonstrate the ways in which 
Liberum Arbitrium builds upon and develops that which Will has learned before through 
Imaginatif.  
Just as Imaginatif argues that love is among the chief virtues through which the 
thief on the cross participates in the grace God extends to him and is thereby saved, so 
Liberum Arbitrium’s teaching is an extended reflection on love. In the opening exchange 
between Will and Liberum Arbitrium, the latter offers harsh words to those leaders of 
Holy Church ‘That lyuen ayen holy lore and the loue of charite.’495 Will latches on to this 
term, and notes, ‘Charite…that is a thyng forsothe / That maistres commenden moche; 
where may hit be yfounde?’496 Will’s question, ‘where may [Charitie] be yfounde’ recalls 
the search for an order, a community or vocation that might claim possession over 
charity. This is a question and an answer that Will rejected in Passus X when the friar 
self-confidently proclaimed that Dowell dwelled with his order perpetually. Will’s 
question repeated here returns to the puzzles Recklessness and Imaginatif considered in 
their respective appeals to a limited vision of the atonement on the one hand, and a 
universal extension of grace on the other. Liberum Arbitrum rejects all three of these 
options, and instead explains that, ‘By clothyng ne by carpynge knowe shaltow hym 
                                                
495 Langland, Piers Plowman, XVI.283, [Who live against holy doctrine and the love of charity]. 
496 Langland, Piers Plowman, XVI.284-5, [Charity…that is a thing indeed / That masters praise much; 
where can it be found?]. 
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neuere / Ac thorw werkes thow myhte wyte wher-forth he walketh.’497 Liberum 
Arbitrium goes on to list that he has seen Charity walk in a poor man’s clothes, in the 
robes of different monastic and mendicant orders, in the gilt armor of a knight, in the 
robes worn by scholastic theologians, among the rich and those in the king’s court.498 The 
only restriction Liberum Arbitrium notes is that, ‘Ac biddyng als a beggare byhelde Y 
hym neuere.’499 Liberum Arbitrium insists that Charity can be found across the full 
spectrum of society, and that no particular community, order, class, or vocation has claim 
over charity.  
Charity, perhaps similar to Imaginatif’s account of the Holy Spirit, blows where it 
wills and is neither restricted nor controlled by the arbitrary boundaries of social ordering 
nor by any institution. Love, that virtue which is central to a person’s reception of and 
participation in God’s saving grace, extends as wide as the world. Thus, Liberum 
Arbitrum’s vision of the extent of the atonement hints towards key elements of 
Imaginatif’s view as opposed to Recklessness. Furthermore, Liberum Arbitrium’s 
teaching on charity questions the view offered by Patience at the end of the dinner scene. 
There, Patience connects charity with poverty as the ‘chief of all vertues’ and comes 
close to the position offered by the friars of Passus X that Dowell resides with their order 
perpetually.500 In contrast, Liberum Arbitrium focuses not on poverty, but on charity as 
the chief of all virtue, and sees charity present in all orders of society and persistently 
resistant to any attempt to restrict or contain charity to one group or individual in a 
society. Charity, Liberum Arbitrium appropriately argues, is free.  
                                                
497 Langland, Piers Plowman, XVI.337-8, [You’ll never know him by clothing or speech, / But through 
works you might learn where he walks]. 
498 Langland, Piers Plowman, XVI.339-65. 
499 Langland, Piers Plowman, XVI.348, ‘[never beheld [Charity] acting like a beggar]. 
500 Langland, Piers Plowman, XV.275. 
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Liberum Arbitrium defines the content of charity quite distinctly from Patience’s 
close association of it to poverty. Liberum Arbitrum teaches, 
And lele men lyue as lawe techeth and loue therof aryseth  
The whiche is the heued of charite and hele of mannes soule. 
Dilige deum propter deum, id est propter veritatem; Et inimicum tuum 
propter mandatum, id est propter legem; Et amicum propter amorem, 
id est propter caritatem. 
Loue god for he is goed and grounde of all treuthe;  
Loue thyn enemye entirely, goddess heste to fulfille; 
Loue thy frende that folleweth thy wille, that is thy fayre soule. 
… 
And that is charite, leue chield, to be cher ouer thy soule; 
Contrarie her nat as in consience yf thow wold come to heuene.501 
 
For Liberum Arbitrium, charity is not poverty but the love of God, the love of enemy and 
the love of neighbor grounded in and for the sake of God who is truth. This form of 
Charity is not reducible to sentiment. Instead, Liberum Arbitrium argues that this 
particular form of charity is the charity which ought to lead Christians and the church out 
into the world on evangelical missions proclaiming and embodying charity to friends and 
enemies alike.502 An evangelical mission that, for Liberum Arbitrium, may well result in 
                                                
501 Langland, Piers Plowman, XVII.139-43, 148-9, [And true men live as the law teaches and love arises 
from that, / Which is the head of charity and salvation of man’s soul. / Love God for the sake of God, that 
is, for the sake of truth; / your enemy for the sake of the commandment, that is, for the / sake of law; your 
friend for the sake of love, that is, / for the sake of charity. / Love God because he is good and ground of all 
truth; / Love your enemy entirely, God’s commandment to fulfill; / Love your friend that follows your will, 
who is your fair soul. /… / And that is charity, dear child, to be anxious concerning your soul; / Do not 
contradict her, as in conscience, if you would come to heaven]. 
502 Langland, Piers Plowman, VXII.160-323. 
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martyrdom. This is an important element of Liberum Arbitrium’s teaching because it 
qualifies the power charity has in the world. That is to say, Liberum Arbitrium does not 
envision charity as a sort of unimpeachable argument, the strength of which will 
eventually win over and lead to the conversion of non-Christians. Rather, charity is 
vulnerable to both rejection and violence in the world to which it is offered. This is 
underscored by Liberum Arbitrium’s assessment that Constantine’s donation was 
‘venom’ and ‘poison’ to Holy Church. Specifically, Liberum Arbitrium does not assume 
that the church’s evangelical mission will build up any sort of empire, or Christendom.503  
Parallel to Imaginatif, Liberum Arbitrium teaches that charity is not limited to the 
boundaries or identity markers of the church but extends beyond it to include Jews and 
Saracens.504 And yet, Liberum Arbitrium suggests that the gospel will not coerce non-
Christians with argument. Rather, Liberum Arbitrium both warns and exhorts the church 
that faithful proclamation will be met with violence by those powers (religious and 
otherwise) at odds with such proclamation. This is an important element in Liberum 
Arbitrum’s vision of charity and the church because it introduces a vision of those moved 
by charity and who in turn constitute the church not as a potential majority buffered by 
the power of Christendom, nor as a predetermined group of the elect visible or invisible, 
but rather as a diverse and difficult to define ad hoc minority group identifiable through a 
freely chosen commitment to love God, neighbor and enemy alike.505 Will is ravished by 
this vision of charity and begs Liberum Arbitrium to lead him on to charity.  
                                                
503 Compare Recklessness and Liberum Arbitrium’s distinct assessments of Christendom (e.g. XVII.220 vs. 
XII.105). 
504 Langland, Piers Plowman, II.105, XVII.220. 
505 Aers’ interpretation of Liberum Arbitrium’s ecclesiology is particularly instructive here, Beyond 
Reformation, p. 170, ‘But [Liberum Arbitrium] also evoked a very different model of church. Wille asks 
him, ‘What is holy churche, chere [dear] frende?’ (XVII.125). His answer is summed up in one word: 
‘‘Charite,’ he said’ (XVII.125). However enigmatic the reply, his gloss on it shows that such a church is far 
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The image Langland’s poetry creates next is extraordinary, 
 
Thenne louh Liberum Arbitrium and ladde me forth with tales /  
Til we cam into a contre, Cor-hominis hit heihte, / 
Erber of alle pryuatees and of holiness. /  
Euene in the myddes an ympe, as hit were, / 
That hihte Ymago-dei, graciousliche hit growede.506 
 
Liberum Arbitrium does not take Will to the church of Christendom. Nor does he lead 
Will to an illusory and difficult to discern company of fools (‘foles’) representing the true 
church. Instead, Liberum Arbitrium leads Will into the heart of humanity (Cor-hominis), 
in the middle of which grows the very image of God (Ymago-dei) like a graft. This 
remarkable image carries forward and develops Imaginatif’s earlier representation of 
grace and human agency. Where Imaginatif envisioned grace as blown into the human 
heart as the good will of God which melts even wicked human hearts and makes them 
capable of good will through which God gifts the merit of salvation, Liberum Arbitrium’s 
image makes God and God’s grace even more intimate, more deeply interwoven into 
humanity. Grace, for Liberum Arbitrium, is not blown into the human heart from outside, 
rather the very image of God (Ymago-dei) is represented as a graft squarely planted in the 
middle of the human heart set by the Trinity itself. It is upon and through this graft that 
                                                                                                                                            
removed from the contemporary ecclesiastical polity with its material powers and hierarchies of dominion. 
Liberum Arbitrium has in mind not such an institution, even if reformed by an armed elite, but rather a 
form of life freely chosen (‘liberum arbitrium’ is speaking). The latter is beautifully described as a ‘loue-
knotte’ in which people hold together in ‘o will,’ lending and selling with integrity, a memory of relations 
in the Pentecostal community founded by the Holy Spirit (XVII.125-29; XXI.213-61). No hierarchy and no 
conventional signs of divisions between laity and clergy can even be glimpsed in this model.’ 
506 Langland, Piers Plowman, XVIII.3-8, [Then Free Will laughed and led me forth with tales / Until we 
came to into a country called Cor-hominis, / Garden of all mysteries and holiness. / Squarely in the middle 
a graft, as it were, / That’s named Ymago-dei graciously grew]. 
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human beings grow.507 God plants God’s image squarely in the middle, at the very core, 
of humanity and it is upon and through God’s image planted at the core of humanity that 
humanity grows.  
This picture offers another, even more sophisticated representation of the 
mysterious overlaps and elisions of human and divine agency constitutive of grace. It is 
an image that both subverts and surpasses the flat dichotomies drawn between human and 
divine agency that had become pervasive in late-medieval scholastic semi-pelagian 
debates.508 Human agency, in the terms of this image, is unimaginable apart from God’s 
grace because human agency itself is both created and empowered by God. As such, the 
image blocks any attempt to represent human agency apart from the creative and 
empowering grace of God. Human agency is itself a gift, and thus merit and salvation are 
thereby seen through a lens in which the giftedness of human agency is not seen as 
competitive with nor possible apart from God’s grace.  
Liberum Arbitrium’s mode of teaching in this scene is as significant as the image 
he offers. He leads Will to this vision ‘with tales.’ Specifically, the image itself is 
presented within a narrative through which key figures, the trinity, the fiend, etc., 
respectively create and attack the tree of charity. Liberum Arbitrium recasts theological 
terms (Potencia-dei-patris and Sapiencia-dei-patris) previously abstracted from 
                                                
507 See Augustine Confessions, lib. 3, cap. 6, linea 57, ‘tu autem eras interior intimo meo et superior summo 
meo [‘You [God] were more inward than my most inward part and higher than the highest element within 
me’], trans. Henry Chadwick Saint Augustine Confessions (Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 43. Julian of 
Norwich rendered a similar sentiment contemporary to Langland, ‘And so I saw most surely that it is 
quicker for us and easier to come to the knowledge of God than it is to know our own soul. For our soul is 
so deeply grounded in God and so endlessly treasured that we cannot come to knowledge of it until we first 
have knowledge of God, who is the Creator to whom it is united’, see Julian of Norwhich Showings trans. 
Edmund Colledge, OSA and James Walsh, SJ (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), p. 288. 
508 See William J. Courtenay Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth Century England (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988) and Heikiko Oberman The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late 
Medieval Nominalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963). 
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scriptural narratives by figures like Recklessness, and places them back in the context of 
the economy of salvation. This becomes abundantly apparent following Liberum 
Arbitrium’s brief teaching on marriage, when Will asks Liberum Arbitrium to allow 
someone to shake the tree of charity so that the ripe fruit might fall. Immediately the 
poetry enters into an imaginative depiction of the fall of the fruit, a retelling of the story 
of humanity’s fall in the garden of Eden, then the witness of the patriarchs, the 
annunciation, incarnation, and a summary narrative of Jesus’ ministry up until the 
moment of Judas’ betrayal in another garden.509  Liberum Arbitrium’s imagistic and 
narrative representation of the mystery of grace literally cascades into a retelling of the 
‘tale’, the narratives that make up the economy of salvation which culminate in Christ’s 
passion. And yet, Liberum Arbitrium does not offer Will the story of the passion in full. 
His telling of the tale is interrupted when Will awakes at the moment of Judas betraying 
Jesus in the garden. 
Will awakes ‘nere frentyk’ [almost frantic], panting for the tale to continue.510 He 
meets another character in the story, Abraham, a representative of both the theological 
virtue of faith and the biblical patriarch in whom God establishes a covenant relationship 
with Israel. Langland here couples a potentially abstract virtue, faith, with a figure and a 
narrative that shapes and informs the meaning of the virtue itself. This mode of teaching 
is far removed from figures like Recklessness, the friar, and the Master of Passus XV 
who all taught Will by way of abstracting theological language. Significant also is that 
Will meets this Abraham not simply in the blank chronology on one damn thing after 
another. Rather, Will meets this figure ‘a Mydde-Lentones Sonenday’ [on Mid-lent 
                                                
509 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXIII.112-79. 
510 Langland, Piers Plowman, XVIII.178. 
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Sunday], within the liturgical time of the church’s worship.511 Thus, just as Will is being 
led on by figures who continue the tales of Christ’s passion, he is simultaneously swept 
up into a form of time that is ordered by the practices of the church’s worship. Abraham 
offers Will another summary gloss of the trinity, creation, Old Testament history and the 
incarnation until the two meet another figure along the way. Spes, or hope, affirms 
Abraham’s teaching on the trinity and adds the ‘greatest commandment’ to love God and 
neighbor. Will attempts to dismiss Spes, ‘Go thy gate [Get out of here]’, on the grounds 
that his, and Abraham’s, teaching on the trinity and the law of neighbor love are 
inconceivable.512 The three continue walking along until they meet a Samaritan; a figure 
of the third theological virtue, love, embodied. Lest the hurried reader miss Langland’s 
point, this third and authoritative teacher is represented via a story within a story, a 
parable offered by Christ himself within the narrative of salvation. As previous 
interlocutors’ errant theological positions are corrected and superseded, Will is led along 
on his journey towards truth by way of stories layered upon stories replete with images 
outside of which the kind of technical second order theological language used by 
Recklessness is utterly unintelligible.  
 
§ The Samaritan’s rescue 
The Samaritan takes up key elements of Abraham and Spes’ teachings by offering 
creative images that work together to represent a vision of grace, the atonement and the 
church that remembers and develops positions previously explored through Imaginatif 
and Liberum Arbitrium. While the Samaritan’s teaching on the nature of grace has been 
                                                
511 Langland, Piers Plowman, XVIII.181. 
512 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.44. 
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examined previously (see Chapter 2.2), a few elements are worth recalling here. First, the 
Samaritan’s representation of Semyuief depicts a person so wounded by sin that he 
literally cannot move to help himself, ‘For he ne myhte stepe ne stande ne stere foet ne 
handes / Ne helpe hymsulue sothly.’513 Semyuief is entirely dependent upon the 
Samaritan to save his life. There is no hint in this narrative that Semyuief might, as the 
popular phrase of the via moderna suggested, facere quod in se est, or do that which is in 
him. Wounded and bound on the roadside, Semyuief has absolutely no agency of his own 
with which he might heal himself. He cannot even wiggle a toe towards untying the ropes 
of his bondage. Once the Samaritan arrives, anoints and unbinds Semyuief; the Samaritan 
then takes Semyuief to a grange, the church. Here, Semyuief’s agency becomes critical. In 
fact, Semyuief’s healing is left up to the contingency of his participation in his own 
healing within the care of the inn keeper and other guests, ‘And lefte hym there a-
lechyng, to lyue yf he myhte.’514 Derek Pearsall’s rendering of the grammar here differs 
from Economou’s in a way that points to Langland’s gestures towards the overlaps and 
elisions constitutive of human agency and God’s grace that Langland has so carefully 
crafted throughout the poem. Pearsall renders the lines thus, ‘And left him there to be 
healed, to live if he had the strength.’515 The passive ‘to be healed’ invites the audience to 
imagine that Semyuief will be brought to health by the continued care of someone outside 
of himself, the innkeeper perhaps, much the same way as the Samaritan arrived as an 
outside actor to save Semyuief’s life on the roadside. Yet, the line continues in a way that 
makes Semyuief’s healing contingent upon his own strength, his own agency. He will 
                                                
513 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.56-7, [For he could neither step nor stand nor stir a foot or hands / Nor 
help himself in anyway…]. 
514 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.75, [And left him there for healing, to live if he might]. 
515 Pearsall, William Langland Piers Plowman: A New Annotated Edition, p. 312, XIX.75. 
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only live, the line suggests, if he [Semyuief] has the strength. Specifically, the strength, 
the Samaritan says, to receive ‘the bloed of a barn’ [the blood of a child].516  
The Samaritan continues,  
And thouh he stande and steppe, riht stronge worth he neuere  
Til he haue eten al that barn and his bloed drunken… 
And yut bote they leue lelly vpon that litel baby,  
That his lycame shal lechen at the laste vs alle.517 
 
The Samaritan teaches Will that Semyuief will only survive if he receives all the body and 
blood of this child and believes that this child’s body will heal all people in the end. Here 
again, Langland is including, while simultaneously qualifying, human agency in the 
economy of salvation. Semyuief cannot save himself. And yet, his strength, his agency, is 
a necessary component of his healing. That healing, and the strength to participate in it, is 
contingent upon receiving and believing fully in another. Will, however, is not yet ready 
to receive the subtleties of the Samaritan’s teaching concerning the connection between 
the Incarnation and the Eucharist. He is still puzzled by Abraham and Spes’ respective 
teaching on the trinity.518  
Before departing from the Samaritan’s instruction, four elements of the 
Samaritan’s teaching in particular stand out. First, the Eucharistic emphasis that 
Semyuief’s life is contingent upon the blood of Christ. Second, that Christ’s healing blood 
must be received by Semyuief and that this will require a degree of strength (albeit a 
                                                
516 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.86. 
517 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.89-90, 94-5, [And though he stand up and take a step, he’ll never get 
strong / Till he has eaten all that child and drunk his blood, /… / And further unless they believe loyally in 
that little child, / That his body will heal us all in the end.]. 
518 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.96. 
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strength that is only enabled by the Samaritan’s saving act). Third, that the place in which 
Semyuief will receive the blood and body of Christ is in the grange under the care of the 
innkeeper. And fourth, the Samaritan’s hint that the blood of Christ received at the inn 
extends to all. The Samaritan’s vision of grace echoes those representations of grace that 
craft a picture of human agency and God’s grace not as competitive, but as mysteriously 
doubled, cooperating. God’s saving act is primary, and God-enabled human agency is 
represented as necessary for human salvation. Furthermore, the Samaritan’s teaching 
grounds human salvation in the very blood of Christ and extends the hope of salvation in 
and through Christ’s blood to all. Lastly, the church, figured as the grange, or inn, is 
portrayed by the Samaritan as the context in which Semyuief might come to health as he 
receives little by little the fullness of Christ’s body and blood. A final, and key, element 
of the Samaritan’s teaching adds yet another layer of nuance to his depiction of grace, the 
atonement and the church.  
As the Samaritan guides Will into another image representing the mystery of the 
trinity, that of a taper; the Samaritan insists that unkindness, unkindness against the Holy 
Ghost, against one’s fellow Christians or the killing of another human being for their 
property, will not be forgiven, ‘Leue Y neuere that oure lord at the laste ende / Wol louye 
that lyf that loue and charite destruyeth.’519 This appears to be a significant qualification 
to the Samaritan’s hints towards Christ’s blood offering a universal salvation to all. God 
will not save all persons, it seems, rather God will reject those who are unkind. Will, 
hedging his bets, asks the Samaritan whether he might be saved were he guilty of such 
                                                
519 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.277-8, [I’ll never believe that our Lord at the last end / Will love that 
life that destroys charity]. 
519 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.96 
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unkindness and was now moved to contrition, confession and begged for God’s mercy.520 
The Samaritan says, ‘Yus…so thow myhtest repente / That rihtwisnesse thorw 
repentaunce to reuthe mythe turne.’521 A qualified ‘yes’, that is underscored by his final 
words,  
For ther ne is sike ne sory ne non so moche wreche  
That he ne may louye, and hym lyke, and lene of his herte  
Goed wil, goed word bothe, wischen and wilnen  
Alle manere men mercy and foryeuenesse,  
And louye hem yliche hymsulue and his lyf amende.522 
 
The Samaritan is clear that Christ’s blood offers salvation to all. This salvation, however, 
can only be realized through one’s active reception of Christ’s blood through the 
Eucharist within the care of the church. The Samaritan also insists that those who are 
unkind to the Holy Ghost and their neighbors will be rejected by God unless they 
earnestly seek repentance, and that such earnest repentance is seldom performed. Will 
then awakens, his vision again interrupted, prior to the full telling of the passion and 
resurrection. Langland will now offer one final Christ figure, quite literally the Christ 
who harrows hell, to add one last layer to the poem’s dialectic unfolding of grace, the 
atonement and the church. 
 
§ Christus Victor  
                                                
520 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.279-81. 
521 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.283-4, [Yes…provided you repent so / That through repentance 
righteousness might turn to pity. / But it is very seldom seen]. 
522 Langland, Piers Plowman, XIX.324-9, [For there is none so sick or sorry or so wretched / That he may 
not love, if he likes, and give from his heart / Good will, a good word as well, to wish and will / All manner 
of men mercy and forgiveness, / And love them like himself, that he may not amend his life]. 
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 Passus XX opens with Will wandering like a vagrant, weary, falling asleep and 
entering into another vision. He beholds the scene of Palm Sunday, with children crying 
osanna as ‘Oen semblable to the Samaritaen and somdeel to Pers the ploughman / 
Barefoot on an asse bake boetles cam prikynge.’523 The vision moves quickly from 
Christ’s entrance into Jerusalem, Pilate’s order and then to the execution. Following the 
death of this Samaritan/Piers figure, Will beholds a vision of Christ’s work performed on 
Holy Saturday, that veiled time of darkness between Christ’s passion and resurrection, 
through a discussion between four sisters; Mercy, Righteousness, Justice, and Peace. 
Langland uses these sisters to illustrate the tensions of a theology that holds together 
mercy with righteousness, justice with peace. The differences between the squabbling 
siblings at first appear irreconcilable. From a vantage that allows both a sight of hell, in 
all its darkness and agony, and the flash of the coming light of Christ racing towards 
hell’s gates, Peace speaks with great hope about what Christ’s light will bring, 
My wil is to wende…and welcomen hem alle  
That many day myhte Y nat se for merkenesse of synne,   
Adam and Eue and other mo in helle.  
… 
Loue that is my lemman such lettres he me sente  
That Mercy, my sustur, and me to maynprisen hem alle  
And that Crist hath conuerted the kynde of rihtwisnesse  
Into pees and pyte of his puyr grace.524 
                                                
523 Langland, Piers Plowman, XX.8-9, [One who resembled the Samaritan and Piers the plowman 
somewhat / Barefoot came riding bootless on an ass’s back]. 
524 Langland, Piers Plowman, XX.179-81, 185-90, [My wish is to go…and welcome them all / Who for 
many a day I could not see for murkiness of sin, / Adam and Eve and many others in hell. /… / Love, who 
 246 
 
Peace envisions a welcome party for all humanity soon to be liberated from hell by this 
coming light. Mercy and Peace will not only bail humanity out of hell through the letters 
patent issued by Christ, but Christ, Peace hopes, will convert the very kynde of 
righteousness into peace and pity. With a line that appeals to those familiar with sibling 
rivalries across generations, Righteousness baulks at Peace’s proposal of a conversion 
that will not only erase Righteousness’ identity, but subsume it into that of her sister 
Peace. Righteousness protests, ‘Rauest thow?... or thow art riht dronke!’525 Righteousness 
insists, 
At the bigynnynge of the world god gaf the doem hymsulue  
That Adam and Eue and al his issue  
Sholde deye down-riht and dwelle in payne euere  
Yf that thei touched that tre and of the fruyt eten.526 
 
God’s judgment is eternal and unchanging, Righteousness argues. Fallen sinful humanity 
is doomed to die forever. God’s just punishment is permanent. The debate continues, with 
additional commentary from Justice, but Langland refuses to settle the tensions through 
debate. Instead, Langland recasts the tensions at the heart of Peace and Righteousness’ 
argument back into the narrative of salvation history as the sisters’ debate is interrupted 
                                                                                                                                            
is my lover, sent me such letters / That my sister Mercy and I shall save mankind, / And that God has 
forgiven and granted to all mankind / Mercy, my sister, and me to bail them all out; / And that Christ has 
converted the nature of righteousness / Into peace and pity out of his pure grace]. 
525 Langland, Piers Plowman, XX.193, [Do you rave?...Or are you just drunk!]. 
526 Langland, Piers Plowman, XX.196-9, [At the world’s beginning, God gave the judgment himself / That 
Adam and Eve and all their issue / Should downright die and dwell in pain forever / If they touched that 
tree and ate of its fruit]. 
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by ‘A vois loude in that liht’ that speaks to Lucifer holed up in hell, and demands the 
abolition of the prisoner’s enslaved therein.527  
 Having jousted for humanity upon the cross, Christ now descends into hell as a 
burst of luminous light to claim that which he has won, ‘Y fauht so m fursteth yut for 
mannes soule sake.’528 Christ himself proclaims that he did not fight for a few, but rather 
‘shal Y come as kynge, with croune and with angeles, / And haue out of helle alle 
mennes soules.’529 Christ, Langland imagines, is bound to a radical universal soteriology 
because of the nature of the Incarnation through which God in Christ has become 
‘brethrene of o bloed’ [brothers of one blood] with all humanity. Christ binds Lucifer and 
his minions with chains, and Christ leads out of hell ‘Tho ledes that Y louye and leued in 
my comynge’, all his “brethrene of o bloed” bound together through the Incarnation and 
Christ’s Passion.530 This image of the twin soteriological implications of the Incarnation 
and the Passion project a hope that the God who has become human in Christ will indeed 
save all humanity who believes in Christ through the resurrection. Will awakens from this 
vision by the ringing of church bells on Easter morning, and he quickly calls his wife and 
daughter to pilgrim with him to worship. 
 
§ Langland’s ecclesial catechesis 
A dialectical reading of the representations of grace, the atonement and the church 
unfolded through Imaginatif, Liberum Arbirtrium, the Samaritan and the Christ who 
harrows hell prepare Langland’s audience to make specific judgments about 
                                                
527 Langland, Piers Plowman, XX.274-7, [a loud voice within that light]. 
528 Langland, Piers Plowman, XX.407, [I fought so, I thirst even more for the sake of man’s soul]. 
529 Langland, Piers Plowman, XX.413-4, [I shall come as king, with crown and with angles, / And have out 
of hell all men’s souls]. 
530 Langland, Piers Plowman, XX.444, [The people I love and who believe in my coming]. 
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Conscience’s departure from Vnity in the poem’s closing lines. The debates between 
Recklessness and Imaginatif concerning the nature of human agency and God’s grace, 
subvert theologies that might exclude human agency from human salvation. As 
Imaginatif, Liberum Arbitrium and the Samaritan teach through a myriad of creative tales 
and images; God’s grace is necessary and prior to any human agency insofar as God’s 
gifting of grace enables human beings and makes them capable of participating in the 
‘gode-will’ which merits the gift of salvation. This gifting does not take place purely in 
the will or the mind, but includes embodied participation in the blood and body of Christ 
which is received at the grange, or church, in the Samaritan’s telling. As if to block any 
attempt to limit Christ’s atonement to those baptized in the hierarchical institution of the 
late-medieval Roman Church, Langland’s final Christ figure makes it clear that the 
implications of the Incarnation stretch beyond institutions and rituals because through the 
Incarnation, God in Christ has made God’s-self ‘brethrene of o bloed’ with all humanity. 
The Samaritan’s teaching that Semyuief can only be healed through participating in the 
Eucharist, and the community through which it is offered, is not however excluded. In 
fact, Christ’s recollection that it is through his very blood, not will or knowledge, that 
binds God and humanity in Christ emphasizes the implications of the Samaritan’s 
teaching on the Eucharist. Reception of the Eucharist, and the gift of the church through 
which Christ’s blood is received, can be seen from the perspective of both the Samaritan 
and the Christ who harrows hell as a gracious means through which God heals and 
restores humanity. This is punctuated by Will hurrying in joy towards the church’s bells 
singing the hope of the resurrection on Easter Sunday to receive Christ’s body and blood.  
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And yet, by giving the Christ who harrows hell the last words, Langland is also 
emphasizing an indebtedness to and development of an Anselmian theological 
inheritance that locates the ultimate cause of salvation in the atoning work of Jesus Christ 
achieved through the incarnation and passion. God’s saving acts, not Will’s, are the 
cornerstone and foundation of the church’s resurrection hope. Blood, not knowledge, not 
will, is the foundation of both the church and human salvation. Langland’s commitment 
to the narratives of God’s economy of salvation leads him to establish the church through 
an image that reflects a robust theology of the incarnation. Specifically, Langland’s 
representation of the incarnation, that Christ is ‘brethrene of o bloed’ with all humanity, 
and the soteriological and ecclesial implications through Grace’s establishment of the 
church offer an imaginative and theologically instructive teaching regarding the ecclesial 
implications of Chalcedon. Christ is one person in two natures, and thus Christ’s union 
with the church, opens up the imaginative possibility to envision participation in the 
church’s life as a means of participation in and transformation through unity with God’s 
divine nature. Through the Eucharist, the person of Christ, in body and blood, is extended 
to those who, the Samaritan teaches, receive Christ’s body and blood fully in their own 
bodies through their participation in Eucharistic lives that include reconciliation between 
God and also material restitution with fellow human beings.  
Here, Langland’s poetry does something quite distinct from contemporary debates 
concerning transubstantiation.531 That is to say, the poetry moves beyond flat dichotomies 
of transubstantiated versus spiritual presence, beyond fetishization of the host and beyond 
dismission of Christ’s real presence in the meal. Instead, Langland invites the audience to 
                                                
531 See de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum; Ian Christopher Levy John Wyclif’s Theology of the Eucharist in its 
Medieval Context (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2015); Aers Sanctifying Signs. 
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imagine participation in the Eucharistic life of the church as a participation in the very 
life of God which heals human souls through a grace that is as equally oriented to social 
practices of justice as it is to a mystical corporate union with God. It is here that 
Langland’s ecclesial vision perhaps most powerfully echoes the retrieval of the patristic 
and Augustinian vision de Lubac retrieves through Corpus Mysticum and describes 
through The Splendor of the Church. Langland’s poetic inquiry maintains space for 
mystery as well as the overlapping unities of the sacraments of Christ’s body upon the 
altar and Christ’s body the church. The compilation of these four teachings and the 
authority the poem grants to these figures, coupled with the dialectical mode through 
which their teachings interact, set Langland’s audience up to make specific judgments 
about Conscience’s leadership of, and ultimate departure from Vnity in the poem’s final 
scenes. While Conscience fails to guide the folk to embody this mystical, material and 
participatory vision of Eucharistic life through the church, his failure does not erase the 
poem’s ecclesial vision. Conscience’s failure is itself instructive. 
Chapter 2.1 analyzed Langland’s representation of Conscience’s turning, a 
turning or formation, that was shown to be significantly influenced by his time at court. 
Having now outlined the teachings of Imaginatif, Liberum Arbitrium, the Samaritan and 
Christ, Conscience’s treatment of the Eucharist and the church is discernable as a 
significant and errant departure from the instruction of the poem’s most authoritative 
voices. Three aspects make this evident: the conditionality under which Conscience 
offers the Eucharist; the form of church Conscience organizes; and Conscience’s decision 
to abandon Vnity. 
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In Passus IV and V, the king’s court is established by a conditional view of justice 
taught by Reason. Disobedience to the law results in punishment, while conferring fealty 
to the king garners reward. This is a view of justice that is ultimately conditional upon the 
maintenance of laws which are themselves written by the slew of lawyers dubiously 
influenced by Lady Mede.  In Passus XXI, while Conscience no longer acts as a 
constable at court, his formation in that particular context seeds a vestige memory of 
conditional justice. This becomes evident when Conscience calls the people into Vnity to 
receive the Eucharist. Conscience withholds the sacrament of Christ’s body and blood on 
condition that the people uphold the conditions of the pardon extended to Piers in Passus 
IX, redde quod debes.532 The folk infamously draw out the explicit conditionality of 
Conscience’s Eucharist: ‘How? ... thow conseylest vs to yelde / Al that we owen eny 
wyhte or that we go to hosele?’533 ‘That is my conseil’, says Conscience.534 Conscience’s 
perspective on the Eucharist is nothing novel in late medieval England. Thomas Brinton’s 
1383 Easter sermon, for example, condemns ‘usurers’ who fail to ‘make proper 
restitution of what [they have] unjustly acquired’, as well as ‘merchants who use false 
measures with which he deceive his neighbors or poor pilgrims.’535 Brinton here echoes 
not only Conscience’s emphasis on human to human restitution as conditional for the 
reception of the Eucharist, but also a similar confident assessment of human agency 
voiced by the friar in Passus X. Brinton urges his audience to ‘rise from sin 
                                                
532 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.390. 
533 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.391-2, [‘Come again? ... you counsel us to give back / All that we owe 
anybody before going to communion?’]. 
534 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.393, [‘That’s my advice’]. 
535 Thomas Brinton, Sermons, ed. Mary Aquinas Delvin, O.P., Camden Third Series 85-6 (continuous 
pagination) (London: Royal Historical Society, 1954), 2:492-6 and 466 (BR-107 and end of 101). See also 
Preaching in the Age of Chaucer: selected sermons in translation trans. Siegfried Wenzel (The Catholic 
University of America Press: Washington, D.C. 2008), p. 130. 
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quickly…perfectly and without relapse…as far as it lies in him.’536 Here, Brinton, like 
Conscience, focuses his Easter sermon not on the atonement won through Christ’s 
passion to reconcile God and humanity, but rather upon the human agency one must 
employ to arise from sin through church governed practices to satisfy human to human 
restitution.  
The terms through which Conscience extends the Eucharist in this scene, and 
upon which Briton focuses his Easter sermon, as well as the view of human agency 
assumed by both Brinton and the friar of Passus X, are far removed from the vision of 
Christ’s atonement which converted Justice into Peace in Passus XX. It is equally far 
removed from the insistence of the Samaritan that human salvation is grounded in the 
blood and body of Christ, not perfect adherence to an ethic of human-to-human 
restitution. While the Samaritan does insist that unkindness, specifically violence against 
one’s neighbor out of covetousness for property, is unforgiveable, Christ qualifies the 
soteriological implications of human ethics by insisting, in Anselmian fashion, that Christ 
bind’s himself to save humanity through the Incarnation which makes God in Christ 
“brethrene of o bloed” with humanity. This is necessary for human salvation, in Anselm’s 
terms, because the debt humanity owes as a result of sin is infinite. For Anselm, it is not 
possible for human beings to redde quod debbes. Indeed, this is the tension point upon 
which the whole of Cur deus homo hangs and the lens through which Anselm discovers 
the beauty of the Incarnation’s soteriological implications taught through the 
Chalcedonian Creed. For Anselm, only God God’s-self is capable to repay humanity’s 
infinite debt, and thus the Incarnation is supremely fitting as God’s gracious act as a 
supererogatory repaying of the debt only humanity owed but which only God was able to 
                                                
536 Ibid., pp. 127, 131, 132. 
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repay. As such, the Eucharist is not a seal of human-to-human restitution (though it 
certainly points towards it), but rather to the supererogatory satisfaction of restitution 
between humanity and God that Christ accomplishes perfectly through the atonement. 
God’s gracious act in Christ opens the possibility for human-to-human restitution, but it 
is not the condition for the atonement. That condition is already met, indeed 
paradoxically surpassed, through Christ’s passion.  
In his conditional offering of the Eucharist, Conscience seems to have forgotten, 
or perhaps his formation at court predisposed him to reject the idea, that human salvation 
is ultimately dependent upon God’s act in Christ not human adherence to the strict terms 
of redde quod debbes.537 And yet, the audience remembers the Samaritan who insisted 
that Semyuief’s healing would only be possible if he received fully the blood and body of 
Christ. Held together, the dialectical unfolding of the Samaritan and Christ’s teaching 
suggest that the Eucharist is to be offered to humanity as a celebration of and invitation 
into the atonement, the restitution, that God has effected in Christ. It is to be a sign and a 
sacrament that makes human beings holy through Christ’s blood. Grace is a healing that 
transforms not merely the mind, nor human actions, but also the material and social 
elements of human life. Conscience is not wrong for including human-to-human 
restitution as part of the Eucharist. Indeed, such restitution is what the Samaritan seems to 
hope for Semyuief as Semyuief learns to participate little by little in the body and blood of 
Christ. However, Conscience errs in making reception of the Eucharist contingent upon 
human agency rather than Christ’s blood. 
Here, at the very heart of the church’s life - the Eucharist - de Lubac’s ecclesial 
vision begins to offer a helpful lens through which to see Langland’s. Specifically, the 
                                                
537 Conscience had, after all, dismissed Clergy and [clergy’s counsel] at the dinner scene (XV). 
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teachings of the Samaritan and the Christ who harrows hell, juxtaposed with 
Conscience’s praxis, demonstrate the way that the Eucharist stands as a sort of 
translucent medium through which the church presents Christ and communicates grace. 
That is to say, the Eucharist, like the church, is not to be confused as an end in itself. 
Rather, both the Eucharist and the church itself are understood as translucent mediums. 
Gifts that are necessary for the healing and salvation of humanity, gifts that cannot be left 
behind or discarded, and yet gifts that humanity ought always to see through, beyond. 
Church and Eucharist, in this sense, are both necessary for seeing and yet not the thing to 
be seen. Both are Christ and yet point beyond themselves towards Christ in resurrected 
glory one with the Father and the Spirit. Conscience, in his desperate attempt to protect 
the church and heal his fellow Christians facing anti-Christ’s siege, confuses the nature of 
the church and the sacrament. In his frantic hands, the church is reformed into a fortress 
and the Eucharist reimagined as a law. Vnity begins to crumble as it becomes a mirror 
image of the king’s court clothed in Christian language. This because Vnity is grounded 
not in Christ’s atoning blood, but rather in the conditional maintenance of human-to-
human restitution as the requirement rather than the divinely empowered aspiration of 
fallen humanity. 
Conscience’s error of grounding salvation in human action rather than the blood 
of Christ is something the poem’s final passus hints towards multiple times. Indeed 
Conscience had first committed this error, and Langland’s poetry highlights the nature of 
it, in his establishment of Vnity itself. While Grace, the Holy Spirit, had established the 
very foundation of the church (Vnity) with the mortar of Christ’s blood and wattled its 
walls with the pain of Christ’s passion, Conscience calls the people into penance and 
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thereby founds the church not in Christ’s blood but rather in the people’s penitent tears, 
‘Clannesse of the comune and clerkes clene lyuynge / Made Vnite holi churche in 
holinesse stande.’538 Langland punctuates Conscience’s error by ironically depicting 
Conscience as pridefully admiring his newly fortified church, dismissive of none other 
than Pride and anti-christ’s ensuing siege.539 Establishing the church in the purity of the 
common people and clerics clean living makes Vnity more, rather than less, vulnerable to 
Pride and the siege of anti-Christ. For, when Friar Flattery enters Vnity and seduces 
Contrition to forget herself, Vnity’s foundation, the pure tears of the penitent folk, is 
washed away and Vnity crumbles.   
Piers Plowman gives its audience all the tools it needs to interpret Conscience’s 
departure from this church founded upon the penitent tears of human beings. First, the 
Samaritan’s tale whereby Semyuief is entrusted to the innkeeper at the grange and the 
gradual healing effected through reception of the Eucharist questions Conscience’s 
decision to abandon the institution through which the medicine of God’s grace is freely 
offered. This is emphasized by Kynde, who commands Will to remain in Vnity, even as it 
crumbles from within, because it is only here that Will might learn to love. Second, the 
poem’s long depiction of both Will and Conscience’s malleability, and susceptibility to 
malformation, emphasizes both the need for good teachers and the danger of trusting 
one’s-self to discern that which is good. Yet, Will and Conscience end up in very 
different places at the poem’s end: Will remains within Vnity, while Conscience leaves 
crying out for grace in search of Piers the Plowman. Many interpreters of Langland’s 
                                                
538 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.379-80, [Purity of the common people and clerics’ clean living / Made 
Unity, Holy Church, stand in holiness]. 
539 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXI.379-80, ‘Y care nat now,’ quod Consience, ‘thow Pryde come nouthe’ 
[‘I sure don’t care’, said Conscience, ‘if Pride comes now’]. 
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great work praise Conscience’s departure, in a rather Kantian mode, as courageous.540 
Yet, this is to ignore the poem’s rigorous and sustained critique of the trustworthiness of 
the self.541 Langland, however, does not resign his ecclesiology to a conservative 
commitment to an institution that his own poetry has shown to be corrupt.  
Piers Plowman intentionally shifts the modes of Will’s instruction as he 
encounters more virtuous teachers. As Will is led away from errant views that might 
suggest that he could save himself by either his own knowledge (‘kynde kynowing’) or 
will (‘dowell’), and is drawn deeper into the saving mysteries of the trinity and the 
incarnation, Langland represents those more trustworthy guides as leading Will on by 
way of stories and images rather than abstract concepts and second order theological 
language. The poetry also blocks those teachers who pridefully assumed that they or their 
respective order might perfectly embody the life that leads to salvation. Instead, Will’s 
journey towards truth is constituted by guides, stories and images as he is swept up into 
the liturgical time of the church’s worship and sacramental practices. Will’s faithfulness 
to remain in Vnity is not reducible to his obedience to a divine command or a reformist 
ecclesiology. Rather, it gestures towards something the poem has carefully worked to 
teach its audience throughout its dialectical unfolding. The church is a necessary part of 
the Christian journey towards salvation, and this is because Langland imagines salvation 
as equally social, material and mystical. However, the church must not be confused with 
the strict boundaries of the institutional, hierarchical and landed institution of the late-
                                                
540 See Walter W. Skeat’s Commentary in The Vision of William Langland Concerning Piers the Plowman: 
In Three Parallel Texts together with Richard the Redeless by William Langland (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1886, repr. 1924, 1956) vol. 2 (of 2), pp. 285-6. See also Mary Carruthers The Search for 
St. Truth: A Study of Meaning in Piers Plowman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), and 
Aers in Beyond Reformation, pp. 171-2. 
541 See Chapter 1. 
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medieval church. The church, Langland teaches, includes and sometimes stretches 
beyond those institutions claiming the name ‘church.’ This is not because God’s promise 
of the Holy Spirit might fail. Rather, as Langland shows through the turning of various 
figures throughout the poem, it is due to the fallenness of humanity, and the capacity 
twisted human wills might have to claim for themselves powers that only properly belong 
to God. This is a reality Langland, Ockham and other medieval Christians wrestled with 
explicitly as they beheld with horror the violence and pomposity of the Great Schism. 
The church, Langland teaches, is discernable, as Liberum Arbitrum taught concerning 
charity, not by title or vestment, but ‘Ac thorw werkes thow myhte wyte wher-forth he 
walketh.’542 And the stride of the church, as Langland’s teachers have stressed in both 
content and form, is discernable through the praxis of telling the stories and participating 
in them through the transforming mysteries of the sacraments.  
 
§ Conclusion 
Langland’s ecclesiology cannot be limited to congregationalists terms, if by 
congregationalist one infers only those Christians and communities perceived outside of 
the corpus permixtum of the broader Catholic Church.543 Piers Plowman suggests, 
through a subtle dialectic, that even in the midst of the church’s error the faithful might 
still discover the Holy Spirit. That Spirit is, for Langland, not necessarily confined to the 
institution of the late-medieval church, but is rather discovered in the practice of telling 
and sacramentally participating in the story of Christ’s incarnation, passion, and 
                                                
542 Langland, Piers Plowman, XVI.340, [‘But through works you might learn where he walks’]. 
543 That is to say, Langland’s ecclesiology is not limited to include figures like Haisia Moon, Margery 
Kemp, and Walter Brut; but extends also to include, however paradoxically, all those who might tell the 
story of Christ’s passion and pass on the images that inspire human beings towards the mystery of the 
trinity. 
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resurrection. For Langland, Will’s journey is shaped by the tales, the liturgical ordering 
of time and the sacraments that form individual and corporate life through those 
mysteries. Langland argues against reducing any ecclesial practice to a mechanistic or 
human controlled conferral or grace, a la Conscience’s mishandling of the Eucharist. 
Instead, the poetry’s iconoclasm consistently subverts the reification of grace by insisting 
that the church’s task is, as de Lubac would say, not to become an end in itself but rather 
to be constantly at work representing Christ and communicating grace. The Church is 
Christ and exists for the purpose of drawing God’s beloved into union with Christ. 
 De Lubac’s vision of the church as a sort of ‘translucent medium’ thus emerges as 
a helpful lens through which to consider Langland’s depiction of the nature and identity 
of the church. Langland depicts the church as necessary for the Christian life, while 
ruthlessly laying bare its corruptions in late-medieval England. While Langland examines 
and warns against the church’s corruptions more critically than de Lubac, Langland and 
de Lubac seem to agree that the church is not to be considered an end in itself. Neither 
the Samaritan nor Kynde deem the church’s corruptions in the poem’s closing lines as 
justification for abandoning the community established in Christ’s blood. The Samaritan 
and Kynde remain committed to the social, material and mystical facets of the church 
practiced through the Eucharist as necessary for fallen humanity to be healed. The nature 
of the church, at least as argued through some of the most authoritative voices in Piers 
Plowman, is to guide pilgrims into union with God through Christ by way of the stories 
and sacraments that sweep human life up into God’s binding the two as ‘brethrene of o 
bloed.’ Langland’s poetry argues with great subtlety that this is not equivalent to being 
swept up into the church as a historical, material or hierarchical institution. Indeed, 
 259 
Langland’s poetry rigorously displays the myriad corruptions besieging the church as 
well as the possibility of charity outside those marked by baptism. Rather, Langland’s 
poetry urges pilgrims to seek truth through the tales and sacraments that consistently re-
tell the economy of salvation which culminates in the passion and resurrection of Christ.  
It is an economy quite at odds with the material economies developing in late 
medieval England that Langland has depicted as corrupting both the church and the wider 
world through the seductions of Mede. In step with de Lubac, Langland argues that the 
church is never to be confused as an end in itself, but rather exists only to communicate 
and unite fallen humanity with Christ, 
We never come to the end of passing through this translucent medium, which we 
must, nevertheless, always pass through and that completely. It is always through it 
that we reach what it signifies; it can never be superseded, and its bonds cannot be 
broken.544 
 
The historical form of the church and its practices, despite its many failings, cannot be 
superseded, nor should it be made into an idol. The church in which both Will and 
Semyuief remain at the poem’s end is necessary, broken and yet filled with the Holy 
Spirit. While Langland has taught his audience to be critical of Conscience’s 
abandonment of the church, his poetry has simultaneously insisted that remaining in the 
church is not equivalent to a journey’s end. Semyuief’s road to health in the inn will be 
long, and Will has far more yet to learn within an institution that is fraught with error and 
in the act of dissolution. Yet, for Langland and de Lubac, the church remains a necessary 
institution for pilgrims along a journey that has no earthly end: 
                                                
544 De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, p. 203. 
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Her whole end is to show us Christ, lead us to him, and communicate his grace to us; 
to put it in a nutshell, she exists solely to put us into relation with him. She alone can 
do that, and it is a task she never completes; there will never come a moment, either in 
the life of the individual or in the life of the race, in which her role ought to come to an 
end or even could come to an end. If the world lost the Church, it would lose the 
Redemption too.545 
 
‘Yf thow wolt be wreke, wende into Vnite  
And halde the there euere til Y sende for the. 
And loke thow conne som craft ar how come thennes.’ 
 ‘Consaileth me, Kynde,’ quod Y, ‘what craft be beste to lere?’ 
 ‘Lerne to loue,’ quod Kynde, ‘and leef all othere.’ 
 ‘How shal Y come to catel so, to clothe me and to fede?’ 
 ‘And thow loue lelly, lacke shal the neure 
Wede ne worldly mete while thy lif lasteth.’ 
And Y bi conseil of Kynde, comsed to rome 








                                                
545 Ibid. 
546 Langland, Piers Plowman, XXII.204-212, [‘If you want revenge, make your way into Unity / And keep 
yourself there till I send for you, / And make sure you learn some craft before you come from there.’ / 
‘Counsel me, Kind,’ I said, ‘what craft’s best to learn?’ / ‘Learn to love,’ said Kind, ‘and forget all the rest.’ 
/ ‘How shall I earn a living, to clothe and feed myself?’ ‘If you love loyally, you’ll never lack / Clothes or 
earthly food as long as you live.’ And according to Kind’s advice I began to roam / Through Contrition and 
































‘A Song in the Dark’ 
 
 
Langland presents a complex journey to his audience. Will, for example, exhibits 
a life through which learning to discern truth from falsehood does not take place through 
submission to the command of superiors, but rather through a constantly interrupted 
journey into the economy of salvation. The journey Langland sets out upon includes not 
only virtuous teachers, vicious tempters, erroneous clerks as well as virtuous yet 
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imperfect guides, but also Will’s own conflicted self-understanding made manifest in his 
very clothing. Will is simultaneously dressed as a sheep, a wolf, a hermit, and a 
hypocrite. Characteristic of Langland’s poetry, ideas are presented in both their noetic 
and material complexity to stress the particular ways in which form and content are 
inseparably bound together.   
In Piers Plowman, all of these voices, internal and external, conflicting and 
correcting, play vital roles along Will’s pilgrimage towards truth. Piers Plowman never 
depicts a clearly defined authority. Nor, does Langland represent a self that is stable 
enough to be trusted in the face of either an individual’s own malformation in sin, or the 
examination of an institutional authority.547 In this way, Langland’s depiction of Will’s 
pilgrimage is that of an unending journey that is guided neither by a superior, nor a self, 
but is instead only possible through an iterative journey in communion with a wildly 
diverse array of guides in a dialectic that perpetually reshapes and reforms a pilgrim.  
At the same time, Langland’s poem goes beyond its own subtle re-presentation of 
a self, life’s diverse guides and the complex processes of grace. Langland’s theological 
imagination applies the logic of Chalcedonian Christology to the church in order to 
demonstrate the way in which a pilgrim’s journey necessarily includes the church 
because grace’s healing transforms not merely the mind, nor individual human actions, 
but also the material and social elements of all human life. The nature of the church, at 
least as argued through some of the most authoritative voices in Piers Plowman, is to 
guide pilgrims into union with God through Christ by way of the stories and sacraments 
                                                
547 Will’s exchange with Reason and Conscience in passus V is an explicit example of Langland 
representing precisely this kind of unknowing. A lack of self knowledge resulting from a fractile and 
conflicting understanding a one’s self that leaves a person incapable of justifying their form of life in the 
face of ecclesial authority (V.6-104).  
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that sweep human life up into God’s thereby binding the two as ‘brethrene of o bloed.’ 
Conscience’s failure to found the church and the Eucharist upon the blood of Christ at the 
poem’s end is so deeply poignant precisely because the Samaritan has shown Will, and 
the audience, that persistent reception of Christ’s body and blood in the grange of the 
church is utterly necessary for salvation. While not realized in the poem, Piers Plowman 
has trained its audience in a character of hope so as to grieve Conscience’s failure. This is 
a hope in a new creation enacted through the incarnation whereby God and humanity are 
made ‘brethrene of o bloed.’  
This is a vision, for Langland, that is social and spiritual, material and 
institutional. Creation is transformed and held together in the body and blood of Christ. 
While the poem’s closing lines depict the unraveling of Vnity and Conscience’s departure 
from it, Langland’s catechesis has taught his audience to behold the church’s 
fragmentation with great grief. Figures such as the Samaritan and the Christ who harrows 
hell re-present the salvific necessity of the church by depicting it as a focal point through 
which God’s grace empowers pilgrims to participate in God’s atoning and sanctifying 
work that transforms humanity through the narratives, and indeed the very body and 
blood, of Christ’s reconciliation. This transformation will, Langland imagines, reshape 
the church and society into more just social and economic relations along the way 
towards the sanctification of the creation into union with God.  
Seen in this light, Will’s obedience to Kynde at the poem’s end (an obedience to 
continue his pilgrimage within Vnity despite the darkness brought on by anti-christ’s 
siege) can be regarded as an act of great courage. Will must learn to love within an 
institution and amongst figures who will constantly mishandle the sacraments and the 
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Scriptures, and also contort life-giving patterns of discipleship in the face of Mede’s 
temptations. Will’s submission to remain in such darkness and yet hope to learn, therein, 
how to love further emphasizes Langland’s insistence concerning the unending nature of 
the Christian journey. The instability of the self and the corruptive potential of church 
and society, coupled with Langland’s thoroughly social vision of grace and salvation, 
depict an ecclesiology that is as committed to the church’s role in the Christian life as it is 
ruthless towards the potential for that very community to become a corrupting idol.  
Langland’s emphasis on the sacramental power of the church, even as he refuses 
to ignore the potential for the church to be usurped and manipulated in his own 
contemporary society, holds together Aquinas’ view of a sacrament, and thus the church, 
as ‘a holy thing that makes human beings holy’548, with Augustine’s view of love as 
recounted in the introduction:  
Then again charity itself, which binds people together with the knot of unity, would 
have no scope for pouring minds and hearts in together, as it were, and blending them 
with one another, if human beings were never to learn anything from each other.549 
God might have chosen to heal humanity through means more firmly established against 
humanity’s fragilities and vulnerability to corruption. Yet, God’s decision to include 
human participation in the divine extension of grace – even to the point that God’s 
inclusion of human agency entails the potential for human failure – is itself an act of 
                                                
548 Aquinas, ST IIIa q.60.2.co, ‘Respondeo dicendum quod signa dantur hominibus, quorum est per nota ad 
ignota pervenire. Et ideo proprie dicitur sacramentum quod est signum alicuius rei sacrae ad homines 
pertinentis, ut scilicet proprie dicatur sacramentum, secundum quod nunc de sacramentis loquimur, quod 
est signum rei sacrae inquantum est sanctificans homines.’ 
549 Augustine, De doctrina christiana, ed. Joseph Martin, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 27 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), prooem., linea 98, ‘deinde ipsa caritas, quae sibi homines inuicem nodo unitatis 
adstringit, non haberet aditum refundendorum et quasi miscendorum sibimet animorum, si homines per 
homines nihil discerent’, trans. Edmund Hill, O.P. in Teaching Christianity (De Doctrina Christiana) 
(Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1996) p. 103. 
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grace. This is because fallen humanity’s fragile and imperfect participation in grace is the 
very means through which God invites God’s creatures to participate in their own 
healing. The remedy must heal the wound. Therefore, healing is only possible when/if 
those same creatures participate in and are transformed through the bonds of charity that 
reweave all creation back into the very charity that is God. Learning, loving and healing 
go hand in hand.  
If sin truly eviscerates a human soul and human society in the horrific ways that 
Langland images individually through the figure of Covetousness, and corporately 
through the social disintegration Covetousness’ economy effects upon both church and 
realm alike, then the reconciliation of persons like Semivuief and Will, and communities 
like Vnity can only be possible when pilgrims participate in the social practices of 
retelling stories and the corporate performance of the sacraments that remember and re-
enact those stories. As such, Langland’s is a pedagogy that is genuinely instructive: there 
are mysteries that Will must be baptized into in order to ‘pilgrim on’. And yet, 
Langland’s poetry consistently functions in such a way as to identify and subvert 
ideologies as well as institutions manipulated to perpetuate such idols.550 
The tension between conscience and the role of authority took on added strain in 
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, and was only exacerbated by the 
ecclesial, social and political ruptures of plague, revolt and schism that followed.551 
                                                
550 There is, I think, I kind of analogy between the ways in which the creeds offer the church a grammar for 
speaking about mysteries of the Christian faith, and the way Langland’s poem offers a pedagogy for the 
Christian pilgrimage. For more on the ways in which the creeds function as a grammar in the Christian 
tradition, see John Henry Newman An Essay on the Development of Doctrine (New York, NY: Longmans, 
Green, & Co, 1909); George A. Lindbeck The Nature of Doctrine: religion and theology in a postliberal 
age (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1984). 
551 For examples of the ways in which William of Ockham and John Wyclif exacerbated this strain in the 
late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries see respectively Stephen Arthur McGrade The Political 
Thought of William of Ockham: Personal and Institutional Principles (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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Langland’s text responds to the urgent need for the rule of faith, passed down from 
generation to generation through a succession of formations that a person takes on under 
the tutelage of teachers within body of Christ, and yet simultaneously takes seriously the 
fragmentations that same body of Christ endures in the fourteenth-century England. 
The various canons of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 reveal the Bishops’ 
perception that some weaknesses harming the church’s faithful in the early thirteenth 
century result from ignorance and poor education of the clergy. Canons insist on both the 
increase in trained teachers in cathedral schools and improvements to the education of 
ordinands, ordinands who would in turn educate the laity.552 As Watson has pointed out, 
this zeal for religious education extended and passed down to the laity by way of a well-
formed clergy took institutional form in England through the creation and practice of 
Pecham’s Syllabus of 1281.553 However, as Watson argues, in the fourteenth and early 
fifteenth centuries the zeal for lay education in England cooled among members of the 
ecclesial hierarchy. The rise of vernacular theology in England, and in particular the rise 
of vernacular theology performed by John Wyclif and various Wycliffite groups, as well 
as works like Piers Plowman, led figures like Archbishop Arundel to constrict the ‘licit’ 
production and ownership of works of vernacular theology as well as lay preaching. 
                                                                                                                                            
Press, 2002) and Michael Wilks Wyclif: Political Ideas and Practice (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2000). For a 
recent analysis of the social and economic impacts of the Black Death in England in the fourteenth century 
see especially Alan Kissane’s Civic Community in Late Medieval Lincoln: Urban Society and Economy in 
the Age of the Black Death, 1289-1409 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2017); on the Great Schism see 
especially Norman Housley’s The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades 1305-1378 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986) and Walter Ullmann’s A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages (London: 
Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972), p. 279-305; on the Great Rising of 1381 see especially Rodney Hilton’s Bond 
Men Made Free: Medieval Peasant Movements and the English Rising of 1381, 2nd edit. (London: 
Routledge Press, 2003) and Steven Justice’s Writing and Rebellion: England in 1381 (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1994); and on the Blackfriars Council of 1382 see especially Andrew Cole’s 
Literature and Heresy in the Age of Chaucer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
552 Norman Tanner Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils (Georgetown University Press, 1990) vol. 1 of 2, 
especially cannons 23 & 27, pp. 246-8. 
553 Watson, Nicholas ‘Censorship and Cultural Change in Late-Medieval England: Vernacular Theology, 
the Oxford Translation Debate, and Arundel’s Constitution of 1409’, Speculum, 70 (1995), pp. 822-64. 
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Christian formation was certainly still encouraged by the ecclesial hierarchy, but the 
syllabus and training Arundel proscribed was shaped in the interests of stabilizing and 
building up the late medieval church in reaction against those voices like Wyclif and 
Ockham who questioned the church’s wealth and power.554 In a moment of intense social 
disruption, Arundel’s Constitutions aimed to stabilize society and the church’s power 
within it. Works like Piers Plowman and others can be seen as participating in a sort of 
literary sub-culture aimed to offer an ecclesial vision that often challenged the 
contemporary church even if it also sought to reform it.555  
What does discipleship entail in Piers Plowman, and how does the poem envision 
a person to be properly formed in the rule of faith along the journey towards truth, and 
how is that vision distinct from the vision of Christian discipleship that emerges from 
Arundel’s Constitutions? These questions are inseparable from the previous question, 
concerning how the rule of faith might be passed on in the midst of cultural and ecclesial 
fragmentation.  
The rule of faith, for Langland, is not to be confused with a set of principles or 
propositional truth claims, nor is it hermetically sealed or finished. Rather, the rule of 
faith is represented in Piers Plowman as a dialectical practice, made up of an array of 
voices stretching across time, consistently at work retelling and re-enacting the narratives 
of God’s salvation that crystalize in the incarnation, passion and resurrection of Christ. 
The rule of faith, like Langland’s own work, is an unending dialectic carried out within 
the corpus permixtum of the church until Christ’s return. As such, Langland’s 
representation of a Christian pilgrimage affirms the role of the community and the 
                                                
554 Ibid. 
555 David Aers Chaucer, Langland, and the Creative Imagination (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul,1980), especially chapters 1 & 2. 
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practices of the church as necessary for presenting Christ and communicating grace even 
as it problematizes the contemporary late medieval church’s capacity so to do. This is 
exemplified, specifically, in the tension for Langland is bound up in the puzzle examined 
in detail in Chapter 1 concerning how the rule of faith is passed on through time. 
Specifically, the tension between Thomas Aquinas’ commitment to a hierarchical 
pedagogy through which the Holy Spirit vivifies the church to enable the passing on of 
the regula fides across time, on the one hand, and the challenge that figures such as 
Chaucer’s Pardoner and Langland’s depiction of the church, clerks and religious orders 
pose to Aquinas’ view. 
However, Langland was not an anti-institutional thinker, nor did he imagine the 
Christian pilgrimage as possible without the sacraments and community that make up the 
body of Christ, the church. Quite the opposite, Langland’s theological vision insists that 
God’s gift of grace is thoroughly wrapped up in an ornate web of mediations that include 
the sacraments, scripture, the church, priests, and lay people which, if woven together in 
unity with faith, hope and love, and embodied in the narratives of salvation history, God 
then employs to heal sin sick persons and communities. However, Langland’s 
commitment to such a rich tapestry of grace’s mediations also drives him to rigorously 
consider the horrific ways in which those mediations can become fractured, inverted and 
torn apart due to the failures of sin. This is no abstract thought-experiment or poetic 
fiction, as has been seen, but the result of an imagination formed under immense 
intellectual and institutional pressures including the Black Death, the Great Schism, the 
Great Rising of 1381, and the Blackfriars Council of 1382.  
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Langland’s unique capacity to speak into the contemporary tensions concerning 
the identity and practice of the church, both in terms of the poem’s form and content, is a 
significant contribution to the development of doctrine in the late fourteenth century. 
Langland’s representation of the church offers a unique ecclesial vision in the midst of a 
historical moment in which many were rethinking the shape of the church as well as the 
relationship between church and realm.556 Henri de Lubac’s ressourcement-formed 
ecclesiology offers a helpful lens through which to situate Langland in his late medieval 
context and amidst his patristic inheritances. Indeed, as explored in chapter 3, Langland’s 
representation of the atonement, grace and the church deeply resonate with de Lubac’s 
vision of the church as a ‘translucent medium’. Langland’s poetry trains its audience to 
reject theories of the atonement that might lead to either the reification of the institutional 
church (including overly mechanistic, and easily coopted, sacramental theologies), on the 
one hand, or the outright rejection of the church in favor of the judgment of the individual 
or groups of individuals outside the church, on the other. For Langland, the church is 
founded upon the blood of Christ. This foundation has implications for both the 
atonement and the communication of grace that pours forth from Christ’s side to build up 
and also vivify a people formed by and taken up into Christ’s own body.  
Langland’s poetry models a way for Christians to learn how to discern good and 
evil, truth and false, in a world in which the two are bound together in persons, 
institutions and ideas by seams that are often so subtle as to be invisible. Rather than 
stress absolute distinctions between, for example the elect and the reprobate, or human 
                                                
556 See for example Marsiglio of Padua Writings on the Empire: Defensor minor and De translations 
Imperii ed. Cary J. Nederman (Cambridge University Press, 1993); William of Ockham ‘A Letter to the 
Friars Minor’ and other writings ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade, John Kilcullen (Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), John Wyclif: Selected Latin works in translation (Manchester University Press, 2019). 
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and divine agency, Langland’s poetry trains its audience to recognize the delicate and 
dialectical subtlety of such puzzles when read in light of the narratives of God’s 
salvation. For Langland, the Christian journey is not grounded in the absolutes of elect 
and reprobate, but rather in Christ’s passion and the iterative journey of being swept up 
into faith, hope and love as one learns and relearns to enact the narrative of God’s 
salvation in and through the body of Christ. In this way, Langland makes a contribution 
to late medieval debates about the identity of the church and how Christians might 
discern the development of doctrine by offering a sort of via media between confidence 
in the church’s benevolent hierarchical pedagogy, on the one hand, and confidence in the 
discernment of an individual (and specifically the theologian), on the other. Langland’s 
poem offers its students a pedagogy, a formation, in the rule of faith through a form of 
poetry that models how the faith might be both examined and participated in, especially 
when the assertions of superiors either conflict with one’s conscience or have proven 
themselves untrustworthy (for example, in the context of the Great Schism). Langland’s 
poem offers its audience less of a ‘light’ in the dark, as if such a lantern might allow a 
pilgrim to discern between hard and fast categories of good and evil. Instead, Piers 
Plowman teaches its audience the narratives and figures whose lives animate the 
economy of salvation, and which give content to some of the core mysteries and practices 
of the Christian faith. As such, Piers Plowman instructs more like a hymn. It teaches its 
audience certain harmonies against the grain of dissonances. Its poetry informs and is 
informed by those harmonies, as its hearers are swept up into and learn to sing 
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